Konstantin Pollok - Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 559-575 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion Konstantin Pollok There are two significant places in Kant's Critical corpus where he discusses the concept of motion. The first is in the Critique of Pure Reason, where in the "Deduction of the Categories" Kant writes: Motion, as an act of the subject , (...) and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession—if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form. In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject. For present purposes, the most relevant passage is paragraph 15 of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant says that the concept of matter had … to be carried through all four of the indicated functions of the concepts of the understanding , where in each a new determination of this concept was added. The.. (shrink)

Konstantin Pollok offers the first book-length analysis of Kant's theory of normativity that covers foundational issues in theoretical and practical philosophy as well as aesthetics. Interpreting Kant's 'critical turn' as a normative turn, he argues that Kant's theory of normativity is both original and radical: it departs from the perfectionist ideal of early modern rationalism, and arrives at an unprecedented framework of synthetic a priori principles that determine the validity of our judgments. Pollok examines the hylomorphism in Kant's theory (...) of normativity and relates Kant's idea of our reason's self-legislation to the 'natural right' tradition, revealing Kant's debt to his predecessors as well as his relevance to contemporary debates on normativity. This book will appeal to academic researchers and advanced students of Kant, early modern philosophy and intellectual history. (shrink)

Various publications claim that medical AI systems perform as well, or better, than clinical experts. However, there have been very few controlled trials and the quality of existing studies has been called into question. There is growing concern that existing studies overestimate the clinical benefits of AI systems. This has led to calls for more, and higher-quality, randomized controlled trials of medical AI systems. While this a welcome development, AI RCTs raise novel methodological challenges that have seen little discussion. We (...) discuss some of the challenges arising in the context of AI RCTs and make some suggestions for how to meet them. (shrink)

PA is Peano Arithmetic. Pr(x) is the usual Σ1-formula representing provability in PA. A strong provability predicate is a formula which has the same properties as Pr(·) but is not Σ1. An example: Q is ω-provable if PA + ¬ Q is ω-inconsistent (Boolos [4]). In [5] Dzhaparidze introduced a joint provability logic for iterated ω-provability and obtained its arithmetical completeness. In this paper we prove some further modal properties of Dzhaparidze's logic, e.g., the fixed point property and the Craig (...) interpolation lemma. We also consider other examples of the strong provability predicates and their applications. (shrink)

Synchronic norms of theory choice, a traditional concern in scientific methodology, restrict the theories one can choose in light of given information. Diachronic norms of theory change, as studied in belief revision, restrict how one should change one’s current beliefs in light of new information. Learning norms concern how best to arrive at true beliefs. In this paper, we undertake to forge some rigorous logical relations between the three topics. Concerning, we explicate inductive truth conduciveness in terms of optimally direct (...) convergence to the truth, where optimal directness is explicated in terms of reversals and cycles of opinion prior to convergence. Concerning, we explicate Ockham’s razor and related principles of choice in terms of the information topology of the empirical problem context and show that the principles are necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence to the truth. Concerning, we weaken the standard principles of agm belief revision theory in intuitive ways that are also necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence. Then we show that some of our weakened principles of change entail corresponding principles of choice, completing the triangle of relations between,, and. (shrink)

Against the well-established critical rejection of rights a growing literature in the tradition of agonistic democracy asserts their emancipatory role in the struggles for social change. However, agonistic theorists, invested as they are in the idea of democratic innovation as a process of gradual ‘augmentation’ of existing rules, institutions and practices, fail to account for the ruptural capacity, and hence for the full radical potential, of rights. Using the performative approach, I develop a conception of rights claiming as a defiant (...) practice to express the ruptural dimension of certain forms of rights politics. I demonstrate how defiant rights claiming articulates immanent critique by declaring the incapacity of putative duty-bearer institutions and governments to uphold the claimed right due to structural constraints, thereby generating inevitable contradictions within the extant order and creating the necessity for an alternative one. Moreover, in order to fully capture the emancipatory potential and creative capacity of rights, this article argues for understanding certain forms of rights politics both as augmentation and rupture, taking the two to be different dimensions of the same radical democratic practice. I present the creative use of rights discourse by the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil and the transnational network of agrarian movements, La Via Campesina, as precisely such a combination of the practice of augmentation and defiant claims, which has led to the transformation of the right to food and land into the right to food sovereignty, demonstration of the structural embeddedness of rights violations in the existing global regime of food production and distribution, and authorisation of an alternative vision of the future. (shrink)

