Jin Qian Dans son Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois, Leibniz produit une interprétation du premier principe de la philosophie chinoise. Le présent article s’interroge sur les conditions de cette interprétation en la comparant avec la controverse entre Leibniz et Descartes par rapport à la conception de la substance. Il sera montré que, bien que Leibniz utilise un « principe herméneutique » dans son interprétation de la philosophie chinoise, ce principe n’est pas suffisant mais repose sur (...) des conditions plus fondamentales. La comparaison avec la controverse Leibniz-Descartes sur la substance permet d’identifier deux conditions majeures de l’application de ce principe herméneutique, à savoir la théorie dynamique de la substance et la conception de la théologie naturelle comme fondement de la physique, deux points sur lesquels divergent Leibniz et Descartes. (shrink)

This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).

This intelligent and often subtle introduction to rationalist metaphysics focuses on the development of the concept of substance in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. After briefly reviewing the Aristotelian background in the introduction, Woolhouse spends the first three chapters presenting the broad outlines of each thinker’s account of substance. These are followed by three chapters devoted more specifically to the metaphysics of extended substance and to foundational issues in early modern physics. Next come two chapters on thinking (...) class='Hi'>substance and its relation to extended substance, and finally a chapter on the relation between created and uncreated substance, which Woolhouse describes as "an organizing centre of the whole book". (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe most prominent early modern argument against materialism is to be found in Descartes. Previously I had argued that this argument relies crucially on a robust conception of substance, according to which it has a single principal attribute of which all its other intrinsic qualities are modes. In the present paper I return to this claim. In Section 2, I address a question that is often raised about that conception of substance: its commitment to the idea that a (...) substance has a single such principal attribute. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Daniel Garber have argued that this claim relies on Descartes's identification of substance with attribute. But I argue that it relies on his view that a substance has a single, unitary nature. In Section 3, I examine the role of this conception of substance in arguments found in Malebranche and Leibniz and compare these arguments with Descartes's. (shrink)

The monadology.--On the notions of right and justice.--New system of the nature of substances and of the communication between them.--Explanation of the new system--Third explanation of the new system.--On the ultimate origination of things.--New essays on the human understanding.--Introduction.--Principles of nature and of grace.

The Discourse on Metaphysics is one of Leibniz's fundamental works. Written around January 1686, it is the most accomplished systematic expression of Leibniz's philosophy in the 1680s, the period in which Leibniz's philosophy reached maturity. Leibniz's goal in the Discourse is to give a metaphysics for Christianity; that is, to provide the answers that he believes Christians should give to the basic metaphysical questions. Why does the world exist? What is the world like? What kinds of things exist? And what (...) is the place of human beings in the world? To this purpose Leibniz discusses some of the most traditional topics of metaphysics, such as the nature of God, the purpose of God in creating the world, the nature of substance, the possibility of miracles, the nature of our knowledge, free will, and the justice behind salvation and damnation. This volume provides a new translation of the Discourse, complete with a critical introduction and a comprehensive philosophical commentary. (shrink)

Two of Leibniz's most studied and often quoted works appear in this volume. Published in 1686, the Discourse on Metaphysics consists of the philosopher's explanation of individual perception as an expression of the rest of the universe from a unique perspective. The whole world--the best of all possible worlds, as he famously remarks--is thus contained in each individual substance. The Monadology, written in 1714, offers a concise synopsis of Leibniz's philosophy, establishing the laws of final causes, which underlie God's (...) free choice to create the best possible world--a world that serves as dynamic and perfectly ordered evidence of the wisdom of its creator. Translated by George R. Montgomery. (shrink)

