Modern schooling in Korea, which was officially established by law in 1949, is well known for its function as an engine of economic success in modern Korea. Although this fact seems to be world-wid...

v.1. Yuhak ŭi parwŏn kwa wansŏng -- v. 2. Chungguk Yuhak ŭi chŏn'gae -- v. 3. Han'guk ŭi Yuhak (sang) -- v. 4. Han'guk ŭi Yuhak (ha) -- v. 5. Ilbon kwa Pet'ŭnam ŭi Yuhak.

서문 제1장 언어적 공간 인식 비교 분석 1.서론 2.공간 인식을 통해 본 한국어와 영어의 차이점 3.두 언어의 차이점에 대한 영어 작문 분석 4.마무리 제2장 총칭성의 비교 분석 1.서론 2.명사구에서의 총칭성 3.동사의 내재적 분류와 총칭성과의 상관성 4.동사 시제-상의 반영으로서의 총칭성 5.총칭성의 해석 원리 6.마무리 제3장 수동구문과 어휘부에서의 행위성 비교 분석 1.서론 2.수동 구문 유형의 차이와 행위성 3.동사 어휘의 행위성과 유생성의 실현 4.마무리 제4장 지각동사 의미론 비교 분석 1.서론 2.지각 동사 보어 유형과 의미의 상호 작용 3.시각 동사의 다의성 양상 4.청각 동사와 활성역의 (...) 상호 작용 5.마무리 제5장 술어적 소유 구문 비교 분석 1.서론 2.국부주의와 소유의 원천 도식 3.술어적 소유구문 도식 비교 4.도식 선택 원리 및 번역 텍스트 분석 5.마무리 제6장 Tough 구문의 기능에 관한 비교 분석 1.서론 2.'tough'구문과 정보포장이론 3.'tough'구문의 총칭성 4.마무리 제7장 보문소 의미론 비교 분석 1.비교 2.'언술적/사실적'해석 구분과 보문소 3.IRH와 보문소 교체 4.의미 요소와 보문소 교체 5.마무리 제8장 유동 양화사 구문 비교 분석 1.서론 2.위치 제약과 초점 정보성 3.유동 양화사의 중의성 양상 4.마무리 제9장 사역구문의 함축성 비교 분석 1.서론 2.사역의 정의 및 분류 3.도상성과 사역성의 관련성 4.Cause의 함축성 위계와 ᅵ연속성 5.영어와 한국어의 우언적 사역 6.마무리 제10장 부사의 위치와 위치 유표성에 대한 비교 분석 1.서론 2.영어와 한국어의 부사 위치 및 거울상 효과 3.부사 어순의 유표성 논의 4.마무리 참고문헌. (shrink)

1. Chosŏn sidae Kyŏnghak ŭi kwanchŏm kwa yŏnbyŏn -- 2. Han'guk Kyŏnghak yŏn'gu ŭi hoego wa chŏnmang -- 3. Han'guk Kyŏnghak ŭi chŏn'gae wa t'ŭkching -- 4. "Taehak" haesŏk ŭi yŏn'gu hyŏnhwang kwa hyangbang -- 5. Chosŏn sidae "Chungyong" haesŏk ŭi yangsang kwa t'ŭching : Tosŏl ŭl chungsim ŭro -- 6. Chosŏn chŏn'gi kyŏngsŏ haesŏk kwa Yi Hwang, Cho Sik ŭi Kyŏnghak -- 7. Chosŏn hugi Yŏngnam ŭi Kyŏnghak yŏn'gu wa sot'ong ŭi mosaek -- 8. Paekho Yun Hyu ŭi kyŏnghakkwan (...) -- 9. 18-segi ŭi haksul tonghyang kwa Yi Ik ŭi Kyŏnghak -- 10. Sŏngho Yi Ik "Taehak", "Chungyong" haesŏk. (shrink)

V sklopu čedalje intenzivnejšega ukvarjanja z zgodovino hermenevtike v zadnjih letih se kaže Dilthej pogosto kot »klasik« tiste z Gadamerjem inkriminirane tradicionalne hermenevtike, s čimer je postavljen v pozicijo golega predhodnika filozofske hermenevtike oz. hermenevtične filozofije Heideggra in Gadamerja. Toda ta pogled, ki izhaja v glavnem iz Gadamerjeve koncepcije in se lahko zdi na prvi pogled povsem sprejemljiv, je problematičen in pomeni po mojem mnenju odločno prikrajšanje Diltheyevega filozofskega dosežka in njegovega prispevka hermenevtičnemu mišljenju.Within the context of the more and (...) more intensive research on the history of hermeneutics in recent years, Dilthey more and more often appears as a “classic” of the traditional hermeneutics incriminated by Gadamer, which puts him in the position of a mere predecessor of philosophical hermeneutics viz. hermeneutic philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer. This view, however, stemming primarily from Gadamer’s conception and appearing to be quite acceptable at a first glance, is highly problematic and, in my opinion, contributes to a decisive diminution of Dilthey’s philosophical achievement and his contribution to hermeneutic thinking. (shrink)

