Theory Choice, Theory Change, and Inductive Truth-Conduciveness

Studia Logica 107 (5):949-989 (2019)
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Abstract

Synchronic norms of theory choice, a traditional concern in scientific methodology, restrict the theories one can choose in light of given information. Diachronic norms of theory change, as studied in belief revision, restrict how one should change one’s current beliefs in light of new information. Learning norms concern how best to arrive at true beliefs. In this paper, we undertake to forge some rigorous logical relations between the three topics. Concerning, we explicate inductive truth conduciveness in terms of optimally direct convergence to the truth, where optimal directness is explicated in terms of reversals and cycles of opinion prior to convergence. Concerning, we explicate Ockham’s razor and related principles of choice in terms of the information topology of the empirical problem context and show that the principles are necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence to the truth. Concerning, we weaken the standard principles of agm belief revision theory in intuitive ways that are also necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence. Then we show that some of our weakened principles of change entail corresponding principles of choice, completing the triangle of relations between,, and.

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Konstantin Genin
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Towards a logic for ‘because’.Eric Raidl & Hans Rott - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-31.
How Theories of Induction Can Streamline Measurements of Scientific Performance.Slobodan Perović & Vlasta Sikimić - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2):267-291.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):613-615.

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