Ce livre est donc voué à la bizarrerie. Mais c'est qu'à accorder tout son soin à l'écriture, il la soumet à une réévaluation radicale. Et les voies sont nécessairement extravagantes lorsqu'il importe d'excéder, pour en penser la possibilité, ce qui se donne pour la logique elle-même - celle qui doit déterminer les rapports de la parole et de l'écriture en se rassurant dans l'évidence du sens commun, dans les catégories de 'représentation' ou 'd'image', dans l'opposition du dedans et du dehors, (...) du plus et du moins, de l'essence et de l'apparence, de l'originaire et du dérivé. Analysant les investissements dont notre culture a chargé le signe écrit, Jacques Derrida en démontre aussi les effets les plus actuels et parfois les plus inaperçus. Cela n'est possible que par un déplacement systématique des concepts - on ne saurait en effet répondre à la question 'qu'est-ce que l'écriture?' par un appel de style 'phénoménologique' à quelque expérience sauvage, immédiate, spontanée. L'interprétation occidentale de l'écriture commande tous les champs de l'expérience, de la pratique et du savoir, et jusqu'à la forme ultime de la question ('qu'est-ce que?') qu'on croit pouvoir libérer de cette prise. L'histoire de cette interprétation n'est pas celle d'un préjugé déterminé, d'une erreur localisée, d'une limite accidentelle. Elle forme une structure finie mais nécessaire dans le mouvement qui se trouve ici reconnu sous le nom de différance. (shrink)

This collection of essays and interviews, some previously unpublished and almost all of which appear in English for the first time, encompasses the political and ethical thinking of Jacques Derrida over thirty years. Passionate, rigorous, beautifully argued, wide-ranging, the texts shed an entirely new light on his work and will be welcomed by scholars in many disciplines--politics, philosophy, history, cultural studies, literature, and a range of interdisciplinary programs. Derrida's arguments vary in their responsiveness to given political questions--sometimes they are (...) vivid polemics on behalf of a position or figure, sometimes they are reflective analyses of a philosophical problem. They are united by the recurrent question of political decision or responsibility and the insistence that the apparent simplicity or programmatic character of political decision is in fact a profound avoidance of the political. This volume testifies to the possibility and the necessity of a philosophical politics. Negotiations assembles some of the most telling examples of the intrinsic relationship, so often affirmed by Derrida in more abstract philosophical terms, between deconstructive reading practices and what is called the "political"--more precisely, politics in an almost down-to-earth, pragmatic, and commonsense use of the word. Among the many subjects covered in the book are: the death penalty in the United States, the civil war in Algeria, globalization and cosmopolitanism, the American Declaration of Independence, Jean-Paul Sartre, the value of objectivity, politics and friendship, and the relationship between deconstruction and actuality. (shrink)

La question des frontières des arts plastiques et littéraires contemporains peut être approchée à travers l'exemple de la géopoétique de Kenneth White. Renonçant à réduire l'art à la production d'une représentation dominée par le plaisir de la vue, le mouvement esthétique de la géopoétique cherche à faire de la création artistique un geste de participation aux matières de la terre sur fond d'une expérience polysensorielle où la marche et le nomadisme constituent des explorations d'un proto-monde. L'oeuvre écrite ou plastique est (...) destinée à conserver des fragments et traces de cette aventure sensible, ouvrant ainsi la voie à une rencontre qui n'est plus un spectacle mais une expérience quasi chamanique. Reste à savoir dans quelle mesure on peut s'émanciper totalement de la représentation pour accéder à une auto-présentation du cosmos dont l'artiste serait le médium. (shrink)

"Ce qui s'écrit ici différance marque l'étrange mouvement, l'unité irréductiblement impure d'un différer (détour, délai, délégation, division, inégalité, espacement) dont l'économie excède les ressources déclarées du logos classique. C'est ce mouvement qui donne unité aux essais ici enchaînés. Qu'ils questionnent l'écriture littéraire ou le motif structuraliste (dans les champs de la critique, des “sciences de l'homme” ou de la philosophie), que par une lecture configurante ils en appellent à Nietzsche ou à Freud, à Husserl ou à Heidegger, à Artaud, Bataille, (...) Blanchot, Foucault, Jabès, Levinas, ils n'ont qu'un lieu d'insistance : le point d'articulation dérobée entre l'écriture et la différence. A peser sur cette articulation, ils tentent de déplacer les deux termes."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

