The Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) literature tends to focus on bias as a problem that requires ex post solutions (e.g. fairness metrics), rather than addressing the underlying social and technical conditions that (re)produce it. In this article, we propose a complementary strategy that uses genealogy as a constructive, epistemic critique to explain algorithmic bias in terms of the conditions that enable it. We focus on XAI feature attributions (Shapley values) and counterfactual approaches as potential tools to gauge these conditions (...) and offer two main contributions. One is constructive: we develop a theoretical framework to classify these approaches according to their relevance for bias as evidence of social disparities. We draw on Pearl’s ladder of causation (Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, Causality, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803161) to order these XAI approaches concerning their ability to answer fairness-relevant questions and identify fairness-relevant solutions. The other contribution is critical: we evaluate these approaches in terms of their assumptions about the role of protected characteristics in discriminatory outcomes. We achieve this by building on Kohler-Hausmann’s (Northwest Univ Law Rev 113(5):1163–1227, 2019) constructivist theory of discrimination. We derive three recommendations for XAI practitioners to develop and AI policymakers to regulate tools that address algorithmic bias in its conditions and hence mitigate its future occurrence. (shrink)

Examining variation in reasoning about sustainability between diverse populations provides unique insight into how group norms surrounding resource conservation develop. Cultural institutions, such as religious organizations and formal schools, can mobilize communities to solve collective challenges associated with resource depletion. This study examined conservation beliefs in a Western industrialized (Austin, Texas, USA) and a non‐Western, subsistence agricultural community (Tanna, Vanuatu) among children, adolescents, and adults (N = 171; n = 58 7–12‐year‐olds, n = 53 13–17‐year‐olds, and n = 60 18–68‐year‐olds). (...) Participants endorsed or rejected four types of justifications for engaging in land and animal conservation: sustainability, moral, religious, or permissible. In both populations, participants endorsed sustainability justifications most frequently. Religious justifications increased with age in Tanna and decreased with age in Austin. Tannese participants were also more likely to endorse multiple justifications for conservation than Austin participants. Data across all justification types show a main effect of age in both communities; endorsement of conservation decreased with age in Austin, but increased with age in Tanna. Across age groups, participants were more likely to endorse the conservation of animals than land in Austin, yet equally as likely to endorse the conservation of land and animals in Tanna. Overall, these results reveal similarities and differences in the beliefs that support the conservation of natural resources across populations. (shrink)

Long‐term potentiation (LTP) of excitatory synapses is a leading model to explain the concept of information storage in the brain. Multiple mechanisms contribute to LTP, but central amongst them is an increased sensitivity of the postsynaptic membrane to neurotransmitter release. This sensitivity is predominantly determined by the abundance and localization of AMPA‐type glutamate receptors (AMPARs). A combination of AMPAR structural data, super‐resolution imaging of excitatory synapses, and an abundance of electrophysiological studies are providing an ever‐clearer picture of how AMPARs are (...) recruited and organized at synaptic junctions. Here, we review the latest insights into this process, and discuss how both cytoplasmic and extracellular receptor elements cooperate to tune the AMPAR response at the hippocampal CA1 synapse. (shrink)

Each of the following papers gives an account of a different UK clinical ethics committee. The committees vary in the length of time they have been established, and also in the main focus of their work. The accounts discuss the development of the committees and some of the ethical problems that have been brought to them. The issues raised will be relevant for other National Health Service (NHS) trusts in the UK that wish to set up such a committee.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Ame Naess, John Rodman, George Sessions, and others, designated herein as ecosophers, propose an egalitarian anti-anthropocentric biocentrism as a basis for a new environmental ethic. I outline their “hands-off-nature” position and show it to be based on setting man apart. The ecosophic position is thus neither egalitarian nor fully biocentric. A fully egalitarian biocentric ethic would place no more restrictions on the behavior of human beings than on the behavior of any other animals. Uncontrolled human behavior might lead to the (...) destruction ofthe environment and thus to the extinction of human beings. I thus conclude that human interest in survival is the best ground on which to argue for an ecological balance which is good both for human beings and for the whole biological community. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of the key philosophical themes and debates in discussions of pornography. In particular, I consider the major positions on how pornography ought to be defined, when (and if ) it should be regulated, whether it is best understood as speech (or action), whether there is evidence that is it harmful. I argue in favor of what is known as the civil rights approach to pornography, as reflected in the work of Catharine MacKinnon.

