A presente pesquisa realiza um estudo de caso de uma rádio transmitida por meio do aplicativo WhatsApp e suas dinâmicas interativas em páginas em redes sociais online. Entre os objetivos deste estudo de inspiração etnográfica de uma rádio segmentada estão a descrição e análise dos processos de transmissão, circulação da produção de textos audioverbovisuais, modelo de negócio e interação com os ouvintes usuários do aplicativo. Pretende-se compreender possíveis experiências de pessoas comuns em ambientes digitais que provocam tensões entre os modos (...) de fazer rádio, as tecnologias digitais, a visibilidade e o suposto empoderamento do ouvinte. (shrink)

Legally defining “death” in terms of brain death unacceptably obscures a value judgment that not all reasonable people would accept. This is disingenuous, and it results in serious moral flaws in the medical practices surrounding organ donation. Public policy that relies on the whole-brain concept of death is therefore morally flawed and in need of revision.

Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...) explain obligations and show that it solves this problem. (shrink)

The controversy over brain death and the dead donor rule continues unabated, with some of the same key points and positions starting to see repetition in the literature. One might wonder whether some of the participants are talking past each other, not all debating the same issue, even though they are using the same words (e.g., “death”). One reason for this is the complexity of the debate: It’s not merely about the nature of human life and death. Interwoven into this (...) debate are deep philosophical issues on realism, the normative/descriptive distinction, the relation of thought and language to the world, the mind–body problem, personhood, moral status, and the ethics of killing. There are also social and legal .. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p255 O artigo investiga se o naturalismo biológico (a solução de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo) pode ser considerado uma concepção fisicalista acerca da mente. Apesar de defender um fisicalismo a respeito dos particulares (seção 2), Searle adere ao argumento básico dos dualistas para a irredutibilidade das propriedades mentais (seção 3), e não consegue fundamentar sua alegação de que tal irredutibilidade é compatível com o fisicalismo (seção 4). Desse modo, sua teoria da mente se revela como um dualismo de (...) propriedades. (shrink)

There is consensus among computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers that good reasoning with qualitative beliefs must have the structural property of cumulative transitivity or, for short, cut. This consensus is typically explicitly argued for partially on the basis of practical and mathematical considerations. But the consensus is also implicit in the approach philosophers take to almost every puzzle about reasoning that involves multiple steps: philosophers typically assume that if each step in reasoning is acceptable considered on its own, the whole (...) chain of reasoning must also acceptable. In this paper I focus on whether there are good philosophical reasons for thinking that the consensus that good reasoning must satisfy cut is true. My central claim is that we should not accept the consensus—good reasoning might not satisfy cut. In particular, I consider four arguments for the consensus and explain why they are unpersuasive. (§2-5). I then show that the issue of whether good reasoning is cut turns on a substantive yet until now unnoticed question in epistemology (§6). (shrink)

Reasons can interact in a variety of ways to determine what we ought to do or believe. And there can be cases where two reasons to do an act or have a belief are individually worse than a reason to not do that act or have that belief, but the reasons together are better than the reason to not do that act or have that belief. So the reasons together―which we can call the accrual of those reasons—can have a strength (...) that is an increasing function of the strengths of the individual reasons. In this paper, we will look at how reasons determine what we ought to do and believe in cases where the accrual of reasons is relevant. Our focus will not primarily be on questions about the nature of individual reasons and their weight. Instead, we will at the outset rely on our pretheoretical grip on what reasons there are and how weighty they are individually and ask the more formal or structural question of how to determine the strength of their accrual based on these facts. In looking at these issues, my goal will not be anything as ambitious as developing a full theory of the accrual of reasons. Rather, my goal will be more modest: I will introducing some of the challenges for providing an adequate model and argue that a promising approach to resolving these challenges involves making use of the familiar distinction in moral philosophy between derivative and non-derivative normative notions. (shrink)

One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic (...) logic concerning the existence of conflicting obligations. The second problem arises from a tension between the fact that reasons can conflict and a model of how reasons explain ‘ought’s that has been widely accepted. Having presented each of these problems, I develop a unified solution to them that is informed by results in both ethics and deontic logic. An important implication of this solution is that we must distinguish between derivative and nonderivative reasons and revise our conception how it is that reasons explain ‘ought’s. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients (...) in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life, even in circumstances in which most would agree that that life is of no benefit to the patient. Finally, I address the objection that professional integrity overrides this limited obligation and find the objection unconvincing. In short, my aim in this essay is to see the concept of futility finally buried, once and for all. (shrink)