'I concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any material thing.' Descartes's A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences marks a watershed in European thought; in it, the author provides an informal intellectual autobiography in the vernacular for a non-specialist readership, sweeps away all previous philosophical traditions, (...) and sets out in brief his radical new philosophy, which begins with a proof of the existence of the self, next deduces from it the existence and nature of God, and ends by offering a radical new account of the physical world and of human and animal nature. This new translation is accompanied by a substantial introductory essay which draws on Descartes's correspondence to examine his motivation and the impact of his great work on his contemporaries. Detailed notes explain his philosophical terminology and ideas. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Le corps entier des sciences peut estre consideré comme l’ocean, qui est continué partout, et sans interruption ou partage, bien que les hommes y conçoivent des parties, et leur donnent des noms selon leur commodité. Et comme il y a des mers inconnues, ou qui n’ont esté navigeés que par quelques vaisseaux que le hazard y avoir jettés: on peut dire,[10] de même qu’il y a des sciences dont on a connu quelque chose par rencontre seulement et sans dessein. L’art (...) des combinaisons est de ce nombre; elle signifie chez moy, autant que la science des formes ou formules ou bien des variations en general. En un mot, c’est la Specieuse universelle ou la Characteristique. De sorte qu’elle traite de eodem et diverso; de simili et dissimili; de absoluto et relato; comme la Mathematique ordinaire traite de [15] uno et multis, de magno et parvo, de toto et parte. On peut même dire que la Logistique ou bien l’Algebre luy est sousordonnée en un certain sens. Car lorsqu’on se sert de plusieurs notes indifferentes, ou qui au commencement du calcul pouvoient estre echangées et substituées mutuellement sans faire tort au raisonnement, en quoy les lettres d’Alphabet sont fort propres; et lors que ces lettres ou notes signifient des grandeurs, ou [20] des nombres generaux, il en vient l’Algebre ou plus tost la Specieuse de Viete. Et c’est justement en cela que consiste l’avantage de l’Algebre de Viete et de Descartes sur celle des anciens, qu’en se servant des lettres au lieu des nombres tant connus, qu’inconnus, on vient a des formules, ou il y a quelque liaison et ordre, qui donne moyen à nostre esprit de. (shrink)

Le corps entier des sciences peut estre consideré comme l’ocean, qui est continué partout, et sans interruption ou partage, bien que les hommes y conçoivent des parties, et leur donnent des noms selon leur commodité. Et comme il y a des mers inconnues, ou qui n’ont esté navigeés que par quelques vaisseaux que le hazard y avoir jettés: on peut dire,[10] de même qu’il y a des sciences dont on a connu quelque chose par rencontre seulement et sans dessein. L’art (...) des combinaisons est de ce nombre; elle signifie chez moy, autant que la science des formes ou formules ou bien des variations en general. En un mot, c’est la Specieuse universelle ou la Characteristique. De sorte qu’elle traite de eodem et diverso; de simili et dissimili; de absoluto et relato; comme la Mathematique ordinaire traite de [15] uno et multis, de magno et parvo, de toto et parte. On peut même dire que la Logistique ou bien l’Algebre luy est sousordonnée en un certain sens. Car lorsqu’on se sert de plusieurs notes indifferentes, ou qui au commencement du calcul pouvoient estre echangées et substituées mutuellement sans faire tort au raisonnement, en quoy les lettres d’Alphabet sont fort propres; et lors que ces lettres ou notes signifient des grandeurs, ou [20] des nombres generaux, il en vient l’Algebre ou plus tost la Specieuse de Viete. Et c’est justement en cela que consiste l’avantage de l’Algebre de Viete et de Descartes sur celle des anciens, qu’en se servant des lettres au lieu des nombres tant connus, qu’inconnus, on vient a des formules, ou il y a quelque liaison et ordre, qui donne moyen à nostre esprit de. (shrink)

Le corps entier des sciences peut estre consideré comme l’ocean, qui est continué partout, et sans interruption ou partage, bien que les hommes y conçoivent des parties, et leur donnent des noms selon leur commodité. Et comme il y a des mers inconnues, ou qui n’ont esté navigeés que par quelques vaisseaux que le hazard y avoir jettés: on peut dire,[10] de même qu’il y a des sciences dont on a connu quelque chose par rencontre seulement et sans dessein. L’art (...) des combinaisons est de ce nombre; elle signifie chez moy, autant que la science des formes ou formules ou bien des variations en general. En un mot, c’est la Specieuse universelle ou la Characteristique. De sorte qu’elle traite de eodem et diverso; de simili et dissimili; de absoluto et relato; comme la Mathematique ordinaire traite de [15] uno et multis, de magno et parvo, de toto et parte. On peut même dire que la Logistique ou bien l’Algebre luy est sousordonnée en un certain sens. Car lorsqu’on se sert de plusieurs notes indifferentes, ou qui au commencement du calcul pouvoient estre echangées et substituées mutuellement sans faire tort au raisonnement, en quoy les lettres d’Alphabet sont fort propres; et lors que ces lettres ou notes signifient des grandeurs, ou [20] des nombres generaux, il en vient l’Algebre ou plus tost la Specieuse de Viete. Et c’est justement en cela que consiste l’avantage de l’Algebre de Viete et de Descartes sur celle des anciens, qu’en se servant des lettres au lieu des nombres tant connus, qu’inconnus, on vient a des formules, ou il y a quelque liaison et ordre, qui donne moyen à nostre esprit de. (shrink)

