Mit From Value to Rightness liefert Vuko Andrić einen innovativen, scharfsinnigen und erfreulich klaren Beitrag zur Frage nach der Perspektivabhängigkeit moralischer Pflichten im Allgemeinen und dem angemessenen Verständnis des Konsequentialismus im Besonderen. Andrićs ideenreiches Buch geht der zentralen Frage, ob und in welchem Sinne konsequentialistische Theorien handlungsleitend sein sollten, dabei entlang dreier Argumentationsstränge nach. In diesem Kommentar konzentrieren wir uns auf den zweiten Argumentationsstrang, der die Vereinbarkeit von objektivem und subjektivem Konsequentialismus mit “ Sollen impliziert Können " behandelt. Wir möchten (...) einerseits auf Schwachstellen an Andrićs Kritik am objektiven Konsequentialismus und andererseits auf Probleme, die sich aus Andrićs Evidenzbegriff ergeben, hinweisen. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 4, pp 616 - 624 The claim that it is always good to be reasonable can be understood to mean either that being reasonable is always better than being unreasonable all things considered or that being reasonable is better than being unreasonable in at least one respect. This paper tries to evaluate both claims and argues for the second, weaker thesis while dismissing the first. To do this, two distinct ideas contained in our every-day understanding (...) of reasonability are distinguished and formulated more precisely. It is then argued that, regardless of which idea we take to be fundamental, being reasonable is always good in at least one respect, though not always good all things considered. (shrink)

Every theory of rationality worth taking seriously implies that it is in some way irrational to accept contradictions. In this essay, the author examines how exactly this basic idea should be spelled out. He argues for two claims. First, it is not practically irrational to accept a contradiction in the sense of causing oneself to have contradictory beliefs. Second, it is moreover not theoretically irrational to accept a contradiction in the sense of having contradictory beliefs, if the contradictoriness of the (...) relevant beliefs is inaccessible to the person. The contradictoriness of a set of beliefs is accessible to a person only if this person possesses the general cognitive capacities to realise that the beliefs are contradictory. (shrink)