R. J. Hankinson traces the history of ancient Greek thinking about causation and explanation, from its earliest beginnings through more than a thousand years to the middle of the first millennium of the Christian era. He examines ways in which the Ancient Greeks dealt with questions about how and why things happen as and when they do, about the basic constitution and structure of things, about function and purpose, laws of nature, chance, coincidence, and responsibility.

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

In the Introduction, Hankinson identifies universality, simplicity, and the use of argument as the features that distinguish a properly ‘scientific’ explanation of natural phenomena, from a non‐ or pre‐scientific, e.g. mythical, account. For Hankinson, the Milesians are the first thinkers to display a scientific attitude to the investigation of natural phenomena: they sought to explain events by appealing to repeatable and generalizable laws that are invariant over time and which can ground predictions. Simplicity is an adjunct of generalization—the greater the (...) generality of an explanation, the greater is its simplicity; since this involves the attempt to explain the widest variety of phenomena on the basis of the fewest fundamental principles, reductionism is at the centre of the scientific enterprise. (shrink)

Do UK community pharmacists encounter the high drama dilemmas of the medical ethics literature or is a 'morality of the mundane' more appropriate? This paper presents the findings of a qualitative study that asked a sample of UK pharmacists to describe their ethical issues and to establish whether these were ethical dilemmas as understood philosophically or ethical problems of a more legal or emotional nature. It emerged that although many pharmacists referred to 'dilemmas', these were often problems involving a conflict (...) between an ethical value and a legal or procedural issue and often arose in the routine minutiae of dispensing prescriptions and selling medicines. Such ethical problems remained of concern for pharmacists and the commercial environment, corporate pharmacy ownership and pharmacists' subordination to doctors, all precipitated ethical problems. Law and ethics appeared to be understood synonymously but this may reflect a modernity that increasingly brackets out ethical experiences by encouraging reliance upon law and procedure. (shrink)

Modern thought is sometimes presented as introducing a “turn to the subject” absent from ancient and medieval thought, although the schools of thought associated with Bernard Lonergan, Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, and the new natural law theory often find subjectivity already operative in the older forms. In this volume, sixteen leading scholars examine the turn to the subject in modern philosophy and consider its historical antecedents in ancient and medieval thought.

This study examines the socioeconomic and familial background of Irish Catholic priests born between 1867 and 1911. Previous research has hypothesized that lack of marriage opportunities may influence adoption of celibacy as part of a religious institution. The present study traced data from Irish seminary registries for 46 Catholic priests born in County Limerick, Ireland, using 1901 Irish Census returns and Land Valuation records. Priests were more likely to originate from landholding backgrounds, and with landholdings greater in size and wealth (...) than the local average. Priests were found to originate from families with more sons than the national average, but with similar numbers of daughters. These findings are discussed in relation to competition for resources and lineage survival strategies. (shrink)

This paper describes novel tobacco control laws passed in New York City in 2017. These laws are designed to improve the city's strategy of using price to decrease tobacco consumption, and over time, change the city's landscape by making tobacco less accessible.