Vorwort, von R. Loosen und F. Vonessen.--Leibniz und das binäre Zahlensystem, von F. Vonessen.--Das Geheimnis der Schöpfung; Neujahrsbrief an Herzog Rudolph August von Braunschweig-Lüneburg-Wolfenbüttel, von G. W. Leibniz.--Leibniz und die chinesische Philosophie, von R. Loosen.--Lettre sur la philosophie chinoise à Nicolas de Remond. Abhandlung über die chinesische Philosophie. Von G. W. Leibniz. Anhang: Anmerkungen, Abkürzungen (bibliographical: p. [133-153]--Nachwort: Zur fünftausendjährigen Geschichte des binären Zahlensystems: Fuh-Hi, G. W. Leibniz, Norbert Wiener, von J. Gebser.

Le Système de l'Harmonie préétablie est un système de communication. L'harmonie est une métaphore, que Leibniz reconnaît avoir empruntée à l'art ; la communication est un concept, qui, réglant les rapports perçus entre les éléments, produit et fait fonctionner le système comme tel. La notion de communication s'analyse en termes de correspondance, connexion, liaison, commerce, concomitance, accord, entr'expression (ou, figure négative, entr'empêchement). Lancée dans la controverse avec les cartésiens, elle s'applique à la relation de l'âme au corps ; mais encore (...) des corps aux corps, des substances aux substances, des âmes aux âmes, des esprits aux esprits ; mais aussi à ce qui réunit ou sépare les religions, les églises, les savoirs, les cultures. La communication traverse le système du monde comme celui des textes : elle est de physique, de métaphysique, de morale, de théologie, d'épistémologie. (shrink)

Leibniz construit, teste et vérifie sans cesse la pertinence et la cohérence de sa philosophie en la rapportant aux conclusions des autres disciplines. Cette méthode heuristique nourrit son dialogue avec les sciences mathématiques et physiques; moins connus, les enjeux révélés par la réforme moderne de la médecine et la chimie suscitent une interrogation sur la vie et la qualité. Ces sciences expérimentales s'avèrent en effet cruciales pour une philosophie de la nature qui cherche à concilier le mécanisme et (...) le finalisme à travers les concepts d'entéléchie et de monade. Elles obligent en outre à préciser la logique de l'expérience, la fonction de la raison, le statut des principes explicatifs (loi, cause, éléments, analogie). Enfin, elles exigent un fondement qui permette de rapporter les phénomènes organiques à leur véritable origine: la vie. Ce programme se réalise de façon systématique dans la controverse qu'entretiennent Leibniz et Stahl au sujet d'une philosophie de la nature capable de prendre acte des découvertes modernes de la médecine et de la chimie, tout en fondant ces connaissances sur une théorie générale de la substance et de la vie. (shrink)

Inherited primarily from Aristotle and his scholastic commentators, the concept of substance plays a central role in early modern metaphysics. Roger Woolhouse's book is the first monograph-length introduction devoted to this important philosophical concept. Aimed primarily at the advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate, this wide-ranging and clearly-written book offers a judiciously compendious but rich account of the doctrine of substance in the hands of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

Leibniz used Descartes’ strict notion of substance in “That a Most Perfect being is Possible” to characterize God but did not intend to undermine his own philosophical views by denying that there are created substances. The metaphysical view of substance in this passage is Cartesian. A discussion of radical substance without any sort of denial in the possibility of other substances does not indicate Spinozism. If this interpretation is correct, then the passage is neither anomalous nor mysterious. (...) There is reason to believe that the passage expresses just the beliefs that we should expect Leibniz to hold in his De Summa Rerum period. Furthermore, this interpretation indicates that while Leibniz’s metaphysics during this stage of his career is suggestively similar to Spinoza’s, there is no evidence that Leibniz accepted Spinoza’s pantheistic conclusion. (shrink)

Leibniz's claim that a substance which is simple perceives is examined in terms of the cartesian model of mind which leibniz adopted. This examination helps to explain some of leibniz's claims about perception. Although leibniz can account for perception while maintaining that the substance which perceives is simple, He cannot adapt the cartesian model to encompass his broadened understanding of perception which includes unconscious perceptions in monads which apperceive nothing.

Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz stand out among their seventeenth-century contemporaries as the great rationalist philosophers. Each sought to construct a philosophical system in which theological and philosophical foundations serve to explain the physical, mental and moral universe. Through a careful analysis of their work, Pauline Phemister explores the rationalists seminal contribution to the development of modern philosophy. Broad terminological agreement and a shared appreciation of the role of reason in ethics do not mask the very significant disagreements that led to (...) three distinctive philosophical systems: Cartesian dualism, Spinozan monism and Leibnizian pluralism. The book explores the nature of, and offers reasons for, these differences. Phemister contends that Spinoza and Leibniz developed their systems in part through engagements with and amendment of Cartesian philosophy, and critically analyses the arguments and contributions of all three philosophers. The clarity of the authors discussion of their key ideas including their views on knowledge, universal languages, the nature of substance and substances, bodies, the relation of mind and body, freedom, and the role of distinct perception and reason in morals will make this book the ideal introduction to rationalist philosophy. (shrink)

Locke and Leibniz on Substance gathers together papers by an international group of academic experts, examining the metaphysical concept of substance in the writings of these two towering philosophers of the early modern period. Each of these newly-commissioned essays considers important interpretative issues concerning the role that the notion of substance plays in the work of Locke and Leibniz, and its intersection with other key issues, such as personal identity. Contributors also consider the relationship between the two (...) philosophers and contemporaries such as Descartes and Hume. (shrink)

Gottfried Leibniz is well known for his claim to have “rehabilitated” the substantial forms of scholastic philosophy, forging a reconciliation of the New Philosophy of Descartes, Mersenne and Gassendi with Aristotelian metaphysics (in his so-called Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686). Much less celebrated is the fact that fifty years earlier (in his Hypomnemata Physica, 1636) the Bratislavan physician and natural philosopher Daniel Sennert had already argued for the indispensability to atomism of (suitably re-interpreted) Aristotelian forms, in explicit opposition to the rejection (...) of substantial forms by his fellow atomist Sébastien Basson.1.. (shrink)

Comprendre ce que les philosophes du XVIIe siècle entendaient par représentation est essentiel à l'intelligence de leurs conceptions des idées et de la vérité. Ce livre renouvelle notre approche du problème à travers des lectures de Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Pascal, en reliant leurs analyses philosophiques à leurs textes scientifiques. Les figures de la Dioptrique et de la Géométrie éclairent chez Descartes le contenu de l'idée sensible, le rapport du clair et du confus, la nature de la couleur et celle de (...) l'existence. Les anamorphoses de l'Essai sur l'entendement humain de Locke donnent à voir comment les idées renvoient aux choses. Et l'hexagramme pascalien raconte l'herméneutique des Pensées. La représentation classique s'avère l'effet d'une transformation qui affecte en même temps la science et la philosophie. À l'encontre des lectures qui ont insisté sur les filiations avec les pensées médiévales et tenté de réduire la nouveauté de la pensée classique, ce livre retrouve une thèse essentielle de Michel Foucault dans Les Mots et les Choses sur la rupture inaugurant l'âge classique. Mais il découvre dans cette rupture l'effet d'une opération matérielle, qui conduit à un nouveau mode d'existence concret des images et des signes dans les textes du savoir, analysable à l'intérieur de dispositifs textuels. Ce qui l'amène enfin à déplacer profondément les analyses de Foucault et à interroger les présupposés de son archéologie du savoir. (shrink)

While a significant amount of work has been done in recent years on the notion of substance in the seventeenth century, much of this work is narrow in focus and addresses itself only to specialists in the field. With this text, Roger Woolhouse has remedied this deficiency. The book, aimed at an audience at the advanced undergraduate level, provides a clear, comprehensive, and appropriately compact study of the doctrine of substance as it is developed by Descartes, Spinoza, and (...) Leibniz. (shrink)

