Weder der offizielle Staat noch die Gesellschaft, und besonders die Schriftsteller, scheinen im Byzanz zu betonen oder zu erkennen, daß die Fälschung bzw. das «Plagiat» ein strafbares Vergehen – der herrschenden Meinung der Neuzeit gemäß – ausmacht. Das «Plagiat» hat meines Wissens die Forscher der byzantinischen Literatur nicht so beschäftigt, daß die Arbeiten von Stemplinger und Ziegler über das Plagiat in der Antike auch für Byzanz fortgesetzt würden. Weder Franz Dölger noch Sp. Troianos und K. Pitsakis, die sich mit den (...) unechten bzw. gefälschten juristischen und anderen offiziellen Schriften befaßten, haben das «Plagiat» bei den byzantinischen Autoren speziell behandelt. Und doch gibt es Anzeichen dafür, daß beim Verfassen eines neuen Werkes frühere Schriften oder Werke von ähnlichem Inhalt in größerem Ausmaß herangezogen wurden. (shrink)

Within the bosom of the humanities philosophy reposes and, as an academic field, it is ever so often criticized for its aloofness. In a recent book, Roudometof and Dessi (2022, 9-10) politely quip that philosophy’s engagement with the “glocal” has been “resilient,” transacted mostly “without encroaching on other fields.” Philosophy’s ostensible remoteness stems in part from its institutional affiliation with, cultivation and deployment of often forbiddingly technical tools of logical analysis. Although the academic field comprises a manifold of specialities, with (...) resentment often arising against prohibitively technical branches, I narrow my focus to an understanding of “philosophy” as an activity engrossed in logical analysis, and I will plead as defence of this avowed postulation that by so doing, operationally as it were, I can argue that philosophy can make critical and salutary contributions to the burgeoning field of glocalization studies, which is so ably canvassed in the book edited by Roudometof and Dessi. Notwithstanding the promissory note offered above, and since my definition of philosophy may seem unduly restrictive, it is incumbent on me to disambiguate across related notions and to make an initial case as to both the plausibility and arguable pay-offs from taking philosophy in the way I just adumbrated. This is a substantive issue as it relates to a case I will be making as to what philosophy may have to offer to the study of glocalization. (shrink)

This paper considers characteristic views advanced in the past fifteen years that may be considered relatively sympathetic to student practices of cheating on graded assignments or exams. We detect and analyze typical fallacies that are recurrent in articles that promote a revisionist view of cheating as morally permissible. We offer a general, deontological argument that cheating is immoral. The efforts to justify student cheating take several forms. For example, it has been argued that cheating may be tolerated if the student (...) did not intend to cheat, perhaps because of a failure to understand the normal rules or expected procedures. We also argue that student collaboration in graded work constitutes cheating even if the instructor condones such collaboration. In a similar vein, we address the view that student copying is cheating even if the instructor alters the rules to allow such copying. This moral view can be applied to any cheating behavior, we argue. As a specific example, we demonstrate how it can be applied to the pedagogical recommendation that instructors should encourage their students to cheat in order to cultivate student skills in the area of cyber security. We also address the view that student cheating can be justified by situations in which the student believes that he/she is being subjected to an unfair or unethical overall learning environment. (shrink)

Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental (...) action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment.In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways.In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention. (shrink)

This essay scrutinizes certain cardinal themes of Book VI of Plato’s Republic. After a brief inquiry into, and defense of the cogency of, the preliminary methodological groundwork for the study of Platonic dialogues and their sections, the essay probes into the VIth book.

This essay scrutinizes certain cardinal themes of Book VI of Plato’s Republic. After a brief inquiry into, and defense of the cogency of, the preliminary methodological groundwork for the study of Platonic dialogues and their sections, the essay probes into the VIth book.

_First English translation of Nikos Kazantzakis’s 1909 doctoral dissertation on Nietzsche._.