Vier opstellen over rechtssociologie en criminologie, vanuit fenomenologische invalshoek bezien.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:46. HUME AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS In the section of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature entitled Of the laws of nations (Section XI of Book III) he says: Political writers tell us, that in every kind of intercourse, a body politic is to be consider 'd as one person; and indeed this assertion is so far just, that different nations, as well as private persons, (...) require mutual assistance; at the same time that their selfishness and ambition are perpetual sources of war and discord.But tho' nations in this particular resemble individuals, yet as they are very different in other respects, no wonder they regulate themselves by different maxims, and give rise to a new set of rules, which we call the laws of nations. 1 He goes on to give examples of such laws:the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, the declaration of war, the abstaining from poison'd arms, with other duties of that kind, which are evidently calculated for the commerce, that is peculiar to different.societies. (T 567) Hume then tells us in the next paragraph that such laws of nations may be added to the three laws of nature (that possessions should be stable, that possessions should be transferable by consent, and that promises or contracts should be kept) but that these laws of nations do not supersede the laws of nature; that is, they do not make the laws of nature irrelevant to relations among nation-states. In fact, the morality among nation-states involves the same kinds of obligations as morality among private persons, but the obligations are not as binding. The obligations of nation-states to each other can more readily be overridden by concerns of self-interest than would be legitimate in the case of private persons because nation-states are more nearly able to maintain themselves without external assistance than are individual persons. In Hume's words,... tho' the 47. morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons (T 558) because tho' the intercourse of different states be advantageous, and even sometimes necessary, yet it is not so necessary nor advantageous as that among individuals, without which 'tis utterly impossible for human nature ever to subsist. (T 569) In the last paragraph of this section Hume addresses himself to the question of the proportion these two species of morality bear to each other. (T 569) He says that we can never give any precise answer (T 569) and that the proper proportion is exhibited in the actual practice of the world. He takes this fact as showing that all men recognize that the rules of morality, both among private individuals and among nation-states, arise from human conventions, and from the interest, which we have in the preservation of peace and order. (T 569) When discussing the same issue in his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals Hume is more succinct. The observance of justice, though useful among them [nations], is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with the usefulness. 2 """ The moral obligations of individuals to each other is thus greater than that of nations to each other because keeping the rules of justice is inore useful in the former case than in the latter. But Hume did not live in an age of atomic weapons, long-range missiles, and precision-guided munitions. Furthermore, the nations of the world are now much more interdependent than in his day, not only with regard to where they get the resources they need but also with regard to what they do with their wastes. There seems to be little roo.? _or dtubt that the utility of following the rules of justice among nations is much greater now than it was in the eighteenth 48. century. Since a nuclear war might mean the end of the human species, the utility of justice among nations seems to be approaching, perhaps even surpassing, the utility which moral rules have at the level of private persons. In view of this changed situation, I intend to review what Hume has... (shrink)

It is good to have this fine English translation of the second German edition of Kelsen's Reine Rechtslehre, which has heavily influenced so much contemporary thought on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law. Reading Kelsen now one is struck by the stilted and naïve positivism that pervades his thought. At the same time, one is also impressed by the clarity that he brings to what is normally a very muddled area. There is a bold statement of the "pure" theory, a (...) sharp distinction between the legal and the moral orders, a reiteration of the "dualism" of the is and the ought, and a defense of legal norms as the object of the science of law. While Kelsen's quasi-dogmatic pronouncements can provoke disagreements at almost every stage of his argument, the book is certainly one which must be directly encountered by any serious student of the philosophy and theory of law.—R. J. B. (shrink)

While there has been a resurgence of interest in Kant's moral philosophy, most philosophic discussion centers about the Grunlegung and the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Consequently there has been a great deal of sterility concerning discussions of the application of the categorical imperative. In her careful commentary, Gregor has attempted to show us the role of Metaphysik der Sitten in Kant's moral philosophy as well as to illuminate Kant's discussion of perfect and imperfect duties. The study helps to correct the (...) lopsided image of Kant's moral philosophy as excessively formalistic and legalistic and shows us the importance of a teleological perspective for understanding the import of the categorical imperative.—R. J. B. (shrink)

