A monosexual configuration of sexuality assumes that sexual desire is directed at either men or women. Bisexuality resists a choice between oppositional categories and is often theorised as having a transgressive potential to destabilise binary logic, not only in relation to sexuality but also to gender. There is, however, a lack of empirical work exploring how this potential might be realised in the accounts of bisexual individuals. Drawing on interviews with South African bisexual women, we use a narrative-discursive lens to (...) examine the discursive resources employed by participants to trouble or resist hetero-gendered norms. Our findings demonstrate how resistance to the gender binary hinges on citational politics that are fundamentally gendered and linked to sexuality. Instead of entirely destabilising hetero-gendered norms, participants draw on gendered scripts that simultaneously expand norms to accommodate their sexual difference and, through processes of othering, function to reiterate hetero-gendered norms. While complete subversion of gender binaries is not possible in participants’ discursive contexts, what does occur is a ‘slow bending’ of norms. Theorising bisexuality as transgressing oppositional categories closes off opportunities to interrogate the pervasive influence of gender binaries in contexts that remain marked by pervasive heteronormativity and heterosexism. Significantly, it also obscures more modest improvisations of gender scripts that hold potential for destabilising gender binaries. (shrink)

Background:The global COVID-19 pandemic has imposed challenges on healthcare systems and professionals worldwide and introduced a ´maelstrom´ of ethical dilemmas. How ethically demanding situations are handled affects employees’ moral stress and job satisfaction.Aim:Describe priority-setting dilemmas, moral distress and support experienced by nurses and physicians across medical specialties in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in Western Norway.Research design:A cross-sectional hospital-based survey was conducted from 23 April to 11 May 2020.Ethical considerations:Ethical approval granted by the Regional Research Ethics Committee in (...) Western Norway (131421).Findings:Among the 1606 respondents, 67% had experienced priority-setting dilemmas the previous two weeks. Healthcare workers who were directly involved in COVID-19 care, were redeployed or worked in psychiatry/addiction medicine experienced it more often. Although 59% of the respondents had seen adverse consequences due to resource scarcity, severe consequences were rare. Moral distress levels were generally low (2.9 on a 0–10 scale), but higher in selected groups (redeployed, managers and working in psychiatry/addiction medicine). Backing from existing collegial and managerial structures and routines, such as discussions with colleagues and receiving updates and information from managers that listened and acted upon feedback, were found more helpful than external support mechanisms. Priority-setting guidelines were also helpful.Discussion:By including all medical specialties, nurses and physicians, and various institutions, the study provides information on how the COVID-19 mitigation also influenced those not directly involved in the COVID-19 treatment of patients. In the next stages of the pandemic response, support for healthcare professionals directly involved in outbreak-affected patients, those redeployed or those most impacted by mitigation strategies must be a priority.Conclusion:Empirical research of healthcare workers experiences under a pandemic are important to identify groups at risks and useful support mechanisms. (shrink)

Ethical dilemmas are part of medicine, but the type of challenges, the frequency of their occurrence and the nuances in the difficulties have not been systematically studied in low-income settings. The objective of this paper was to map out the ethical dilemmas from the perspective of Ethiopian physicians working in public hospitals. A national survey of physicians from 49 public hospitals using stratified, multi-stage sampling was conducted in six of the 11 regions in Ethiopia. Descriptive statistics were used and the (...) responses to the open-ended question “If you have experienced any ethical dilemma, can you please describe a dilemma you have encountered in your own words?” were analyzed using a template analysis process. A total of 587 physicians responded, and 565 met the inclusion criteria. Twelve of 24 specified ethically challenging situations were reported to be experienced often or sometimes by more than 50% of the physicians. The most frequently reported challenge concerned resource distribution: 93% agreed that they often or sometimes had to make difficult choices due to resource limitation, and 83% often or sometimes encountered difficulties because patients were unable to pay for the preferred course of treatment. Other frequently reported difficulties were doubts about doing good or harming the patient, relating to conflicting views, concern for family welfare, disclosure issues and caring for patients not able to consent. Few reported dilemmas related to end-of-life issues. The 200 responses to the open-ended question mirrored the quantitative results. Ethiopian physicians report ethical challenges related more to bedside rationing and fairness concerns than futility discussions and conflicts about autonomy as described in studies from high-income countries. In addition to the high report of experienced challenges, gravity of the dilemmas that are present in their narratives are striking. Recognition of the everyday experiences of physicians in low-income settings should prompt the development of ethics teaching and support mechanisms, discussion of ethical guidelines as well as increase our focus on how to improve the grave resource scarcity they describe. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Care and Gender in Contemporary Capitalist Societies Supporting Care and Moving Toward Gender Justice The Consequences of Property‐Owning Democracy for Gender and Care Conclusion References.