Plato inaugurated the Western tradition of political philosophy in his effort to vindicate the memory of Socrates and prevent future persecutions of philosophy. To attain this double objective, Plato embedded teachings and distributed themes with a view to appropriately revealing and withholding insights. The ultimate crucible for heuristically testing this Platonic method is Plato's distribution of themes of eros and force. Eros and force parallel the two cardinal features of the erotic Socrates who was suspected of guiding ambitious youths to (...) demagogic careers. Plato's metaphysics, dominated by his theory of Forms or Ideas, similarly originated in indignation at Socrates' legal murder and anguish about the future of philosophy. By positing fixed, eternal, and immutable standards, Plato seeks to preempt the litigious excesses, oratorical shenanigans and legalistic leeway that once made it possible to charge and convict Socrates. The reference of what is actual to a transcendent standard of truth served also to usher in the western tradition of textual embeddedness of meanings. This means that original political philosophy, understood as Platonic philosophy, is a relationship between form and content---between "how" something is articulated in writing and "what" is written. After the onslaught of the diagnostic critique of western thought, unleashed mainly by Nietzsche and Heidegger, the revival of esotericism in our century has been useful in unlocking Platonic interpretation and in showing Plato's text to be dependent on an inextricable interweaving between form and content. (shrink)

First English translation of Nikos Kazantzakis’s 1909 doctoral dissertation on Nietzsche.

Im Rahmen psychiatrischer Behandlungen ergeben sich immer wieder Situationen, in denen ärztliche Interventionen zwar dringend erforderlich sind, die Patientinnen und Patienten aber krankheitsbedingt nicht aufgeklärt in die Behandlung einwilligen können oder sie sogar ablehnen. In dem Beitrag soll erstens gezeigt werden, dass es sich bei derartigen Situationen tatsächlich um moralische Dilemmata handelt. Das liegt daran, dass das medizinethische Prinzip, Behandlungen nur nach aufgeklärter Einwilligung durchzuführen, nicht nur auf dem Recht auf Selbstbestimmung beruht, sondern auch auf dem Recht auf Integrität des (...) Körpers und der Intimsphäre sowie dem Recht, keinem Zwang ausgesetzt zu werden. Alle drei Rechte sind wiederum eng mit dem Schutz der Würde der Patienten verbunden. Zweitens soll gezeigt werden, dass der Abschluss von Behandlungsvereinbarungen einen ethisch attraktiven Ausweg aus derartigen Dilemmata bieten kann, weil Behandlungsvereinbarungen eine Unterform sogenannter Odysseus-Verträge sind, die dazu geeignet sind, auch im Rahmen von Zwangsmaßnahmen die Würde der Patientinnen und Patienten zu wahren. (shrink)

The article shows that Odysseus in Sophocles’ _Ajax_ and _Philoctetes_ is at the centre of a redefinition of the concept of “nobility”. This figure has been seen to promote a new definition of the concept, but previous analyses tended to focus only on one or the other of the two plays, as Odysseus appeared too dissimilar to be considered from the same viewpoint. A closer analysis reveals that he defends the same values and is endowed with the same (...) non-élite features in both plays. Among those values is the idea that nobility has nothing to do with descent, but with the ability at proving helpful to the whole social group. The perception other characters have of Odysseus, however, changes between the first and the second play. This change can be linked to the evolution of Athenian society. With the development of democracy, non-élite citizens redefined concepts such as _eugeneia_. (shrink)

Was Odysseus to Achilleus “as hateful as the gates of Hades”? This is the implication of the prevailing tenor in the exegesis of Il. 9.312-13 from antiquity to the present: that Achilleus is referring to Odysseus, when he states that he detests like “the gates of Hades that man who hides one thing deep in his heart and speaks forth another”. Going one better, an influential school in North American Homeric studies has made the poet himself share Achilleus’ (...) assumed detestation of Odysseus. The very eccentricity of this view and the extraordinary vehemence of this school’s disparagement of Odysseus have had the salutary effect that some doubt has settled on the communis opinio. The exegesis of the couplet Il. 9.312-313 can now pass for a modern zêtêma, involving, as will become evident, larger questions of Homeric hjqopoiiva and μίμησις πράζεως. This is a zêtêma that must be resolved; and the good news is that it can be. (shrink)

