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Moral thinking: its levels, method, and point
R. M. Hare (ed.)
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1981)
Abstract
In this work, the author has fashioned out of the logical and linguistic theses of his earlier books a full-scale but readily intelligible account of moral argument.
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Introduction
The task of moral philosophy is to help us think better about what we ought to do. This can be primarily accomplished by improvements in rationality and our capability to understand the proper structure of moral reasoning. Hare's project is shaped by three methodological points. Firstly, t... see more
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Citations of this work
The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.
Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.
Are moral judgments unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.
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