The goal of the modern scientific project, as defined by such thinkers as Descartes and Bacon, is "mastery of nature." Martin Heidegger, in an interpretation of mastery of nature that has left its imprint on post-modern critique of science, maintains that the essence of modern science lies in a projection of "technological being" upon nature. This projective "assault" has its origin in the "self-grounding" project of modern metaphysics, in which the human subject attempts to secure a self-sufficient position over against (...) all possible objects. ;The dissertation examines Heidegger's "technological thesis" from the vantage point of the history and philosophy of science. Adopting the vis viva debate between Leibniz and the Cartesians as a point of departure, it identifies and develops, historically and systematically, two themes upon which hinges the question of the technological essence of modern science and its relationship to the "self-grounding" project: the "rationalism" of modern science, and modern science's view of natural teleology. The main argument of the dissertation is that examination of the relationship between these two themes reveals the "teleology of reason" in modern science. ;Chapter's One and Two focus on Leibniz' disagreement with Descartes over the ontology of corporeal substance. From that discussion emerge our two metaphysical themes, which are addressed in Chapter's Three and Four respectively. On the basis of the results of those chapters it is argued that the problem of "mastery of nature" resides in a clash, indigenous to reason, between the intrinsic teleology of nature, through which nature is rendered intelligible to reason, and the teleology of reason itself, which is freedom. ;The conclusion shows that Heidegger ignores tendencies within science, and within the very self-grounding project itself, which run counter to his pessimistic portrayal of science as an "assault" upon nature. Finally, the prospect for a non-coercive resolution to the clash of teleologies in modern science through the "ravishing of nature" is considered. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was hailed by Bertrand Russell as "one of the supreme intellects of all time." A towering figure in Seventeenth century philosophy, his complex thought has been championed and satirized in equal measure, most famously in Voltaire's Candide. In this outstanding introduction to his philosophy, Nicholas Jolley introduces and assesses the whole of Leibniz's philosophy. Beginning with an introduction to Leibniz's life and work, he carefully introduces the core elements of Leibniz's metaphysics: his theories of substance, (...) identity and individuation; monads and space and time; and his important debate over the nature of space and time with Newton's champion, Samuel Clarke. He then introduces Leibniz's theories of mind, knowledge, and innate ideas, showing how Lenin anticipated the distinction between conscious and unconscious states, before examining his theory of free will and the problem of evil. An important feature of the book is its introduction to Leibniz'smoral and political philosophy, an overlooked aspect of his work. The final chapter assesses legacy and the impact of his philosophy on philosophy as a whole, particularly on the work of Immanuel Kant. Throughout, Nicholas Jolley places Lenin in relation to some of the other great philosophers, such as Descartes, Spinoza and Locke, and discusses Leibniz's key works, such as the Monadology and Discourse on Metaphysics. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was hailed by Bertrand Russell as 'one of the supreme intellects of all time'. A towering figure in seventeenth-century philosophy, his complex thought has been championed and satirized in equal measure, most famously in Voltaire's _Candide_. In this outstanding introduction to his philosophy, Nicholas Jolley introduces and assesses the whole of Leibniz's philosophy. Beginning with an introduction to Leibniz's life and work, he carefully introduces the core elements of Leibniz's metaphysics: his theories of substance, identity and (...) individuation; monads and space and time; and his important debate over the nature of space and time with Newton's champion, Samuel Clarke. He then introduces Leibniz's theories of mind, knowledge, and innate ideas, showing how Leibniz anticipated the distinction between conscious and unconscious states, before examining his theory of free will and the problem of evil. An important feature of the book is its introduction to Leibniz's moral and political philosophy, an overlooked aspect of his work. The final chapter assesses legacy and the impact of his philosophy on philosophy as a whole, particularly on the work of Immanuel Kant. Throughout, Nicholas Jolley places Leibniz in relation to some of the other great philosophers, such as Descartes, Spinoza and Locke, and discusses Leibniz's key works, such as the _Monadology_ and _Discourse on Metaphysics_. (shrink)

This paper paper will examine some very different positions that Leibniz held or explored on monism, force, and substance during his long philosophical life. For reasons to be explained, positions drawn from Leibniz’s youth as well as his maturity will be considered. It will prove useful to consider these Leibnizian positions on these issues in relation to some of the leading alternatives of his age, in particular, those of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche. A guiding idea of this paper is (...) that by meditating seriously on some key ideas explored by Leibniz on our topics, one can gain new insight into the philosophical options of his era. A few introductory remarks on Descartes, followed by an overview of the main divisions and aims of the present paper, will help set the stage for these Leibnizian meditations. (shrink)

