The idea of ‘modal fields’ is inspired by regional and pluralistic ontologies, which were sketched and developed by Hegel, Husserl and especially Nicolai Hartmann. It suggests that the world is structured by spheres which are not reducible to each other, and that modal fields denote the scope of real possibilities inside the spheres. It is, for example, possible to distinguish between physical, biological, ecological, economic and technological possibilities/modal fields. It is also possible to define, for the purpose of scientific research, (...) very specific modal fields. For example, we can ask “What are the physiological or social possibilities of ants?”, or “What are the social and psychological possibilities of fundamental religious sects?” It is possible to apply this ontological theory to philosophy of science in order to clarify the scope and limits of causal explanations and hermeneutic understanding especially in human and environmental sciences. In general, this ontological theory serves as a fruitful basis for the kind of scientific thinking which is open to counterfactuals and possibilities and which considers deterministic causal thinking too restricted for human and environmental sciences. On the other hand, this theory avoids the individualistic and anthropocentric presuppositions of hermeneutical understanding, connecting it to the real subjective and objective possibilities in a certain historical situation. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that the ethics of environmental economy must search for a virtue-ethical basis. The traditional utilitarian approach has been the dominant ethical paradigm in neoclassical economics, but it is very problematic regarding environmental issues. Alternative orientations for an environmentally responsible economy can be found from the history of economics, especially from the Aristotelian tradition, and recent discussions about values in nature. Through these, one can look for economic virtues which are ecologically sound and, at the (...) same time, socially and culturally possible. Some such virtues do already exist which must be interpreted only ecologically. Others can be found from the economic ethics of Antiquity. Economic virtues are usually followed unconsciously and alternatives are scarce. The ethics of ecological economics must develop ecologically meaningful virtues: through that it can make a place for new environmentally sound practices and policy. (shrink)

For Aristotle, man is part of nature, a “political animal” with the faculty of reason. In this sense, Aristotelian virtue ethics can be said to relate virtues to nature. On the one hand, virtues lean on the natural dispositions of man as a social animal. On the other hand, virtues are connected to praxis, that is, with man’s active realization of his inherent biological, social and cultural potential. Recently, the material value ethics of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann developed the (...) Aristotelian tradition in a naturalistic direction, posing the problem of the value of life and connecting this question to the question of virtue. Virtues sensitize us to values and are, therefore, especially important for ethical praxis. I claim that precisely because of its historical and cultural concreteness, virtue ethics can besuccessfully applied to environmental issues. In critical connection with common mentalities, naturalistic virtue ethics can be a politically effective way of ethical thinking. Furthermore, we can avoid the trap of relativism by suggesting strong environmental values and virtues. An example would be the health of ecosystems and of humans. (shrink)