1. Reference and modality by W. V. O. Quine.--2. Modality and description by A. F. Smullyan.--3. Extensionality by R. B. Marcus.--4. Quantification into causal contexts by D. Føllesdal.--5. Semantical considerations on modal logic by S. A. Kripke.--6. Essentialism and quantified modal logic by T. Parsons.--7. Reference, essentialism, and modality by L. Linsky.--8. Quantifiers and propositional attitudes by W. V. O. Quine.--9. Quantifying in by D. Kaplan.--10. Semantics for propositional attitudes by J. Hintikka.--11. On Carnap's analysis of statements of assertion and (...) belief by A. Church.--Bibliography (p. [173]-175). (shrink)
Introduction In this introduction I will comment on some of the central issues of the papers included in this volume and point out some of the relations ...
Deception.Leonard Linsky - 1963 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 6 (1-4):157 – 169.details
Philosophers have based arguments on the contention that we arc deceived in our dreams. I argue that we are not, and that this can be shown by considerations concerning the meaning? of the word ?deceive?. This kind of argument, common in recent philosophy, has been much criticized. In a methodological digression (sections 2?6), some aspects of the nature, the rationale, and the relevance of the appeal to ordinary language in philosophy are exposed and defended. The paper presents an analysis of (...) the meaning of the word ?deceive? by way of a list of necessary conditions for the semantically nondeviant occurrences of utterances containing it. It is shown that the philosophical uses in question do not satisfy these conditions. (shrink)
A somewhat simplified version of Jerrold J. Katz's theory of the analytic/synthetic distinction for natural languages is presented. Katz's account is criticized on the following grounds. (1) the antonymy operator is not well defined; it leaves certain sentences without readings. (2) The account of negation is defective; it has the consequence that certain nonsynonymous sentences are marked as synonymous. (3) The account of entailment is defective; it has the consequence that analytic sentences entail synthetic ones. (4) Katz's account of indeterminable (...) sentences is criticized; it has the consequence that certain logical truths are not marked as analytic. (5) Katz's semantics provides no account of truth, so that he is unable to show that analytic sentences are true and that indeterminable sentences are not. (shrink)