El presente artículo se propone indagar el caso de Leopoldo Castedo dentro del más amplio contexto de la variada reflexión politológica del republicanismo español en el exilio que siguió a la derrota en la Guerra civil española. Castedo, exiliado en Chile tras el conflicto, desarrolló una intensa actividad cultural entre Chile y los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, uniendo en ella, en lo que fue siempre signo identitario de su quehacer intelectual, la reflexión teórica con la praxis, las ideas con (...) su traducción concreta en el mundo y en la sociedad de su tiempo. (shrink)

The problem of the ontological limit of Artificial Intelligence and transhumanism in contrast with the ontology of Homo sapiens is discussed. Beyond the so-called exogenous or endogenous integration, the scenario of a technological singularity seems to materialize in entities that synthesize biology and technology, for example, by means of a download or transbiomorphosis that translates the neural networks of our mind into the memory of a computer. This is a hybridization that warns us about the advent of new species that (...) could leave Homo sapiens behind. If the human/machine synthesis is the limit desired by the transhumanist program, this limit seems to have crossed, in turn, the very ontological limit of the human, on which science, philosophy and religion had so far more or less agreed –each presenting their own cards. (shrink)

The United Nations’ increasing involvement in global sustainability culminated in 2015 with the release of the 2030 Agenda. This agenda puts businesses in the spotlight, and their innovation and stakeholder partnering activities are portrayed as essential strategies for achieving an ambitious set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals. In this study, we identify six distinct dynamic stakeholder engagement strategies—resilient specialists, opportunity explorers, uncommitted diversifiers, rainbow warriors, rainbow washers, and progressive learners—and distinguish two approaches to innovate, depending on the range of SDG (...) targets aimed to achieve simultaneously. On the one hand, for firms that take a narrow approach intended to achieve a reduced set of SDG targets, we predict that successful dynamic stakeholder engagement strategies are those that end up with an intensive collaboration with a reduced number of stakeholder groups. On the other hand, for firms adopting a broad innovation approach to satisfy a wide set of SDG targets, we predict that successful dynamic stakeholder engagement strategies are those that end up interacting with a wide number of stakeholder groups. Longitudinal analysis of more than 3900 Spanish firms supports our predictions and suggests clear implications for responsible innovation research and the advancement of sustainable development through collaboration. (shrink)

Se discurre sobre la idea de isla antropógena o isla inteligente, que en Sloterdijk adquiere las figuras del cosmonauta, del acróbata, del asceta, pero también la del soldado con máscara antigás. En la era del atmoterrorismo, las islas humanas requerirían –sobre todo– de tecnologías de climatización procedentes de los prototipos de las islas absolutas y de las islas atmosféricas (los otros dos modelos descritos por el filósofo alemán). Tal integración tecnológica no equivaldría sino a la síntesis entre ascesis e inmunización. (...) En tal sentido, ambos polos, el de la ultratecnología y el de la naturaleza, parecen condensar en la noción de isla humana el propósito pre-adámico y de tintes prometeicos de construir una máquina de mundo de vida. (shrink)

Presents opposing viewpoints on various ethical, moral, legal, and medical issues concerning euthanasia.

One important limitation of the current renditions of interpretivism is that its emphasis on the moral dimension of sport has overlooked the aesthetic dimension lying at the core of this account of sport. The interpretivist’s failure to acknowledge and consider the aesthetic implicitly distances this realm from the moral. Marcia Muelder Eaton calls this distancing the separatist mistake. This paper argues that interpretivism presupposes not only moral but also aesthetic principles and values. What it sets out to demonstrate is that (...) interpretivism is an integralist, or nonseparatist, account of sport, one in which ethical and aesthetic values are not exclusive. Making explicit and specifying interpretivism’s combined moral-aesthetic approach to sport not only helps to better distinguish the whole range of values that make up sport as well as their interconnection but also encourages sportspeople to pursue more coherent sport and, thus, more enriching lives. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

This article provides a comprehensive review of the rather intricate relationship between contemporary environmental ethics, understood as a philosophical branch, and ancient philosophy. While its primary focus is on Western philosophy, it also includes some brief yet crucial considerations about the influence of Eastern traditions of thought on environmental ethics. Aside from the introduction in the first section, the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the Reception: Ancient philosophy in environmental ethics section, I review the initial reception of (...) ancient philosophy in contemporary environmental ethics. Next, in the Reaction: Environmental ethics in ancient philosophy scholarship section, I examine how the scholarship in AP responded to this early reception. I conclude, in the final section, with some constructive suggestions for future research. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

_Enrique Dussel was by any meaningful measure a giant representative of Latin American and world philosophy. This personal reflection sheds light on his intellectual trajectory and his contributions to liberation philosophy, world philosophy, South-South and South-North dialogues, and the decolonial turn._.

