Objective: The aim of this research was to study the mediation of body dissatisfaction, physical self-concept, and body mass index (BMI) on the relationship between physical activity and self-concept in adolescents. Materials and Methods: A sample of 652 Spanish students between 12 and 17 years participated in a cross-sectional study. Physical self-concept and general self-concept were assessed with the Physical Self-Concept Questionnaire (CAF), body dissatisfaction with the Body Shape Questionnaire (BSQ), and physical activity was estimated with the International Physical Activity (...) Questionnaire (IPAQ-SF). BMI was utilized as a measurement of body composition. Structural equation modeling was used to assess the results. Results: The resulting models showed good fit indexes. Physical activity had a positive and indirect effect on self-concept (β = 0.29, p < 0.01) and direct effects on dissatisfaction (β = -0.26, p < 0.01) and physical self-concept (β = 0.20, p < 0.01). BMI had a direct effect on dissatisfaction (β = 0.31, p < 0.01) and on physical self-concept (β = -0.10, p < 0.01) and an indirect effect on general self-concept (β = -0.24, p < 0.01). However, it was only associated with physical activity in males, playing a mediating role between physical activity and body dissatisfaction. Conclusion: Physical activity can help individuals to achieve a positive self-concept and promote psychological well-being in adolescents through the improvement of physical perceptions and body satisfaction. The importance of BMI, body dissatisfaction, and physical self-concept on the configuration of the self-concept are also emphasized. Educational policymakers and Physical Education teachers should implement strategies to promote physical activity in the schools and provide a Quality Physical Education programs to increase physical activity during adolescence. (shrink)

Two paradigms have guided emotion research over the past decades. The dual-system view embraces the long-held Western belief, espoused most prominently by decision-making and social cognition researchers, that emotion and reason are often at odds. The integrative view, which asserts that emotion and cognition work synergistically, has been less explored experimentally. However, the integrative view (a) may help explain several findings that are not easily accounted for by the dual-system approach, and (b) is better supported by a growing body of (...) evidence from human neuroanatomy that has often been overlooked by experimental neuroscience. (shrink)

The imperative to practice hospitality constitutes a mark of Western civilization. Already in Homer’s Odyssey, the hero Ulysses punishes Polyphemus for not having respected the obligation of hospitality towards him and his companions. In fact, hospitality has been a constitutive element of the West, marked by linguistic, cultural, and religious differences, in a world whose borders are supposed to be well defined. In his discussion of hospitality, Derrida shows how Socrates, in Plato’s dialogue The Apology of Socrates, places himself in (...) the position of a foreigner. In fact, Socrates presents himself as foreigner, that is, someone who is alien to the language and procedures of the court that is judging him. According to Derrida, he shows, in this way, the extent to which the foreigner is forced to ask for hospitality in a language he does not know. The court reduces Socrates to the other, the different. Moreover, the court forces him to deny his difference, his own identity, asking him to adapt himself to a system that he does not control. The paradox arises when Socrates, who regrets being regarded as a foreigner, asks the court to treat him at least as a foreigner. He feels so outraged that he asks to be granted at least the rights of a non-national. In doing so, Socrates shows how recognizing the rights of the foreigner generates hospitality but, at the same time, also limits it. Whenever a human being is recognized as human being, he or she will necessarily be seen as another, as someone different. This person will have to adapt him or herself to a system, culture or world that will define him or her as a foreigner. In short, in the phenomena that we tend to see as hospitality there is always a certain hostility. In a world of ongoing migratory crises, and in the context of a return to nationalisms of exclusion combined with populisms of prejudice and aversion to those who are different, it becomes imperative to rethink the ethics and politics of hospitality. In this context, Derrida’s distinction between conditioned and unconditioned hospitality can be useful. (shrink)

