Based on our research regarding the relationship between physics and mathematics in HPS, and recently on Geneva Edition of Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1739–42) by Thomas Le Seur (1703–70) and François Jacquier (1711–88), in this paper we present some aspects of such Edition: a combination of editorial features and scientific aims. The proof of Proposition XLIII is presented and commented as a case study.

An account of the distinction between singular and general propositions should reflect the core ideas that have motivated the distinction. Those core ideas can be appreciated independently of many commitments regarding the metaphysics of propositions, but theorists with differing views on the latter have given quite different explanations of what it is for a proposition to be singular or general. Many of those explanations turn out not to reflect the core ideas adequately after all, either by misclassifying certain propositions (...) or by failing to be sufficiently informative. A more satisfactory account can be formulated by more directly elaborating on the background ideas motivating the distinction. The resulting account not only does better than its competitors, but is compatible with various views on the metaphysics of propositions. (shrink)

_From Naming to Saying_ explores the classicquestion of the unity of the proposition, combining an historical approach with contemporary causal theories to offer a unique and novel solution. Presents compelling and sophisticated answers to questions about how language represents the world. Defends a novel approach to the classical question about the unity of the proposition. Examines three key historical theories: Frege’s doctrine of concept and object, Russell’s analysis of the sentence, and Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning. Combines an (...) historical approach with discussion and defense of a contemporary causal theory of the unity of the proposition. Establishes a view compatible with, though not dependent on, a causal theory of meaning. (shrink)

Richard Gaskin presents a work in the philosophy of language.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains a wide range of profound insights into the nature of logic and language – insights which will survive the particular theories of the Tractatus and seem to me to mark definitive and unassailable landmarks in our understanding of some of the deepest questions of philosophy. And yet alongside these insights there is a theory of the nature of the relation between language and reality which appears both to be impossible to work out in detail in a way (...) which is completely satisfactory, and to be bizarre and incredible. I am referring to the so-called logical atomism of the Tractatus . The main outlines of this theory at least are clear and familiar: there are elementary propositions which gain their sense from being models of possible states of affairs; such propositions are configurations of names of simple objects, signifying that those simples are analogously configured; every proposition has its sense through being analysable as a truth-functional compound of elementary propositions, thus deriving its sense from the sense of the elementary propositions when this view is taken in conjunction with the idea that the sense of a proposition is completely specified by specifying its truth-conditions. In this way the Tractatus incorporates in its working out a philosophical system analogous to the classical philosophical systems of Leibniz or Spinoza which are regarded by many people, in a sense rightly, as the prehistoric monsters of philosophy which are not to be studied as living organisms, but studied as the curiosities of human thought. And we may here agree that in the end we must simply reject a philosophy which incorporates such features as its postulation of simple eternal objects, or of a possibility of an analysis of a proposition which was presented as a pre-condition for the propositions that we ordinarily utter to make sense, and yet the specific form of which we are unaware of, and so on. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although in recent years Christine Ladd-Franklin has received recognition for her contributions to logic and psychology, her role in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, as well as her relationship with American pragmatism, has yet to be fully appreciated. My goal here is to attempt to better understand Ladd-Franklin’s place in the pragmatist tradition by drawing attention to her work on the nature and unity of the proposition. The question concerning the unity of the proposition – namely, (...) the problem of how to determine what differentiates a mere collection of terms from a unified and meaningful proposition – received substantial attention in Ladd-Franklin’s time, and would continue to interest analytic philosophers well into the twentieth century. I argue that Ladd-Franklin had a distinct theory of the proposition and solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition that she developed over the course of her writings on logic and philosophy. In spelling out her views, I will also show her work interacted with and influenced that of the pragmatist who was her greatest influence, C.S. Peirce. (shrink)

A proposition is associated in classical mechanics with a subset of phase space, in quantum logic with a projection in Hilbert space, and in both cases with a 2-valued observable or test. A theoretical statement typically assigns a probability to such a pure test. However, since a pure test is an idealization not realizable experimentally, it is necessary — to give such a statement a practical meaning — to describe how it can be approximated by feasible tests. This gives (...) rise to a search for a formal representation of feasible tests, which leads via mixed tests (weighted means of pure tests) to vague tests (convex sets of mixed tests). A model is described in which the latter form a continuous lattice; the pure and mixed tests are the maximal elements and the feasible tests form a basis. Each type of test has its own logic; this is illustrated by the passage from mixed tests to pure tests, which corresponds to the transition from L to classical logic. (shrink)

On November 2, 2004, California voters elected to radically expand their state criminal DNA database through the passage of Proposition 69. The approved ballot initiative authorized DNA collection and retention from all felons, any individuals with past felony convictions – including juveniles – and, beginning in 2009, all adults arrested for any felony offense. This dramatic database expansion threatens civil liberties and establishes a dangerous precedent for U.S. criminal databases.