What is the role of Hesiod's poetry in the beginnings of Greek philosophy? This book explores the question by going beyond the traditional responses that stress either continuities or discontinuities between myth and philosophy. Instead, this volume attempts a reflexive or response-oriented approach, that highlights the active re-appropriation and renewal of Hesiodic thought by the Presocratic philosophers. Its fifteen contributions offer large scale comparisons, historiographical considerations, thematic and generic approaches, and detailed case studies.

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...) of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary personstage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. (shrink)

Many of the social deprivations of Mexico will be worsened due to the SARSCOV2 pandemic. Namely, the insufficient access to public health, lack of labor rights, and the unsuccessful government’s response to eradicate male violence against women. The historical unconcern in promoting a culture rooted in mutual aid and self-care has provoked many citizens are disconnected from their social and health rights. Thus, people’s inability to carry through one direction –stay home- is unfulfilled, in part, due to structural inequalities. I (...) affirm that effective liberty could be obtained by approving a Universal Basic Income from a feminist perspective. I conclude that the aftermath of COVID-19, which will define everyday life for a while, require the endorsement of such measure. Likewise, women as a class deserve protection from a feminist critical framework. (shrink)

Se plantea que la estética posmoderna, alejada de la posibilidad de concebirse como estética filosófica o filosofía del arte (al menos como la presentó Alexander G. Baumgarten al inicio de la Modernidad), adquiriría en la era actual la fisonomía de una pop estética, cuya expresión fundante pareciese ser la propia experiencia estética y no otras condiciones atribuibles a un determinado canon estético. En relación a esta conjetura, que por lo visto implica una cierta superación de la idea de obra, se (...) discute, por un lado, la conexión entre arte e inteligencia artificial y, por otro, las implicancias de la Everyday Aesthetics sobre el concepto de experiencia. Una y otra práctica, testimoniarían en la actualidad un renovado sentido común estético. (shrink)

El artículo pretende desmontar una vieja contienda habida en la tercera Crítica entre una estética y una filosofía del arte. Tal contienda mostraría a la de Kant como una estética en conflicto. Cual Jano bifronte, el filósofo de Königsberg presentará en la última Crítica una Crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética que va y viene entre una estética filosófica y una metafísica del arte, y que terminará convirtiéndose en una propedéutica para las filosofías del arte del Romanticismo. A partir (...) de la crítica de Derrida a lo colosal kantiano —comentario que permitiría conjeturar la presencia en la primera parte de la tercera Crítica de un olvidado arte sublime—, se plantea como hipótesis la posibilidad de una inacabada y obscura arquitectónica de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética, donde la condición bastarda de lo sublime evidenciaría una cuestión no deducida trascendentalmente, pero sí experimentada por nuestras facultades del conocer, esto es, una conmoción suprasensible determinada por una suerte de principio de contra-finalidad. De este modo, el problema de lo sublime, cuya expresión de lo colosal está lejos de calificar como un caso del mundo del arte, revelaría al Kant de la tercera Crítica preso en el conflicto aparentemente irresoluble entre razón y sentimiento. (shrink)

É bem conhecida a oposição estabelecida por Kant entre experiência possível e dialética, na medida em que esta última é caracterizada como a “lógica da ilusão”. Ao mesmo tempo, o modo de pensar metafísico, que ocorre dialeticamente, em sentido kantiano, é uma tendência inevitável da razão, expressa na exigência formal de completude das categorias. Como o pensar, enquanto exercício livre da razão, é em si mesmo mais amplo do que a atividade de conhecer, própria do entendimento, o pensar contém o (...) conhecimento, embora este se qualifique pelas regras e pelos limites determinantes da objetividade. A pergunta que tentaremos formular é se essa relação continente-conteúdo não poderia configurar também uma dependência da experiência em relação ao raciocínio dialético, que estaria de algum modo indicada na função reguladora das idéias da razão. Nesse caso, a oposição formal entre conhecer e pensar seria inseparável da inclusão estrutural (dependência) da experiência no âmbito da razão. Na raiz do problema estaria talvez a tensão (dialética) entre a aspiração subjetiva de totalidade e as exigências objetivas de limitação e segmentação da experiência e a forma da experiência teria de ser finalmente concebida a partir de um fundo de inteligibilidade problemática. Dialectics and experienceThe separation of possible experience as objective knowledge and dialetics as a non-objective or non-theoretical knowledge is one of the most important aspects of kantian critical philosophy. But Kant also says that the activity of reason, as a pure thinking, has more amplitude than understanding knowledge. So we could say that theoric knowledge would depend on rational ( and non-theoretical) knowledge, as something contained in it. If we accept that, the consequence would be a relation of dependence between the form of objective knowledge and the background of a problematic – even doubtful – inteligible knowledge. (shrink)