An overview of the latest interdisciplinary research on human morality, capturing moral sensibility as a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms. Over the past decade, an explosion of empirical research in a variety of fields has allowed us to understand human moral sensibility as a sophisticated integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms shaped through evolution, development, and culture. Evolutionary biologists have shown that moral cognition evolved to aid cooperation; developmental psychologists have demonstrated that the elements that underpin (...) morality are in place much earlier than we thought; and social neuroscientists have begun to map brain circuits implicated in moral decision making. This volume offers an overview of current research on the moral brain, examining the topic from disciplinary perspectives that range from anthropology and neurophilosophy to justice and law. The contributors address the evolution of morality, considering precursors of human morality in other species as well as uniquely human adaptations. They examine motivations for morality, exploring the roles of passion, extreme sacrifice, and cooperation. They go on to consider the development of morality, from infancy to adolescence; findings on neurobiological mechanisms of moral cognition; psychopathic immorality; and the implications for justice and law of a more biological understanding of morality. These new findings may challenge our intuitions about society and justice, but they may also lead to more a humane and flexible legal system. Contributors Scott Atran, Abigail A. Baird, Nicolas Baumard, Sarah Brosnan, Jason M. Cowell, Molly J. Crockett, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Andrew W. Delton, Mark R. Dadds, Jean Decety, Jeremy Ginges, Andrea L. Glenn, Joshua D. Greene, J. Kiley Hamlin, David J. Hawes, Jillian Jordan, Max M. Krasnow, Ayelet Lahat, Jorge Moll, Caroline Moul, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Laurent Prétôt, Jesse Prinz, David G. Rand, Rheanna J. Remmel, Emma Roellke, Regina A. Rini, Joshua Rottman, Mark Sheskin, Thalia Wheatley, Liane Young, Roland Zahn. (shrink)

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...) in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism. Contributors to Volume 3 Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn. (shrink)

Relational Quantum Mechanics is an interpretation of quantum theory based on the idea of abolishing the notion of absolute states of systems, in favor of states of systems relative to other systems. Such a move is claimed to solve the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, RQM has been argued to account for all quantum correlations without invoking non-local effects and, in spite of embracing a fully relational stance, to successfully explain how different observers exchange information. In this work, (...) we carry out a thorough assessment of RQM and its purported achievements. We find that it fails to address the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics—related to the lack of clarity in its ontology and the rules that govern its behavior—and that it leads to serious conceptual problems of its own. We also uncover as unwarranted the claims that RQM can correctly explain information exchange among observers, and that it accommodates all quantum correlations without invoking non-local influences. We conclude that RQM is unsuccessful in its attempt to provide a satisfactory understanding of the quantum world. (shrink)

Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and his collaborators. While an expression will (...) be considered formally nonsensical if the formal criteria required for the assignment of any truth-value (whether true, false, pragmatically true, or pragmatically false) to such sentence are not met, a (well-formed) formula will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the pragmatic criteria (inscribed within the context of scientific practice) required for the assignment of any truth-value to such sentence are not met. Thus, in the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, any (well-formed) formula of a formal language interpreted on a simple pragmatic structure will be considered pragmatically nonsensical if the set of primary sentences of such structure is not well-built, that is, if it does not include the relevant observational data and/or theoretical results, or if it does include sentences that are inconsistent with such data. (shrink)

While the failure of the so-called classical theory of concepts - according to which definitions are the proper way to characterize concepts - is a consensus, metaphysical philosophy of religion still deals with the concept of God in a predominantly definitional way. It thus seems fair to ask: Does this failure imply that a definitional characterization of the concept of God is equally untenable? The first purpose of this paper is to answer this question. I focus on the representational side (...) of the matter. My goal is to analyze the extent to which the most important problems raised against the classical view of concepts affect a definitional-representational approach to the concept of God. The second purpose of the paper is to deepen into these issues, arguing for a pluralistic view of concepts and outlining a hybrid special theory of concepts, called the theory of ideal concepts. The theory is special because it deals with a special sort of concepts that I call ideal concepts; it is hybrid because, in addition to definitions, it uses another structure in the characterization of concepts: ideals. My goal is to argue that when applied to the concept of God and added to a pluralistic view of concepts, this theory can function as a tenable representational theory of the concept of God. (shrink)

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists (...) in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The neuroscience of morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development undertaken only in 2001. The contributors to volume 3 sample the best work in this very new field, discussing a variety of approaches, including functional imaging, lesion studies, abnormal psychology, and developmental neuroscience. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author of the original essay. Topics include the neural basis of moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparisons of normal adult moral judgments with those made by children, adolescents, and people with psychopathy, brain damage, and autism. Contributors to volume 3:_ _Abigail Baird, William Casebeer, Cordelia Fine, Nathan Fox, Uta Frith, Jordan Grafman, Joshua Greene, Catherine Hynes, Fatima Azavedo Ignacio, Richard Joyce, Jerome Kagan, Leonard Katz, Kent Kiehl, Jeanette Kennett, Melanie Killen, Daniel Lapsley, Heidi Maibom, Victoria McGeer, John Mikhail, Jorge Moll, Shaun Nichols, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Adina Roskies, Jana Schaich Borg, Katrina Sifferd, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Michael Smith, Mark Timmons, Frederick de Vignemont, Paul Whalen, Roland Zahn. (shrink)