Ni le potreba po logični samorazjasnitvi tista, ki duhoslovne znanosti povezuje s filozofijo. Gre predvsem za to, da ti. duhoslovne znanosti same predstavljajo problem za filozofijo: kar je bilo povedano in kar se da povedati o njihovi logični, spoznavnoteoretski utemeljitvi in o razlogih za njihovo znanstveno samostojnost v razmerju do naravoslovnih znanosti, daleč zaostaja za tem, kar duhoslovne znanosti so in kar pomenijo filozofiji.The need for logical self-explication is not the only thing that relates human sciences to philosophy. The primary (...) reason for it is that the so-called human sciences themselves represent an issue for philosophy: what has been and can be said about their logical, epistemological foundation and about the reasons for their scientific independence in relation to natural sciences is lagging behind what human sciences are and mean to philosophy. (shrink)

3. Han-Chung kŭnse chŏngch'i sasangsa pigyo.

이 글의 주된 목적은 최한기의 ‘측인’(測人)이 1) 고전의 상법적 판단에 의존하면서도, 유가적 도리(道理)의 실천 여부를 최종적 판단 근거로 제시한다는 점에서 ‘상법의 유가적 확장물’로 규정될 수 있으며, 2) ‘상호주의적 구조’를 함축, 타인과의 상관적 영향관계 속에서 수시변통할 수 있는 중요 계기로 읽힐 수 있음을 해명하는 것이다. 최한기는 ‘사람 헤아리는 법[측인]’의 단초를 열어준 고전 상법의 경험적 성과를 높이 평가하고 그것에 적극적으로 의존하면서도, 상법적 판단이 인간을 ‘관계로부터 규정되는 존재’임을, 그리고 활동변화하는 세계에 능동적으로 대응하는 행사상(行事相)을 감안하고 있지 않다는 점에서 새로운 탐구의 필요성을 제기한다. 상법적 판단이 (...) 신뢰를 얻기 위해서는 변화하는 세계에 적극적으로 대응하는 행사상의 검증이 수반되어야만 하며, 그 실천적 행위는 반드시 ‘오륜(五倫)의 실현에 부합되는 것’이어야 한다. 결국 형모(形貌)로 보는 상격의 귀천이 행사상에 드러나는 오륜의 실천 여부에 따라 최종적으로 확정될 수 있는 것이다. 이 점에서 측인은 유가적 관점에서 재해석된 ‘상법의 변용’으로 보인다. 다른 한편으로 최한기의 측인은 ‘상호주의’를 실현할 수 있는 수시변통의 중요 계기를 담고 있다. 최한기에게 ‘나’는 공동체 안에 존재하는 ‘관계-내-존재’로서 부단히 남의 호오(好惡)에 따라 내 행위를 지속적으로 ‘교정’해 가야 하는 ‘능동적 존재’로 이해된다. 결국 최한기에게 수신(修身)과 측인은 그 자체로 확정적인 내용을 담고 있지 않으며, 타인과의 상관적 영향관계 속에서 변통의 결정적 계기가 된다. 최한기의 측인이 인간을 읽는 유일한 지침은 될 수 없다. 그러나 측인은 1) 활동변화의 관점에서 세계를 인식하고, 2) 인간을 ‘세계-내-존재’ ‘관계-내-존재’로 규정, 끊임없이 상호작용하며 수시변통해야 하는 존재로 규정한다는 점에서 이전 상법과 구분되는 이론적 진전을 보여 준다. 인간이 타인을 인식하려 하는 것은 결국 ‘상호작용’을 위한 것이라는 점을 상기해본다면, 최한기의 측인은 인간의 삶에서 상호작용의 중요성을 환기시켜 준다는 점에서 의미를 지닌다. (shrink)