The paper proposes a solution to the problem with Odysseus’ kingship in the Odyssey by maintaining that Odysseus is not officially considered dead. Consequently, Telemachus cannot inherit the position of king and Penelope must leave Odysseus’ household before remarrying. After discussing the modern concept of legal death and previous interpretations of the Ithacan situation, the paper focusses on Athena's speech at 1.275–92. A close reading demonstrates that erecting a cenotaph to Odysseus would be tantamount to a (...) modern declaration of death in absentia, since it will render Penelope a widow and Telemachus the head of the household. This legal convention chimes with the Homeric depiction of Hades. (shrink)

:This essay provides a reading of Steve McQueen's critically acclaimed movie Hunger, which tells the story of the hunger strike of Bobby Sands in light of contemporary hunger strikes around the world and especially in Guantánamo. The central concern of the essay is to read Hunger together with Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment, showing how both works problematize the sacrificial subjectivity of enlightenment, its instrumental rationality, and sovereign temporality, while advancing a devastating critique of Western civilization. I argue that (...) Hunger situates the high-security prison within the self-destructive tendency of enlightenment and depicts how self-sacrificial resistance emerges as a response to sovereign domination. Interpreting the figure of Bobby Sands as the reversal of Odysseus in the encounter with the Sirens, I explore how insurgent sacrifice interrupts the dialectic of enlightenment and points to a new configuration of subjectivity and time. (shrink)

A number of recent papers have discussed the episode at Odyssey 10.156–72 in which Odysseus, on the third morning after landing on Circe's island, sees, kills, and transports a huge stag whose meat revives his men, who are exhausted in both body and spirit. Since the incident does not advance the main action, it invites interpretation, particularly since it is so richly elaborated. Naturally, it has received several: that the stag should be understood as a transformed human, and thus (...) prefigures the rest of the episode; that the incident marks the liminality of Odysseus, who is about to lose some of his manhood in remaining for a year on the island; that the stag derives from the magical animal which, in folktale, often leads the hero into the Otherworld or the Underworld; and that it serves, both within its immediate context and within the narrative as told to the Phaeacians, as a figure for heroic action, removed from the battlefield and rendered ‘urbane’ by its emphasis on the cleverness with which Odysseus transports the dead animal rather than on the actual killing. I would like to point to a completely different aspect of the episode and to suggest that although some of these studies may be true pointers to its origin, its function within the narrative is straightforward and does not in itself demand such elaborate interpretation: the incident with the stag belongs to a series of incidents that test the ability of Odysseus and his crew to obtain meat, and so develop central themes of feasting, social order, and leadership. (shrink)

A number of recent papers have discussed the episode atOdyssey10.156–72 in which Odysseus, on the third morning after landing on Circe's island, sees, kills, and transports a huge stag whose meat revives his men, who are exhausted in both body and spirit. Since the incident does not advance the main action, it invites interpretation, particularly since it is so richly elaborated. Naturally, it has received several: that the stag should be understood as a transformed human, and thus prefigures the (...) rest of the episode; that the incident marks the liminality of Odysseus, who is about to lose some of his manhood in remaining for a year on the island; that the stag derives from the magical animal which, in folktale, often leads the hero into the Otherworld or the Underworld; and that it serves, both within its immediate context and within the narrative as told to the Phaeacians, as a figure for heroic action, removed from the battlefield and rendered ‘urbane’ by its emphasis on the cleverness with which Odysseus transports the dead animal rather than on the actual killing. I would like to point to a completely different aspect of the episode and to suggest that although some of these studies may be true pointers to its origin, its function within the narrative is straightforward and does not in itself demand such elaborate interpretation: the incident with the stag belongs to a series of incidents that test the ability of Odysseus and his crew to obtain meat, and so develop central themes of feasting, social order, and leadership. (shrink)