This article addresses a classical question: Can a machine use language meaningfully and if so, how can this be achieved? The first part of the paper is mainly philosophical. Since meaning implies intentionality on the part of the language user, artificial systems which obviously lack intentionality will be `meaningless'. There is, however, no good reason to assume that intentionality is an exclusively biological property and thus a robot with bodily structures, interaction patterns and development similar to those of human beings (...) would constitute a system possibly capable of meaning – a conjecture supported through a Wittgenstein-inspired thought experiment. The second part of the paper focuses on the empirical and constructive questions. Departing from the principle of epigenesis stating that during every state of development new structure arises on the basis of existing structure plus various sorts of interaction, a model of human cognitive and linguistic development is proposed according to which physical, social and linguistic interactions between the individual and the environment have their respective peaks in three consecutive stages of development: episodic, mimetic and symbolic. The transitions between these stages are qualitative, and bear a similarity to the stages in phylogenesis proposed by Donald and Deacon. Following the principle of epigenetic development, robotogenesis could possibly recapitulate ontogenesis, leading to the emergence of intentionality, consciousness and meaning. (shrink)

Neste artigo mostra-se os resultados de uma busca em bases de dados internacionais sobre a teoria do agir comunicativo de Habermas na área da Administração de Organizações. A teoria de Habermas foi desenvolvida após a sua guinada linguística, de ruptura com a filosofia da consciência e a metafísica em 1981. Nela os usos da linguagem são modos de expressão e representação, mas também modo de construção de vínculos sociais. A partir desta teoria, Habermas desenvolve a ideia de discurso como agir (...) comunicativo orientado para o entendimento, e elabora uma ética do discurso e uma política deliberativa. A entrada da obra de Habermas na Administração antecede a sua guinada linguística, e deve ser destacado o uso da sua tese "Mudança estrutural da esfera pública". Neste artigo quer-se destacar as relações estabelecidas entre a filosofia da linguagem e a Administração, tanto em acordos teóricos quanto práticos. Entre os aspectos teóricos destaca-se os estudos teóricos do conhecimento, incluindo a epistemologia. Entre os aspectos práticos estão as questões da filosofia prática, a ética e a política. Quer-se assim apresentar o potencial da filosofia de Habermas para pesquisa e trabalho na Administração de Organizações. (shrink)

O objetivo é analisar algumas interpretações conexas que giram em torno da tensão entre duas concepções da díke em Édipo Rei. Como as tragédias ocupavam um papel privilegiado na pólis ateniense, pode-se dizer que as exibições e festividades trágicas eram uma verdadeira instituição política. Não por acaso se pode afirmar que as peças apontavam para um conflito entre os valores aristocráticos tradicionais e a nova ordem democrática. Tal tensão pode ser evidenciada na investigação promovida por Édipo que se manifesta em (...) duas formas de justiça, uma de origem divina e outra, humana. Para tanto, este texto, em um primeiro momento, descreve a relação entre tragédia e pólis; após essa introdução, assinala o conflito que se desenhava na democracia e que se reflete nas tragédias; por fim, examina a possível articulação racional entre a díke tradicional e sua contrapartida humana. (shrink)

Is the no-minimum claim true? I have argued that it is not. Andrew Cullison contends that my argument fails, since human sentience is variable; while Michael Schrynemakers has contended that the failure is my neglect of vagueness. Both, I argue, are wrong.

It is widely thought that God must love each and every human to the same depth and degree. This proposition plays a prominent role in influential versionsof the problem of evil, and in theistic attempts to answer the problem of evil. A common reason cited in support of the idea of God’s loving equally every human is that a perfect being would possess every great-making property and loving equally every human would be a great-making property. It is the argument of (...) this essay, however, that a perfect being cannot in principle equally love every human. This argument is erected upon an unnoticed principle of perfect being theology: for all properties F, if F is a deficiency when had by a human, then F cannot be great-making when had by God. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to clarify or explicate the concept of theodicy. More specifically, I shall provide an account of the concept that takes its logical aspects seriously into consideration as well as satisfies the basic intuitions philosophers of religions have had about it. This shall be done by systematically analysing the several theodical conditions found in the literature. As it shall be seen, these conditions are logically related to one another; collectively, they point not to one, but (...) to several concepts of theodicy. Thus, as by-product of this explicatory endeavour, I shall provide a logically guided, I may say, analysis of such conditions as well as a systematization of the theodical concepts arising from them. I shall follow what might be termed a semiformal approach; despite not developing a full logical theory, I use the standard notation and some important results from the field of formal logic. (shrink)

Brain death, or death by neurological criteria (BD/DNC) is the permanent loss of brain function as defined by an unresponsive coma, loss of brainstem reflexes, and the ability to breathe without me...

