​Kaum ein Konzept in der jüngeren politischen Theoriegeschichte kann auf eine solch steile und, wie sich mittlerweile gezeigt hat, auch langanhaltende Karriere zurückblicken wie das der Deliberation. Die in diesem Sammelband vereinigten Überlegungen stehen unter der zweiteiligen übergreifenden Überschrift "Deliberative Kritik – Kritik der Deliberation", die in einem Zug den kritischen Sinn der Deliberation und die Notwendigkeit einer reflexiven Kritik am Konzept der Deliberation selbst deutlich macht. Neben Erkundungen der Ideengeschichte und der normativen Grundlagen der Deliberation geht es um eine (...) Auseinandersetzung mit alternativen Konzeptionen und institutionellen Kontexten. Angesichts des Umstands, dass sich politische Prozesse bekanntlich seit geraumer Zeit aus den nationalstaatlichen Rahmungen herauslösen, werden zudem transnationale und kosmopolitische Perspektiven umfassend ausgeleuchtet. All diese topoi berühren wesentliche Denklinien der Arbeiten Rainer Schmalz-Bruns’, dem dieser Sammelband zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet ist. (shrink)

Recently, some mechanists have embraced reductionism and some reductionists have endorsed mechanism. However, the two camps disagree sharply about the extent to which mechanistic explanation is a reductionistic enterprise. Reductionists maintain that cellular and molecular mechanisms can explain mental phenomena without necessary appeal to higher-level mechanisms. Mechanists deny this claim. I argue that this dispute turns on whether reduction is a transitive relation. I show that it is. Therefore, mechanistic explanations at the cellular and molecular level explain mental phenomena. I (...) make my case in part by noting that mechanisms at higher levels are composed of mechanisms at lower levels. Compositional relations are transitive. In addition, they are explanatory. I conclude that there are explanatory linkages from cellular and molecular mechanisms to mental phenomena within a hierarchy of nested mechanisms. (shrink)

We introduce a new model of reduction inspired by Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model [Kemeny & Oppenheim 1956] and argue that this model is operative in a “ruthlessly reductive” part of current neuroscience. Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was quickly rejected in mid-20th-century philosophy of science and replaced by models developed by Ernest Nagel and Kenneth Schaffner [Nagel 1961], [Schaffner 1967]. We think that Kemeny and Oppenheim’s model was correctly rejected, given what a “theory of reduction” was supposed to account for at (...) that time. But their guiding insights about what constitutes scientific reduction—increases in explanatory scope and systematization—reflect actual practices of current reductionistic neuroscience. The key rehabilitative step to make their insights fit current scientific details is to restate them using resources from recent work on causal-mechanistic explanation. We begin with a scientific case study, drawn from the relatively new field of “molecular and cellular cognition”. It provides an explanation of the well-known Ebbinghaus spacing effect on learning and memory in terms of interactions between a transcriptional enhancer protein and its inhibiting phosphatase in neurons recruited into the memory trace. Next we briefly describe some popular models of reduction from mid-20th-century philosophy of science. We point out how these models fail to illuminate key features of our scientific case study. Finally we present our causal-mechanistically updated Kemeny and Oppenheim-inspired model and argue that it nicely accounts for the details of our scientific case study. We close with a remark that will hopefully undercut the surprise many may feel to learn that a long-rejected philosophical account of reduction actually is at work in one of the most prominent reductionistic endeavors in current science. (shrink)

Next SectionThe principle of respect for autonomy has shaped much of the bioethics' discourse over the last 50 years, and is now most commonly used in the meaning of respecting autonomous choice. This is probably related to the influential concept of informed consent, which originated in research ethics and was soon also applied to the field of clinical medicine. But while available choices in medical research are well defined, this is rarely the case in healthcare. Consideration of ordinary medical practice (...) reveals that the focus on patient choice does not properly grasp the moral aspects involved in healthcare. Medical decisions are often portrayed as if doctors and patients in confidence confront specific decisions about examinations or treatment, yet the reality often involves many different participants, with decisions being made over time and space. Indeed, most of the decisions are never even presented to patients, as it would be unethical to suggest something that is not medically justifiable. The options patients do confront are somewhat arbitrarily constructed within the narrow framework of both what is deemed to be medically appropriate and how the healthcare system is organised practically. While the autonomy discourse has proven valuable, a failure to distinguish between the fields of medical research and clinical medicine has generated a focus on patient choice that does not reflect what is really at stake in healthcare settings. This is alarming, because the current discourse misrepresents medical practice in a way that actually contributes to bioethical self-delusion. (shrink)

