日本思想史上での宣長再評価に向けて。『古事記伝』は『古事記』の解釈を通して、宣長による新たな神話を成立させたテキストであった。つくり出された“古事記”はいかなる物語となったのか。『古事記伝』の読みが『 古事記』と最も乖離している箇所「外国“とつくに”」に着目し。ひるがえって、自国日本に対して用いた語「皇国“みくに”」の意味を追究する。神について語る『古事記』を、人に適用して読もうとした『古事記伝』の 本質が明らかになる。.

Cecilea discusses with Shelley Tremain her experience as a first-generation U.S. citizen and first-generation university graduate; why she was motivated to study philosophy and become a professional philosopher; the launching of the new, open access, online journal, the Journal of Philosophy of Emotions (JPE); the “mismatch” between what she seemed like “on paper” and what she is is capable of; how societal, institutional, professional, and philosophical practices and policies must be adjusted to enable others like her to flourish as professional (...) philosophers; and any resources—such as articles, books, and videos—that she would like to recommend on the topics and issues that she has addressed in this interview. (shrink)

In recent analytic philosophy of religion, one hotly debated topic is the veridicality of religious experience. In this paper, I briefly trace how the argument from religious experience comes into prominence in the twentieth century. This is due to the able defense of this argument by Richard Swinburne, William Alston, and Jerome Gellman among others. I explain the argument's intuitive force and why the stock objections to religious experience are not entirely convincing. I expound Swinburne's approach and his application of (...) the Principle of Credulity to religious experience. Then I critically examine four major objections to Swinburne. I conclude that the argument from religious experiences is not likely to be conclusive but it should not be dismissed either. (shrink)

Second, follow-up interview of Cecilea Mun by Shelley Tremain.

Resumo: Lopes dos Santos, ao colocar o Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus no que denomina “tradição crítica”, mostra que Wittgenstein delimita o alcance da filosofia ao eliminar sua pretensão de ser um tipo de conhecimento que, como a ciência, possa formular proposições verificáveis sobre objetos. E Wittgenstein faz isso de modo distinto da crítica moderna à metafísica, pois elimina o sujeito do problema: não é preciso recorrer a faculdades subjetivas para fazer essa delimitação, mas apenas à linguagem na qual o pensamento se expressa. (...) Por outro lado, na perspectiva da “tradição lógica”, há na mesma obra uma identificação entre a essência do “logos” que pode enunciar algo verdadeiro sobre o ser e do próprio ser do qual se fala nesse discurso. Nosso objetivo é destacar este vínculo com a “tradição lógica” para defender que, para além de uma “virada linguística”, há no Tractatus uma espécie de “metafísica silenciosa” que coloca problemas tais como o do sujeito e o da “essência” do mundo em seu correto lugar após passá-los pelo crivo da crítica. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Experiential Roots of Religion The ARE in the Twentieth Century The Decline of Traditional Foundationalism and Stock Objections to RE The ARE via the Principle of Critical Trust (PCT) RE and TE Conceptual Coherence of TE Intracoherence of TE The Structure of the CTA The Impartiality Argument for the PCT Objections to the ARE The ARE in the Twenty‐First Century References.

This monograph introduces a meta-framework for conducting interdisciplinary research in the science of emotion, as well as a framework for a particular kind of theory of emotion. It can also be understood as a “cross-over” book that introduces neophytes to some of the current discourse and major challenges for an interdisciplinary approach to the science of emotion, especially from a philosophical perspective. It also engages experts from across the disciplines who are interested in conducting an interdisciplinary approach to research and (...) theorizing in the science of emotion, and introduces to them some of the contemporary debates in the philosophy of emotion. It does so by providing a taxonomy of theories of emotion which allows one to understand the contemporary interdisciplinary discourse in the science of emotion as a debate between four fundamental types of theories of emotion—realism, instrumentalism, eliminative-realism, and eliminativism—and which can be found or potentially found across the disciplines, and by arguing for foundational principles which can unify, without consilience, these four kinds of approaches as perspectives about the same object of inquiry. It also covers a wide range of concerns, including the problem of skepticism in the science of emotion, the problem of the underdetermination of a theory by the evidence, the question of the place of ordinary intuitions and ordinary language for a science of emotion, the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, the meta-hard problem of consciousness, the problem of intentionality, questions about the rationality of emotions and whether emotions can be a vehicle for knowledge, and the debate between cognitive and noncognitive theories in the philosophy of emotion. (shrink)

I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or an emotion there exists some normative standard that is given by what emotion or an emotion is against which our emotional responses can be judged (...) or evaluated in virtue of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account. (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...) ([1992] 1996) experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor’s account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (i.e., by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized). (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize it as an emotion of global negative self‐assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self‐evaluation. According to nonstandard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self‐assessment. I argue here in favor of nonstandard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor's standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper's experience (...) of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor's account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences. (shrink)

Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...) ([1992] 1996) experience of groundless shame can be portrayed as 1) both a rational and an irrational experience of shame, in accordance with Taylor’s account as a paradigm model of standard accounts of shame, and 2) as a rational experience of shame when taken in its own right as a legitimate, rational account of shame. Third, without denying that some experiences of shame either are or can be irrational experiences of shame, I elucidate how standard accounts of shame can act as mechanisms of epistemic injustice, and in doing so can transmute the righteous indignation of the marginalized by recasting them as shameful experiences (i.e., by recasting them as experiences of the righteous shame of the marginalized). -/- (This chapter was previously published in Hypatia, forthcoming, under the title "Rationality through the Eyes of Shame: Oppression and Liberation via Emotion"). (shrink)