This article focuses on Alexei Losev’s literary texts that embrace his mythology of music: “I was 19 years old,” “A meteor,” “A woman-thinker,” “The Tchaikovsky trio,” and “An encounter.” It is shown that Losev’s musical mythology developed from his early musical-critical works—through the artistic-mythological episodes of his philosophical works per se —to his fiction of the 1930s. Losev’s intentionally abstract philosophy of music required to be complemented by the artistic, emotional, socially and historically specific expression. The main idea of Losev’s (...) musical myth in its historical-cultural aspect is to reflect the relevant self-consciousness of an individual. The epoch of religious super-individualism and “prayerful delight” is replaced by the epoch of “musical delight” and professed idealization of an individual. This change was a reason of the extreme ambivalence of music, which, on the one hand, expresses the highest order and harmony and, on the other, is a continuous evolvement and chaos, a substantive uncertainty. The novelty of the article consists, firstly, in the analysis of correspondence between musical ambivalence and drama in the lives of the heroes, especially heroines symbolizing music itself; and secondly, in identifying the constant features of Losev’s musical myth, as well as its specific features that emerge at different stages. (shrink)

Synchronic norms of theory choice, a traditional concern in scientific methodology, restrict the theories one can choose in light of given information. Diachronic norms of theory change, as studied in belief revision, restrict how one should change one’s current beliefs in light of new information. Learning norms concern how best to arrive at true beliefs. In this paper, we undertake to forge some rigorous logical relations between the three topics. Concerning, we explicate inductive truth conduciveness in terms of optimally direct (...) convergence to the truth, where optimal directness is explicated in terms of reversals and cycles of opinion prior to convergence. Concerning, we explicate Ockham’s razor and related principles of choice in terms of the information topology of the empirical problem context and show that the principles are necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence to the truth. Concerning, we weaken the standard principles of agm belief revision theory in intuitive ways that are also necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence. Then we show that some of our weakened principles of change entail corresponding principles of choice, completing the triangle of relations between,, and. (shrink)

This article is a commentary on ChatGPT and LLMs (Large Language Models) in general. It argues that this technology has matured to the point where calling systems such as ChatGPT “stochastic parrots” is no longer warranted. But it also argues that these systems continue to have serious limitations when it comes to reasoning. These limitations are much more severe than commonly thought. A large array of examples are given to support these claims.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 4 Seiten: 509-530.

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and (...) thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity. (shrink)

By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the (...) A-deduction. Whereas the first step of the B-deduction is an attempt to show that the manifold of an intuition belongs to the ‘necessary unity of self-consciousness’ by means of the synthesis of the understanding, the second step has the task of showing that the very same synthesis is responsible for the spatio-temporal unity of the manifold. Thus, Kant's ‘answer to Hume’ is that no spatio-temporal objects of experience at all are merely ‘given’, independently of the conceptual activities of the understanding. Against the established view I substantiate the claim that with this ‘almost single inference’ of the second proof step the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience consequently vanished from Kant's thinking. (shrink)

We say that two arithmetical formulas A, B have the Σ1-interpolation property if they have an ‘interpolant’ σ, i.e., a Σ1 formula such that the formulas A→σ and σ→B are provable in Peano Arithmetic PA. The Σ1-interpolability predicate is just a formalization of this property in the language of arithmetic.Using a standard idea of Gödel, we can associate with this predicate its provability logic, which is the set of all formulas that express arithmetically valid principles in the modal language with (...) two modal operators, □ for provability in PA and for Σ1-interpolability. In this paper we determine this provability logic .It turns out that this problem appears to be quite similar to the problem of such modal description of relative interpretability, a problem, solved by Berarducci and Shavrukov. However, the present case is sometimes easier. In particular, we prove in this paper the fixed point property and the Craig interpolation property for our modal system ELH. (shrink)

The problems recently detected in the famous words ars adeo latet arte sua (Ov. Met. 10.252) can be resolved if the line is repunctuated on the basis of an unjustly neglected interpretation put forward by Byzantine and Renaissance scholars.

For philosophers of German idealism and early German Romanticism, the imagination is central to issues ranging from hermeneutics to transcendental logic and from ethics to aesthetics. This volume of new essays brings together, for the first time, comprehensive and critical reflections on the significances of the imagination during this period, with essays on Kant and the imagination, the imagination in post-Kantian German idealism, and the imagination in early German romanticism. The essays explore the many and varied uses of the imagination (...) and discuss whether they form a coherent or shared notion or whether they embody points of philosophical divergence within these traditions. They shed new light on one of the most important and enigmatic aspects of human nature, as understood in the context of a profoundly influential era of western thought. (shrink)

У статті досліджується проблема утворення та діяльності машинно-тракторних станцій у Радянському Союзі, починаючи від появи перших машинних товариств, тракторних колон та МТС у 20-30-х рр. XX століття та закінчуючи реорганізацією їх у ремонтно-технічні станції в 1958 р. Історичний процес створення, функціонування та реорганізації МТС розглядається в процесі сільськогосподарського виробництва.