For a symposium on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.

Subjects and Simulations presents essays focused on suffering and sublimity, representation and subjectivity, and the relation of truth and appearance through engagement with the legacies of Jean Baudrillard and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe.

This paper has two major goals: First, I argue that Catharine MacKinnon’s and Andrea Dworkin’s anti-pornography activism was an act of public reason and their arguments public reasons arguments. Thus, MacKinnon’s argument that pornography is best understood as a practice of sex discrimination is a public reason argument—and so can be defended as grounded in liberal political principles. Political liberalism, as I defend it, can support MacKinnon’s approach to pornography as embodied in a civil rights ordinance. By way of contrast, (...) I will take up another feminist position on pornography, Drucilla Cornell’s, that differs from, and in fact is quite critical of, the MacKinnon/Dworkin anti-pornography position. My primary aim here is to show that Cornell’s arguments fail—as they stand—as public reason arguments, and thus further highlight the crucial aspects of MacKinnon’s feminist approach that are compatible with public reason, and so with liberal political principles. This is not to say that one could not provide a public reason argument for a position like Cornell’s. However, as she offers it, her position is not compatible with the norms of public reason. Second, I show why the obscenity route to the regulation of pornographic material—the traditional liberal approach—is actually antithetical to the version of political liberalism I am interested in defending. The conclusion of these arguments is that contrary to the mainstream view, liberalism is hospitable to the arguments of MacKinnon and Dworkin, and so as liberals we have not only good reason to take their arguments very seriously, but even stronger their arguments flow from fundamental liberal political values. (shrink)

In 1985, a member of the Canadian judiciary handed down a written judgment in which he distinguished between erotica and obscene matter. The judgment attracted the scorn of some normative sociologists, who complained of the insufficiency of the social psychological research on which it was based. Their reaction prompts a review of the judgment in the light of social constructionism and of ethnomethodology; this, in turn, prompts a comparison of social constructionist and ethnomethodological methodologies, in which the legal judgment serves (...) merely as a test case. It is argued that normative sociology and social constructionism, both being of an essentially ironic cast, occlude the judge's sense-making procedures, the very phenomena they purport to describe. Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, being nonironic, promises to capture those procedures. (shrink)

Commentators onEpode11 generally begin by comparing the opening couplet with Archilochus : κα⋯ μ' οὔτ' ἰ⋯μβων οὔτε τερπωλ⋯ων μ⋯λει, and sometimes also Catullus 68. 1–40. In both of these the poet explains that grief at the death of a loved one has expelled all desire to compose verses. According to the comparison, Horace, in 1–2, is stating that the onset of love has, similarly, so absorbed his attention that he cannot write verse. The translation will then run ‘Pettius, I have (...) no pleasure any longer in writing verse, smitten as I am with a heavy love’. (shrink)

