“Towards a Theory of Taxation” is a proper theme for an Englishman to take when giving a paper in America. After all it was from the absence of such a theory that the United States derived its existence. The Colonists felt strongly that there should be no taxation without representation, and George III was unable to explain to them convincingly why they should contribute to the cost of their defense. Since that time, understanding has not advanced much. In (...) Britain we still maintain the fiction that taxes are a voluntary gift to the Crown, and taxing statutes are given the Royal Assent with the special formula, “La Reine remercie ses bons sujets, accepte leur benevolence, et ainsi le veult” instead of the simple “La Reine le veult,” and in the United States taxes have regularly been levied on residents of the District of Columbia who until recently had no representation in Congress, and by the State of New York on those who worked but did not reside in the State, and so did not have a vote. Taxes are regularly levied, in America as elsewhere, on those who have no say on whether they should be levied or how they should be spent. I am taxed by the Federal Government on my American earnings and by state governments on my American spending, but I should be hard put to it to make out that it was unjust. Florida is wondering whether to follow California in taxing multinational corporations on their world-wide earnings. (shrink)

The consequences of taxation matter for the optimal design of the tax system. Those consequences depend on behavioral responses to taxation, as summarized by the elasticity of taxable income. Although this elasticity depends on characteristics of preferences, such as the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure, it also depends on the avoidance technology, and on the response of government to avoidance behavior. It depends on the size of states, and the amount of tax coordination and harmonization. To (...) some degree the elasticity of response can be affected by government policies, and the government need not accept it passively, but rather should put in place policies that optimally determine it. (shrink)

Regulation of gatekeepers of taxation has been so controversial and important that a review of ethical standards, professional responsibility and industry guidelines is examined. This paper explores whether gatekeepers of taxation need more ethics and enforcement to increase the compliance rate. In this paper we argue that an effective mixture of professional ethics and enforcement of gatekeepers can increase tax compliance. However, we question how much is optimal or reasonable? We theorize that ethics and enforcement should be proportionate (...) to the ecosystem because too much of it can lead to unintended consequences such as increase costs and higher noncompliance. A friendlier tax authority with less complex laws can enhance the compliance process. This strategy, in amalgamation with professional ethics, enforcement policies, and effective reporting systems, could increase the compliance rate. (shrink)

This article presents an argument for a new form of tax calculation. Firstly it is argued that Hypothetical Insurance is the best method to determine the correct type of distributive policies and the precise amounts that should be redistributed. Hourly averaging is then presented as a new candidate policy for both assisting the less economically fortunate and taxing the more economically fortunate. The article then argues that hourly averaging compares favourably against rival policies as a hypothetical insurance choice.

This volume presents philosophical contributions examining questions of the grounding and justification of taxation and different types of taxes such as inheritance, wealth, consumption or income tax in relation to justice and the concept of a just society. The chapters cover the different levels at which the discussion on taxation and justice takes place: On the principal level, chapters investigate the justification and grounding of taxation as such and the role taxation plays and should play in (...) the design of justice, be it for a just society or a just world order. On a more concrete level, chapters present discussions of these general reflections in more depth and examine different types of taxation, tax systems and their design and implementation. On an applied level, chapters discuss certain specific taxes, such as wealth and inheritance taxes, and examine whether or not a certain tax should be favored and for what reasons as well as why it is just to target certain kinds of assets or income. Finally, this volume contains chapters that discuss the central issue of international and global taxation and their relation to global justice. (shrink)

Lockeans regard taxation as a—perhaps sometimes permissible—infringement of moral property entitlements. This essay discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth and the limits of the conventionalist reply of Murphy and Nagel to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent of the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, (...) that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. Because taxation can be a part of property conventions, taxation as such is not an infringement of moral property entitlements. But the essay will also argue that some taxation—excessive taxation—does infringe on moral property entitlements. This is because the moral rationale for property conventions sets some standards for what owners should be entitled to, and so excessive taxation will infringe upon moral entitlements that are partly not convention-based. (shrink)