In his preface, Smart tells us that there are three types of treatises on the philosophy of science: the philosopher's philosophy of science, "baby" philosophy of science, and the scientist's philosophy of science. He classifies his own attempt as "a not too technical scientist's philosophy of science." But this book is an excellent introduction to contemporary philosophy of science for anyone interested in the topic. Smart writes lucidly and has the gift of carrying the reader from the most elementary issues (...) to some of the most recent controversies and disputes. Many of the usual topics are covered including the nature of theories, laws, explanation in the different sciences, induction, and probability. But Smart also gives a heavy emphasis to problems of space and time, especially the "direction of time." He has adopted the excellent device of supplying a commentary on further reading at the end of each chapter which enables the student to pursue topics in greater depth. Smart's own views, familiar to those who know his work, are not hidden here but there is a serious attempt to report different views and to provide the reader with the information needed to explore controversies. As an introduction for the intelligent student, this now stands as one of the best books available.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The point of departure in this work is a defense against that view which would hold Hegel to be a glorifier of the Prussian state, a reactionary, and an enemy of freedom. Hegel, as the work illustrates, recognized that the French Revolution only annihilated what was already in itself destroyed; and he saluted it with "rapture" as the coming of a "new dawn" in the preface of the Encyclopaedia. He continued to celebrate its anniversary even while at the same time (...) and with no less intensity holding before himself an awareness of the dangers and horrors which it occasioned. In fact, Ritter submits that one might well understand the idea of freedom brandished by the Revolution to be the fundamental element of Hegel’s entire philosophy. Hegel disengages the notion of freedom from all previous connections which, over the centuries, have distorted it, and recovers the classic definition of Aristotle : "free is the man who is for himself and not for another." Political order must guarantee this possibility. The problem posited by the Revolution is: how? Hegel, the supposed "reactionary," in all his writings, both public and private, was consistently opposed, and occasionally with passion, to any political restoration. Yet one should also take notice of Hegel’s extreme and profound antipathy for the associations of students and demagogical movements, which he saw had no rapport with the real political and historical events of the time. Both the romantic liberal and the romantic conservative united in "hatred against the law." They were concerned not with freedom as such, but with political activity which pretended to be in its service, spewing platitudes which would renounce all searching knowledge and make truth an affair of the heart, the soul, or enthusiasm. Hegel alone, with perhaps the exception of Goethe, perceived the profound danger of anarchy revealed in these movements, a danger menacing to all, when one elevates pure subjectivity and sentiment to the rank of norm for political structures. The Revolution was accompanied by the dissolution of all the representations, concepts, and norms of the previous world as if they had been the fabric of dreams. In the face of this event, along with that of the constant danger of anarchy, philosophy must furnish the ideas which can determine that which can be conserved and that which can no longer survive. For both the advocates of restoration and the revolutionaries the Revolution was understood to be the end of previous history, the severing of man from his past: one wanted merely to recover it, the other to bury it. This scission, together with the real power which it has exerted on man and his conscience, is the fundamental structure of the new age. The remainder of the current study pursues the development of this scission, revealing the inner contradiction of the poles when taken alone: the scission itself to be the unity of historic existence in the form of subjectivity and objectivity; and the scission to find its objective expression in modern civil society. There is an on-going enrichment in the notion of freedom until it finds its fulfillment in the modern State, which assures freedom by providing the structures through which it can exist. Most of what should be said is said, although Ritter’s presentation occasionally harbors some confusion, a common and probably inescapable fate when one cuts in on the dialectic to forage for an isolated topic. Still, the book achieves its goal with admirable success, and is certainly a valuable tract on Hegel vis-à-vis the notion of political freedom. The main work is a translation from the German original; it is followed by an address which develops the material in the Philosophy of Right, § 34-81; and the book concludes with a rather amazing fifty-page bibliography citing the influence exercised by Hegel’s political theory throughout the nineteenth century.—R. J. G. (shrink)

