Epistemology has traditionally sought to discover the foundations of knowledge. Recently, anti‐foundational philosophers have construed epistemo‐logy's failure to discover an ultimate ground to indicate the bankruptcy of foundational theory. On closer examination, however, the history of epistemology reveals the aim of foundational theory to be different both from the reductive ideal of its traditional defenders and from the unsystematic relativism that its recent critics offer instead. An alternative history of foundational theory reveals a progress toward multiple necessary foundations which is (...) the task of epistemology to articulate. (shrink)

In contemporary epistemology of religion, evidentialism has been included in a wider critique of traditional foundationalist theories of rational belief. To show the irrelevance of evidentialism, some critics have offered alternatives to the foundationalist approach, prominent among which is Alvin Plantinga's 'warrant as proper function'. But the connection between evidentialism and foundationalism has been exaggerated, and criticisms of traditional foundationalism do not discredit evidentialism in principle. Furthermore, appeals to warranted belief imply that the heart of evidentialism — the proportioning of (...) belief to rational grounds — has not been discredited but assimilated to the reliabilist view of knowledge by expanding the concept of evidence to include religious experience. In the end, the warrant concept extends the reach of evidentialism, thereby enhancing rather than diminishing its relevance for rational belief. (shrink)

The postmodern debate has been heavily influenced by often contradictory conclusions about the foundations of knowledge: hermeneutics challenges epistemology, politics challenges science, identity theory challenges critical theory, pragmatism challenges formalism, and so on. Horace Fairlamb contends that philosophy's foundationist quest has usually been misconceived as a choice between a 'super-science' and theoretical anarchy. Through an examination of the history of foundationism, and detailed analysis of the work of leading theorists including Fish, Foucault, Derrida, Gadamer and Habermas, Dr Fairlamb (...) argues for a less reductive and less arbitrary conception of knowledge and meaning. The result in this 1994 book is a sophisticated critique of contemporary theory with implications for philosophers as well as literary theorists, and an important contribution to the re-evaluation of theoretical discourse. (shrink)

So far, the sciences of complexity have received less attention from philosophers than from scientists. Responding to Salthe’s (Found Sci 15, 4(6):357–367, 2010a ) model of evolution, I focus on its metaphysical implications, asking whether the implications of his canonical developmental trajectory (CDT) must be materialistic as his reading proposes.

Though Adam Smith believed that the spontaneous forces of the market set prices at the most productive level, he doubted that market forces price wages as fairly as the prices of other commodities. In fact, various observations by Smith suggest that the market tends to undervalue wages almost as naturally as it naturalizes the prices of most commodities under nonmonopolistic conditions. Those observations imply the germ of a capitalist theory of exploitation.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 5, Page 1012-1015, September 2011.

Study of concept of Brahman in Upanishads with special reference to the philosophy of Śāṇḍilya.

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including (...) the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

El libro se abre con una primera parte que pudiera ser calificada como inductoria de toda la obra, donde se considera a la bioética como punto de partida y al bioderecho como punto inicial de llegada y de posterior desarrollo. El derecho y la bioética se necesitan mutuamente y se complementan. El libro despliega sus afanes en tres partes, donde son abordadas las tres grandes cuestiones: libertad, vida y muerte.

Ethics and Humanity pays to tribute to Jonathan Glover, a pioneering figure whose thought and personal influence have had a significant impact on applied ...