This book focuses on the impact of technology on taxation and deals with the broad effect of technology on diverse taxation systems. It addresses the highly relevant eTax issue and argues that while VAT may not be the ultimate solution with regard to taxing electronic commerce, it can be demonstrated to be the most effective solution to date. The book analyzes the application and the effectiveness of traditional income tax principles in contradistinction to VAT principles. Taking into account (...) rapidly ameliorating technology, the book next assesses the compatibility between electronic commerce and diverse systems of taxation. Using case studies of Amazon.com and Second Life, as well as additional practical examples, the book demonstrates the effectiveness of VAT in respect of electronic commerce and ameliorating technology in the incalculable and borderless realm of cyberspace. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to meet their (...) aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

The article considers a surprisingly resilient argument, going back to Adam Smith, for the fairness of proportionate taxation: that proportionate taxation represents the fair way to divide the surplus value produced by social cooperation among all of society's members. The article considers two recent variants on that argument, one by Richard Epstein in Takings and one by David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement. It concludes that the normative and empirical assumptions that underlie these, and all other variants, of (...) the argument are so implausible as to suggest the argument cannot be taken seriously as a defense of proportionate taxation. The article concludes by considering other possible explanations for the enduring attraction of proportionate taxation for political philosophers, particularly those with libertarian and quasi-libertarian leanings. Footnotes I am grateful to participants in faculty workshops at Vanderbilt, NYU, Virginia and Stanford Law Schools and the Qunnipiac College School of Law Conference on Law and Philosophy, as well as the anonymous outside readers for this journal, for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. (shrink)

Substantially increased wealth inequality across the developed world has prompted many philosophers, economists and legal theorists to support comprehensive taxes on all forms of wealth. Proposals include levying taxes on the basis of total wealth, or alternatively the change in the value of capital holdings measured from year-to-year. This contrasts with most existing policies that tax capital assets at the point they are transferred from one beneficiary to another through sale or gifts. Are these tax reforms likely to meet their (...) aims of greater economic and political equality? We argue that these policies are likely to fail because, following neoclassical economic theory, they are based on a conception of capital as possessing given values in what amounts to a static equilibrium. This mischaracterizes the dynamic and subjective character of market economies and the contested value of real instantiations of capital goods. This makes them very difficult, often impossible, to value apart from at the point of voluntary transfer or profit realization. This means most taxes levied on a mark-to-market basis will be arbitrary and unfair. We propose alternative policies based on an income realization approach to taxation that are more likely to curb excessive wealth holdings. This includes introducing international treaties that prohibit preferential tax treatment for individual companies and specific sectors, and broadening the income tax base to include the imputed rent of personal housing wealth. (shrink)

Libertarians such as Nozick have argued that any redistributive tax scheme intended to achieve and maintain an egalitarian distributive pattern will violate self‐ownership. Furthermore, since self‐ownership is a central component of the idea of freedom, instituting an egalitarian distribution makes a society less rather than more free. All this turns on the claim, accepted by both libertarians and their critics, that a redistributive tax will violate self‐ownership because it must expropriate the fruit of a person’s labour. I show here that (...) there is no reason to accept this claim. The libertarian argument works only if the fruit of one’s labour must be understood to include everything that a person produces through his labour. But there is an alternative reading of the fruit of labour which identifies it with that subset of the total product of one’s labour which is due to his choices rather than luck. I argue that this reading is plausible, that there is nothing in the concept of self‐ownership which disallows it, and that if it is adopted, a redistributive tax need not automatically expropriate the fruit of one’s labour. Consequently there is no necessary inconsistency between redistributive taxation and self‐ownership, and so egalitarians can endorse the latter idea. (shrink)

Like many governments in this COVID-19 pandemic, the Nigerian government imposed a lockdown on the country. As a consequence of the lockdown, many businesses shutdown and effectively had no source of revenue. Yet, without receiving any bailout or palliatives from the government, these businesses are required to meet their tax obligations to the government. Bearing in mind that this time (COVID-19 era) is different, one wonders what is required of businesses in view of the taxation problem and the social (...) contract between the businesspersons and the government. In view of social contract obligations, in this COVID-19 pandemic should businesses pay tax to a government that seems to have delegitimised itself by its exploitative actions in terms of taxation and delinquent omission in terms of the provision of public goods and social services? The Nigerian government at all tiers (federal, state and local) seldom respect the essence of taxation. Therefore, businesses often pay tax for nothing. For many businesses, as far as taxation is concerned, to pay or not to pay? that is the question. This article is aimed at teasing out this taxation problem that may or may not be a moral dilemma. In view of certain ethical considerations, this article shows why in spite of social contract obligations, there is no consensus or canonical agreement on whether, as law-abiding citizens and juridical persons (legal entities), businesspersons and businesses ought to or ought not to pay tax to the Nigerian government in this COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