O objetivo desta pesquisa é averiguar se no caso específico brasileiro, a judicialização da política seria ou não uma relação de correspondência a uma condição de subsidiariedade das demandas sociais dentro da arena legislativa que tem como definição cumprir a função de representação do povo, ou seja, o Poder Legislativo segue uma lógica democrática procedimental que provoca a necessidade da atuação do Poder judiciário sobre demandas da sociedade civil?

A traditional picture is that cases of deontic constraints--- cases where an act is wrong (or one that there is most reason to not do) even though performing that act will prevent more acts of the same morally (or practically) relevant type from being performed---form a kind of fault line in ethical theory separating (agent-neutral) consequentialist theories from other ethical theories. But certain results in the recent literature, such as those due to Graham Oddie and Peter Milne in "Act and (...) Value", do not sit well this traditional wisdom. My aim in this paper is to argue that both the traditional wisdom and Oddie and Milne are mistaken. I begin by looking more closely at the traditional wisdom and why it fails (§1). Then I develop my account of this fault line in ethical theory and its importance (§2). Finally I show that a diagnosis of where Oddie and Milne go wrong follows as a corollary of this new account (§3). An important upshot will be that discussions of cases of deontic constraints would do best to focus on the account of the nature and importance of the cases identified in this paper rather than continuing to work with the mistaken traditional picture. (shrink)

In this chapter, we begin by sketching in the broadest possible strokes the ideas behind two formal systems that have been introduced with to goal of explicating the ways in which reasons interact to support the actions and conclusions they do. The first of these is the theory of defeasible reasoning developed in the seminal work of Pollock; the second is a more recent theory due to Horty, which adapts and develops the default logic introduced by Reiter to provide an (...) account of reasons. However, the implementations are complex enough, in both cases, to prevent anything more than this sketch. And we would not want to give the impression that we think that work on the logic of reasons must follow the path mapped out in either of these theories—indeed, we feel that the field is wide open. In the remainder of the chapter, therefore, will concentrate on a number of issues bearing on the logic of reasons that are either not treated in the work of Pollock and Horty, or whose treatment there is, we feel, either inadequate or incomplete. These are: first, the question of whether it is necessary to understand logical interactions among reasons themselves, rather than simply between reasons and the actions or conclusions they support, and if so, what principles might govern these interactions; second, priority relations among reasons and the notion of reason accrual; and third, some problems posed by undercutting defeat. (shrink)

A tese defendida no presente artigo é que a autoconsciência, na visão de Searle é uma caraterística do campo unificado de consciência. Após uma discussão de três distinções a respeito da consciência propostas por Rosenthal, é discutido o conceito de consciência de Searle – como um fenômeno qualitativo, subjetivo e unificado – e o caráter holístico desse conceito. A discussão que Searle faz dos conceitos de autoconsciência e de introspecção mostra que ele acredita que uma autoconsciência implícita é uma característica (...) constitutiva do campo unificado de consciência. (shrink)

Business ethics researchers and practitioners are interested in understanding the temporal mechanisms of various managerial activities, processes, and policies. In this direction, I borrow notions of time from Virginia Woolf’s _Mrs. Dalloway_ to examine how social time intersperses with the paid and (unpaid) care work of female employees during the pandemic. I explore how discussions of social time in connection to care work appear in newspaper discourses of “shecession”, i.e. the large-scale job/income losses experienced by women during the COVID-19 pandemic. (...) Since shecession is a byproduct of the pandemic times, exploring the role of time in it is crucial. In fact, my findings show that the macro social time of the pandemic affects working women with care responsibilities who are situated at the intersection of multiple vulnerable social categories by simultaneously being a penalizer and a lost opportunity. Similarly, I also find that the micro social times of working women embed, stratify, and synchronize differently during the pandemic when compared to normal times. Working women with care responsibilities are thus adversely affected by both micro and macro social time changes. My findings, therefore, could be instrumental in developing and implementing inclusive policies and processes in business organizations and labor markets. In so doing, my study also indicates how a consideration of social time enriches the application of care ethics in work contexts. Ultimately, this article is also about developing caring organizations, societies, and families which care for the caregivers (working women), since receiving care is a precondition of giving care. (shrink)