This paper paper will examine some very different positions that Leibniz held or explored on monism, force, and substance during his long philosophical life. For reasons to be explained, positions drawn from Leibniz’s youth as well as his maturity will be considered. It will prove useful to consider these Leibnizian positions on these issues in relation to some of the leading alternatives of his age, in particular, those of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche. A guiding idea of this paper is (...) that by meditating seriously on some key ideas explored by Leibniz on our topics, one can gain new insight into the philosophical options of his era. A few introductory remarks on Descartes, followed by an overview of the main divisions and aims of the present paper, will help set the stage for these Leibnizian meditations. (shrink)

This paper paper will examine some very different positions that Leibniz held or explored on monism, force, and substance during his long philosophical life. For reasons to be explained, positions drawn from Leibniz’s youth as well as his maturity will be considered. It will prove useful to consider these Leibnizian positions on these issues in relation to some of the leading alternatives of his age, in particular, those of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche. A guiding idea of this paper is (...) that by meditating seriously on some key ideas explored by Leibniz on our topics, one can gain new insight into the philosophical options of his era. A few introductory remarks on Descartes, followed by an overview of the main divisions and aims of the present paper, will help set the stage for these Leibnizian meditations. (shrink)

This study of the metaphysics of G. W. Leibniz gives a clear picture of his philosophical development within the general scheme of seventeenth-century natural philosophy. Catherine Wilson examines the shifts in Leibniz's thinking as he confronted the major philosophical problems of his era. Beginning with his interest in artificial languages and calculi for proof and discovery, the author proceeds to an examination of Leibniz’s early theories of matter and motion, to the phenomenalistic turn in his theory of substance and (...) his subsequent de-emphasis of logical determinism, and finally to his doctrines of harmony and optimization. Specific attention is given to Leibniz’s understanding of Descartes and his successors, Malebranche and Spinoza, and the English philosophers Newton, Cudworth, and Locke. Wilson analyzes Leibniz’s complex response to the new mechanical philosophy, his discontent with the foundations on which it rested, and his return to the past to locate the resources for reconstructing it. She argues that the continuum-problem is the key to an understanding not only of Leibniz’s monadology but also of his views on the substantiality of the self and the impossibility of external causal influence. A final chapter considers the problem of Leibniz-reception in the post-Kantian era, and the difficulty of coming to terms with a metaphysics that is not only philosophically "critical" but, at the same time, “compensatory.” Originally published in 2050. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In their book on Descartes’s Changing Mind, Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. Descartes famously proposed that there are two separate substances, mind and body, with distinct attributes of thought and extension. According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitations of our intellect, we cannot have insight into the nature of either substance. After reviewing their argument in some detail, I will argue that Descartes did not relinquish (...) his favorite doctrine but may have actually fooled himself about the nature of his dualism. It is my contention that the problem with Cartesian dualism stems from the definition of mind and body as substances and the role of their respective attributes—thought and extension—in the definition of substances. (shrink)

In the early modern period one can find unity of consciousness arguments in the writings of Rene Descartes and G. W. Leibniz, and in the recent literature they have been defended by David Barnett, William Hasker, and Richard Swinburne (among others). Descartes's unity of consciousness argument for dualism is to be found in the sixth of his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes claims that his unity of consciousness argument was itself sufficient to establish substance dualism. Swinburne's central line of (...) argument involves deploying a number of puzzle cases. He argues that our intuitions about these cases can be accommodated only by adopting a “further fact” view of the self, according to which the continued existence of a person over time consists in the continued existence of a mental substance, and “it is metaphysically possible that the substance acquires a totally new body, totally new apparent memories, and character”. (shrink)

In this work I argue that Descartes was not a trialist by showing that the main tenets of trialist interpretations of Descartes's theory of substance are either not supported by the text or are not sufficient for establishing the trialist interpretation.