Joseph Heath makes a strong case that the principles of fairness or desert that arise in social interactions have at best a loose connection to economic outcomes in decentralized markets. However, there is evidence that when people are given the opportunity—say, in collective bargaining situations—they will try to alter these market outcomes in favor of their own perceptions of justice, fairness, or desert. Taxation is an important domain in which the public can alter market outcomes. This paper explores to (...) what extent desert can be used as a principle of tax policy. It analyzes tax policies that can be used to implement both individualized and categorical assessments of desert. I argue that there might be some room for tax policy at the broad, categorical level. Finally, using the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 as a case study, I explore whether merit or other bases for desert were embedded in the recent legislation. While there was evidence of attempts to implement ideas based on principles of deservingness in the legislation, they were not of the type necessary to sustain a merit-based society. (shrink)

Taxation is more than one thing. Taxes can be levied in various ways on various things, with varying effects on a culture and an economy, and raising different challenges of justification.

I examine how reforming our international tax regime could be an important vehicle by which we can begin to realize global justice. For instance, eliminating tax havens, tax evasion, and transfer pricing schemes are all important to ensure accountability and to support democracies. I argue that the proposals concerning taxation reform are likely to be more effective in tackling global poverty than Thomas Pogge's global resources dividend because they target some of the central issues more effectively. I also discuss (...) many particular proposals for global taxes that have already been floated and implementation prospects and successes. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the relationship of taxation to conceptions of the state and the community. The paper contends that public finance theorists have focused little attention on what, precisely, the state is and the role of subnational and supranational communities, even though understanding the state and these communities is essential for grasping how tax revenues are really distributed. The failure of public finance to do so is explainable by the powerful faith in the expertise of theorists and (...) bureaucrats and abstract models for social welfare, whether or not they work or would be agreed upon and implemented via the political process. (shrink)