A rich exploration of the idea of friendship and its political consequences, past and future, by the most influential of contemporary philosophers. Until relatively recently, Jacques Derrida was seen by many as nothing more than the high priest of Deconstruction, by turns stimulating and fascinating, yet always somewhat disengaged from the central political questions of our time. Or so it seemed. Derrida's "political turn," marked especially by the appearance of Specters of Marx, has surprised some and delighted others. In (...) The Politics of Friendship Derrida renews and enriches this orientation through an examination of the political history of the idea of friendship pursued down the ages. Derrida's thoughts are haunted throughout the book by the strange and provocative address attributed to Aristotle, "my friends, there is no friend" and its inversions by later philosophers such as Montaigne, Kant, Nietzsche, Schmitt and Blanchot. The exploration allows Derrida to recall and restage the ways in which all the oppositional couples of Western philosophy and political thought—friendship and enmity, private and public life—have become madly and dangerously unstable. At the same time he dissects genealogy itself, the familiar and male-centered notion of fraternity and the virile virtue whose authority has gone unquestioned in our culture of friendship and our models of democracy The future of the political, for Derrida, becomes the future of friends, the invention of a radically new friendship, of a deeper and more inclusive democracy. This remarkable book, his most profoundly important for many years, offers a challenging and inspiring vision of that future. (shrink)

" Ce livre est un livre sur l'héritage, bien qu'il ne doive pas s'enfermer avec des "fils de Marx". C'est plus précisément un livre sur ce que "hériter" peut non pas vouloir-dire, de façon univoque, mais, peut-être, enjoindre de façon contradictoire et contradictoirement obligatoire. Comment répondre, comment se sentir responsable d'un héritage qui vous lègue des ordres contradictoires? " Avec Marx & Sons, Jacques Derrida nous livre sa contribution au débat suscité par son Spectres de Marx, paru chez Galilée (...) en 1993. Dans ce texte, qui répond aux questions et objections formulées par une dizaine d'intellectuels, en majorité des marxistes de langue anglaise, il affronte dans son ensemble la question de la signification historique du marxisme. (shrink)

Translator's introduction -- Preface -- Part I: The aesthetics of politics -- Ten theses on politics -- Does democracy mean something? -- Who is the subject of the rights of man? -- Communism : from actuality to inactuality -- The people or the multitudes -- Bio-politics or politics -- September 11 and afterwards : a rupture in the symbolic order -- Of war as the supreme form of advanced plutocratic consensus -- Part II: The politics of aesthetics -- The aesthetic (...) revolution and its outcomes -- The paradoxes of political art -- The politics of literature -- The monument and its confidences or Deleuze and Art's capacity for resistance -- The ethical turn of aesthetics and politics -- Part III: Response to critics -- The usage of distinctions. (shrink)

Entre les postes et le mouvement analytique, le principe de plaisir et l'histoire des télécommunications, la carte postale et la lettre volée, bref le transfert de Socrate à Freud, et au-delà. Cette satire de la littérature épistolaire devait être farcie - d'adresses, de codes postaux, de missives cryptées, de lettres anonymes, le tout confié à tant de modes, de genres et de tons.