Ki Jeong-jin is the one of the most famous Neo-Confucian theorists of the late Joseon Dynasty, and he is well known as a proposer of the theory of statements that there is only one Principle although the phenomena vary. He particularly emphasizes the role and authority of Principle. His arguments related to the theory were mainly raised in the work of Napryangsaeui. He, in this work, explicitly reveals the intention to resolve the issues of the nature of humans and things (...) in the Ho-hak debate. But he has never directly participated in the debate. Instead, after his death, some debates over Napryangsaeui arose between his students and Jeon Woo. This paper aims to analyze Ki Jeong-jin’s theory by comparison with the view of Han Wonjin who represents the theory of nature of humans and things in the Ho-hak school, and with the issues of debate between Ki Jeong-jin’s students and Jeon Woo. Particularly, we focused on the matter of relation between ‘completeness and incompleteness’ and ‘original nature’. Through this analysis, we could expand the understanding of the aspects discussed in the theory on the similarities and differences in nature of humans and things, and the significance of Ki Jeong-jin’s theory. Furthermore, in the history of Neo-Confucianism in the Joseon Dynasty, we could shed light on the reconstruction process of the philosophical statements that there is only one Principle but the phenomena vary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology. By HANS Kii'NG. Translated by J. R. Stephenson. New York: Crossroad, 1987. Pp. 601. $37.50 (cloth bound). This is an imposing book (first German edition, 1970), not only in length, but in breadth of presentation. Kiing, in the introduction, outlines the philosophical, theological and cultural milieus out of which Hegel's theology (...) and philosophy emerged. In the next 400 pages (seven chapters), Kiing thoroughly articulates the historical development of Hegel's theological and philosophical thought as expressed in his successive writings, specifically examining and evaluating the christological elements. Kiing's final chapter interprets Hegel's Christology in light of recent biblical historical/critical methodology, by way of a prolegomenon to a future Christology. The book concludes with five integral historical/theological excursus which take up specific questions that arise out of this Hegelian enterprise, for example: "Does God suffer?," "The Dialectic of the Attributes of God," "Immutability of God?". In the preface to this English edition, Kiing states that the purpose of this work is to "provide theologians with an introduction to Hegel's theological and christological thought.... [It will be] a many-leveled 'invitation' into Hegel's life and 'thought, with particular reference to his religious world, and then into his theology and Christology " (p. ix). "Moreover,.this book is an introduction to Hegel's thought by way of 'prolegomena to a future Christology '. In ·these pages we endeavour to return... a provisional reply that will take us some way in the right direction" (p. x). Why did Kiing look to Hegel for the clue to a future Christology? His thesis is that "the biblical message concerning a God who is by no means separated from the world but rather operates within it, and who is by no means stuck immovable and immutable in an unhistorical and suprahistorical realm but rather performs living acts in hi&tory can be better understood [along the lines of Hegelian thought] than in terms of the metaphysics of either classical Greece or the middle ages" (p. xii). Any student of historical or philosophical theology/christology will be captivated by Kiing's treatment of.the development of Hegel's ilhought. Undoubtedly he has mastered Hegel's life, writings and 698 694 BOOK REVIEWS thought, and presents these in a clear, complete and engaging manner. Kiing notes that Hegel, beginning with his student days at Tiihingen, was influenced by three strong cultural and intellectual currents: the Enlightenment as it specifically culminated in the thought of Kant, the French Revolution, and the rise of the Romantic movement. Kiing shows that, while the young Hegel was acquainted with the Bible, and even,though he already displayed an interest in the role of religion (folk religion) as formative of society, nowhere was he "seized in a lively and inward fashion by the Christian faith, by the figure of Christ himself" (p. 54). To rthe contrary, Hegel's early experience of Christianity was lifeless and joyless. During his subsequent time in Bern, Hegel's evaluation of Jesus un· derwent a transformation. Hegel became fascinated with Greek religion, not because it was true, but because it embodied the culture and spirit of the people. Developing this train of thought, he stated that "The supreme end of man is morality, and his religious bent is pre· eminent among his aptitudes for promoting that end" (p. 69). In light of this, Hegel considered Jesus,to lack the humane and universal scope of Socrates, who was " the paradigm of a free, good and humane Hellenism and of harmony with nature, world and state " (p. 63). Jesus' teaching was too much an authoritarian imposition upon people rarther than, like Socrates', a nurturing of their inner spirit and life. Shordy, as reflected in his Life of Jesus, Hegel's view of Jesus was to change. Now he was placed above Socrates, not because he was acknowledged to be the eternal Son of God, nor because he reconciled mankind to God by his death on the cross, but rather because he per· sonified the divine ideal of virtue that is so necessary for social order. " Whart is... (shrink)