No apology, I imagine, is necessary for the appearance of this translation\nof Marx's "Misere de la Philosophic" On the contrary it is strange\nthat it should not have been published in England before, anu that\nthe translation of his monumental work, the "Capital," tardy as that\nwas, should have yet been made before that of a work which was originally\npublished some twenty years before "Capital" first appeared.\n\n\nIt may be that the translators and editors of the latter work were\nof opinion that in view of (...) the comprehensiveness of "Capital," a\npublication of an English edition of the "Misere de la Philosophic"\nwould be a work of supererogation. Or it may be that they thought\na book so distinctly French—as the "Capital" may be said to be distinctly\nEnglish—and which was, further, exclusively a criticism of a work\nof Proudhon's little known in England—would have slight interest\nfor English readers. On the other hand, the groundwork of the theories\nso fully elaborated in "Capital," apart from its exhaustive analysis\nof the capitalist system of production and distribution, will be\nfound in "Misere." In addition, there are several subjects—notably\nthat of rent—dealt with in this volume which are barely touched upon\nin the single book of " Capital " which has been translated into\nEnglish.\n\n\nMarx's criticism of Proudhon's theory that " the time which is necessary\nto create a commodity indicates exactly its degree of utility," so\nthat " the things of which the production costs the least time are\nthe things which are the most immediately useful," has been matched\nby H. M. Hyndman's crushing refutation of the theory of Final Utility.\nThe subject of rent, too, has been fully dealt with by the latter\nin the same book, " The Economics of Socialism," published, as the\nauthor says, in the hope of furnishing " the rapidly-increasing number\nof students of sociology with a concise and readable statement of\nthe main theories of the scientific school of political economy founded\nby Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels." Neither of these facts, however,\nnecessarily detracts from the value of this older work of Marx's.\nOn the question of rent, after reviewing the Ricardian theory and\nthe many objections which present themselves to that theory, Hyndman\nsays: " It seems, therefore, that a wider definition of the rent\nof land under capitalism is needed than that given by Ricardo, and\nthe following is suggested: — Rent of land is that portion of the\ntotal net revenue which is paid to the landlord for the use of plots\nof land after the average profit on the capital embarked in developing\nsuch land has been deducted." On the question of confiscating rent\nhe says it " would not affect the position of the working portion\nof the community unless the money so obtained were devoted to giving\nthem more amusement, to providing them with better surroundings and\nthe like. ... In fact, the attack upon competitive rents is merely\na capitalist attack. That class sees a considerable income going\noff to a set of people who take no part in the direct exploitation\nof labor; and its representatives are naturally anxious to stop this\nleakage, as they consider it, and to reduce their own taxation for\npublic purposes by appropriating rent to the service of the State.\nThat is all very well for them."\n\n\nOn this point Marx says: " We can understand such economists as Mill,\nCherbulliez, Hilditch and others, demanding that rent should be handed\nover to the State to be used for the remission of taxation. That\nis only the frank expression of the hate which the industrial capitalist\nfeels for the landed proprietor, who appears to him as a useless\nincumbrance, a superfluity in the otherwise harmonious whole of bourgeois\nproduction."\n\n\n" Rent," says Marx, " results from the social relations in which exploitation\nis carried on. It cannot result from the nature, more or less fixed,\nmore or less durable, of land. Rent proceeds from society and not\nfrom the soil."\n\n\nThe criticism of Proudhon's appreciation of gold and silver as the\nfirst manifestation of this theory of " constituted value" should\nbe interesting reading to those admirers of the French Anarchist\nwho yet profess their profound detestation of money and its function.\nSo, too, should his declaration against strikes and combinations\nof workmen. In this we see once more how extremes meet. This declaration\nof Proudhon's would not be out of place in the organ of the Liberty\nand Property Defence League.\n\n\nIn this matter of trade union combination, Marx was scarcely accurate\nin his perception of its development. He clearly did not foresee\nthat the great English trade unions would become fossilised, as it\nwere; and that instead of being a revolutionary force they would\nbecome a reactionary mass, opposing the progress of the mere proletarian\noutside their ranks, as they have done. With the spread of Socialist\nideas among them, however, their exclusive character is being modified,\nand they may even yet take that place in the revolutionary working-class\nmovement which Marx anticipated they would occupy. Given this change\nof attitude, the development must inevitably be along the lines he\npredicted. We are seeing "in face of constantly united capital, the\nmaintenance of the association [becoming] more important and necessary\nfor them than the maintenance of wages," and, further, that the combinations\nof capital are forcing the trade unions to that point where "association\ntakes a political character."\n\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to point out that in this work, written in\n1847, some words have a meaning quite other than that which they\nbear to-day. Thus, for instance, the words "Socialists" and "Socialism,"\nwhere they occur, refer to the utopians—who formulated theories of\na social system independent of the industrial evolution— and to these\ntheories themselves.\n\n\nIn most cases the numerous quotations have been verified and reproduced\nin the original. In some instances, however, they are summaries rather\nthan quotations, and appear ^is translated.\n\n\nA translation jn* necessarily an imperfect presentation of the thoughts,\nideas, and conclusions of the author. In this work I have endeavored\nto adhere as closely as possible to the form and letter, as well\nas the spirit of the original, and to this the indulgent reader is\nasked to ascribe such faults of language as would otherwise merit\nhis censure. (shrink)

Against the easy presupposition that such a thing as ‘democratic taxation’ not only exists but is also practicable, this paper points to the dilemma posed by what I call ‘quantifiable action.’ The essay develops an approach to theorizing the place of taxation in political theory that counters trends in fiscal sociology, political science, and liberal theory by highlighting how taxation presumably violates the requirement that self-government includes an absence of instrumental rationality on the part of democratic citizens. (...) For this reason, taxation presents a persistent problem for any concept of self-government, and may usefully be regarded as a technology of the self, conventional with democracy but at most ambiguous in its capability to be genuinely democratic, both theoretically and practically. (shrink)