Jacques Derrida is probably the most famous European philosopher alive today. The University of Nebraska Press makes available for the first English translation of his most important work to date, Glas. Its appearance will assist Derrida's readers pro and con in coming to terms with a complex and controversial book. Glas extensively reworks the problems of reading and writing in philosophy and literature; questions the possibility of linear reading and its consequent notions of theme, author, narrative, and discursive demonstration; (...) and ingeniously disrupts the positions of reader and writer in the text. Glas is extraordinary in many ways, most obviously in its typography. Arranged in two columns, with inserted sections within these, the book simultaneously discusses Hegel’s philosophy and Jean Genet’s fiction, and shows how two such seemingly distinct kinds of criticism can reflect and influence one another. The customary segregation of philosophy, rhetoric, psychoanalysis, linguistics, history, and poetics is systematically subverted. In design and content, the books calls into question “types” of literature (history, philosophy, literary criticism), the ownership of ideas and styles, the glorification of literary heroes, and the limits of literary representation. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I shall speak of ghost [revenant], of flame and of ashes.And of what, for Heidegger, avoiding means.What is avoiding? Heidegger on several occasions uses the common word Vermeiden: to avoid, to flee, to dodge. What might he have meant when it comes to “spirit” or the “spiritual”? I specify immediately: not spirit or the spiritual but Geist, geistig, geistlich, for this question will be, through and through, that of language. Do these German words allow themselves to be translated? In another (...) sense: are they avoidable?Sein und Zeit : what does Heidegger say at that time? He announces and he prescribes. He warns [avertit]: a certain number of terms will have to be avoided . Among them, spirit . In 1953, more than twenty-five years later—and this was not just any quarter-century—in the great text devoted to Georg Trakl, Heidegger notes that Trakl always took care to avoid the word geistig. And, visibly, Heidegger approves him in this; he thinks the same. But this time, it is not Geist nor even geistlich that is to be avoided, but geistig.How are we to delimit the difference, and what has happened? What of this meantime? How are we to explain that in twenty-five years, between these two warning signals , Heidegger made a frequent, regular, marked use of all this vocabulary, including the adjective geistig? And that he often spoke not only of the word “spirit” but, sometimes yielding to the emphatic mode, in the name of spirit? Jacques Derrida is Directeur d’Études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and also teaches at the University of California, Irvine. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man’s War” . An English translation of De l’espirit: Heidegger et la question is forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press. Geoff Bennington, author of Lyotard: Writing the Event, is a lecturer in French at the University of Sussex. Rachel Bowlby, author of Virginia Woolf: Feminist Destinations, is a lecturer in English at the University of Sussex. (shrink)

It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible (...) to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty. (shrink)

Is knowledge the epistemic norm of action and assertion? Gettier and justified-false-belief cases have been raised as counterexamples to the necessity direction of that claim. Most knowledge normers reply by distinguishing permissibility from excusability. An important objection to this move, however, is that it requires a still lacking view of epistemic excuses sufficiently general to cover all the cases, correctly relating the supposed excuse to the subject's cognitive life, and not collapsing into an account of the fundamental normative standard (see (...) Gerken 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm. (shrink)

Derrida's first book-length work, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy , was originally written as a dissertation for his diplôme d'etudes superieures in 1953 and 1954. Surveying Husserl's major works on phenomenology, Derrida reveals what he sees as an internal tension in Husserl's central notion of genesis, and gives us our first glimpse into the concerns and frustrations that would later lead Derrida to abandon phenomenology and develop his now famous method of deconstruction. For Derrida, the problem of genesis (...) in Husserl's philosophy is that both temporality and meaning must be generated by prior acts of the transcendental subject, but transcendental subjectivity must itself be constituted by an act of genesis. Hence, the notion of genesis in the phenomenological sense underlies both temporality and atemporality, history and philosophy, resulting in a tension that Derrida sees as ultimately unresolvable yet central to the practice of phenomenology. Ten years later, Derrida moved away from phenomenology entirely, arguing in his introduction to Husserl's posthumously published Origin of Geometry and his own Speech and Phenomena that the phenomenological project has neither resolved this tension nor expressly worked with it. The Problem of Genesis complements these other works, showing the development of Derrida's approach to phenomenology as well as documenting the state of phenomenological thought in France during a particularly fertile period, when Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and Tran-Duc-Thao, as well as Derrida, were all working through it. But the book is most important in allowing us to follow Derrida's own development as a philosopher by tracing the roots of his later work in deconstruction to these early critical reflections on Husserl's phenomenology. "A dissertation is not merely a prerequisite for an academic job. It may set the stage for a scholar's life project. So, the doctoral dissertations of Max Weber and Jacques Derrida, never before available in English, may be of more than passing interest. In June, the University of Chicago Press will publish Mr. Derrida's dissertation, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy , which the French philosopher wrote in 1953-54 as a doctoral student, and which did not appear in French until 1990. From the start, Mr Derrida displayed his inventive linguistic style and flouting of convention."--Danny Postel, Chronicle of Higher Education. (shrink)