This paper analyses the story of the ἀσκóς, which Aiolos presents to Odysseus and discusses its setting and background (Od. 10, 1-79). The general explanation of the ἀσκóς as a piece of wind magic is modified in favour of an Ancient Near Eastern background of the device. The ἀσκóς represents an inflated skin which, as opposed to the Aegean, was a common device to traverse the rivers and canals in the Middle East. Around 700 B.C.E., in the reign of (...) the Assyrian king Sennacherib, a new type of inflated skin was introduced which was much larger and made of cattle hide. Such plump hides are depicted on Neo-Assyrian reliefs where they are presented as fully inflated and lying on rafts. It is argued that the awareness of such hides triggered the story of the ἀσκóς, which transfered the inflated skin into an entirely new setting. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Odysseus-Verfügung ist als besondere Form der Patientenverfügung zumindest in der Literatur hinlänglich bekannt. Die Verwendung des Begriffs und damit sein Gegenstandsbereich sind hingegen noch immer umstritten. Zudem wird oft nicht beachtet, dass es innerhalb dieses Gegenstandsbereichs Varianten von OVs zu differenzieren gilt, die sich auch in ihrer moralischen Rechtfertigung unterscheiden. Nicht zuletzt ist die Grundstrukturstruktur dieser Rechtfertigung umstritten. Vor diesem Hintergrund plädieren wir im Folgenden zunächst für eine Eingrenzung des Begriffs, mit der argumentative und klinisch-praktische Verwirrungen vermieden werden (...) können. Anschließend betrachten wir zwei Varianten von – Zwang legitimierenden – OVs, die sich in der individuellen Kompetenz des Destinatärs unterscheiden. Schließlich zeigen wir, dass deren Rechtfertigung ungeachtet des Umstandes, dass OVs auf Wiedererlangung der Urteils- und Steuerungsfähigkeit des Patienten angelegt sind, weder in einer gemutmaßten noch gar in einer faktischen retrospektiven Billigung von Zwang durch den Patienten liegt. Die primäre Legitimationsgrundlage von OVs besteht vielmehr in der ex ante erfolgenden Autorisierung durch den Betroffenen selbst. Die hier einzuräumende Autorität wiederum basiert auf dem Recht jeder Person auf lebensplanerische Selbstbestimmung. In einem kurzen abschließenden Teil skizzieren wir dann noch die besondere Bedeutung der Odysseus-Vereinbarung als einer Unterform der OV. (shrink)

Not very long ago, Plato'sSophistwas often presented as a dialogue devoted to the problem of being and not-being, entangled with limited success in an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Thanks to the renewal of interest in the dramatic form of Plato's dialogues, recent works have shown that this entanglement is far from ill-conceived or anecdotal. However, the inquiry into the sophist is itself introduced by another question, concerning the nature of the Stranger from Elea himself. I would like (...) to show that this question and the way in which it is raised in the prologue may themselves shed light on the relations between the many threads which run across this very complex dialogue. (shrink)

Odysseus has lived through many transformations since Homer commemorated him in the Odyssey. None of them, however, has made Homer obsolete. Both the Iliad and the Odyssey have been translated many times. By common consent of those competent to judge such matters, Robert Fagles has done a superb job with the Odyssey. Even before I read it, I heard it read by Ian McKellan. That was an eye-opener, or should I say ear-opener. It sounded as though that was the (...) natural way to come at it. The spaciousness, the contrast of tones alternating between casual, even rambling digression and the tightness of dramatic moments, the sense of intimacy a voice establishes—all these drew me into the poem and made me aware of new meanings, or forgotten relationships, that I would like to share. The Odyssey is so large and various that we need reminding of its riches. The only way to do this properly, it seems to me, is to travel along with Homer, hitting the highlights and commenting as I go. (shrink)

The law of England and Wales provides that an adult with capacity has the right to refuse medical treatment both contemporaneously and in an advance refusal. Legislation separates general advance refusals of treatment from advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment. The law, outlined in ss.24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, is stricter for creation of the latter. These sections brought with them a new age of interests by purporting to elevate individual autonomy as the primary concern. Beginning with (...) the classical tale of Odysseus and a general discussion of the value to be found in a law seeking to preserve individual autonomy, this thesis seeks to act as a critique of the current enactment in practice. The provisions are already under-used and under-applied; without change, they may never reach the stage where they are ethically and practically viable. It is argued that the advance refusals provisions are not taking full effect due to a combination of lacking moral grounding and general dismissal of key ethical dilemmas at the forefront of application. Building on this, the moral basis for this thesis is found in Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) which links directly with the general application of human rights. The PGC becomes a compass for determining how best to treat persons when addressing the three most prominent challenges faced by the 2005 Act which are: the debate between the conferred right of autonomy versus the right to life; the issue of personhood; and, the personal identity problem. Ultimately, unless framework provisions are strengthened, and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is rethought in light of prominent ethical, legal and social considerations, the constraints of the Act on paper will continue to suppress the important underlying values promulgating individual autonomy. (shrink)

