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Jennifer Hawkins [17]Jennifer S. Hawkins [5]Jennifer Susan Hawkins [2]
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Jennifer Hawkins
Duke University
  1. The Experience Machine and the Experience Requirement.Jennifer Hawkins - 2016 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 355-365.
    In this article I explore various facets of Nozick’s famous thought experiment involving the experience machine. Nozick’s original target is hedonism—the view that the only intrinsic prudential value is pleasure. But the argument, if successful, undermines any experientialist theory, i.e. any theory that limits intrinsic prudential value to mental states. I first highlight problems arising from the way Nozick sets up the thought experiment. He asks us to imagine choosing whether or not to enter the machine and uses our choice (...)
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  2. Theory Without Theories: Well-Being, Ethics, and Medicine.Jennifer Hawkins - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):656-683.
    Medical ethics would be better if people were taught to think more clearly about well-being or the concept of what is good for a person. Yet for a variety of reasons, bioethicists have generally paid little attention to this concept. Here, I argue, first, that focusing on general theories of welfare is not useful for practical medical ethics. I argue, second, for what I call the “theory-without-theories approach” to welfare in practical contexts. The first element of this approach is a (...)
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  3.  68
    Exploitation and Developing Countries: The Ethics of Clinical Research.Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2008 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton Univ Pr.
    This book was inspired originally by the debates at the turn of the century about placebo controlled trials of antiretrovirals in HIV positive pregnant women in developing countries. Moving forward from this one limited example, the book includes several additional controversial cases of clinical research conducted in developing countries, and asks probing philosophical questions about the ethics of such trials. All clinical research by its very nature uses people to acquire generalizable knowledge to help future people. But what sorts of (...)
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  4. Well-Being, Time, and Dementia.Jennifer Hawkins - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):507-542.
    Philosophers concerned with what would be good for a person sometimes consider a person’s past desires. Indeed, some theorists have argued by appeal to past desires that it is in the best interests of certain dementia patients to die. I reject this conclusion. I consider three different ways one might appeal to a person’s past desires in arguing for conclusions about the good of such patients, finding flaws with each. Of the views I reject, the most interesting one is the (...)
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  5.  40
    Decision-Making Capacity.Jennifer Hawkins & Louis C. Charland - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Decision-Making Capacity First published Tue Jan 15, 2008; substantive revision Fri Aug 14, 2020 In many Western jurisdictions the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own medical decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This question has to do with what (...)
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  6. Desiring the Bad Under the Guise of the Good.Jennifer Hawkins - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):244–264.
    Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on (...)
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  7. Internalism and Prudential Value.Jennifer Hawkins - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:95-120.
    Existence internalism claims that facts about human psychological responsiveness constrain the metaphysics of value in particular ways. Chapter 5 examines whether some form of existence internalism holds for prudential value. It emphasizes the importance of a modal distinction that has been traditionally overlooked. Some facts about personal good are facts about realized good. For example, right now it may be true that X is good for me. Other facts about goodness are facts about what would be good for me in (...)
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  8. Well-Being, The Self, and Radical Change.Jennifer Hawkins - 2019 - In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 9. Oxford, UK: pp. 251-270.
    This chapter explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of (...)
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  9. Well-Being: What Matters Beyond the Mental?Jennifer Hawkins - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 4. Oxford, UK: pp. 210-235.
    Most philosophers these days assume that more matters for well-being than simply mental states. However, there is an important distinction that is routinely overlooked. When it is said that more matters than mental states, this could mean either that certain mind-independent events count when it comes to assessing the prudential value of a life (the mind-independent events thesis or MIE), or it could mean that it is prudentially important for individuals to have the right kind of epistemic relation to life (...)
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  10.  54
    Diversity of Meaning and the Value of a Concept: Comments on Anna Alexandrova's A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being.Jennifer Hawkins - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):529-535.
    In her impressive book, looking at the philosophy and science of well-being, Anna Alexandrova argues for the strong claim that we possess no stable, unified concept of well-being. Instead, she thinks the word “well-being” only comes to have a specific meaning in particular contexts, and has a quite different meaning in different contexts. I take issue with (1) her claim that we do not possess a unified, all-things-considered concept of well-being as well as with (2) her failure to consider why (...)
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  11.  45
    What’s Good for Them? Best Interests and Severe Disorders of Consciousness.Jennifer Hawkins - 2016 - In Walter Sinnott Armstrong (ed.), Finding Consciousness. Oxford, UK: pp. 180-206.