Donner, est-ce possible? Dès lors qu'il engage dans le cercle de l'échange, le don semble s'annuler. Pour donner, il faudrait ne rien attendre en retour. Rien espérer, rien escompter de ce qui doit rester incalculable. Plus gravement encore, et avant même que rien ne s'inscrive dans une économie des signes ou des choses, il suffit peut-être qu'il y ait intention de donner, il suffit que le don apparaisse comme tel à la conscience ou que dans son sens il devienne présent (...) pour disparaître et se perdre aussitôt en faisant retour : comme s'il était impossible de connaître par l'expérience ce que nous pensons et désirons sous le nom de don ; comme si même il était impossible de désirer le don ou de vouloir donner ; comme si le don était voué à l'irresponsabilité ; comme si, pour dire " il y a don ", il fallait renoncer au présent - et à dire : " le don est " ou " le don existe ". Renouant avec le fil d'analyses antérieures, Jacques Derrida tente ici de formaliser les conditions et les effets de cette aporie, à savoir l'incompatibilité apparente du don et du présent. La nécessité pour le don d'excéder le retour circulaire à son origine implique une interprétation du temps, qui fut souvent représenté comme un cercle. Avec la question du don et du présent, comme question de la répétition, il y va donc du temps : du temps de l'être, du temps du monde, du temps social, du temps de la conscience et de l'inconscient. A travers des lectures de Heidegger, de Mauss ou de Benveniste ; il s'agit ici de ressaisir la grande question du don à la racine commune de l'ontologie et de la sémantique, de l'anthropologie et de l'économie politique. Et de la littérature, : la seconde partie de ce premier volume est en effet consacrée à la lecture d'un bref récit de Baudelaire, La fausse monnaie, qui oriente en vérité tout l'ouvrage. (shrink)

"When he died in 2004, Jacques Derrida left behind a vast legacy of unpublished material, much of it in the form of written lectures. With The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I, the University of Chicago Press launches an ambitious series of English translations of these important works based upon the meticulously established original French editions." "In this seminar from 2001 and 2002, Derrida explores the persistent association of bestiality or animality with sovereignty and continues his deconstruction of the (...) traditional determinations of the human. The beast and the sovereign are connected, he contends, because neither animals nor kings are subject to the law - the sovereign stands above it, while the beast falls outside the law from below. He then traces this association through an astonishing array of texts, including La Fontaine's fable "The Wolf and the Lamb," Hobbes's biblical sea monster in Leviathan, D. H. Lawrence's poem "Snake," Machiavelli's Prince with its elaborate comparison of princes and foxes, a historical account of Louis XIV attending an elephant autopsy, and Rousseau's evocation of werewolves in The Social Contract." "Deleuze, Lacan, and Agamben also come into critical play as Derrida focuses in on questions of force, right, justice, and philosophical interpretations of the limits between man and animal." --Book Jacket. (shrink)

In the English-speaking world, Jacques Derrida’s writings have most influenced the discipline of literary studies. Yet what has emerged since the initial phase of Derrida’s influence on the study of English literature, classed under the rubric of deconstruction, has often been disowned by Derrida. What, then, can Derrida teach us about literary language, about the rhetoric of literature, and about questions concerning style, form, and structure? The Derrida Reader draws together a number of Derrida’s most interesting and idiosyncratic essays (...) that treat literary language, the idea of the literary, and questions of poetics and poetry. The essays discuss single tropes or concepts, a figure such as metaphor, the ideas of titles and signatures, proper names, and Derrida’s thinking on such subjects as undecidability or aporia. The editor’s introduction is a demonstration in practice of how Derrida reads and how he adapts the act of reading to the text or figure in question. The introduction also outlines each essay’s main points, its usefulness for reading literary texts, and its particular area of interest. The Derrida Reader thus provides students of literature with a focused, contextualized, and readily understandable volume. (shrink)

According to a widely discussed view, knowledge plays a significant normative role in action: It is epistemically rational to treat p as your reason for action if and only if you know that p. As many philosophers have observed, however, this view clashes with the claim that knowledge is moderate and stable. For, granting that claim, there will be high stakes cases in which knowledge seems insufficient. To deal with such cases, some philosophers embracing the knowledge norm combine three independently (...) plausible claims. First, they say that no non-trivial condition is luminous; second, they say that doing something while not being in a position to know that that is appropriate is bad (in high stakes cases); third, they say that in the high stakes cases in question, the subject knows but fails to be in a position to know that she knows (Williamson Philos Q 55:213–235, 2005). This paper argues that this account can overcome the main objections already raised in the literature, but that it still faces the apparently insurmountable challenge of providing a natural and helpful way of substantiating the second claim. (shrink)

