Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: The subtitle of “An Austrian Contribution” emphasizes a basic distinction between German and Austrian traditions in the philosophy of fields of science. In S. J. Schmidt’s genuinely German way of writing, one can observe a high emphasis on terminology and a specific arena of heavy philosophical problems that have to be solved in a strictly philosophical manner, (...) whereas the Austrian tradition places its importance on scientific progress, especially in the natural sciences, and on the clarifying, mediating, and self-reflecting role of philosophy within the overall context of scientific evolution. (shrink)

The aim of the present investigation was to describe and to classify significant ethical problems encountered by the members of the staff during the daily clinical work at a hospital medical department. A set of definitions was prepared for the purpose, including the definition of a 'significant ethical problem'. During a three month period 426 inpatients and 173 outpatients were admitted. Significant ethical problems were encountered during the management of 106 in-patients (25 per cent) and 9 out-patients (5 per cent). (...) No significant difference was found between the frequency of ethical problems in female and male patients, but a positive correlation was noted between the number of problems and the patients' age. The problem types were classified according to a problem list. The results of this investigation suggest that greater attention must be paid to discussions about ethical problems among doctors and other categories of health personnel and that, among others, medical students ought to be taught the analysis of ethical problems. (shrink)

Leibniz' General Investigations, a group of memoranda on logical and methodological matters, remained unpublished until Couturat published the original Latin manuscript in 1903. Only after 1960 was a German translation made by F. Schmidt and an English translation by G. H. R. Parkinson. The present translation provides extensive reference notes to Leibniz' other manuscripts, and a commentary and notes to the text. In these respects it has some advantages over previous translations. The translation is clear although the work itself (...) is sometimes difficult to follow and the notes are most welcome. An introduction discusses the place of the General Investigations within the context of Leibniz' thought. With the interest in Leibniz' logical writings very strong at present, this new translation and commentary is most welcome.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Russell writes with wit, candor, and uncommon honesty about his Victorian childhood, his painful adolescence, and his extracurricular amorous conquests. On the credit side, it must be said that it offers a remarkable insight into the development of a remarkable man. But for the benefit of those with more than a casual interest in the philosopher named Bertrand Russell, it should be mentioned that this book suffers from chronic intellectual malnutrition. Not that there isn't a lot of name-dropping and folksy (...) correspondence between the intellectual giants of the early twentieth century. There is a perfectly mad letter from Georg Cantor, who refers to Kant as "this abominable mummy"; and a perfectly charming one from Norbert Weiner's father, who, by way of introduction, states that his son has studied philosophy under "professors Royce, Perry, Palmer, Munsterberg, Schmidt, Holt, etc." In a delicious jest, Russell adds as a footnote, "Nevertheless he turned out well." There is, however, nothing substantial about philosophy in this book. At its close, Russell had completed Principia. He had returned to Cambridge already a most important figure in philosophy and mathematics. But there is no real discussion of the ideas which led up to and leavened this period in Russell's life. There is instead the dreary story of Whitehead's financial troubles. One hopes that a proper sense of the importance of things will be restored in future volumes of Russell's autobiography.—H. P. K. (shrink)

That a considerable fragment of the Fabulae of Hyginus—whoever Hyginus may have been and whenever he lived—exists in a Greek translation in the Hermeneumata Leidensia is well known to all students of his work. Indeed, this extract furnishes the terminus ante quem for Hyginus’ date in its opening words; I cite it as accented and punctuated by Schmidt : Maξμѱ ka “Aπρ v´πáτoιs πρò у εδν ΣεπTεμβρων ‘Ỵуνoυ уενεaλoуaν πâσιν уνωστν μετуραΨα, ν σoνται π λεoν στoρατ δτερμνευνατ ν τoτ (...) τ βιβλ θεν уàρ kα θεáων νματα ν δευτρ ξεπλξαμεν λ’ π τoτ σoνται τoτων ξμуσεισ, ε kα μ πσαι, ττων μντoιуε ν τoστ δναμαι. (shrink)

Study of rationalism in Urdu literature.

On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

Articles, chiefly on Islamic ethics and behavior of Muslims.