We confront the following popular views: that mind or life are algorithms; that thinking, or more generally any process other than computation, is computation; that anything other than a working brain can have thoughts; that anything other than a biological organism can be alive; that form and function are independent of matter; that sufficiently accurate simulations are just as genuine as the real things they imitate; and that the Turing test is either a necessary or sufficient or scientific procedure for (...) evaluating whether or not an entity is intelligent. Drawing on the distinction between activities and tasks, and the fundamental scientific principles of ontological lawfulness, epistemological realism, and methodological skepticism, we argue for traditional scientific materialism of the emergentist kind in opposition to the functionalism, behaviourism, tacit idealism, and merely decorative materialism of the artificial intelligence and artificial life communities. (shrink)

Many have argued that sexualized banter is indicative of “masculine” culture, serving as a mechanism by which men construct masculine identity and dominance and create a climate of sexual harassment. While this claim has much empirical support, sexualized banter among women remains undertheorized. Furthermore, many contemporary scholars agree that the meaning of a sexual exchange may vary widely between cultural and material contexts, but this insight has only recently been applied to studies of workplace sexuality. This article considers the issues (...) of gender, sexuality, power, and context in light of ethnographic data collected in two service work establishments. Within these organizations, many workplace sexualized interactions emerge as facilitating camaraderie and empowerment between workers. The article concludes that the sexual particularities of a workplace should be interpreted as one of its many cultural features, reflective more of its organizational conditions than of a static sexual symbolism. (shrink)

An introduction to the seven principles for practicing critical hope.

It is often maintained that Samuel Pufendorf founded natural equality on human dignity. This article partly questions this interpretation, maintaining that the dignity Pufendorf attributed to human nature did not indicate the Kantian idea of absolute and incomparable worth but only superiority in relation to other animals. This comparative dignity of humanity implied that all humans are equally obliged to obey natural law, but it did not offer a foundation for the similarity of their innate duties. The latter followed from (...) the fundamental principle of natural law, the duty to maintain sociality, and from observations concerning human self-esteem. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers of science have attempted to articulate a theory of non-epistemic emergence that is compatible with mechanistic explanation and incompatible with reductionism. The 2005 account of Fred C. Boogerd et al. has been particularly influential. They argued that a systemic property was emergent if it could not be predicted from the behaviour of less complex systems. Here, I argue that Boogerd et al.'s attempt to ground emergence in complexity guarantees that we will see emergence, but at (...) the cost of rendering it either trivial or epistemic. There are three basic problems. First, neither the measures of complexity explicitly mentioned by Boogerd et al. nor the most popular measures in the literature can do the practical and theoretical work that they assign to complexity. Second, I argue that while the success of their view depends on restricting the base of information available to the reductionist, this cannot be done in a way that is metaphysically neutral with respect to emer.. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive exposition of the work of one of the most important intellectual historians and political theorists writing today.

The current antireductionist consensus rests in part on the indefensibility of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, on which classical reductionism depends. I argue that the DN model is inessential to the reductionist program and that mechanism provides a better framework for thinking about reductionism. This runs counter to the contemporary mechanists’ claim that mechanism is an alternative to reductionism. I demonstrate that mechanists are committed to reductionism, as evidenced by the historical roots of the contemporary mechanist program. This view shares (...) certain core commitments with reductionism. It is these shared commitments that constitute the essential elements of the reductionist program. (shrink)