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

In this chapter I will present, in a general way, Millikan's biosemantic theory of the phenomenon of intentionality. For this purpose, the text will take the following path. First, I will present the problem of intentionality and an overview of the dominant theories of intentional content during the twentieth century and part of the twenty-first century. Then, I will present a general version of Millikan's biosemantic theory, appearing in 1984, which will allow us to see what the relevance and originality (...) of his proposal consists in. Finally, in keeping with one of the central purposes of Las filósofas que nos formaron, I will share a brief interview that Millikan very kindly agreed to give for this publication, in which she tells us some non-theoretical aspects of her history as a philosopher. (shrink)

Sound symbolism refers to non-arbitrary associations between word forms and meaning, such as those observed for some properties of sounds and size or shape. Recent evidence suggests that these connections extend to emotional concepts. Here we investigated two types of non-arbitrary relationships. Study 1 examined whether iconicity scores (i.e. resemblance-based mapping between aspects of a word’s form and its meaning) for words can be predicted from ratings in the affective dimensions of valence and arousal and/or the discrete emotions of happiness, (...) anger, fear, disgust and sadness. Words denoting negative concepts were more likely to have more iconic word forms. Study 2 explored whether statistical regularities in single phonemes (i.e. systematicity) predicted ratings in affective dimensions and/or discrete emotions. Voiceless (/p/, /t/) and voiced plosives (/b/, /d/, /g/) were related to high arousing words, whereas high arousing negative words tended to include fricatives (/s/, /z/). Hissing consonants were also more likely to occur in words denoting all negative discrete emotions. Additionally, words conveying certain discrete emotions included specific phonemes. Overall, our data suggest that emotional features might explain variations in iconicity and provide new insight about phonemic patterns showing sound symbolic associations with the affective properties of words. (shrink)

Dentro de la perspectiva de lo que el autor denomina lecciones universales,los grandes pensamientos que de las conversaciones con Goethe pudo recoger Eckermann constituyen enseñanzas sobre lo que puede llamarse sabiduría de la vida, y también orientaciones para el diseño de una humanidad más alta, espiritualmente. El artículo contiene, además, información sobre quién era Eckermann y una serie de lecciones goethianas que van desde una profunda intuición metafísica hasta asuntos prácticos y concretos.

Esta tesis tiene como objetivo proponer una perspectiva crítica que permita un análisis filosófico del arte que fue desarrollada a partir de una lectura de El arte como experiencia de John Dewey. Para ello, recupero en primer lugar dos conceptos centrales, arte y experiencia, para desarrollar luego tres conceptos subsidiarios, expresión, comunicación y educación de la sensibilidad.

In Philosophy, it is well known that of the total faculty population, the proportion of women is significantly lower than men. This disproportion is odd for a discipline within the humanities; these numbers seem more compatible with what is found in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) careers. These proportions are in turn a product of the low female presence that exists from the previous levels of academic training in philosophy. What happens in the case of the philosophy student body? For (...) example, the report presented by BeeBee and Saul (2011), on women in philosophy in the United Kingdom, in the period 2008 and 2009, points out that in the first degrees of academic training, in the bachelor's degree, women occupy 45% of the student population, in the master's degree 38% and in the doctorate 35%. Thus, "it is notable that there is a reduction in the proportion of women from the bachelor's degree to the doctorate [...]. This has as a consequence that at the professional level women holding positions as professors represent only 19%" (BeeBee & Saul, 2011, p. 11). Recently, Torres González (2018), based on European Union studies, points out that in Spain, with respect to gender disparity in students, "the data yield as a result masculinized studies, where, contrary to what happens in the branch of the humanities to which it [philosophy] belongs, males outnumber females by 28 percentage points" (2018, p. 328). This disparity is reflected in philosophy at the professional level, "the indicators of vertical segregation show a reinforced glass ceiling, which presents one of the worst data of hierarchical discrimination in the university: the percentage of female professors in philosophy is 12% compared to 21% of female professors in higher education" (Idem). Although it is a fact that there are fewer women than men studying philosophy and, therefore, fewer women than men working professionally in this discipline, we do not yet have possible explanations for this phenomenon of gender disparity in the student body in philosophy. In some cases, even if the number of women entering the philosophy degree program is already low, the number of women graduating is even lower, which indicates that there is attrition along the way; the initial numbers of women entering the program tend to decrease by the time they graduate. Thus we come to the question that is the subject of this paper: What causes female students to drop out of the philosophy program? In this article we answer this question from the philosophy of science and supported by local empirical data, so we do not give a complete or even less exhaustive answer. We review two explanatory models that purport to answer the question of why there are fewer women in philosophy, both formatively and professionally. These are the Different Voices Model (DVM) and the Perfect Storm Model (PSM); we opt for the latter and give reasons for it. Regarding the empirical aspect of our research, our source of statistical data belongs to the undergraduate program in philosophy at the Facultad de Estudios Superiores Acatlán-UNAM, Mexico (FES Acatlán), obtained in the framework of the SWIP-Analytic Mexico workshops. Our analysis of these data shows that even when female students have better GPAs than male students and take fewer subjects while enrolled, female students graduate less than male students in the FES Acatlan degree program. (shrink)