Este artículo muestra varios detalles para entender la compleja figura de Ariadna en el pensamiento de Nietzsche, pero que va más allá del autor alemán y se sumerge en ciertos momentos de Ariadna, desde lo etimológico a Otto pasando por Ovidio y Catulo, para dar cuenta de una Ariadna que es la compañera del dios Diónysos y que en cierta forma posibilita la propia verdad del dios; lo que Nietzsche llamaría “eterno retorno”.

How can students’ character formation be supported such that their youthful energy can become a force for the good? There is burgeoning research on how universities can help form people of character (Brooks et al. in _International_ _Journal of Ethics Education_ 4(2):167–182, 2019 ; Lamb et al. in _Journal of Moral Education_ 1–23, 2021b ). Nongovernmental organizations can also play a role. This article explores how a leadership program for students in the Philippines cultivates character using as theoretical framework the (...) 7 strategies of character development presented in Lamb et al. in _Journal of Character Education_ 17(1):81–108, 2021a. Upon examination of how the strategies are integrated, recommendations for improvement of the program design are given. (shrink)

This article reflects on how the issue of the Real allows us to rethink the human of today in a more complete and up-to-date way. And for this purpose, two apparently dissimilar perspectives of understanding the Real are discussed: that of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, which is rooted in Lacan’s psychoanalysis, and that of the Spanish philosopher Xavier Zubiri, which is born from a deep critical dialogue with Heidegger’s ontology. This paper will show the unity of two visions of (...) the Real that lie at the heart of what is human and that allow us to criticize certain very influential psychoanalytic thought, centred on Jacques-Alain Miller, which cannot account for what is happening to us radically in the current era, or, perhaps, in any era. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at introducing the ontological argument through the analysis of five historical developments: Anselm’s argument found in the second chapter of his Proslogion, Gaunilo’s criticism of it, Descartes’ version of the ontological argument found in his Meditations on First Philosophy, Leibniz’s contribution to the debate on the ontological argument and his demonstration of the possibility of God, and Kant’s famous criticisms against the (cartesian) ontological argument. Second, it intends to critically examine (...) the enterprise of formally analyzing philosophical arguments and, as such, contribute in a small degree to the debate on the role of formalization in philosophy. My focus will be mainly on the drawbacks and limitations of such enterprise; as a guideline, I shall refer to a Carnapian, or Carnapian-like theory of argument analysis. (shrink)

This article looks at the complexity of the thought processes that lead Seneca's Oedipus to choose the mors longa of blindness as punishment for his crime. It offers an analysis of the consolation of this existence on the threshold between life and death, notably with reference to the end of the Oedipus, but also of the sorrow of this liminal existence. The latter is described in Seneca's Phoenissae, which suggests an escape, by death stricto sensu, from the threshold represented by (...) blindness, by which Oedipus now feels trapped.By examining these three topics, the article shows how the threshold between life and death which Oedipus chooses at the end of Seneca's Oedipus and experiences in the Phoenissae mirrors the ambivalence and the errors of his life before he blinded himself. Ultimately, it also illustrates Oedipus’ continuing failure to achieve self-knowledge. (shrink)

With the aim of ascertaining if child-to-parent offenders have impairments in the executive functions and psychological maladjustment, and to quantify the potential harm and epidemiology, a field study was designed. As for this, 76 juvenile offenders sentenced for child-to-parent violence were assessed in executive functions and psychological adjustment. The results showed valid responses for 75 juveniles and that data were not generally biased in line with defensiveness or malingering. In psychological adjustment, the results revealed a significantly higher maladjustment among offenders (...) on all the basic clinical scales with 23% more symptoms of hysteria than the normative population, 37% more of depressive symptoms, 44% more of hypochondriac symptoms, 68% more of psychopathic deviation symptoms, 46% more of paranoid symptoms, 26% more of psychasthenic symptoms, 24% more symptoms of schizophrenia, 17% more symptoms of hypomania, and 13% more symptoms of social introversion. Epidemiologically, the prevalence rates of clinical deterioration were significantly greater than expected in hypochondria, depression, hysteria, psychopathic deviation, paranoia, psychasthenia, and schizophrenia. As for the cognitive functions, the offenders exhibited impairments estimated at 62.0% in word reading, 47.9% in color naming, 45.8% in color-word, and 11.9% in interference and a significantly higher prevalence of caseness than expected in word reading, color naming, and color-word. The implications of the results for intervention are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, I present a defense of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase “plausible concept”: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument based on the (...) debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta a teoria supervalorativista da vagueza e discute a objecção, que frequentemente lhe é dirigida, segundo a qual essa teoria não consegue dar conta do fenómeno da vagueza de ordem superior.