Against the easy presupposition that such a thing as ‘democratic taxation’ not only exists but is also practicable, this paper points to the dilemma posed by what I call ‘quantifiable action.’ The essay develops an approach to theorizing the place of taxation in political theory that counters trends in fiscal sociology, political science, and liberal theory by highlighting how taxation presumably violates the requirement that self-government includes an absence of instrumental rationality on the part of democratic citizens. (...) For this reason, taxation presents a persistent problem for any concept of self-government, and may usefully be regarded as a technology of the self, conventional with democracy but at most ambiguous in its capability to be genuinely democratic, both theoretically and practically. (shrink)

Explores some steps toward non-assimilative encounters in the "global village.".

National membership in itself aggravates global inequality, and plural membership does all the more so. A key mechanism by which that occurs are double taxation agreements that have the effect of favoring the global rich at the expense of the global poor. One egalitarian solution is a levy on multiple citizenship; another is redesigning double taxation agreements along prioritarian lines. Revising the OECD Model Tax Convention could be a feasible strategy for implementing such reforms.

Comparative political theory is at best an embryonic and marginalized endeavor. As practiced in most Western universities, the study of political theory generally involves a rehearsal of the canon of Western political thought from Plato to Marx. Only rarely are practitioners of political thought willing (and professionally encouraged) to transgress the canon and thereby the cultural boundaries of North America and Europe in the direction of genuine comparative investigation. Border Crossings presents an effort to remedy this situation, fully launching a (...) new era in political theory. Thirteen scholars from around the world examine the various political traditions of West, South, and East Asia and engage in a reflective cross-cultural discussion that belies the assumptions of an Asian "essence" and of an unbridgeable gulf between West and non-West. The denial of essential differences does not, however, amount to an endorsement of essential sameness. As viewed and as practiced by contributors to this ground-breaking volume, comparative political theorizing must steer a course between uniformity and radical separation--this is the path of "border crossings.". (shrink)

In this article I examine how reforming our international tax regime could be an important vehicle for realizing key aspects of global gender justice. Ensuring all,including and especially multinationals, pay their fair share of taxes is crucial to ensuring that all countries, especially developing countries, are able to fund education, job training, infrastructural development, programs which promote gender equity, and so forth, thereby enabling all countries to help themselves better. I discuss various positive proposals for levying global taxes. I review (...) why overtly gender-neutral taxes can sometimes have unintended gendered consequences, disproportionately burdening or benefiting individuals, according to their gender. Any endorsement of global taxes must take this concern into account. Fortunately there is good fit between the rationale for the Tobin tax and the way in which it can be harnessed to promote gender equity, so of the taxes discussed here, it emerges as one of the most promising. However, as I also argue, eliminating tax havens and blocking avenues that currently facilitate tax escape must also be part of the agenda to promote gender equity, given the vast amounts of revenue that currently escape taxation. In a context of globalization, fiscal policies cannot achieve equity (including gender equity) at national levels alone. Many concerns, such as clamping down on tax evasion and harmonizing corporate tax rates, can only effectively be tackled at a global level. As I also discuss, feasible arrangements for tackling such issues are available, as are mechanisms for collecting and disbursing funds in ways that promote accountability and compliance. Failing to reform our tax arrangements means that the basic institutional structure of the global economy is unjust and also involves gender injustice. Gender consciousness is indispensable for developing an adequate account of taxation justice and therefore a global institutional structure that is gender just. (shrink)

'Tis true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit everyone who enjoys a share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e., the consent of the majority giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and (...) without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself. (shrink)

Liberal egalitarians argue that the state is justified in taxing members of a political community to achieve distributive justice and ensure political equality and regime stability. This involves an uneasy compromise between equality and efficiency, a compromise that many argue has recently been undermined by the growth of unchecked wealth and income inequality. This essay argues that there is also a trade-off between selecting fair processes for taxation and aiming for particular distributive outcomes. The way people accumulate wealth, and (...) the way states tax often matters more than distributive outcomes. Policymakers must allow for the fair assessment of tax liabilities, avoid excessive enforcement costs and prevent political actors from using tax systems to achieve their partial ends. Recognizing these considerations justifies a systematic scheme of taxation while constraining the mechanisms for collecting revenue. I justify this position using comparative analysis, which I contrast with the conceptual intuitionistic approach associated with egalitarianism. (shrink)