We live in a time where masks are rewriting wearable protocol. It is critical to understand entwining narratives around masks from the notion of health and safety to a wider discourse between the masked and the mask, including opportunistic capitalism and climatic implications. How about a mask that breathes, that is made by organic raw materials? As we confront and question narratives of the new normalcy in the year of pandemic and hindsight, these frames have coalesced in a vision of (...) the mask as an emblem for open-source eco-consciousness-functional, accessible DIY living wearables made with biomaterials. ‘Algae Mask’ explores the symbiosis between humans and other beings, layered as second skins; this project is driven by an ardent group of art and design practitioners across the Asia-Pacific and European regions with ongoing satellite collaborations. A related film Algae Dream, on the other hand, speculates on the prototyping process and the sleek languages of market economy to smudge the fine line between fiction and reality. Within the bricolage of source videos and original footages, motivational video mock-up and authentic presentation documentation, the video essay intends to challenge audience in a multiplicity of narrations stemming from discourses of business and science. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma discussão sobre as condutas metodológicas adotadas na pesquisa pragmática. São analisadas posições que vão dos trabalhos seminais do filósofo Paul Grice àquelas assumidas por pesquisadores de tendência neogriceana e pós-griceana, levando em conta os modos filosófico e científico de construir e avaliar teorias, bem como a estreita relação entre as opções metodológicas e os pressupostos teóricos da pesquisa. Como conclusão, chega-se ao reconhecimento da necessidade de se adotar uma postura francamente pluralista quanto à questão do método, (...) mas que não deve ser confundida com um mero anarquismo metodológico. (shrink)

The present study explored motivations for lying self-presentation on Instagram as well as the mental and behavioral outcomes of this presentation. We also examined the differential mediational roles of perceived popularity in accounting for the association between lying self-presentation and depression. Our results showed that individuals with a strong need for approval reported higher levels of lying self-presentation. The results also revealed that lying self-presentation positively influenced depression, perceived popularity and deleting behaviors. Furthermore, we found that even if lying self-presentation (...) increased depression, perceived popularity served as a psychological buffer against depression. (shrink)

We investigate corporate giving behaviors of prestigious business award winners in Korea. In particular, we examine whether firms strategically use corporate giving to enhance corporate reputation. We find that award winners generally make more charitable contributions than nonwinners prior to winning awards and maintain significant charitable contributions after winning awards; multiple award winners make even more charitable contributions than single-award winners; and an increase in charitable contributions does not raise the probability of winning awards in the year after the increase. (...) The results suggest that CEOs of award-winning firms do not use corporate giving opportunistically to enhance their status and reputation. Rather, significant charitable contributions by award winners may be indicative of a sound business strategy to maximize long-term firm value. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that an understanding of what shame is through an understanding of its rationality and intentionality can provide a single framework that may be able to unify the research on shame, perhaps even across disciplines. To do so, I begin by explaining what a criterion for the ontological rationality of shame is, and I explain its relation to an understanding of what makes shame the kind of emotion that it is. In doing so, I demonstrate how (...) the rationality of shame, including the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame, is intimately intertwined with shame’s intentionality. Next, I consider some of the research on shame from the disciplines of philosophy and psychology in order to isolate the genus from the differentia of shame, and, with the inclusion of research from the discipline of sociology, I derive the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame. I follow this discussion by introducing an understanding of shame as a superordinate inference rule, which amounts to a non-standard account of shame, in order to fulfill the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame. I conclude by explaining how what I suggest as the core of shame—the superordinate inference rule of shame—fulfills the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame, by constituting the ontological rationality of shame, and I highlight the benefit of my account over alternative accounts of shame in regard to the rationality of our experiences of shame. I thereby argue in virtue of an inference to the best explanation for my proposal to fulfill the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame and to provide a single unifying framework for an understanding of what shame is. (shrink)

Many clinical and psychological constructs are conceptualized to have multivariate higher-order constructs that give rise to multidimensional lower-order traits. Although recent measurement models and computing algorithms can accommodate item response data with a higher-order structure, there are few measurement models and computing techniques that can be employed in the context of complex research synthesis, such as meta-analysis of individual participant data or integrative data analysis. The current study was aimed at modeling complex item responses that can arise when underlying domain-specific, (...) lower-order traits are hierarchically related to multiple higher-order traits for individual participant data from multiple studies. We formulated a multi-group, multivariate higher-order item response theory (HO-IRT) model from a Bayesian perspective and developed a new Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to simultaneously estimate the (a) structural parameters of the first- and second-order latent traits across multiple groups and (b) item parameters of the model. Results from a simulation study support the feasibility of the MCMC algorithm. From the analysis of real data, we found that a bivariate HO-IRT model with different correlation/covariance structures for different studies fit the data best, compared to a univariate HO-IRT model or other alternate models with unreasonable assumptions (i.e., the same means and covariances across studies). Although more work is needed to further develop the method and to disseminate it, the multi-group multivariate HO-IRT model holds promise to derive a common metric for individual participant data from multiple studies in research synthesis studies for robust inference and for new discoveries. (shrink)

One might think that the European verb “to be” can find no counterpart in archaic Chinese. This paper starts with two sidetracks on Heidegger and Benveniste, which prepare us a broader horizon in dealing with the notion of “being.” It is indeed conceivable in the four Chinese characters shi 是, zai 在, cun 存 and you 有. These notions are discussed with the help of corresponding archaic Chinese script tokens. This so-called fourfold root explains why it is precisely these characters (...) that have become the most widely used Chinese translations for the notion of “being.”. (shrink)