This paper is about David Gauthier’s concept of constrained maximization. Attending to his most detailed and careful account, I try to say how constrained maximization works, and how it might be changed to work better. In section I, that detailed account is quoted along with amplifying passages. Difficulties of interpretation are explained in section II. An articulation, a spelling out, of Gauthier's account is offered in section III to deal with these difficulties. Next, in section IV, constrained maximization thus articulated (...) is tested on several choice problems and shown to be seriously wanting. It appears that there are prisoners’ dilemmas in which constrained maximizers would not cooperate to mutual advantage, but would interact sub-optimally just as straight-maximizers would. ‘Coordination problems’ are described with which constrained maximizers might, especially if transparent to one another, not be able to cope–problems in which they might not be able to make up their minds to do anything at all. And I prove that there are prisoners’ dilemmas that, though possible for real agents and for straight maximizers, are not possible for constrained maximizers, so that agents’ internalising dispositions of constrained maximization could not be of help in connection with such possibly impending dilemmas. Taking constrained maximization as it stands, there are many problems for which it does not afford the ‘moral solutions’ with which Gauthier would have it replace Hobbesian political ones. After displaying these shortcomings of constrained maximization as presently designed, I sketch, in section V, possible revisions that would reduce them, stressing that these revisions would not be cost-free. Whether finishing the job of fixing up and making precise constrained maximization would be worth the considerable trouble it would involve lies beyond the issues taken up in this paper. So, of course, do substantive comparisons of constrained maximization, perfected and made precise, and straight maximization. (shrink)

The semantic paradoxes are a family of arguments – including the liar paradox, Curry’s paradox, Grelling’s paradox of heterologicality, Richard’s and Berry’s paradoxes of definability, and others – which have two things in common: first, they make an essential use of such semantic concepts as those of truth, satisfaction, reference, definition, etc.; second, they seem to be very good arguments until we see that their conclusions are contradictory or absurd. These arguments raise serious doubts concerning the coherence of the concepts (...) involved. This article will offer an introduction to some of the main theories that have been proposed to solve the paradoxes and avert those doubts. Included is also a brief history of the semantic paradoxes from Eubulides to Tarski and Curry. (shrink)

Resumen La parrhesía constituye una práctica de "decir veraz" que Michel Foucault investiga en sus últimos seminarios del Colegio de Francia, como una de las maneras originales de constitución de uno mismo en la cultura grecolatina antigua. En este trabajo, dicha noción de parrhesía es desplegada en toda su contemporaneidad política y se afirma que constituye un complemento fundamental para la tesis agonísitica de la democracia, en especial la defendida por Chantal Mouffe. El "decir veraz" del parrhesiasta, al interpelar de (...) manera radical el statu quo de la identidad colectiva constituida en el proceso de politización propio de la democracia radical, subvierte y transforma dicha identidad en un objeto permanente de disputa. Se recupera así el sentido del polemos propio de la práctica democrática.The parrhesia is a practice of "true-telling" that Michel Foucault researches in his last courseof the College of France, as one of the most singulars ways of becoming oneself in the ancient Greco Latin culture. In this paper, such notion of parrhesia is developed in its whole political contemporaneity, and it is assumed as a key component for the agonistic thesis of democracy, especially in Chantal Mouffe's work. The "true-telling" of parrhesiast, while contesting in a radical way the status quo of the collective identity formed in the own process of politization of radical democracy, it subverts and transform this given identity in an object of constant dispute. The polemos sense characteristic of democracy is in that way recovered. (shrink)

La parrhesía constituye una práctica de “decir veraz” que Michel Foucault investiga genealógicamente en sus últimos seminarios del Colegio de Francia, como una de las maneras originales de constitución de uno mismo en la cultura grecolatina antigua. En este trabajo, dicha noción de parrhesía es desplegada en toda su contemporaneidad política, afirmándose que constituye un complemento fundamental para la tesis agonísitica de la democracia, en especial la defendida por Chantal Mouffe. El “decir veraz” del parrhesiasta, al interpelar de manera radical (...) el statu quo de la identidad colectiva constituida en el proceso de politización propio de la democracia radical, subvierte y transforma dicha identidad en un objeto permanente de disputa. Se recupera así el sentido del polemos propio de la práctica democrática. (shrink)