Leibniz admet la thèse de la création continuée. Le but de cet article est de montrer les raisons pour lesquelles, à ses yeux, les tentatives de Descartes et de Weigel pour s’en servir comme preuve de l’existence de Dieu ont échoué et ce qui, dans sa propre métaphysique, empêche l’élaboration d’une démonstration pleinement satisfaisante sur son fondement. Il n’est pas sûr en effet que Leibniz soit parvenu à concilier parfaitement la nécessité de la dépendance permanente des créatures à l’égard de (...) leur créateur – qui requiert son action continuelle – et l’exigence de l’autonomie causale des substances finies. (shrink)

In the present book, Pauline Phemister argues against traditional Anglo-American interpretations of Leibniz as an idealist who conceives ultimate reality as a plurality of mind-like immaterial beings and for whom physical bodies are ultimately unreal and our perceptions of them illusory. Re-reading the texts without the prior assumption of idealism allows the more material aspects of Leibniz's metaphysics to emerge. Leibniz is found to advance a synthesis of idealism and materialism. His ontology posits indivisible, living, animal-like corporeal substances as the (...) real metaphysical constituents of the universe; his epistemology combines sense-experience and reason; and his ethics fuses confused perceptions and insensible appetites with distinct perceptions and rational choice. In the light of his sustained commitment to the reality of bodies, Phemister re-examines his dynamics, the doctrine of pre-established harmony and his views on freedom. The image of Leibniz as a rationalist philosopher who values activity and reason over passivity and sense-experience is replaced by the one of a philosopher who recognises that, in the created world, there can only be activity if there is also passivity; minds, souls and forms if there is also matter; good if there is evil; perfection if there is imperfection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Leibniz’s Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise by Patrick RileySusanna GoodinPatrick Riley. Leibniz’s Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii + 338. Cloth, $39.95.Leibniz’s political views are often downplayed, if not simply ignored, by philosophers focusing on his metaphysical accounts of substance and force. That Leibniz himself does not view these two areas as distinct (...) is forcefully argued in Patrick Riley’s detailed account of Leibniz’s theory of justice. Under Riley’s presentation, Leibniz’s definition of justice as the “charity of the wise” depends crucially on both his monadology and his theodicy. And his political maneuverings, particularly with France, are dominated by this unique definition of justice.Riley begins his argument by detailing Leibniz’s objections to Descartes’s voluntarism and Hobbes’s mechanistic view of human nature and the emphasis on power as the foundation of moral truths. The central Leibnizian theme to which Riley returns repeatedly is perfection. A perfect God does not act on whim or power but on reason. Monads are created with the freedom to strive toward perfection. Love, or charity, becomes perfect by becoming universal. Justice is not, as Hobbes claimed, that which is determined to be good for the whole by an absolute power, but a love or benevolence for the whole, striving through reason for the best. Wisdom is the heart of justice, not power. And for Leibniz, wisdom is inseparable from charity. God wills to actualize the best of all possible worlds out of love and wisdom, thus, wise charity.But Leibniz’s view of justice as wise charity is not without problems, most significantly the problem of freedom. In his first chapter, “Foundations,” Riley skillfully raises this problem in the context not only of Leibniz’s political stance on justice but also in the context of his metaphysics and theodicy. It is in the second chapter, “Monadology and Justice,” that Riley does the bulk of the work relating the metaphysics with the moral-political: “... on the knowledge of substance, and in consequence of the soul, depends the knowledge of virtue and of justice” (Leibniz, as quoted in Riley, 51). Political philosophy cannot be done correctly without first acquiring an adequate and proper account of substance, something the materialist Hobbes had failed to do. But because Leibniz has so closely linked his politics with his metaphysics, the perhaps insurmountable problem of freedom in his metaphysics hounds his politics. “If there are no autonomous persons with nonillusory ‘wills’, there cannot be ‘general benevolence’—for benevolence is just [End Page 470] ‘good willing’, and Leibniz invariably equates benevolentia with caritas sapientis. Without a certain kind of will, then, wise charity cannot serve as the heart of a justice which is more than sovereign-ordained law” (61). To prevent Hobbes from ruling the day, Leibniz must, as Riley correctly notes, devise a metaphysics which allows for freedom for both God and man.And here arises the one troubling aspect of Riley’s work. He addresses the problem of freedom in Leibniz’s metaphysics, but there is no discussion of the recent work done by such scholars as Robert Adams, whose book Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist makes significant contributions on exactly this topic. Regarding Leibniz’s serpentine defense of freedom, Riley does little more than bring up the problem and comment that Leibniz had a problem which, ultimately, he seemed unable to resolve. In fact, Riley shows little appreciation for the work done by mainstream scholars in the area of Leibniz’s metaphysics. If Riley’s work centered primarily on Leibniz’s political writings this might not matter, but given that the thrust of the first part of the book is to argue that Leibniz’s political theory is not merely compatible with his metaphysics but arises out of it, so that an understanding of Leibniz’s metaphysics is essential to grasping the logic of his political views, the absence of current scholarship on the metaphysics is troubling. References in footnotes confirm that Riley had read Adams’s book, as well as The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, which contains David Blumenfeld’s excellent... (shrink)