THE most influential figure in Aristotelian scholarship in modern times was undoubtedly Werner Jaeger. There had been great original thinkers about Aristotle in the hundred years before Jaeger: one need only mention Brandis in Germany and Case in England. There were also fine scholars contemporary with Jaeger, like Sir David Ross, the editor and commentator on Aristotle. But no Aristotelian scholar made such an impact as Jaeger. His arguments for Aristotle’s development, for his declining Platonism and growing empiricism, started a (...) sort of revolution in Aristotelian studies. Jaeger’s position has been very much questioned since but it would be ungenerous to call his work on Aristotle anything other than a great contribution to scholarship. But Jaeger did not attempt an extended analysis and criticism of central problems in Aristotle’s philosophy. And the same must be said of other prominent contributors to Aristotelian scholarship in this century. Ross’s editions and commentaries on Aristotle are invaluable but his commentary often seems to leave off just when the problem is getting interesting. This may be explained by his reported answer to the question of whether he actually agreed with Aristotle: ‘Oh, my dear child, I am a scholar, not a philosopher’. This might not be the answer of Ingemar During who has written the latest big scholarly book covering all aspects of Aristotle’s thought but one feels at times that it should be, and particularly when Düring is dealing with Aristotle’s metaphysics. (shrink)

This article explores the role of limit experiences (Tracy) and linguistic relativity (Whorf) in shaping our ontological and epistemological understandings of the world. Specifically, I trace the transformations in embodied understanding I have undergone in three situations across my life course–in Hawai'i, Solomon Islands, and as an acutely ill and disabled patient in a live-in clinic in Dallas, Texas. I give examples of how our perceptions, conceptions, and proprioceptions are positioned, constrained, opened to interpretation, and even denied by our culture (...) and language. Limit experiences, however, open the possibility for transformation of understanding and recognition that there are probably infinite manifest and unmanifest realities. (shrink)

Preface: A different kind of meditation -- Part I: Introductory -- A polemical clearing of the ground : Harris, Hitchens and Dawkins' lack of scruple : the unimpressive face of atheism -- Why we need to rethink religion -- Part II: The outside -- Shifting focus from the "outsider" to the "outside" -- Thought from the outside : Lawrence, Levinas and Derrida : at the firing line and into the unknown -- Thought from the outside : Abraham and Isaac : (...) hospitality, the messianic turn and the religious suspension of the ethical -- Balancing as we go : slave or noble, Abrahamic or Hellenic? -- Conclusion : "Driv[ing] on to the edge of the unknown and beyond". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy by Susan JamesRichard A. WatsonSusan James. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. vii + 318. Cloth, $35.00.Susan James shows how during the seventeenth century philosophers moved from the three souls of Aristotle and the tripartite soul of Thomas Aquinas in which passions and reasons compete for the attention of the will, (...) to a Cartesian view of man as a single soul in union with the body who wills under the influence of both passions and reasons, to a Hobbesian view that the soul is the body and that the bodily motions we call reasons and passions are desires; acts of will are merely the deciding desires in deterministic causal sequences of the material motions of the body that constitute desires. This sets up the contemporary view that, motions are caused by desires and beliefs, leaving behind the difficulties of integrating with one another Aristotelian souls, Thomistic faculties, and Cartesian mind and body. James conceives of this evolution as one of unification of mental and bodily powers, and of integration of the active and passive powers of the mind. This concourse also represents a development from theories meant to explain to theories calculated for control and finally to theories facilitating therapy. Aristotle and Thomas adapted their ontologies to perceived differences in powers and faculties, while Descartes and Hobbes worked toward an ideal of unity of science and nature. The Christian Descartes brought together all the substances and powers of nature under a single extended matter divided into parts by the single force of motion, but he excepted the human soul with its power of will to alter the course of nature. The atheist Hobbes simply dispensed with supernatural [End Page 168] mental substance and occult power of will in order to integrate the whole of nature (including sensing and reasoning) under a cause and effect sequence of moving material bodies in which the last desire in a sequence of human bodily motions is designated as an act of will.James intends her book “as a contribution to the reinstatement of the emotions within philosophy, to the… opinion that we need to take account of our emotional life if we are to understand… moral motivation and growth, the springs of action (rational and otherwise), and the nature of reasoning” (22). She agrees that the sharp division between ideas and passions or emotions is properly abolished to be replaced by the view that all ideas have an emotional component, and all passions an ideational component. This fits with the parallel development of the notion that all sensible perceptions are propositional, and the somewhat less widespread notion that all concepts have a sensible component.But did this development result in a view of passions and ideas, learning and knowing, thinking and action, that is more true to nature than Aristotelian ontology? It is very hard to answer this question, and despite her sympathies with the notion that all human thought is both conceptual and emotional, James does not try. The reason we don’t know lies under the surface of the movement from Aristotle to Hobbes (i.e., to Daniel Dennett) like a monster in the deep. The monster is the monotheistic God, the perfection and unity of which underlies the Western drive to a unitary view of nature including man. The possibility that this God could be a deceiver, and so all our sensations and ideas might not represent the real world, set up Cartesianism and modern hypothetico-deductive science. But lurking throughout James’ book is a more palpable dreadnought, a demoness, the woman Eve. The female is responsible for the Fall of Man, and thus the fear and suspicion of women that suffuses patriarchic Christianity, and is expressed openly by such philosophers as Malebranche. Bodily passions and emotions (particularly the concupiscent ones) are nasty, evil, irrational, overpowering; to wit, they are feminine. They are not to be trusted, and must be subdued. So while still driven by ideals of monotheism, Descartes and Hobbes do move beyond the dogmatic Christian association of the emotions with female treachery. Even so... (shrink)