SummaryIn a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth‐value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something , and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra‐ and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We (...) suggest that the divide be based on ontological considerations related to the way content depends on external factors. There is a fundamental difference, we submit, between object‐dependent and property‐dependent contents. The requirements concerning modes of presentation as well as cognitive significance can be met by one kind of content. This content, it will appear, is property‐dependent, but never object‐dependent. (shrink)

Moral philosophers aside, people sustain a vital interest in the results of ethical theorizing only on the hope that these results will eventually provide satisfying, clear, and univocal answers to essential moral questions like: What is Right Action? What is Good? But whatever else might be said of this century’s labors in moral philosophy, they have failed utterly to nurture this hope. Instead, the overwhelming perception has been that this sort of answer to these questions is beyond our ken, or (...) else that the questions themselves are somehow unintelligible. It would not be unrealistic to forecast a dismal and lonely future for the discipline of ethics should this perception continue to be the dominant one. (shrink)

Traditional approaches to computer ethics regard computers as tools, andfocus, therefore, on the ethics of their use. Alternatively, computer ethicsmight instead be understood as a study of the ethics of computationalagents, exploring, for example, the different characteristics and behaviorsthat might benefit such an agent in accomplishing its goals. In this paper,I identify a list of characteristics of computational agents that facilitatetheir pursuit of their end, and claim that these characteristics can beunderstood as virtues within a framework of virtue ethics. This (...) frameworkincludes four broad categories – agentive, social, environmental, and moral– each of which can be understood as a spectrum of virtues rangingbetween two extreme subcategories. Although the use of a virtue frameworkis metaphorical rather than literal, I argue that by providing a frameworkfor identifying and critiquing assumptions about what a `good' computer is,a study of android arete provides focus and direction to the developmentof future computational agents. (shrink)

A partir de la correspondance entre Fénelon et le bénédictin dom François Lamy et des lettres de l'archevêque publiées sous les titres de Lettres sur divers sujets concernant la religion et la métaphysique et de Lettres sur l'autorité de l'Église, on étudie le passage de textes épistolaires à des opuscules et à des traités de portée générale, c'est-à-dire le passage au « public » du « privé » de l'échange entre deux correspondants. Starting from the correspondence between Fénelon and the (...) Benedictine dom François Lamy and afew lettersfrom the archbishop published under the title Letters on several topics dealing with religion of metaphysics and Letters on the Church authority, hère the author studies the passage from true letters to both opuscules and treaties with a wider range, i.e. the passage from the « private » to the « public » ofthe exchange between two correspondents. (shrink)

Collection of presentations and essays on philosophy.

Suhrawardī, Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash, 1152 or 1153-1191 -- Criticism and interpretation ; Ishrāqīyah ; Islamic philosophy -- Iran -- History.

Es spricht einiges dafür, daß sich die Zukunftsfähigkeit auch westlicher Gesellschaften an ihrer Fähigkeit zur demokratischen Selbsttransformation, z.B. durch eine Ausweitung der Mitwirkungsrechte der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, erweisen wird.Vor diesem Hintergrund wird hier der Versuch unternommen, die Bedingungen und Chancen einer partizipatorischen Reform parlamentarischer Demokratien zu sondieren. Dabei führt der Verfasser zunächst im Durchgang durch die neuere staats- und demokratietheoretische Diskussion die Idee einer deliberativen Politik ein, die er dann in ein Modell reflexiver Demokratie übersetzt und so eine Perspektive auf (...) die grundlegende Reform politischer Institutionen eröffnet. Der Schlußabschnitt konzentriert sich auf neue Formen der politischen Willensbildung in Verhandlungssystemen, politischen Netzwerken o.ä., um vor allem am Beispiel der Umwelt- und Technologiepolitik zu prüfen, unter welchen Voraussetzungen sich diese Entwicklungen für Zwecke einer durchgreifenden Strukturreform aufgreifen und weiterführen lassen. (shrink)

Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...) purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed. (shrink)

Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confusions about what truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need a more accurate picture of how the term ‘true’ is in fact used. Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’ shows substantial variance within the empirical domain, indicating that ‘true’ is ambiguous between a correspondence (...) and a coherence reading. We then explore the consequences of these results for the project of re-engineering truth. (shrink)