    I consider the current best interests of patients who were once thought to be either completely unaware (to be in PVS) or only minimally aware (MCS), but who, because of advanced fMRI studies, we now suspect have much more “going on” inside their minds, despite no ability to communicate with the world. My goal in this chapter is twofold: (1) to set out and defend a framework that I think should always guide thinking about the best interests of highly cognitively (...)
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  12. Well-Being, Autonomy, and the Horizon Problem.Jennifer S. Hawkins - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (2):143-168.
    Desire satisfaction theorists and attitudinal-happiness theorists of well-being are committed to correcting the psychological attitudes upon which their theories are built. However, it is not often recognized that some of the attitudes in need of correction are evaluative attitudes. Moreover, it is hard to know how to correct for poor evaluative attitudes in ways that respect the traditional commitment to the authority of the individual subject's evaluative perspective. L. W. Sumner has proposed an autonomy-as-authenticity requirement to perform this task, but (...)
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  13. The Subjective Intuition.Jennifer S. Hawkins - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):61 - 68.
    Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision that dooms subjective theories to failure. (...)
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  14.  88
    Clarifying Confusions About Coercion.Jennifer Susan Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2005 - Hastings Center Report 35 (5):16-19.
    Commentators often claim that medical research subjects are coerced into participating in clinical studies. In recent years, such claims have appeared especially frequently in ethical discussions of research in developing countries. Medical research ethics is more important than ever as we move into the 21st century because worldwide the pharmaceutical industry has grown so much and shows no sign of slowing its growth. This means that more people are involved in medical research today than ever before, and in the future (...)
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  15.  14
    Clarifying Confusions About Coercion.Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2005 - Hastings Center Report 35 (5):16.
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  16.  97
    Barnes, Elizabeth. The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 160. $45.00. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hawkins - 2017 - Ethics 128 (2):462-467.
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  17. Artistic Creativity and Suffering.Jennifer Hawkins - 2018 - In Berys Gaut & Matthew Kieran (eds.), Creativity and Philosophy. New York, NY, USA:
    What is the relationship between negative experience, artistic production, and prudential value? If it were true that (for some people) artistic creativity must be purchased at the price of negative experience (to be clear: currently no one knows whether this is true), what should we conclude about the value of such experiences? Are they worth it for the sake of art? The first part of this essay considers general questions about how to establish the positive extrinsic value of something intrinsically (...)
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  18.  50
    Patient Autonomy and the Challenge of Clinical Uncertainty.Mark Parascandola, Jennifer Hawkins & Marion Danis - 2002 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12 (3):245-264.
    : Bioethicists have articulated an ideal of shared decision making between physician and patient, but in doing so the role of clinical uncertainty has not been adequately confronted. In the face of uncertainty about the patient's prognosis and the best course of treatment, many physicians revert to a model of nondisclosure and nondiscussion, thus closing off opportunities for shared decision making. Empirical studies suggest that physicians find it more difficult to adhere to norms of disclosure in situations where there is (...)
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  19.  66
    Justice and Placebo Controls.Jennifer S. Hawkins - 2006 - Social Theory and Practice 32 (3):467-496.
  20.  75
    Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Pp. Ix + 357. [REVIEW]Jennifer Hawkins - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (2):237-241.
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  21.  41
    Further Reflections: Surrogate Decisionmaking When Significant Mental Capacities Are Retained.Jennifer Hawkins - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (1):192-198.
    Mackenzie Graham has made an important contribution to the literature on decisionmaking for patients with disorders of consciousness. He argues, and I agree, that decisions for unresponsive patients who are known to retain some degree of covert awareness ought to focus on current interests, since such patients likely retain the kinds of mental capacities that in ordinary life command our current respect and attention. If he is right, then it is not appropriate to make decisions for such patients by appealing (...)
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  22.  9
    David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics[REVIEW]Jennifer Hawkins - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (7).
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  23. Why Even a Liberal Can Justify Limited Paternalistic Intervention in Anorexia Nervosa.Jennifer Hawkins - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (2):155-158.
    Most adult persons with anorexia satisfy the existing criteria widely used to assess decision-making capacity, meaning that incapacity typically cannot be used to justify coercive intervention. After rejecting two other approaches to justification, Professor Radden concludes that it is most likely not possible to justify coercive medical intervention for persons with anorexia in liberal terms, though she leaves it open whether some other framework might succeed. I shall assume here that the standard approach to assessing decisionmaking capacity is adequate.1 The (...)
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