Those who have read me, in particular those who have read “Paul de Man’s War,” know very well that I would have quite easily accepted a genuine critique, the expression of an argued disagreement with my reading of de Man, with my evaluation of these articles from 1940-42, and so on. After all, what I wrote on this subject was complicated enough, divided, tormented, most often hazarded as hypothesis, open enough to discussion, itself discussing itself enough in advance for me (...) to be able to welcome questions, suggestions, and objections. Provided this was done so as to demonstrate and not to intimidate or inflict wounds, to help the analysis progress and not to score points, to read and to reason and not to pronounce massive, magical, and immediately executor verdicts. Five of the six “responses” that I reread last night are written, as one used to say, with a pen dipped in venom. Less against the de Man of 1940-42, perhaps, then against me . Less against me, in truth, than against “Deconstruction” . How can the reader tell that these five “critical responses” are not “responses,” critical texts or discussions, but rather the documents of a blinded compulsion? First of all, the fact that they are all monolithic. They take into account none of the complications of which my text, this is the very least one can say, is not at all sparing. They never seek to measure the possibility, the degree, or the form, as always happens in an honest discussion, of a partial agreement on this or that point. No, everything is rejected as a block; everything is a block and a block of hatred. Even when, here or there, someone makes a show of being moved by my sadness or my friendship for de Man, it is in order to get the better of me and suggest that I am inspired only by friendship, which will appear ridiculous to all those who have read me. Inspired by friendship means for those people misled by friendship. How foreign this experience must be to them! Jacques Derrida is Directeur d’Études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales as well as professor at the University of California, Irvine, and visiting professor at the Graduate School of the City University of New York. His most recent publication in English is the collection Limited Inc , which includes a new afterword, “Toward an Ethic of Discussion.” Peggy Kamuf is professor of French at the University of Southern California. Her most recent book is Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship . She has also contributed essays to Reading de Man Reading and Responses: On Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism , and is currently editing A Derrida Reader. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Avant-propos Première recherche - Autrui, présence sans concept Présentation 1 - L'état de la question : de l'anthropologie à la philosophie de la notion d'autrui 2 - Aporétique de l'altérité personnelle 3 - La (...) problématique de la proximité et la seconde personne 4 - Une catégorie linguistique de la personne? 5 - Connaissance ou reconnaissance d'autrui? L'illusion spéculative 6 - Une formulation linguistique du problème de l'altérité personnelle 7 - Vers une éthique des relations interpersonnelles par l'exercice de la parole 8 - L'hypothèse transcendantale 9 - La parole tronquée faire échec à la peur et à la violence : la réciprocité du signe Deuxième recherche - Essai pour introduire en pragmatique les concepts de rétro-référence et de co-référence Présentation I - Questions de méthode II - L'état de la question III - La référence aux interlocuteurs IV - Les conditions dialogiques de la référence au monde Troisième recherche - Eléments pour une pragmatique du dialogue. Le dialogue référentiel Présentation I - L'espace logique de l'interlocution II - L'intégration des théories existantes III - Le dialogue régulier IV - Pour une typologie du dialogue Quatrième recherche - L'enjeu épistémique du dialogue : avoir une croyance commune Présentation 1 - Les trois voies de l'analyse : une homologie 2 - Du registre modal de la croyance à sa dynamique interne : vers un élargissement des référentiels 3 - Le dialogisme de la croyance commune 4 - Individuation et identification le problème posé par l'identification bilatérale des individus 5 - Caractère réflexif de la croyance commune la convention des critères et les hypothèses restrictives 6 - Les phases du dialogue et le travail de quantification logique une objection dirimante? 7 - « Fixer la référence » des termes singuliers remarques sur l'interprétation de Saul Kripke 8 - Le recours à la théorie des jeux de stratégie notion de règle stratégique 9 - De la logique du dialogue à l'idée d'une logique fondée sur le dialogue 10 - La métaphore secourable du jeu compétitif compétition et coopération dans le jeu dialogique 11 - Le consensus pragmatique : notion de confrontation épistémique le dynamisme novateur de la relation dialogique 12 - Triple relativité de la référence 13 - Questions en suspens : figuration et symbolisation l'opinion droite 14 - L'appel à une sémantique de l'action Cinquième recherche - Le système sublogique des phrases en « nous » Présentation 1 - Clore le dialogue : réussite, échec, contrefaçons 2 - La mise en communauté de l'énonciation équivocité, plurivocité, polysémie 3 - Le dialogisme de la compréhension remarques critiques sur l'instance transcendantale 4 - Variables logiques et variables pronominales 5 - Le « nous » comme sujet apparent d'une double prédication 6 - Degrés de dépendance à l'égard du contexte pragmatique 7 - La pluralisation de « je » : pluriel objectif et pluriel personnel 8 - L'autodétermination du « nous » 9 - Les supplétifs stylistiques 10 - La parole heureuse matrice de la relation humaine de mutualité NotesIndex des noms propres Index analytique Pages de fin. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "Prenant ici toute l’initiative, Elisabeth Weber a choisi, en les présentant, vingt entretiens parmi tous ceux auxquels Jacques Derrida a participé depuis près de vingt ans. Elle s’est donné pour cela un certain nombre de critères, et d’abord celui de la diversité : celle des sujets (la question des femmes, la poésie, la drogue, le sida, l’enseignement, en particulier celui de la philosophie, et, croisant tous ces thèmes, la politique et les médias), celle (...) des tons (analytique ou joueur, militant ou « autobiographique »), celle des destinataires (en France, en Europe, Outre-Altantique).". (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that concessive knowledge attributions—assertions of the form “I know that p but it might be that not p”—can be true. Yet, these assertions plainly sound incoherent. Fallibilists have proposed to explain this incoherence pragmatically. The main proponents of this approach appeal to Gricean implicatures (Rysiew in Noûs 35(4):477514, 2001; Dougherty and Rysiew in Philos Phenomenol (...) Res 78(1):123132, 2009; Dougherty and Rysiew in Synthese 181(3):395403, 2011). Very recently, some philosophers have observed that fallibilists can also explain this apparent incoherence pragmatically if they embrace a (context-sensitive) certainty norm for assertion (Petersen in Synthese 196(11):4691–4710, 2019; Beddor in Philos Impr 20(8), 2020; Vollet in Dialectica 74:3, 2020). In this paper, I argue for the superiority of this latter explanation over its older rivals. (shrink)