The extent to which discourses surrounding the Good, the sacred, and (more problematically) the beautiful have preoccupied thinkers in continental philosophy and in poststructuralism is striking. What is equally striking, however, is the decisively ‘non-theological’ theoretical cast of this account of the Good. Attempts to “disengage” the account of trancendence at stake remain complicated. What is in question is an understanding that is profoundly ethical—and, I want to argue, against the fabric of theoretical modernity, profoundly historical in ways doubtless that (...) motivate much of ‘poststructuralist’ thought in this area. In what follows, I want to show how Emmanuel Levinas distinguishes the “divergence” of the Good within philosophy, and how Levinas’s philosophy betrays the effect of modernity and the detraditionalization of the ethical even in appealing to certain traditions for the intelligibility—if you will, the figure—of the ethical. (shrink)

The care of elderly people with dementia poses ethical problems in several respects. This paper considers the problems in relation to treatment, withdrawal of treatment (including nutrition and hydration) in terminal care, and consent to involvement in research. It is ultimately the responsibility of the physician to take the decision about whether or not to proceed with treatment, according to the best interests of the patient, but nurses, families and significant others can be involved in making the decision. When withdrawal (...) of treatment or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in the terminal stages of dementia are being considered it is necessary to take into account the nature of the treatment, whether or not it is extraordinary, and the goals of continued nutrition. In some circumstances it may be possible for them to be withdrawn. Only research which is aimed at evaluating treatment for dementia may involve subjects who are suffering from dementia.Soigner des personnes âgés souffrant de la démence pose plusieurs problèmes éthiques. Cet article considère les problèmes concernant le traitement, cessation de traitement (y inclus nutrition et hydration) dans la phase terminale, et consentement de participation dans les recherches. C'est ultimement la décision du docteur si oui ou non de continuer avec le traitement selon les meilleurs intérêts du malade, mais les infirmiers/ères, les familles et les personnes importantes autour du malade peuvent jouer un rôle dans les décisions. Si la cessation de traitement ou cessation de nutrition et hydration dans la phase terminale de démence est envisagée il est nécessaire de tenir compte de la nature du traitement, s'il est 'extraordinaire' ou non, et le but de nutrition si on continuait. Dans quelques circonstances il est possible de les discontinuer. Seuls les recherches qui ont pour but d'évaluer les traitements pour la démence peuvent utiliser des personnes souffrant de démence.Die Pflege von älteren Personen mit Demenz stellt einige ethische Probleme. Dieser Artikel betrachtet die Probleme in Beziehung auf die Pflege, Zurückziehung von Pflege (auch von Nahrung und Getrank) der Sterbenden und der Entscheidung, in der Forschung beteiligt zu sein. Der Arzt hat die schlussendliche Verantwortung über die Entscheidung ob mit der Pflege weitergefahren werden soll oder nicht nach dem besten Interesse der Patienten. Aber das Krankenpflegepersonal, die Familie und bedeutende Andere können auch an dieser Entscheidung teilnehmen. Wenn es sich um Zurückziehung der Pflege, oder Zurückziehung von Nahrung oder Getrank in der Sterbepflege von Personen mit Demenz handelt, is es nötig, das Wesen der Pflege und die Ziele einer fortfahrenden Nahrung zu kennen. In gewissen Fällen ist es möglich, diese zurück zu ziehen. Es sollen nur Patienten mit Demenz an Forschungen teilnehmen die über die Pflege der Demenz einschätzt. (shrink)

