Is It Always Good to Be Reasonable?

Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):616-624 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 4, pp 616 - 624 The claim that it is always good to be reasonable can be understood to mean either that being reasonable is always better than being unreasonable all things considered or that being reasonable is better than being unreasonable in at least one respect. This paper tries to evaluate both claims and argues for the second, weaker thesis while dismissing the first. To do this, two distinct ideas contained in our every-day understanding of reasonability are distinguished and formulated more precisely. It is then argued that, regardless of which idea we take to be fundamental, being reasonable is always good in at least one respect, though not always good all things considered.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Weakness of the Will as Furtive Irrationality.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):191–215.
John Rawls and Liberal Neutrality.Tim Hurley - 2000 - Interpretation 27 (2):105-128.
Reasons and religious belief.David Michael Levin - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):371 – 393.
Quand nos émotions sont-elles raisonnables?Stéphane Lemaire - 2016 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141 (2):215-234.
Against Personifying the Reasonable Person.Matt King - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):725-732.
On Some Ways in Which A Thing Can be Good.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1992 - Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):96-117.
Does rationality presuppose irrationality.Xavier Vanmechelen - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.
Reason and Certainty.O. R. Jones - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (171):55 - 58.
The Metaphysics of Goodness in the Ethics of Aristotle.Samuel Baker - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1839-1856.
Purity and Judgment in Morality.John Kekes - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (246):453 - 469.
Rape and the reasonable man.C. D. & K. Haely - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (2):113-139.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-29

Downloads
26 (#571,586)

6 months
4 (#657,928)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Incoherence and irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.
Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-354.

Add more references