’Aυαγυώρισις γàρ διόλov, says Aristotle of the Odyssey,2 and throughout the poem's second half, with which we are here concerned, there is indeed a series of progressive recognitions as Odysseus reveals himself to Telemachos, Eurykleia, Eumaios, the suitors, Penelope and finally Laertes. So the importance of the opposite is not surprising; without concealment and deception there could be no eventual recognition. Concealment is of course necessary if Odysseus is to survive in the face of so many enemies, as (...) Athena tells him. But in addition, in any work of imaginative literature, so long as the reader or audience is aware of the truth, concealment and unperceived identity open the door to all sorts of half-truths and ironies – possibilities most obviously explored in tragedy and later comedy, but also made use of in the Odyssey. The irony which may be inherent in the arrival of the ‘nameless stranger’ has been most thoroughly explored by Fenik;3 here we examine a further implication. (shrink)

Things in Homer cannot complain about a lack of attention. Nearly forty years ago, Jasper Griffin, in response to the oralist emphasis on composition and formulaic language, drew our attention to the many significant objects populating the Iliad and the Odyssey. Nestor's cup, for example, is so heavy that other men have difficulties to lift it; the cup illustrates the eminence of its owner who rubbed shoulders with the far greater heroes of the past. As Griffin demonstrated, Homer deftly uses (...) the significance of objects to enrich many scenes of his narrative. While the sceptre, symbol of the king's power, underscores the sorry figure cut by Agamemnon in Iliad Book 2, the washing places that Hector passes when he tries to escape Achilles generate a powerful tragic contrast to the battlefield chase in which he is now involved. Following Griffin's lead, scholars have closely examined things and their role in Homeric epic, notably their commemorative function: weapons and other objects have biographies and are therefore an important means of evoking the past besides song. (shrink)

From the Stoics, there follows a psychological tradition leading, through Hobbes and Leibniz, to Peirce and Dewey. These thinkers are drawn on to show the significance of the conception of thinking first articulated in the Odyssey. Homer's work inaugurates an approach that has provoked philosophical conflict persisting into the present, and opposition to pragmatism and Pragmatism can be discerned in prominent critiques of Homer and his hero which are analyzed and countered in this study.

In the Odyssey, there is a description of Odysseus being recognized by his age-old and decrepit dog Argos, whom he had reared and trained himself before his departure for Troy. This so-called Argos episode (Od. 17.290–327) is still famous today. It has been continuously treated by generations of scholars from antiquity to our time and served as an inspiration to both the visual arts and literature. The present article deals with the function and intended effects of the Argos scene. (...) After a brief synopsis of the position of this scene within the Odyssey as well as of its content and structure, the author discusses the role of dogs in the Iliad and the Odyssey. The focus of this article lies on the interpretations of the Argos scene, suggested by scholars so far, and on their review by means of a close reading to check their plausibility. (shrink)

In his celebrated article on the narrative technique of Odysseus' Wanderings (‘Ich-Erzählungen’) W. Suerbaum concludes that this character's narration is not essentially (‘wesentlich’) different from that of the primary narrator of theOdyssey(p. 163). Even though Odysseus is a first-person narrator and hence is subject to certain restrictions, these are almost completely counterbalanced by hisex eventuknowledge. For example, he can even report a conversation which took place on Olympus (12.376–88), because it was afterwards reported to him by Calypso, who (...) heard it from Hermes (12.389–90). He can also tell what went on in the minds of his companions (10.415–17), because they later told him what they had felt (10.419–21). Suerbaum's conclusion is shared by M. Fusillo (‘Ulysse contrôle toujours une vision panoramique avec focalisation zéro et ne la concentre pas en lui-même comme personnage’) and A. Heubeck, p. 11 (‘the form in which Odysseus is made to tell his story is entirely in harmony with the narrative style elsewhere’). (shrink)