_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 4, pp 616 - 624 The claim that it is always good to be reasonable can be understood to mean either that being reasonable is always better than being unreasonable all things considered or that being reasonable is better than being unreasonable in at least one respect. This paper tries to evaluate both claims and argues for the second, weaker thesis while dismissing the first. To do this, two distinct ideas contained in our every-day understanding (...) of reasonability are distinguished and formulated more precisely. It is then argued that, regardless of which idea we take to be fundamental, being reasonable is always good in at least one respect, though not always good all things considered. (shrink)

Popper argued that a statistical falsification required a prior methodological decision to regard sufficiently improbable events as ruled out. That suggestion has generated a number of fruitful approaches, but also a number of apparent paradoxes and ultimately, no clear consensus. It is still commonly claimed that, since random samples are logically consistent with all the statistical hypotheses on the table, falsification simply does not apply in realistic statistical settings. We claim that the situation is considerably improved if we ask a (...) conceptually prior question: when should a statistical hypothesis be regarded as falsifiable. To that end we propose several different notions of statistical falsifiability and prove that, whichever definition we prefer, the same hypotheses turn out to be falsifiable. That shows that statistical falsifiability enjoys a kind of conceptual robustness. These notions of statistical falsifiability are arrived at by proposing statistical analogues to intuitive properties enjoyed by exemplary falsifiable hypotheses familiar from classical philosophy of science. That demonstrates that, to a large extent, this philosophical tradition was on the right conceptual track. Finally, we demonstrate that, under weak assumptions, the statistically falsifiable hypotheses correspond precisely to the closed sets in a standard topology on probability measures. That means that standard techniques from statistics and measure theory can be used to determine exactly which hypotheses are statistically falsifiable. In other words: the proposed notion of statistical falsifiability both answers to our conceptual demands and submits to standard mathematical techniques. (shrink)

In den Kant-Forschungen werden sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Arbeiten zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants veröffentlicht. Die Bände stellen Funde unbekannter oder verschollen geglaubter Kantischer Autographen und Vorlesungsskripte vor und erörtern Editionsprobleme der Kantischen Vorlesungen und Werke. Sie enthalten darüber hinaus Studien zu Kants Umfeld und zur Kant-Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert sowie systematisch angelegte Arbeiten zu Architektonik und System der Philosophie Kants.

ArgumentPost-Stalinist reforms resulted in dramatic changes in the ways of operation of Soviet science: one can say that they altered the very understanding of what science was, or should be, in the socialist society. A new vision came about as a result of political and rhetorical efforts of scientists, who pushed forward their various, often conflicting, agendas acting in accordance with specific rules of Soviet polity. The most visible part of the reform came with the 1961 administrative reorganization of the (...) USSR Academy of Sciences. The related series of changes, however, was much broader and comprehensive, modifying the relationships between science and ideology, politicians and academic researchers, and establishing the very division between fundamental and applied research, which had been strongly rejected during the preceding Stalinist period. (shrink)

Two short typescripts by G. Lukács from the archive, dating from 1941/42, shed light on his appraisal of the cultural ‘inner reserves’ of Germany and the ‘moral reserves’ of the democracies involved in the Second World War, as well as on Lukács’s political philosophy at that time. The conception of an intrinsic interrelation of a humanist philosophical anthropology and rationalist epistemology elucidates his egalitarian and democratic account. Both texts are located within the intellectual development of the author in an introduction (...) by the editor, which sketches the historical background and indicates relevant contemporaneous theoretical and political debates, such as the controversies over realism and humanism and, also in dispute with K. Jaspers, on German collective guilt. (shrink)

Translation of Celan’s and Lévinas’ Meridian. On the Topology of Meeting-Through-a-Caesura by Konstantin Sigov.

The original proof of the four-color theorem by Appel and Haken sparked a controversy when Tymoczko used it to argue that the justification provided by unsurveyable proofs carried out by computers cannot be a priori. It also created a lingering impression to the effect that such proofs depend heavily for their soundness on large amounts of computation-intensive custom-built software. Contra Tymoczko, we argue that the justification provided by certain computerized mathematical proofs is not fundamentally different from that provided by surveyable (...) proofs, and can be sensibly regarded as a priori. We also show that the aforementioned impression is mistaken because it fails to distinguish between proof search (the context of discovery) and proof checking (the context of justification). By using mechanized proof assistants capable of producing certificates that can be independently checked, it is possible to carry out complex proofs without the need to trust arbitrary custom-written code. We only need to trust one fixed, small, and simple piece of software: the proof checker. This is not only possible in principle, but is in fact becoming a viable methodology for performing complicated mathematical reasoning. This is evinced by a new proof of the four-color theorem that appeared in 2005, and which was developed and checked in its entirety by a mechanical proof system. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally and (...) unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

Nowadays the answer to the question “what is logic?” seems very simple and obvious—“logic is a science,” and after that usually one says what is this science about. As for the expressions “logic is an art” or “the art of logic,” then they are only metaphors or some kind of “façon de parler” used in serious scientific discourse. One of my aims here is to trace the line of development of dichotomy “logic as an art—logic as a science” and to (...) demonstrate that both these feat uses of logic have fundamental historical roots and play very important conceptual role in any theorizing about logic. Despite the fact that logic is undoubtedly a science, it can be interpreted as an art, moreover, the analysis of logic from this point of view expands, it seems to me, the researching possibilities in the field of the philosophy of logic at least in better understanding what is logic, what creates its unity independently from the historical period of its development, topics, and methods. (shrink)