This book aims at remedying the deficiency which the author sees in the fact that not a single critical study of Heidegger's treatment of the history of philosophy has appeared in English. Magnus finds the basic theme of Heidegger's later works to lie in this treatment. He is concerned that "no sustained efforts have hitherto been made to come to grips with the methodological questions which Heidegger's hermeneutic occasions," and considers Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche in order to make such an (...) effort. His ultimate motive in so doing is to present his conclusion that "to interpret the great philosophers from Heidegger's point of vantage... is ruinous to the history of philosophy as a discipline and is foreign to Heidegger's own thinking as well." The book is divided into two parts, the first clarifying Nietzsche's presentation of eternal recurrence; the second critically considering Heidegger's methodological approach in general and his conclusions vis-à-vis Nietzsche. The study will show a "partial and inadequate reading of Plato and Descartes" on Heidegger's part; the inadequacy of Heidegger's bald imputation of a "correspondence" epistemology reigning supreme throughout Western philosophy; and the textual evidence cited by Heidegger in his study of Nietzsche to be inadequate to his purposes. Chapter One of Part I points out the questionable nature of the material in Nietzsche's Nachlass; also, that much of the material consists of notes which Nietzsche abandoned or rejected as unfit for inclusion into the published works to which they refer. Nowhere in the published works or those designated for publication is the doctrine of eternal recurrence posited explicitly in "empirical-cosmological" terms. Magnus points out that Nietzsche scholars are unanimous in failing to draw the crucial methodological distinction between his published and unpublished works. To make this distinction is to come to recognize that the significance of eternal recurrence for Nietzsche is its existential imperative and not its empirical verification, which he mulled over as a "corroborative" hypothesis in his notes ; and which was attempted to confirm a doctrine which he had already embraced for other reasons. To understand this primary attraction to the doctrine one must consider Nietzsche's methodological challenging of the law of contradiction, his temperamental abhorrence of systematic, i.e. analytic philosophy. This latter methodology properly obtains in the empirical "proof" which was presented above as of derivative importance. To get at the existential significance of the doctrine, one might properly consider it "within the context of its opposition to three interpenetrating realities as Nietzsche understood them: Metaphysics, Christianity, and nihilism." This is the concern of the remainder of Chapter Three. Eternal recurrence emerges as the doctrine of becoming, and is seen to be "a critique [sic] and alternative to metaphysics." Part II illustrates how Heidegger reworked his understanding of Western philosophy from the period of Being and Time, when metaphysics was seen to begin with Aristotle and to have had its "decisive" phases with Descartes and Kant, to the subsequent consideration of its having begun with Plato and having had its "decisive" culmination with Nietzsche. Magnus argues that the contention that for Plato truth devolved from alétheia to orthotes is highly questionable; that the "humanistic" truth criterion of Western metaphysics pervades Heidegger's own Being and Time; and that the claim by Heidegger that Western philosophers have traditionally presupposed a subject/object correspondence conception of truth is patently false. He concludes that "[Heidegger's] interpretation is subordinated to a thesis which superimposes its meaning upon the history of philosophy." It remains the task of the concluding two chapters to elucidate how this "metahistory" of philosophy distorts Nietzsche's critique and alternative to metaphysics into the very embodiment of metaphysics. This project points out the disparity in the understanding of "nihilism" between the two thinkers; likewise, their variant understandings of the crucial notion of "revenge"; and, finally, Nietzsche's thoroughgoing rejection of Being as a precisely metaphysical notion. Magnus shows that the contexts from which Heidegger draws the quotations for his Nietzschean meditations themselves refute his distorted interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine. A more careful consideration might not sacrifice thinking broadly in order to think deeply. Heidegger's metahistorical methodology Heideggerizes every philosopher to which he turns; hence, the Heideggerian virtue is "to comprehend and express not what another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/say, could not think/say, and why he could not think/say it". To consider Nietzsche in terms of what he said regarding eternal recurrence rather in terms of the fundamentally contradictory words which Heidegger attributes to him, is to see the doctrine as the ultimate affirmation of becoming--and to see Heidegger as the last metaphysician. The serious alternative to metaphysics rests with Nietzsche.--R. J. G. (shrink)