One of the greatest of modern philosophers, on a par with his contemporary John Locke, Leibniz was born in Leipzig in 1646, died in Hanover in 1716. He was a leading figure in European intellectual circles, and the founder of the Academy of Berlin. His strange, complex metaphysical system established him as the third of the great 'Rationalists', after Descartes and Spinoza. Along with the 'New System', his most famous philosophical works are the Discourse of Metaphysics and Monadology. He also (...) made important contributions to logic, mathematics, theology, jurisprudence, and history.Gathered here for the first time are all the key texts in a crucial debate in modern philosophy, centred on Leibniz's famous 1695 essay, the `New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication'. In this classic essay Leibniz introduced to a broad European readership the strikingly original metaphysical ideas he had come to a decade earlier. His 'system' became increasingly famous and drew him into discussion and development of these ideas, both in public and in private, with a variety of thinkers: Simon Foucher; Henri Basbage de Beauval; Francois Lamy; Isaac Jacquelot; the Englishwoman Damaris Masham; Pierre Desmaizeaux; René Joseph de Tournemine; and most notably the great French philosopher and scholar Pierre Bayle. (shrink)

The title of this book, __Leibniz's Mill__, is taken from Leibniz's famous metaphor in support of a dualism between the mind, or self, and the body. Given that Descartes constructed the most famous defense of mind/body dualism, the first chapter is a basic exposition and defense of Descartes' arguments, as well as Leibniz's supporting argument. Charles Landesman's basic claim, argued with clarity and philosophical precision, is that dualism is to be preferred to materialism; namely, the self is not reducible to (...) the body, mental processes are not reducible to brain processes, and the idea that the self is a mental substance constitutes the best understanding of all the facts of mental life. Landesman takes up the central philosophical topics on the nature of the self and the mind in arguing that dualism is a defensible position, even if our mental life is dependent in some respects on the body. Dependency is not the same as identity. Nor should one deny that many bodily events are dependent upon states of mind. He examines our knowledge of other minds, the mind's knowledge of itself, and Descartes' famous argument "I think, therefore I am"; efforts by philosophers such as Hume, Nietzsche, William James, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger to deny the reality of a substantial ego; the mind's way of knowing of the physical world, with its "great deception of sense"; and finally, the teleological structure of human action and the problem of free will. Landesman argues that the dualism of mind and body is perfectly compatible with modern science and that, contrary to the claims of many philosophers, there is no reason to hold that science presupposes a naturalistic or materialistic framework. "Charles Landesman shows that Cartesian mind-body dualism is alive and well and more plausible than its naturalistic and materialistic competitors. This is a first-rate piece of work that will be of real interest to philosophers and educated readers with interests in the philosophy of mind, history of philosophy, and epistemology. It should find a large readership among those who are looking for an alternative to the physicalist perspective that has long dominated the academy." --_Stewart Goetz, Ursinus College_ "Charles Landesman writes effortlessly, conveying to readers a rich alternative to today's mainline forms of materialism. This is a book that is comparable to Richard Rorty's _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ or Roderick M. Chisholm's _Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study_. Like the former, it is historical and substantial, like the latter it is unapologetic in advancing with clear arguments an under-represented position." --_Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College _. (shrink)

Leibniz argues against Descartes’s conception of material substance based on considerations of unity. I examine a key premise of Leibniz’s argument, what I call the Plurality Thesis—the claim that matter (i.e. extension alone) is a plurality of parts. More specifically, I engage an objection to the Plurality Thesis stemming from what I call Material Monism—the claim that the physical world is a single material substance. I argue that Leibniz can productively engage this objection based on his view that (...) matter is discrete. The discreteness of matter provides two aspects of support for the Plurality Thesis. First, it indicates that the parts of matter do not share boundaries and are, therefore, independent in an important sense. Second, it indicates that the parts of matter are determinate and are, therefore, ontologically prior to the wholes they compose. (shrink)