1. Tan'gun sinhwa ŭi wŏnhyŏngjŏk segyegwan kwa p'ungnyu chŏngsin -- 2. Wŏnhyo ŭi hwajaeng sasang kwa muaehaeng ŭi silch'ŏn -- 3. Ŭisang ŭi 'Hwaŏm ilsŭng pŏpkyedo' e nat'anan Hwaŏm sasang -- 4. Chinul ŭi Tono chŏmsu wa Chŏnghye ssangsu sasang -- 5. Sambong Chŏng To-jŏn ŭi Pulgyo paech'ŏk ŭi naeyong kwa sŏngkyŏk -- 6. T'oegye Yi Hwang ŭi ch'ŏrhakchŏk ipchang kwa 'Kyŏng' sasang -- 7. Kobong Ki Tae-sŭng ŭi hangmun chŏngsin kwa ch'ŏrhak sasang -- 8. Ugye Sŏng Hon ŭi Tohakchŏk (...) sam kwa hangmun yŏnwŏn -- 9. Yulgok Yi I ŭi Taedong sahoeron kwa ch'ŏrhakchŏk chihyang -- 10. Sŏgye Pak Se-dang ŭi Sirhakchŏk sayu ŭi kich'o -- 11. Namdang Han Wŏn-jin ŭi yŏksa insik kwa Chosŏn chunghwajuŭi -- 12. Sŏngdam Song Hwan-gi ŭi 'T'aegŭk tosŏl' haesŏk ŭi kibon ipchang -- 13. Kanjŏng Yi Nŭng-hwa 'Chosŏn Togyosa' ŭi haksulsachŏk ŭiŭi wa han'gye -- 14. Manhae Han Yong-un i pon chuch'e ŭi munje wa minjok chagyŏl ŭi wŏnch'ik -- purok. T'algyŏnggye sidae ŭi Han'guk ch'ŏrhak ŭi inmunhakchŏk ŭiŭi wa chŏnmang: Yulgok ŭi ch'ŏrhak. (shrink)

Plakias has recently argued that there is nothing wrong with publishing defences of philosophical claims which we don't believe and also nothing wrong with concealing our lack of belief, because an author's lack of belief is irrelevant to the merit of a published work. Fleisher has refined this account by limiting the permissibility of publishing without belief to what he calls ‘advocacy role cases’. I argue that such lack of belief is irrelevant only if it is the result of an (...) inexplicable incredulity or the result of a metaphilosophical or epistemic stance that is unrelated to the specific claim. However, in many real-life cases, including Fleisher's advocacy role cases, our doubts regarding the claims we defend arise from reasons that have something to do with the insufficiency of the philosophical evidence supporting the claim, and publishing an unconditional defence of a claim without revealing our doubts is impermissible as it involves withholding philosophically relevant reasons. Plakias has also argued that discouraging philosophers from publishing claims they don't believe would be unfair to junior philosophers with unsettled views. I propose that we should change our academic practices that pressure philosophers to publish articles that pretend to be defences of settled views. (shrink)

The present study aimed to develop effective moral educational interventions based on social psychology by using stories of moral exemplars. We tested whether motivation to engage in voluntary service as a form of moral behavior was better promoted by attainable and relevant exemplars or by unattainable and irrelevant exemplars. First, experiment 1, conducted in a lab, showed that stories of attainable exemplars more effectively promoted voluntary service activity engagement among undergraduate students compared with stories of unattainable exemplars and non-moral stories. (...) Second, experiment 2, a middle school classroom-level experiment with a quasi-experimental design, demonstrated that peer exemplars, who are perceived to be attainable and relevant to students, better promoted service engagement compared with historic figures in moral education classes. (shrink)