It is common in contemporary sport to liken the notion of the team to that of the family. That is, the family is used to evoke team life. Portraying the team as a family usually implies a positive evaluation. Despite its prevalence, the team as a family equation has not been analyzed in the sport philosophy literature. Thus, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, it explores whether the team is to be equated with the family. To discuss the (...) nature of the family and the team, I draw together the work of several sport philosophers with that of Laura Wildemann Kane. Second, and considering what characterizes the team, this article investigates whether teammates have special responsibilities to one another by virtue of their relationship and the value attached to it. I propose that the team as a family equation does not align with the constitution of these two social groups and that teammates have special responsibilities to one another, but such responsibilities are different from those observed in the family. (shrink)

El más allá católico ha sido clásicamente figurado como una escena eterna de deslumbramiento ante la contemplación de la revelación del Bonum et Verum. En él, el sujeto se encontrará en un estado de éxtasis pacífico y permanente, ensimismado por la visión de Dios. Estamos ante un imaginario marcado por la pasividad y amenazado de tedio, poco representativo de una existencia auténticamente humana y, mucho menos, divina. Este paradigma está dejando de ser creíble y deseable para el hombre contemporáneo y (...) necesita ser matizado, completado, por otro que acentúe los legítimos rasgos de crecimiento y dinamismo con los que también cabe pensar nuestro éschaton. Las perspectivas de este reto son diversas, aquí trataremos de mostrar, desde la historia de la Teología patrística y medieval, cómo ésta nos ofrece algunos testigos minoritarios, pero enjundiosos, desde los que fundamentar la nueva óptica. (shrink)

Este libro recoge una veintena de estudios que, desde el punto de vista de la teoría social abordan aspectos variados de la Globalización, el Riesgo y la Reflexividad, considerados como los retos fundamentales con los que ha de enfrentarse la sociología actual.

Este libro recoge una veintena de estudios que, desde el punto de vista de la teoría social abordan aspectos variados de la Globalización, el Riesgo y la Reflexividad, considerados como los retos fundamentales con los que ha de enfrentarse la sociología actual.

Cet article cherche à retracer quelques-uns des éléments à la fois empiriques, historiques et sociologiques de la Sociologie de la musique de Max Weber. Même si ce dernier s'intéresse en premier lieu au processus de rationalisation qui traverse la civilisation occidentale, sa Sociologie de la musique est fondée sur l'idée de médium technique, qu'il explore dans plusieurs directions différentes. Nous revisitons ici cette idée au moyen de quelques exemples tirés de la musique occidentale et en particulier du répertoire romantique pour (...) le piano. (shrink)

Call ‘a substance’ a person who is at home in a relatively stable and unified sense-making framework: a social structure that to some degree specifies which categories are important for interpreting reality, which goals are worth pursing, which character traits are admirable, etc. Call ‘an accident’ a person who is not at home in one such framework. It is tempting to think that being a substance is preferable, but I present some considerations for thinking otherwise. Mexican philosophers Emilio Uranga and (...) Jorge Portilla, I argue, present notions of accidentality as decolonial tools. Uranga’s account enables Mexicans to have positive valuation of their being independently of the approving gaze of the colonizers and their standards of value. Portilla’s thought distinguishes between pernicious accidentality resulting from the disintegration of sense-making frameworks and authentic accidentality as a condition for freedom, self-creation, and ultimately for individual and communal liberation. (shrink)