In 1746 the French philosophe Condillac published his Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge , one of many attempts during the century to determine how we organize and validate ideas as knowledge. In investigating language, especially written language, he found not only the seriousness he sought but also a great deal of frivolity whose relation to the sober business of philosophy had to be addressed somehow. If the mind truly reflects the world, and language reflects the mind, why is (...) there so much error and nonsense? Whence the distortions? How can they be remedied? In The Archeology of the Frivolous , Jacques Derrida recoups Condillac's enterprise, showing how it anticipated--consciously or not--many of the issues that have since stymied epistemology and linguistic philosophy. If anyone doubts that deconstruction can be a powerful analytic method, try this. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui délimite le sens et le non-sens, ce qui peut être dit et ce qui ne peut pas être dit? Comme réponse, Jacques Bouveresse propose une réflexion sur la signification linguistique, à partir des principales théories sur la limite des sens, des philosophes contemporains comme Frege, Husserl, et Wittgenstein.

Personne, personne n’ose dire je. Journal. Les illustres stades que Kierkegaard a traversés – esthétique, éthique, religieux – désignent une succession nécessaire et libre à la fois pour une conscience religieuse radicalisée de façon singulière, au point de devoir manquer la rencontre avec l’autre, en l’occurrence pour lui avec Régine Olsen. Le recours aux pseudonymes signale son errance (amplifiée par le menaçant verdict paternel) et ses velléités décisionnaires. C’est une forme de salut qui est peu à peu recherchée et qui (...) passera par la pensée critique et une foi résolue mais néanmoins dans le temps d’un penseur subjectif et volontairement centré sur un exister quasi-solitaire. La chape prédictive du père malmène intimement l’équilibre psychologique de Kierkegaard et la mort paternelle sera pour lui en partie comme une deuxième naissance même si ce lourd passé lui restera comme une écharde dans la chair. Préférant se consacrer à la voie religieuse de sa vie spirituelle, il abandonnera ce qu’il estimera ne pas pouvoir accomplir : le mariage qui restera à jamais à l’état de virtualité avec Régine sa bien-aimée – dont l’éducation religieuse lui aurait paru insuffisante – mais sa vocation restera un pacte de larmes… Fixé en partie malgré lui sur le religieux, il ne peut y avoir pour lui de synthèse des trois stades précités mais le choix religieux est ramené vers l’éthique et l’apparaître de la phénoménalité au sens où il réalise peu à peu et se construit une Régine idéale qui sanctifiera et accompagnera sa volonté de subjectivation centrée sur le souci d’un absolu. Kierkegaard garde la conviction que l’homme recèle en lui l’éternel alors que se façonne un homme modifié de plus exposé à des risques d’aliénation s’il n’aiguise pas sa vigilance à rester lui-même. On restera dans un mouvement d’aspiration religieuse à mesure humaine n’excluant pas la tendance ascétique. Penseur subjectif, passion et intelligence de l’incertitude vont ensemble. Kierkegaard est plus dans l’intériorité vécue que dans le concept qui a aussi ses vertus. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