O artigo investiga a frequente alegação na literatura filosófica de que a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência é incoerente. Após um exame das teses básicas de sua teoria da mente , é discutida sua posição a respeito da identidade entre a consciência e a atividade cerebral . Da adesão de Searle a uma tese da identidade de ocorrências deve-se concluir que não há contradição entre esta tese e a irredutibilidade ontológica que ele defende. Porém, é possível deduzir (...) de sua teoria asserções que contradizem esta mesma teoria , uma vez que essa irredutibilidade resulta em um dualismo de propriedades. (shrink)

Entre os meses de outubro e novembro de 1983, Michel Foucault proferiu, em Berkeley, seisconferências, problematizando as relações do sujeito com a verdade, a partir do conceito grego deparresía (παρρησία). Essas conferências, como tantas outras que compunham uma série de cursosoferecidos pelo filósofo francês, foram gravadas, posteriormente, transcritas e organizadas em livrosque colaboram de modo singular com pesquisas até os dias atuais. As conferências foram editadas pelaUniversidade de Berkeley em 1985 e foram traduzidas no Brasil, ganhando formato de artigos, no (...) anode 2013, organizadas e publicadas pela equipe da Revista Prometeus, sob a coordenação do prof. Dr.Aldo Dinucci da Universidade Federal de Sergipe (UFS). (shrink)

A maternidade é uma das mais complexas conquistas da vida de uma mulher, entretanto, esta conquista nem sempre se dá de forma tranquila. Imprevistos podem acontecer no decorrer deste processo. Com o intuito de aprofundar o estudo acerca dos possíveis efeitos da prematuridade na relação mãe e filho,..

In an earlier study by Nair,1 undergraduate national servicemen were interviewed regarding their perceptions on their conscript experience and nation-building. The present study examines the congruent perceptions of military commanders in the context of social psychological theory and research. Twenty senior military commanders were selected to represent a cross-section of formations and appointments in the army. They were individually interviewed with particular reference to their recall of policies, procedures and practices in conscript service that might have a bearing on (...) nation- building. Verbatim transcriptions of each interview were scrutinized and responses coded and tallied. There was clear identification of the unifying effect of common barracks and training regimes across economic, ethnic and religious differences. The findings provide converging evidence for the presence of the psychological effects of superordinate goals,2 the minimal group paradigm, 3 and the contact hypothesis,4 serving to build a cohesive nation. There were also recurrent and converging attributions of the military experience resulting in national servicemen with the qualities of discipline, responsibility, team spiritedness and physical fitness. It was perceived that these acquired positive qualities were carried over to civilian life and characterized the Singapore workforce. (shrink)

We thank the authors of commentaries for their thoughtful discussion of our target article. Here we briefly summarize the points made in the target article (Nair-Collins and Joffe 2023). Then we em...

Some patients who have been diagnosed as “dead by neurologic criteria” continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of “brain death” or “brainstem death” is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be “dead” (...) would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called “whole brain death” laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either “brain death” or “brainstem death.”. (shrink)

A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation and moral emotions.

The didactic proposal of the post-constructivist (Grossi, 2005), takes into account the relationship between the subject, reality, others and the Other interior and considers the learning potential of all students. Its theoretical foundation is, among other things, the principle that learning is a social phenomenon, and that the spatial organization of the class, in groups of adults, promotes the teaching-learning process. Post-constructivism is a didactic proposition that allows us to respond to the purpose of teaching all students. This article on (...) group work in post-constructivism aims to analyze the change in posture of teachers, and the professional development that follows, and which demonstrates a break with the traditional form of education. The trick of the identified researcher is then to take up in a teacher training, through the aulic groups in the Geempa class and the weekly study group, the scientific approach of post-constructivism. (shrink)