Contrary to the usual interpretation of Locke, Cox argues that Locke's political philosophy has a strong Hobbesian flavor. The state of nature is really a state of war, and the law of nature turns out to be a "con- struct of the mind." To justify this interpretation, Cox carefully analyzes Locke's two Treatises. He suggests that Locke accommodated his philosophic argument to the prevailing political, philosophical, and religious atmosphere of the day, but that this is only a device for presenting (...) a much more radical position. The reader may not be completely persuaded by Cox's forceful arguments, but he will discover insights and difficulties which must be taken into account for an adequate understanding of Locke's political philosophy.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Kemp's purpose is to investigate the function of reason in man's practical life. He proceeds by critically discussing the view of Cudworth, Locke, Clarke, Hume, and Kant on the relation between reason and morality. This serves as a basis for Kemp's own discussion in which, as is characteristic of many contemporary philosophers, he attempts to distinguish carefully between describing a line of conduct and assessing it. He delineates four methods of assessment: conformity of an action to law, consistency of a (...) line of conduct, intelligence of behavior, and insight or discernment of the requirements of a situation. While the approach of Kemp is in the spirit of many other recent investigations of moral discourse and rules, it is not entirely clear in what ways he makes an advance beyond these investigations.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Hardly a month goes by without another book or article concerning some aspect of the philosophy of action. The cluster of issues involved are in the very center of philosophic discussion. Much of the recent concern has been inspired by the liberation from various reductivistic approaches effected by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. And philosophers are coming to realize that the theory of action is not the study of a well delineated specific issue, but rather a focal point where many philosophical issues (...) meet. The present anthology collects together some of the better and most influential papers concerning action. It is divided into three sections: the general theory of action: the explanation of action; and the concept of action in history, ethics, and law. Unfortunately, many of the best discussions of these issues are to be found in books which the editors have not excerpted here. But there is a helpful introduction which sets out to clarify the context of recent discussions and the different problems that have arisen. There is a brief bibliography which might have been more helpful if it were annotated.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Thought experiments in the history of science display a striking asymmetry between chemistry and physics, namely that chemistry seems to lack well-known examples, whereas physics presents many famous examples. This asymmetry, I argue, is not independent data concerning the chemistry/physics distinction. The laws of chemistry such as the periodic table are incurably special, in that they make testable predictions only for a very restricted range of physical conditions in the universe which are necessarily conditioned by the contingences of chemical investigation. (...) The argument depends on how ‚thought experiment’ is construed. Here, several recent accounts of thought experiments are surveyed to help formulate what I call ‚crucial’ thought experiments. These have a historical role in helping to judge between hypotheses in physics, but are not helpful in chemistry past or present. (shrink)

Rapid developments in Artificial Intelligence are leading to an increasing human reliance on machine decision making. Even in collaborative efforts with Decision Support Systems (DSSs), where a human expert is expected to make the final decisions, it can be hard to keep the expert actively involved throughout the decision process. DSSs suggest their own solutions and thus invite passive decision making. To keep humans actively ‘on’ the decision-making loop and counter overreliance on machines, we propose a ‘reflection machine’ (RM). This (...) system asks users questions about their decision strategy and thereby prompts them to evaluate their own decisions critically. We discuss what forms RMs can take and present a proof-of-concept implementation of a RM that can produce feedback on users’ decisions in the medical and law domains. We show that the prototype requires very little domain knowledge to create reasonably intelligent critiquing questions. With this prototype, we demonstrate the technical feasibility to develop RMs and hope to pave the way for future research into their effectiveness and value. (shrink)

J. R. and Philip Milton present the first critical edition of John Locke's Essay concerning Toleration, based on all extant manuscripts, and a number of other writings on law and politics composed between 1667 and 1683. Although Locke never published any of these works himself they are of very great interest for students of his intellectual development because they are markedly different from the early works he wrote while at Oxford and show him working out ideas that were to appear (...) in his mature political writings, the Two Treatises of Government and the Epistola de Tolerantia. With authoritative contextual guidance from the editors, this will be an invaluable resource for all historians of early modern philosophy, of legal, political, and religious thought, and of 17th century Britain. (shrink)

J. R. and Philip Milton present the first critical edition of John Locke's Essay concerning Toleration, based on all extant manuscripts, and other writings on law and politics composed between 1667 and 1683. It is an invaluable resource for historians of early modern philosophy, legal, political, and religious thought, and 17th century Britain.

'A fascinating book. It contains a sweeping survey of approaches to causation and explanation from the Presocratic philosophers to the Neo-platonist philosophers. Hankinson pays a visit to every major figure and movement in between: the sophists, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Sceptics, the Epicureans and a variety of medical writers, early and late... impressive... Hankinson's observations are regularly intriguing, at times refreshingly trenchant, and in some cases straightforwardly arresting... the history itself is excellent: clear, intelligently conceived and executed, and broadly (...) accessible. Those in search of a philosophically astute history of clasical philosophy given in terms of one of its own central unifying obsessions will delight in reading R. J. Hankinson's work.' -Christopher Sheilds, Times Literary SupplementR. J. Hankinson traces the history of ancient Greek thinking about causation and explanation. He examines how the Greeks dealt with questions about how and why things happen as and when they do, about the basic constitution and structure of things, about function and purpose, laws of nature, chance, coincidence, and responsibility. Such diverse questions are unified by the fact that they are all demands for explanation, for an account of the world that will render it amenable to prediction and control. (shrink)

