Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):244–264 (2008)

Authors
Jennifer Hawkins
Duke University
Abstract
Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on the idea of evaluative experience.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.520.x
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References found in this work BETA

Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 2003 - In Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Principles of Object Perception.Elizabeth S. Spelke - 1990 - Cognitive Science 14 (1):29--56.
The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.

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Citations of this work BETA

Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.
Guise of the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
The Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724.
Aiming at the Good.Amir Saemi - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):197-219.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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