This essay examines the early reception of Scheler’s anthropological thought in Spain. The article traces the two main ways of reception of Scheler’s work in the School of Madrid and the School of Barcelona. I argue that, on the one hand, the Spanish translations of the works of the early phenomenologists – Scheler was a central figure among them – contributed to the diffusion of Scheler’s thought; and that, on the other hand, the Spanish authors subjected Scheler’s thought to a (...) critical assimilation and further developments. Scheler influenced the Spanish philosophy of the human affectivity, in which the capacity to feel, the values and love as a kernel of the human being occupy an exceptional position. This reception shows the originality of Spanish authors that incorporate Scheler’s ideas to their anthropological interest and develop these ideas in the direction of their own phenomenological anthropology. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has established that, until the mid-1670s, Leibniz did not hold the possibilist ontology which, in his mature philosophy, provides the foundation for both his account of human freedom and of eternal truth. Concentrating on the Mainz period , this paper examines the conciliation, in those early writings, of an actualist ontology and a conception of necessary truth as analytical. The first section questions the view that Leibniz was educated in a “Platonist” tradition; the second section presents the actualist (...) metaphysics that he adopted in the wake of his teachers; the third section shows how Leibniz could, contrary to those same teachers, hold an analytical view of eternal truth, even without the support of his later possibilist ontology and doctrine of real definitions. (shrink)

Une rapide prospection a permis de localiser six ateliers amphoriques à Paros et deux à Naxos. Cette découverte a permis de préciser les conditions d'installation de ces poteries, de caractériser les argiles employées, de tenter une première esquisse typologique des amphores de Paros (époque hellénistique et impériale) et de Naxos (IVe siècle) et enfin de se fonder sur les échantillons provenant de ces ateliers pour identifier leur composition par thermoluminescence et les comparer avec d'autres vases provenant de sites de consommation.

This monograph on the capability approach does two things. First, it provides an advanced introduction to the capability approach, as an account used in philosophy, as well as other disciplines. Second, it provides an account of the capability approach which is able to encompass all existing views and theories on the capability approach, including the writings on the capability approach by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.

La question des rapports entre sciences et techniques commence à se poser de manière nouvelle à partir de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle. En même temps que se précisent des possibilités inédites d’application des sciences aux techniques, les élites éclairées, encyclopédistes, ingénieurs, Idéologues, réfléchissent à la place que doivent occuper les savoirs techniques au sein de l’organisation générale des connaissances. La réflexion s’approfondit au cours des premières décennies du XIXe siècle. Certains caressent le projet d’une science des techniques, d’une (...) « technologie », qui permettrait d’ordonner la masse des savoirs et des savoir-faire. D’autres se contentent de grouper les techniques en fonction de leurs applications. Ce qui se fait jour en définitive au travers de ces différentes tentatives, c’est le statut moderne d’une technique omniprésente en même temps qu’elle échappe à toute mise en ordre globale. (shrink)

In the past decade, scholars such as Samuel Freeman, Martin O’Neill, Alan Thomas and others have argued that no matter how widely Rawls’s theory of justice (TJ) was understood as a defence of the welfare state (WS), the socio-economic system Rawls defends and always defended is property-owing democracy (POD). In this article I present the argument that Rawls did not defend POD in TJ. However, while the claim that it was POD the socio-economic system implied by the principle of difference (...) generated heated reactions by defenders of the WS, the argument I raise differs from most of them. In the article I maintain that, for Rawls, principles of justice underdetermine the choice of social systems, and that although this is true of both principles, it is especially true of the difference principle, whose ability to arbitrate between different social and economic policies is limited. I show how the attempt to uniquely determine the set of social and economic policies authorized by the difference principle clashes with what Rawls explicitly states in TJ and contrasts with central aspects of his sociological and political conception of socio-economic decision-making. Although my aim is to show that the difference principle itself does not discriminate among socio-economic systems, this does not preclude that additional reasons can help in narrowing the range of socio-economic systems allowed. With reference to the ideal of social union that Rawls expounds in the third part of TJ, I argue that TJ does, in fact, offer additional reasons to appraise the WS as preferable to POD. I maintain that the centrality Rawls attributes to the social unity of a just society provides the basis for an understanding of Rawls’s position towards POD after TJ. (shrink)