The care of elderly people with dementia poses ethical problems in several respects. This paper considers the problems in relation to treatment, withdrawal of treatment (including nutrition and hydration) in terminal care, and consent to involvement in research. It is ultimately the responsibility of the physician to take the decision about whether or not to proceed with treatment, according to the best interests of the patient, but nurses, families and significant others can be involved in making the decision. When withdrawal (...) of treatment or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in the terminal stages of dementia are being considered it is necessary to take into account the nature of the treatment, whether or not it is extraordinary, and the goals of continued nutrition. In some circumstances it may be possible for them to be withdrawn. Only research which is aimed at evaluating treatment for dementia may involve subjects who are suffering from dementia. Soigner des personnes âgés souffrant de la démence pose plusieurs problèmes éthiques. Cet article considère les problèmes concernant le traitement, cessation de traitement (y inclus nutrition et hydration) dans la phase terminale, et consentement de participation dans les recherches. C'est ultimement la décision du docteur si oui ou non de continuer avec le traitement selon les meilleurs intérêts du malade, mais les infirmiers/ères, les familles et les personnes importantes autour du malade peuvent jouer un rôle dans les décisions. Si la cessation de traitement ou cessation de nutrition et hydration dans la phase terminale de démence est envisagée il est nécessaire de tenir compte de la nature du traitement, s'il est 'extraordinaire' ou non, et le but de nutrition si on continuait. Dans quelques circonstances il est possible de les discontinuer. Seuls les recherches qui ont pour but d'évaluer les traitements pour la démence peuvent utiliser des personnes souffrant de démence. Die Pflege von älteren Personen mit Demenz stellt einige ethische Probleme. Dieser Artikel betrachtet die Probleme in Beziehung auf die Pflege, Zurückziehung von Pflege (auch von Nahrung und Getrank) der Sterbenden und der Entscheidung, in der Forschung beteiligt zu sein. Der Arzt hat die schlussendliche Verantwortung über die Entscheidung ob mit der Pflege weitergefahren werden soll oder nicht nach dem besten Interesse der Patienten. Aber das Krankenpflegepersonal, die Familie und bedeutende Andere können auch an dieser Entscheidung teilnehmen. Wenn es sich um Zurückziehung der Pflege, oder Zurückziehung von Nahrung oder Getrank in der Sterbepflege von Personen mit Demenz handelt, is es nötig, das Wesen der Pflege und die Ziele einer fortfahrenden Nahrung zu kennen. In gewissen Fällen ist es möglich, diese zurück zu ziehen. Es sollen nur Patienten mit Demenz an Forschungen teilnehmen die über die Pflege der Demenz einschätzt. (shrink)

We posit that the weight a person assigns a moral principle is not stable between ideal, or un-contextual assessments and the weight the same moral principle is allocated when applied in a contextual dilemma. Second, we postulate that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior or judgment. Results indicate that the importance of moral principles is dynamic and that patterned moral behavior is a significant predictor of moral judgments.

" The essays trace the personal philosophical journeys and orientations of a remarkable group of men and women and reveal a fascinating array of intellectual ...