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is not just a (...) mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

The concept of experience has been central to European philosophy since Descartes. He was the first to use experience to distinguish between two kinds of substance, mental and material, on the basis of the fact that one kind of substance is extended but does not think, while the other kind thinks, doubts, wills, imagines and feels, but is not extended. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume, made the concept of experience the basis of their analysis of knowledge. These (...) ideas have become part of common sense, and provide the background for a range of philosophical problems from Descartes’ time to the present. While the concept of experience is important for philosophy, philosophers do not all have the same understanding of the nature of experience. (shrink)

Context: Many recent research areas such as human cognition and quantum physics call the observer-independence of traditional science into question. Also, there is a growing need for self-reflexivity in science, i.e., a science that reflects on its own outcomes and products. Problem: We introduce the concept of second-order science that is based on the operation of re-entry. Our goal is to provide an overview of this largely unexplored science domain and of potential approaches in second-order fields. Method: We provide the (...) necessary conceptual groundwork for explorations in second-order science, in which we discuss the differences between first- and second-order science and where we present a roadmap for second-order science. The article operates mainly with conceptual differentiations such as the separation between three seemingly identical concepts such as Science II, Science 2.0 and second-order science. Results: Compared with first-order science, the potential of second-order science lies in 1. higher levels of novelty and innovations, 2. higher levels of robustness and 3. wider integration as well as higher generality. As first-order science advances, second-order science, with re-entry as its basic operation, provides three vital functions for first-order science, namely a rich source of novelty and innovation, the necessary quality control and greater integration and generality. Implications: Second-order science should be viewed as a major expansion of traditional scientific fields and as a scientific breakthrough towards a new wave of innovative research. Constructivist content: Second-order science has strong ties with radical constructivism, which can be qualified as the most important root/origin of second-order science. Moreover, it will be argued that a new form of cybernetics is needed to cope with the new problems and challenges of second-order science. (shrink)

Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. This study explored whether people show the predicted intransitivity of the two models proposed to account for the certainty effect in Allais paradoxes. In order to distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice (...) is estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of the same choice. Results showed that few people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that all participants were transitive. (shrink)

Context: The journal Constructivist Foundations celebrates ten years of publishing articles on constructivist approaches, in particular radical constructivism. Problem: In order to preserve the sustainability of radical constructivism and regain its appeal to new generations of researchers, we set up a new course of action for and with the radical constructivist community to study its innovative potential. This new avenue is “second-order science.” Method: We specify two motivations of second-order science, i.e., the inclusion of the observer, and self-reflexivity that allows (...) second-order science to operate on the products of normal or first-order science. Also, we present a short overview of the contributions that we have collected for this inaugural issue on second-order science. Results: These six initial contributions demonstrate the potential of the new set of approaches to second-order science across several disciplines. Implications: Second-order science is believed to be a cogent concept in the evolution of science, leading to a new wave of innovations, novel experiments and a much closer relationship with current research in the cognitive neurosciences in particular, and with evolutionary and complexity theories in general. (shrink)

Volume 2 is made up primarily of unpublished material from the Bradley Papers held at Merton College since Bradley’s death in 1924. The 587 pages of this volume are divided into eight sections with an Introduction by the editor and an Appendix: Introduction by Editor 1. MS Book α : a notebook on metaphysical and psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 2. MS BK T ): one notebook on mainly metaphysical topics with Bradley’s index. 3. Two untitled notebooks containing sketches of (...) chapters for Appearance and Reality. 4. MS BK Z one notebook on psychological topics with Bradley’s index. 5. Draft of a reply to Alfred Sidgwick’s article “Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics” in Mind, vol. 3 ns, July 1894 6. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Alexander Shand’s article “Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action” in Mind, vol. 4 ns, October 1895. 7. Manuscript of unpublished paper on Bertrand Russell’s article “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?” in Mind, vol. 10 ns, July 1901. 8. Selections of Bradley’s reading notes on works read from 1883–1902, taken from 5 separate notebooks. Appendix: What Bradley Read. This is a chronological list of works for which there is some positive evidence that Bradley read something from them. The evidence used to determine what he read includes “his correspondence, papers and/or publications”. An acknowledgement of receipt and a promise to read a work is not considered adequate evidence that he actually read the work in question. (shrink)