Resumen: En Towards a genealogy of pharmaceutical practice, sostuvimos que la práctica farmacológica daba lugar a un nuevo tipo de biopoder, con tecnologías y racionalidades propias, que lo distinguían del biopoder que había reconocido Michel Foucault en su trabajo tardío. Pero también sostuvimos que su contracara era la generación de nuevas formas de resistencia. En este artículo presentaremos dos modelos específicos de resistencias producidos por el dispositivo del poder farmacológico: uno, que tiene como caso básico el de los movimientos proanorexia, (...) que operan resignificando la categoría misma de la patología “anoréxica” a base del fármaco Xenical; otro, que tiene referencia en la experiencia relatada por Beatriz Preciado en su libro Testo yonqui y que actúa superando los límites legales, médicos y morales, para arrojarse a la producción de una nueva identidad jamás antes trazada al consumir dosis no permitidas de testosterona en gel.: In a previous work, we have argued that pharmacological practice has given rise to a new type of biopower, with specific technologies and rationalities, distinguishing it from the biopower that Michel Foucault recognised in his later work. However, we also argued that another effect has been the creation of new forms of resistance. In this article, we present two specific models of resistance created by the apparatus of pharmacological power: one, inspired by pro-anorexia movements, which operates by resignifying the pathological categorization of anorexia using the drug Xenical; another, based on the experience outlined by Beatriz Preciado in her 2008 book Testo Junkie, which operates by overcoming legal, medical and moral limits to create a ground-breaking new identity by consuming prohibited doses of gel testosterone. (shrink)

Following Foucault’s work on disciplinary power and biopolitics, this article maps an initial cartography of the research areas to be traced by a genealogy of pharmacological practice. Pharmacology, as a practical activity, refers to the creation, production and sale of drugs/medication. This work identifies five lines of research that, although often disconnected from each other, may be observed in the specialized literature: pharmaceuticalization; regulation of the pharmaceutical industry; the political-economic structure of the pharmaceutical industry; consumption/consumerism of medications; and bio-knowledge. The (...) article suggests that a systematic analysis of these areas leads one to consider pharmacological practice a sui generis apparatus of power, which reaches beyond the purely disciplinary and biopolitical levels to encompass molecular configurations, thereby giving rise not only to new types of government over life, but also to new struggles for life, extending from molecular to population-wide levels. (shrink)

Este número de Análisis Filosófico, como el anterior, presenta trabajos elaborados en homenaje a Eugenio Bulygin, la mayoría de los cuales fueron presentados en el Seminario organizado por la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico en octubre de 2012. Habida cuenta que en ese material se discuten tópicos de las más diversa índole, se ha optado por incluirlos en los dos números siguiendo el orden alfabético de sus autores.

Eugenio Bulygin mantiene la tesis según la cual la objetividad del derecho depende de la objetividad del conocimiento del derecho. Esta tesis depende de la distinción entre las normas y las proposiciones normativas. las proposiciones normativas son las que tienen que expresar ese conocimiento, en cuanto son aptas para ser verdaderas o falsas, a la inversa de las normas. Así, esa objetividad es una función de las condiciones de verdad de esas proposiciones. Como, además, según Bulygin, solo existen hechos en (...) la dimensión empírica, esas condiciones solo pueden referirse a esa clase de circunstancias. Sin embargo, se sostiene en este artículo, la distinción kelseniana entre sentidos subjetivos y objetivos y la idea correlativa de "validez normativa" plantean un problema a esa manera de entender las proposiciones normativas, a la hora de explicar la objetividad del derecho. Eugenio Bulygin supports the thesis according to which the objectivity of law depends on the objectivity of the knowledge of law. This thesis depends on the distinction between norms and normative propositions. Normative propositions are those that must express this knowledge, insofar as they are apt to be true or false, contrary to norms. Thus, this objectivity is a function of the truth conditions of these propositions. Also, as facts only exist in the empirical dimension according to Bulygin, these conditions can only refer to this class of circumstances. However, the Kelsenian distinction between subjective and objective senses and the idea of "normative validity", this article claims, poses a problem for this way of understanding normative propositions when it comes to explaining the objectivity of law. (shrink)