Coproduction of public policy involves bringing together technical experts, practitioners, and people with lived experience of that policy to collaboratively and deliberatively codesign it. Coproduction can leverage different ways of knowing and evaluative perspectives on a policy area to enhance the legitimacy and efficaciousness of policymaking. This article argues that researcher reflexivity is crucial for getting the most out of coproduction ethically and epistemically. By reflecting on our positionality, habitus, and biases, we can gain new insights into how we affect (...) the research design, production and analysis of data, and communication of findings. This reflexivity helps to disrupt power dynamics that underly research and policymaking, helping to realise the radical potential of coproduction to democratise practice, empower citizens, and make research more relational. We demonstrate the value of reflexivity through an analysis of our work coproducing a theory of thriving in financial hardship in partnership with the UK national anti-poverty charity Turn2us. We contextualise our advocacy for reflexivity within the practical realities of advancing coproduction in the UK today. (shrink)

The paper aims at giving a general exposition of John Searle’s solution of the mind-body problem – biological naturalism – and examines its fundamental theses, and some of its consequences. The exam of such theses – which delineates the characteristics of Searle's theory – shows that the theory has three main difficulties, since it holds some assertions which at first sight seem to be incompatible.

O artigo examina a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência (em especial a sua teoria acerca de seus poderes causais), que se mostra obscura e incoerente. Porém, essa incoerência não é inevitável, pois o naturalismo biológico possui elementos que permitiriam a articulação de uma teoria mais clara a respeito das capacidades causais. O exame da teoria de Pereboom e Kornblith possibilita entender por que a afirmação de identidade das capacidades causais leva a um reducionismo. Essa teoria aponta um (...) caminho promissor para que se possa aprimorar o naturalismo biológico. (shrink)

This paper contains an analysis of a famous criticism from John Searle on materialist tradition. This tradition uses to ignore or even refuse the subjectivity of mental phenomena. This paper examines Searle’s strategy to defend this subjectivity, refusing the essential character of behavior to the mental aspect (section II), distinguishing subjective and objective in epistemic and ontological senses (section III) and showing his solution to the problem of other minds (section IV). However, his attempt to obtain an indirect access to (...) subjective mental phenomena through causal explanations (section V) of these phenomena by brain processes is not enough to integrate the ontological subjectivity in our scientific worldview, once that this supposed ontological irreducibility from subjective to objective phenomena seems to result in the conclusion that mental phenomena are something beyond natural reality. (shrink)

Brain dead organ donors are the principal source of transplantable organs. However, it is controversial whether brain death is the same as biological death. Therefore, it is unclear whether organ removal in brain death is consistent with the ‘dead donor rule’, which states that organ removal must not cause death. Our aim was to evaluate the public9s opinion about organ removal if explicitly described as causing the death of a donor in irreversible apneic coma. We conducted a cross-sectional internet survey (...) of the American public (n=1096). Questionnaire domains included opinions about a hypothetical scenario of organ removal described as causing the death of a patient in irreversible coma, and items measuring willingness to donate organs after death. Some 71% of the sample agreed that it should be legal for patients to donate organs in the scenario described and 67% agreed that they would want to donate organs in a similar situation. Of the 85% of the sample who agreed that they were willing to donate organs after death, 76% agreed that they would donate in the scenario of irreversible coma with organ removal causing death. There appears to be public support for organ donation in a scenario explicitly described as violating the dead donor rule. Further, most but not all people who would agree to donate when organ removal is described as occurring after death would also agree to donate when organ removal is described as causing death in irreversible coma. (shrink)

How do multiple reasons combine to support a conclusion about what to do or believe? This question raises two challenges: How can we represent the strength of a reason? How do the strengths of multiple reasons combine? Analogous challenges about confirmation have been answered using probabilistic tools. Can reductive and nonreductive theories of reasons use these tools to answer their challenges? Yes, or more exactly: reductive theories can answer both challenges. Nonreductive theories, with the help of a result in confirmation (...) theory, can answer one, and there are grounds for optimism that they can answer the other. (shrink)

O artigo defende a tese de que a irredutibilidade ontológica que Searle atribui à consciência envolve o naturalismo biológico (proposto por ele como uma solução para a parte conceitual do problema mente-corpo) em diversas incoerências, especialmente no que diz respeito ao tema da causação mental. Após uma apresentação das teses básicas da teoria (seção 2), são discutidos os problemas que a tese da irredutibilidade ontológica gera para a visão de Searle sobre a causação mental (seção 3), e as incoerências decorrentes (...) dessa tese (seção 4). A conclusão é que o modo como Searle concebe a irredutibilidade ontológica da consciência é uma fonte de problemas para o naturalismo biológico. (shrink)