The recent global financial crisis and worst recession since the Great Depression underscore the theoretical and practical importance of defining requirements for assessing alternative theories of capitalism. The expressed goal of Freeman and his co-authors is to replace value-allocating ‘shareholder capitalism’ with value-creating ‘stakeholder capitalism.’ Each theory combines a different value proposition and principal-agent conception. So interpreted, the value creation proposition suggests two requirements for assessing alternative theories. A proposed better theory of capitalism should demonstrate first practicality of (...) prescriptive guidance for managers and second superiority of its embedded value proposition for sustainable long-term performance. Shareholder and stakeholder conceptions are not the only approaches to developing a theory of capitalism embedding a different value proposition and agency model. Two other conceptions suggest organisational wealth and corporate social responsibility (CSR) theories of capitalism. All four alternatives meet the relatively minimal requirement of practicality. Freeman and his co-authors argue the value creation proposition will outperform the value allocation proposition. But organisational wealth and CSR theories may also outperform shareholder capitalism. Demonstrating that stakeholder capitalism will outperform organisational wealth and CSR theories depends on which principal and value proposition one judges most important in particular conditions. (shrink)

This volume advances discussions between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. -/- The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in (...) response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do indicators of assertoric, but also of directive and interrogative force mean? (shrink)

This monograph reappraises the role of Bertrand Russell's philosophical works in establishing the analytical tradition in philosophy. It's main aims are to: * improve our understanding of the history of analytical philosophy * engage in the important disputes surrounding the interpretation of Russell's philosophy * make a contribution to central issues in current analytical philosophy. Drawing extensively from Russell's less well known and unpublished works, this book is a welcome addition to the literature and will undoubtedly find a place on (...) the bookshelves of philosophers around the world. (shrink)

Ikhwan-i Safa is known as a group of thinkers who wrote treatises in the style of the first scientific encyclopedia in the history of Islamic thought. Ikhwan-i Safa, which emerged in the vicinity of Basra at a time when religious and political conflicts were intense, aims to clean the religion, which they believe has moved away from its essence with false information and false thoughts, with philosophy. For this purpose, the Ikhwan's views on science and wisdom, who use all kinds (...) of religious, philosophical and scientific knowledge with an eclectic approach, are important in understanding the scientific understanding of the classical age of Islamic thought. Ikhwan-i Safa, who states that they are the heirs of every thought they find true, regardless of its source, advises its members not to be hostile to any of the sciences, not to turn their backs on any of the books, and not to be attached to any of the sects with bigotry. In this study, the approaches of İhvân-ı Safâ to the science of logic will be discussed within their understanding of science based on this broad acquis. According to Ikhwan-i Safa, who defines logic as the measure of philosophy and the instrument of the philosopher, since philosophy is the highest of human endeavours after Prophethood, logic, which is the measure of philosophy, must also be the highest of measures and instruments. In the study, it will be emphasized how the Ikhwan approached the science of logic in his treatises in the context of concept, proposition and syllogism, which are the main subjects of classical logic, and whether they made a unique contribution to this science. (shrink)

Hector-Neri Castaneda claimed in several papers that a proposition expressed by an indexical sentence can be re-expressed by means of an oratio obliqua clause that contains a quasi-indicator. Robert M. Adams and Rogers Albritton have presented a counter-argument that is accepted by Castaneda himself. I will argue that the Adams/Albritton argument is not convincing: The argument uses several assumptions which could be disputed. The paper tries to develop a more direct argument against Castaneda’s central claim. If Castaneda’s thesis is (...) false, what then is achieved by quasi-indexicals in oratio obliqua? Adams and Castaneda answer this question with a picture: the quasi-indexical clause portrays an indexical proposition. I use Perry’s idea that quasi-indicators could be seen as expressions that bind special sense variables to give a less metaphorical account of the functioning of quasi-indicators. Finally, I explore the consequences of this account for iterated knowledge-ascriptions with quasi-indicators and for truth-conditional theories of meaning. (shrink)

On November 2, 2004, California voters elected to radically expand their state criminal DNA database through the passage of Proposition 69. The approved ballot initiative authorized DNA collection and retention from all felons, any individuals with past felony convictions – including juveniles – and, beginning in 2009, all adults arrested for any felony offense. This dramatic database expansion threatens civil liberties and establishes a dangerous precedent for U.S. criminal databases.

Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is (...) a concept that is not, and could not be, introduced in paragraphs 9–13 of Groundwork 1. Further, I will argue that the first proposition as I understand it can also be reconstructed as the conclusion (‘Folgerung’) of a deductive argument proper; however, I will also discuss the option that ‘Folgerung’ could be understood as a corollary rather than a conclusion. Finally, Allison's own interpretation will be criticized. (shrink)

_From Naming to Saying _explores the classicquestion of the unity of the proposition, combining an historical approach with contemporary causal theories to offer a unique and novel solution. Presents compelling and sophisticated answers to questions about how language represents the world. Defends a novel approach to the classical question about the unity of the proposition. Examines three key historical theories: Frege’s doctrine of concept and object, Russell’s analysis of the sentence, and Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning. Combines an (...) historical approach with discussion and defense of a contemporary causal theory of the unity of the proposition. Establishes a view compatible with, though not dependent on, a causal theory of meaning. (shrink)

This article examines the concept of creating shared value as articulated by Michael Porter and Mark Kramer, in non-Western and Western contexts. We define non-Western contexts as those in so-called “developing” countries and emerging economies, whereas Western ones pertain to dominant thinking in “developed” regions. We frame our research in postcolonial theory and offer an overview of existing critiques of CSV. We conduct a critical discourse analysis of 66 articles to identify how CSV is being cited by authors, and potential (...) underlying power dynamics that affect its relevance for non-Western contexts. Our review exposes increasingly critical views about the paradoxical positioning of CSV as an instrumental concept that can offer “win-win” solutions, particularly from those working in non-Western settings. Western perspectives generally tend to be more supportive of its instrumental nature, but also recognize the increasing complexity of the business-society nexus and stakeholder engagement. We argue that the CSV framework requires further development to maintain credibility and applicability, especially in non-Western domains. (shrink)

In this paper I do four things. (1) I explain one clear thing that ‘the problem of the unity of the proposition’ might mean. (2) I lay out a few different versions of the theory of propositions as cognitive acts, and explain why this problem arises for the version of that theory which has been defended in different forms by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames. (3) I argue that the natural ways in which the act theorist might try to (...) solve the problem fail to solve it; (4) I propose a way to fix the problem, and then I explain how the problem re-emerges in the act theorist’s treatment of propositional attitude relations. (shrink)

This paper considers the efficiency of the political market in the California State legislature. I analyzed the property tax limitation voter initiative, Proposition 13. I found that districts which supported Proposition 13 more strongly were more likely to oppose the incumbents regardless of whether the incumbents had the different preferences for property taxes from their districts. I also studied how legislators voted on the bills adopted after the passage of Proposition 13 to finance local governments. I found (...) that legislators tended to follow the constituents tax-cutting message expressed by the passage of Proposition 13. (shrink)

In the first half of the 17th century the Aristotelian view that the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change its truth-value.In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative answer (...) and the advocates of a positive answer argued on the basis of different notions of what a mental proposition is:one side taking it as more or less equivalent to a specific utterance?meaning and the other side as more or less equivalent to a generic sentence-meaning. (shrink)

The paper replies to some criticisms by Nicholas Denyer of my recent book on the unity of the proposition.

On November 4, 2008 California voters passed Proposition 8, and accordingly same-sex marriage was banned under the state constitution. Proposition 8 is now being considered by the Supreme Court. The proposition has sparked national debate about the nature of the relationship between the state and citizens’ sexuality and corresponding rights; calling into question the practice of allocating rights and privileges on the basis of sexuality and family form. Proponents of the proposition, who can be classified as (...) predominantly socially conservative, want to maintain the status and privileges of marriage for heterosexuals; arguing that allowing same-sex marriage threatens the legitimacy, sanctity and strength of traditional heterosexual marriage . This article examines the extent to which three Californian pro-same-sex marriage organizations (Equality California, Join the Impact, and the Courage Campaign) have challenged and/or appropriated social conservative and neoliberal discourses in their effort to gain access to the rights and privileges that are currently administered through marriage. (shrink)

King develops a syntax-based account of propositions based on the idea that propositional unity is grounded in the syntactic structure of the sentence. This account faces two objections: a Benacerraf objection and a grain-size objection. I argue that the syntax-based account survives both objections, as they have been put forward in the existing literature. I go on to show, however, that King equivocates between two distinct notions of ‘propositional structure ’ when explaining his account. Once the confusion is resolved, it (...) is clear that the syntax-based account suffers from both Benacerraf and grain-size problems after all. I conclude by showing that King's account can be revised to avoid these problems, but only if it abandons its motivating idea that it is syntax that unifies the proposition. (shrink)