First analysis of the whole treatise On the sense by Theophrastus in the English language. Uses Aristotle's dialectic in its applied sense as analytical and heuristic tool to characterise the argumentative and polemical strategy on the Presocratic and Platonic views on perception and cognition.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant's Critique of Berkeley HENRY E. ALLISON THE CLAIMTHAT KANT'S IDEALISM,or at least certain strands of it, is essentially identical to that of Berkeley has a long and distinguished history. It was first voiced by several of Kant's contemporaries such as Mendelssohn, Herder, Hamann, Pistorius and Eberhard who attacked the alleged subjectivism of the Critique of Pure Reason. 1 This viewpoint found its sharpest contemporary expression in the notorious (...) Garve-Feder review to which Kant responded at length in the Prolegomena. In subsequent times it has been championed by Schopenhauer, and most nineteenth century German commentators on the relation between the two philosophers. 2 In addition, it has been, and continues to be, the prevailing view of the vast majority of British writers on Kant, including, with significant qualifications, Norman Kemp Smith. 3 This tradition continues despite the fact that Kant specifically, and in no uncertain terms, repudiated this identification in the Prolegomena and the second edition of the Critique. In both works he responds to the charges of subjectivism, and in so doing distinguishes his position from that of Berkeley, who in the eighteenth century was commonly regarded as a solipsist and denier of the "external world." 4 In contra-distinction to Kant's own critical or transcendental idealism, which explains the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge within the realm of possible experience, Berkeley is characterized as a "dogmatic" or "visionary idealist." He is judged guilty of "degrading bodies to mere illusion" (B69), of regarding things in space as "merely imaginary entities" (B274), and of holding with all "genuine idealists" that: "all knowledge through the senses and experience is i Cf. Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1892), II, 494-505. Cf. Friederich Fredericks, Der Phainomenale Idealisraus Berkeley's und Kant's (Berlin, 1871); Robert Zimmerman, "Ober Kant's Widerlegung des Idealismus yon Berkeley" (Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, Philox.-hist. Kl.), LXVIII (1871); Gustav Dieckert, tiber dos Verhiiltnis des Berkeleyschen ldealismus zu Kantischen Vernun]tkritik (Konitz, 1888). Tiffs is a consequence of the general British tendency to view Kant in phenomenalist terms. A typical recent example is found in P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966). Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kant's Critique o[ Pure Reason (2nd ed., rev., 1923) takes greaZ pains to distinguish between the subjectivist strand in Kant's thought, which is essentially identical to Berkeley's position, and the genuine critical doctrine which stands side by side with it in the text. 9 Cf. I-I.M. Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Materialism 1710-1733, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of pure understanding is there truth" (374). 5 One of the chief reasons for the continuation of the Kant-Berkeley tradition is that these, and similar statements about Berkeley, which we find in these works and in Kant's correspondenc e with Beck, have not been taken very seriously by Kant's critics. They are usually dismissed as obvious misinterpretations, due to Kant's ignorance of Berkeley's actual writings, and of his reliance upon distorted second and third hand accounts of Berkeley's thought such as is to be found in Beattie. Furthermore, this view is often supported by the philological reflection that Kant did not read English, and that Berkeley's writings were not yet available in German translation. 6 The philological argument, however, loses much of its force when we consider that there was indeed a German translation of Berkeley's Dialogues, which although apparently unknown to nineteenth century scholars, was readily accessible to Kant. This is to be found, together with a translation of Collier's Clavis Universalis and critical analyses, in a work by the professor of philosophy at Rostock, Johann Christian Eschenbach, entitled: Samlung der vornehmsten Schri[tsteller die die tFirklichkeit ihres eignen K~rpers und der ganzen Ki~rperwelt leugnen (Rostock, 1756). Furthermore, in addition to this work, which was probably known to Kant, there is Berkeley's important Latin work, De Motu (1721), as well as French translations of many of... (shrink)

Despite the growing number of studies on the topic of guanxi in a work context, there is a paucity of research on supervisor-subordinate guanxi in the field of organisation and management. This article critically reviews the extant literature on guanxi in human resource management and organisational behaviour and applies an inductive approach to explore the perception of guanxi from both superior and subordinate perspectives in the People's Republic of China. The study reports positive and ethical features of guanxi as well (...) as unethical and negative practices in the Chinese workplace. On the positive side, guanxi comprises reciprocal exchange and perceived positive attributes, whereas its darker aspects include perceived unfairness and supervisor-targeted impression management. Managerial and research implications are discussed. (shrink)

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states (...) of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”. (shrink)

In this paper, I examined whether evidence from the neuroscience of morality supports the standard models of phronesis, i.e., Jubilee and Aretai Centre Models. The standard models explain phronesis as a multifaceted construct based on interaction and coordination among functional components. I reviewed recent neuroscience studies focusing on brain networks associated with morality and their connectivity to examine the validity of the models. Simultaneously, I discussed whether the evidence helps the models address challenges, particularly those from the phronesis eliminativism. Neuroscientific (...) evidence supported the importance of brain networks, i.e., the default mode, salience, and central executive functioning networks, in moral functioning in general. The findings favorably supported the multifaceted and integrative nature of phronesis proposed by the standard models. Finally, I considered how the two models could explain the mechanisms of phronesis more integratively based on neuroscientific findings. At the end of this paper, with the evidence, I proposed several practical ideas to promote the cultivation of phronesis, e.g., the consideration of coordination among components for moral functioning and the use of moral exemplars. (shrink)