Pragmatic difficulties are considered a hallmark of autism spectrum conditions (ASC), but remain poorly understood. We discuss and evaluate existing hypotheses regarding the literalism of ASC individuals, that is, their tendency for literal interpretations of non‐literal communicative intentions. We present evidence that reveals a developmental stage at which neurotypical children also have a tendency for literalism and suggest an explanation for such behaviour that links it to other behavioural, rule‐following, patterns typical of that age. We discuss evidence showing that strict (...) adherence to rules is also widespread in ASC, and suggest that literalism might be linked to such rule‐following behaviour. (shrink)

My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. In contrast to views that attempt to (...) fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

Having Too Much is the first academic volume devoted to limitarianism: the idea that the use of economic or ecosystem resources should not exceed certain limits. This concept has deep roots in economic and political thought. One can find similar statements of such limits in thinkers such as Plato, Aquinas, and Spinoza. But Having Too Much is the first time in contemporary political philosophy that limitarianism is explored at length and in detail. Bringing together in one place the best writing (...) from key theorists of limitarianism, this book is an essential contribution to political philosophy in general, and theories of distributive justice in particular. Including some of the key published articles as well as new chapters, Having Too Much is necessary reading for scholars and students of political theory and philosophy, as well as anyone interested in questions of distributive justice. (shrink)

From the co-founder and president of PETA, Ingrid Newkirk, and bestselling author Gene Stone comes Animalkind, a book that offers both a tour of the wonderful world of animals and a guide to simple ways in which we can reduce the harm we cause them in our everyday lives.

From the co-founder and president of PETA, Ingrid Newkirk, and bestselling author Gene Stone comes Animalkind, a book that offers both a tour of the wonderful world of animals and a guide to simple ways in which we can reduce the harm we cause them in our everyday lives.

Abstract:This article employs the concept of “transformative experience” to develop a radical version of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which engaging with literary perspectives might lead the reader to experience not only an epistemic but also a personal transformation. It is argued that the reader’s imaginative and empathic abilities when subjected to the aesthetic norms that govern a literary work can mobilize other aspects of their psychology, eliciting in this way a change in their core values and, consequently, in the way (...) in which they engage with the world. After introducing the topic (section 1), the article discusses the scope of literary perspectives in terms of the character’s subjective experiences (section 2). Next, it offers an analysis of the depth of literary perspectives in terms of the degree of involvement of the reader’s imaginative and empathic abilities (section 3). It proceeds to examine how the interplay between the scope and depth in the reader’s engagement with a literary perspective can explain their epistemic and personal transformation (section 4). In the final part, the article analyzes how the personal transformation changes the reader’s value system (section 5). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6). (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 249-270, June 2022.