This article asks how global tax reform relates to other emerging proposals for global economic reform. Specifically, I will try to contribute to the philosophical understanding of this relationship, by comparing global tax reform with a reform seeking to end dictators’ trading privileges in their peoples’ natural resources. Through this comparison, I intend to establish two main claims. At a concrete, practical level, I hope to show that reform of dictators’ resource privilege will be easier to initiate than legal reform (...) against global tax avoidance. Yet the heart of this essay is dedicated to supporting this claim through an argument at a more abstract, methodological level, which intends to make a broader contribution. This argument focuses on a key obstacle facing global taxation reforms, in the form of collective action problems. My key conceptual contribution lies in an attempt to distinguish between two forms of collective action situations, arguing that only one of them involves moral collective action problems, while in the other these problems dissolve. I seek to show that this fortunate case obtains for reform of dictators’ resource privilege, but not for global tax reform. (shrink)

This article provides a survey of various topics in which questions about taxation feature alongside questions about justice. It seeks to argue mainly that taxation is a rather fragmentary domain of inquiry about which it is hard to envisage the development of views about what justice requires with respect to tax policy in general. Guided by this idea, the article attempts to highlight some aspects of taxation whose connection with justice has been under-explored by philosophers, as well (...) as to acquaint the reader with a sense of the more thoroughly researched areas. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 59, Issue 3, Page 362-385, September 2021.

We argue that for theorists with a post-institutional conception of property, e.g., Rawlsians, there is no principled reason to limit the domain of distributive justice to tax and transfer-both tax policy and the rules of the private law are constructed in service to distributive aims. Such theorists cannot maintain a commitment to a normative conception of private law independent of their overarching distributive principles. In contrast, theorists with a pre-institutional conception of property can derive the private law from sectors of (...) morality independent of distributive justice. Nevertheless, we argue, this does not entail that the private law, for pre-institutional theorists, must be sanitized of equity-oriented values. Non-libertarian pre-institutional theorists holding principled commitments to equity-oriented values are free to invoke either tax and transfer or the rules of the private law to attain them. Footnotesa We are grateful to John G. Bennett, Harry Dolan, Edward McCaffery, and Ellen Frankel Paul for written comments on a previous draft and to Eric Mack, Fred Miller, Jeffrey Paul, A. John Simmons, and the other contributors to this volume for valuable discussions. (shrink)

This volume contains the first critical edition of the Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum by Peter of Auvergne as well as a pragmatical edition of Books III-VIII of the medieval Latin translation of Aristotle's Politics. Intended as the continuation of Aquinas' unfinished commentary on the first three books of the Politics, the Scriptum became-together with Aquinas' commentary-the commentary on the Politics. From its appearance in the late thirteenth century to the end of the sixteenth century, the Scriptum represented the most (...) authoritative and influential interpretation of Books III-VIII of the Politics.The introduction to the volume provides both an overview of Peter's political thought and a case study of the production and dissemination of a university text. An examination of the manuscripts traces the preparation of the text from its first transcription and revision by a scribe close to the author-if not the author himself-to the preparation of the finished exemplar and its diffusion through the system of peciae. The introduction also explains how the text was adapted to fit the standards of humanistic Latin when it was first printed in the fifteenth century: its language was adjusted to humanistic standards, many formulations were reshaped, and passages were suppressed. These changes were subsequently preserved in all later editions of the text. Freed from this humanistic patina with which it has been transmitted since the early age of printing age, the Scriptum is now restored to its original version. (shrink)