In this paper about Chile, Weber's taxonomy of rational behavior is used together with a genetic-structural approach to explain chilean political life, which can be understood by the following variables : a mean demography, an authoritarian and religious culture, a capitalistic, dependent and under-developed economy, an hybrid social stratification, a centralised state characterized by an higly developed burocracy.In such a context the «Popular Unity» results from a specific acculturationof antagonistic ideologies related to different social strata, to competitive political groups as (...) welt as to rival pressure groups. In the short term ; the confiicting interests might coexist thanks to a growing social support motivated by a superficial economie nationalism, emotional anti-capitalistic feelings and the rise in the income of the popular and middle classes strata.On the other hand, the left government, divided by social, political and ideological oppositions was unable to run the civil service, to structure a congruent economic policy and to face international or national subversion. (shrink)

“Pedagogics of Unlearning”: this phrase obviously echoes a notion and a figure that I had set up in my own way when I published a book entitled The Ignorant Schoolmaster with the subtitle “Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation”.1 Both entail the idea of a specific form of learning, which is a negative one: learning how to unlearn, teaching as an ignoramus, learning the emancipatory virtue of ignorance. This idea raises two interrelated problems. First, how are we to understand the type (...) of negativity at work in this unlearning or this ignorance? Secondly, what is the exact target of this negative action? What is the positivity that is under attack? In other words, what is at stake in matters of... (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s Cinders is among the most remarkable and revealing of this distinguished author’s many writings. White Derrida customarily devotes his powers of analysis to exacting readings of texts from Plato and Aristotle to Freud and Heidegger, readers of Cinders will soon discover that here Derrida is engaged in a poetic self-analysis. Ranging across his numerous writings over the past twenty years, Derrida discerns a recurrent cluster of arguments and images, all involving in one way or another ashes and (...) cinders. First published in 1982, revised in 1987, and printed here in a bilingual edition, Cinders enables readers to follow the development of Derrida’s thinking from 1968 to the present as it defines itself as a persistent questioning of origins that invariably leads to the thought of ash and cinder. Written in a highly condensed poetic style, Cinders reveals some of Derrida’s most probing etymological and philosophical reflections on the relation of language to the human. It also contains some of his most essential elaborations of his thinking on the feminine and on the legacy of the Holocaust in contemporary poetry and philosophy.Uniquely accessible to readers who have only recently begun to read Derrida and essential for all those familiar with Derrida’s work, Cinders is an evocative and thoughtful contribution to our understanding of deconstruction. (shrink)

Femmes, quel titre eût été plus juste et plus résonnant? Prononcée en 1972, cette conférence fut en effet scandée ou jouée par telles propositions : "la femme sera mon sujet", "il n'y a pas d'être ou d'essence de la femme ou de la différence sexuelle", "la femme n'aura donc pas été mon sujet"... Pour "déchiffrer cette inscription de la femme" l'écriture ne doit plus recevoir ses ordres de la philosophie ou de la littérature.

In Speech and Phenomena, Jacques Derriba situates the philosophy of language in relation to logic and rhetoric, which have often been seen as irreconcilable criteria for the use and interpretation of signs. His critique of Husserl attacks the position that language is founded on logic rather than on rhetoric; instead, he claims, meaningful language is limited to expression because expression alone conveys sense.

A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and (...) insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning. (shrink)

Excerpt from Antimoderne Elements DE philosophie, Fascicule I Introduction generale a la Philosophie, 8 edition. Fascicule II. Petite Logique, 4 edition. (tequi. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such (...) as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)