Stem cell science is advancing at an unprecedented rate, with thousands of research papers being published every year and many clinical trials for a wide range of conditions underway as registered on ClinicalTrials.gov. This rapidly expanding and alluring field has brought with it ever more complex and multifaceted ethical issues, many of which require new guidelines, consent protocols and even change in legislation, since they do not fit comfortably in the existing bioethical regulations and protocols. Keeping up with the ethical (...) implications of stem cell research is daunting to the expert and non-expert. We review the various types of stem cells and then focus on multipotent and pluripotent cell types, since it is these cell types that bring with them the greatest research and therapeutic potential, while concurrently delivering novel ethical conundrums. Certain key considerations are currently lacking and what is needed is how to obtain permission from individuals who donate their biological material for both scientific inquiry and eventually, for their potential therapeutic utility. (shrink)

J. R. and Philip Milton present the first critical edition of John Locke's Essay concerning Toleration, based on all extant manuscripts, and a number of other writings on law and politics composed between 1667 and 1683. Although Locke never published any of these works himself they are of very great interest for students of his intellectual development because they are markedly different from the early works he wrote while at Oxford and show him working out ideas that were to appear (...) in his mature political writings, the Two Treatises of Government and the Epistola de Tolerantia. With authoritative contextual guidance from the editors, this will be an invaluable resource for all historians of early modern philosophy, of legal, political, and religious thought, and of 17th century Britain. (shrink)

Bio-heteronormative conceptions of the family have long reinforced a nuclear ideal of the family as a heterosexual marriage, with children who are the genetic progeny of that union. This ideal, however, has also long been resisted in light of recent social developments, exhibited through the increased incidence and acceptance of step-families, donor-conceived families, and so forth. Although to this end some might claim that the bio-heteronormative ideal is not necessary for a social unit to count as a family, a more (...) systematic conceptualization of the family—the kind of family that matters morally—is relatively underexplored in the philosophical literature. This paper makes a start at developing and defending an account of the family that is normatively attractive and in line with the growing prevalence of non-conventional families and methods of family-formation. Our account, which we call a constitutive-affirmative model of the family, takes the family to be constituted by an ongoing process of relevant affective and affirmative relations between the putative family members. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the ethical values that have accompanied human exploration of space so far, and emphasizes the need to infuse human space activity with new ethical values by means of new and well-constructed legislation. One of the values that we deem particularly important in the creation of a new approach towards space exploration is care for the natural environment, including the space environment.

In November 2016, the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences published its revised International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans. In relation to earlier versions, the scope of the new guidelines has been expanded to include public-health research. While successful to some extent, the document does not take into sufficient account the differences between public-health research and other types of health research. It is silent on some issues of importance to public-health research, such as its definition, health inequities (...) and novel research methodologies. Its treatment of some other issues, including the need for researchethics committee approval, consent, community involvement and dissemination of research results, are deficient in some respects. The guidelines that are particularly applicable to and useful for public-health research deal with social value, the health needs of communities and populations, community engagement, disasters and disease outbreaks, cluster randomised trials and data sharing. Much further development of the foundations and applications of public-health research ethics is needed to inform future revisions of the guidelines and of other international and national research-ethics documents. (shrink)

On April 26, 1995, the United States Supreme Court limited the reach of the preemption provision of ERISA in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Tavelers Insurance Co. ). In Travelers, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York statute requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers and requiring health maintenance organizations to pay a surcharge to the state's general fund that varies depending on the number of Medicaid-eligible (...) HMO members enrolled. Neither patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans nor the plans themselves are similarly charged under the statute. Several commercial insurers and HMOs claimed the surcharges should be preempted under ERISA because they are levied on patients whose insurance or HMO membership premiums are purchased by an ERISA plan.The ERISA preemption clause means that federal regulation, or lack thereof, supersedes state regulation that is related to employee pension and benefit plans. This preemption clause prevents states from changing health care and benefit law for a significant portion of state residents. (shrink)