The following essay analyzes the arguments made by the principal academic proponent of income taxation, Columbia University economist E. R. A Seligman, after it was found to be unconstitutional in 1894. Seligman thought that the prevalent theory of just taxation, that it should be based on a natural right to one’s person and property, was wrong. The principal American philosophical proponent of this natural rights-based approach to taxation was the late Brown University philosopher and economist, Francis Wayland. (...) The essay analyzes the flaws in Seligman’s contention that there are no natural rights and, therefore, no natural property rights, so that taxation could not be justified by the benefits received for the protection of such rights. Instead, he claimed taxation should rest upon a person’s financial capacity. Since that capacity would be most accurately measured by net worth, we would have expected Seligman to endorse a proportionately assessed net worth tax (which was commonly used by the states in the nineteenth century). Alternatively, he argued for an income tax progressively assessed. This essay argues that since income is only a portion of financial capacity, his argument fails. (shrink)

Stephen Nathanson's clear-sighted abridgment of Principles of Political Economy, Mill's first major work in moral and political philosophy, provides a challenging, sometimes surprising account of Mill's views on many important topics: socialism, population, the status of women, the cultural bases of economic productivity, the causes and possible cures of poverty, the nature of property rights, taxation, and the legitimate functions of government. Nathanson cuts through the dated and less relevant sections of this large work and includes significant material (...) omitted in other editions, making it possible to see the connections between the views Mill expressed in Principles of Political Economy and the ideas he defended in his later works, particularly On Liberty. Indeed, studying Principles of Political Economy, Nathanson argues in his general Introduction, can help to resolve the apparent contradiction between Mill's views in On Liberty and those in Utilitarianism, making it a key text for understanding Mill’s philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential proposal of how to tax wealth transfers. According to Mill, every person should be free to bequeath but not to receive bequest. Mill proposed an upper limit on how much each person could receive from wealth transfers. We discuss three objections against this proposal. The nonseparability objection holds that it is not possible to separate the freedom to give from the freedom to receive. The objection from private property holds that private property includes (...) an unlimited right to dispose of one’s assets and that this right is violated under Mill’s scheme. The objection from incentives holds that Mill’s scheme would have negative effects on people’s willingness to work and save. We argue that these objections can be met and that taxing bequeathed wealth according to Mill’s scheme is more just and more efficient compared to systems that rely less on wealth transfer taxation. (shrink)

"Providing a thorough examination of distributive justice, Distributive Justice and Taxation presents and discusses different theories of what constitutes a just society, and how goods should be distributed in such a society. The distribution of goods in society has direct and serious consequences on the lives of the people. There are therefore important questions to be asked regarding the justice of that distribution: Is it just that some people inherit large fortunes while others inherit nothing? Do rich people have (...) additional access to political power because of their wealth? If so, is that just? And should the ambition for economic policies be to combat poverty, or to reduce inequality? This book explores these questions and a number of others through the analysis of related theories, spanning from strong egalitarian theories on the left to right-wing libertarianism. The chapters also explicitly examine the case of taxation - one of the most important and controversial measures of distribution of goods in society. Placing emphasis on the case of Norway and using data from both the UK and USA as a point of comparison, the work details and explores the key features of the tax system. It concludes by presenting and evaluating arguments for and against taxes such as income tax, wealth tax, and inheritance tax. This book is essential reading for those interested in distributive justice, as well as students and scholars of philosophy, law, political science and economics. J2rgen Pedersen is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Department of Business Administration, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norway"--. (shrink)

This paper reports on the development of a research instrument designed to explore ethical reasoning in a tax context. This research instrument is a version of the Defining Issues Test originally developed by Rest [1979a, Development in Judging Moral Issues ; 1979b, Defining Issues Test ], but adapted to focus specifically on the environment encountered by tax practitioners. The paper explores reasons for developing a context- specific test, and details the manner in which this was undertaken. The study on which (...) it is based aims to compare the reasoning of tax practitioners in the taxspecific context and in the general social context covered by the original DIT, and to compare this with the reasoning of non-specialists in these two contexts. The paper therefore also considers the issues that arise when using such tests to compare reasoning in different domains or to compare groups. The focus on instrument development to measure ethical reasoning in a specific domain will contribute to the literature on research methods in the area of the DIT and will facilitate cross-study comparisons. (shrink)

This book contains programmatic essays that focus on broad-ranging proposals for re-envisioning a discipline of comparative philosophy of religions. It also contains a number of case studies focussing on the interpretation of particular religio-historical data from comparatively oriented philosophical perspectives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For (...) once, Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)