Trust and Belief

In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 109-120 (2019)
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Abstract

One fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust.

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Arnon Keren
University of Haifa

Citations of this work

Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Authority.Christoph Jäger - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.

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