Research on gender and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) beyond women’s biological susceptibility is limited. A gender and equity lens in AMR research is necessary to promote gender equality and support the effectiveness, uptake, and sustainability of real-world AMR solutions. We argue that it is an ethical and social justice imperative to include gender and related intersectional issues in AMR research and implementation. An intersectional exploration of the interplay between people’s diverse identities and experiences, including their gender, socio-economic status, race, disability, age, (...) and sexuality, may help us understand how these factors reinforce AMR risk and vulnerability and ensure that interventions to reduce the risk of AMR do not impact unevenly. This paper reports on the findings of a systematic scoping review on the interlinkages between AMR, gender and other socio-behavioural characteristics to identify priority knowledge gaps in human and animal health in LMICs. The review focused on peer-reviewed and grey literature published between 2017 and 2022. Three overarching themes were gendered division of caregiving roles and responsibilities, gender power relations in decision-making, and interactions between gender norms and health-seeking behaviours. Research that fails to account for gender and its intersections with other lines of disadvantage, such as race, class and ability, risks being irrelevant and will have little impact on the continued and dangerous spread of AMR. We provide recommendations for integrating an intersectional gender lens in AMR research, policy and practice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wandering the Magnetosphere*Ingrid Koenig (bio)Navigation notes: These emergent drawings–excerpts from a visual essay–take up the complex network of impacts across physical forces entangled with bio-geo-political time. A key element for this work is a living cosmography to depict movement across time, and to visualize wandering on a planet, in the magnetosphere, and between the internal energy of Earth and the solar energy of the cosmos. Physicists say there (...) are no things, there are only relations between things.Q: Hello ancient stone - may I unfold you like a book? Do you carry a message from deep time? A: Yes, what you’re holding is not a thing, but a process. Click for larger view View full resolutionDrawing from Svalbard, Day 17 expedition, 2019[End Page 97]Drifting on a rocky planet, between the internal energy of Earth and the solar energy of the cosmos–we live within a “cosmo-tectonic circulation” —Jerome Gaillardet, geo-chemist. Click for larger view View full resolutionGeocosmic Logic[End Page 98] Click for larger view View full resolutionHow Entropy is Time (detail) Click for larger view View full resolutionMagnetic Story[End Page 99] Click for larger view View full resolutionMessage From Deep Time 3 Click for larger view View full resolutionMessage From Deep Time 1[End Page 100] Click for larger view View full resolutionLooping Matters 1 (Litli-Hrutur, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionLooping Matters 2[End Page 101] Click for larger view View full resolutionMother Rock Waves (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionMother Rock in Time[End Page 102] Click for larger view View full resolutionVolcanic Logic (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionSonic Lava (Miradalir Valley, Iceland)[End Page 103] Click for larger view View full resolutionWaves Across Time (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionDisorientations[End Page 104] Click for larger view View full resolutionMessage From Deep Time 2 Click for larger view View full resolutionGravitational Thought[End Page 105] Click for larger view View full resolutionMagnetic Thought (Miradalir Valley, Iceland) Click for larger view View full resolutionDistance Ladder Collapse[End Page 106] Click for larger view View full resolutionMattering Logic 3 Click for larger view View full resolutionMattering Logic 4[End Page 107] Click for larger view View full resolutionHow We Make Time into Space Click for larger view View full resolutionHow Entropy is Time (detail 2–Svalbard)[End Page 108]Ingrid Koenig Ingrid Koenig is Associate Professor at Emily Carr University of Art + Design, Vancouver, Canada. She was the inaugural Artist in Residence (2011 to 2021) at TRIUMF, Canada’s particle accelerator center, and co-organizes processes of collaboration between artists and physicists in a project called Leaning Out of Windows. Her studio and research practices traverse the fields of physics, social history, feminist theory, and narratives of science. Her drawings explore the complex phenomena of physics and involve intuitive responses to specific sites through fieldwork in Canada’s Rocky Mountains, Germany, Iceland, Arctic Circle art + science expeditions, and through collaborations with physicists. She has received grants from the Canada Council for the Arts, the Goethe Institute, and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. She co-edited the recently published book, Leaning Out of Windows: An Art and Physics Collaboration (Figure 1 Publishing, 2023).Footnotes* Excerpts from Wandering the Magnetosphere–drawings by Ingrid Koenig, 2019 to 2023, and ongoingCopyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press and SubStance, Inc... (shrink)

In the autumn of 1667, the young Leibniz published a «new method» for the science of law. Producing a revised edition of that early work was to become his lifelong project, to the purpose of which he wrote, in the 1690s, a succession of new versions of most of its sections. The main reason for this enduring interest was probably the fact that the juridical part of the treatise was preceded with a more general one, encapsulating in a few pages (...) a systematic overview of the disciplines composing the baroque encyclopaedia, after the model of Johann Heinrich Alsted’s monumental Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta. If Leibniz still depended on Alsted’s notion of philosophy as the «circle of disciplines», he deeply transformed that pre-Cartesian conception of knowledge by two decisive innovations: following Bacon, he defines each branch of demonstrative science as bearing on one single «quality», abstracted from the subjects in which it inheres; yet, contrary to Bacon, he no longer conceives of these qualities as the ultimate components of reality, but as those of our experience of it, marking the limit of the explanatory capacity of language. (shrink)

En quoi le corps participe-t-il de l'entente que l'homme a du monde? Que signifie dès lors écouter? Comment établir un rapport juste à l'animal? Quel sens prêter aux couleurs? Pourquoi la tonalité décisive de notre rapport au monde peut-elle advenir à la faveur d'expériences olfactives et gustatives? En quoi la tactilité incite-t-elle à considérer le corps vif comme une donnée originaire et à reconnaître qu'il est bien une vulnérabilité dotée d'aptitudes qui nous dispose au monde? Comment l'angoisse, révélée et cachée (...) tout à la fois par la maladie, est-elle chevillée au corps de l'être-au-monde, le Dasein? Qu'en est-il du corps dans la nostalgie, dans la mélancolie, dans l'ennui et dans la joie? Pourquoi la coexistence, supposant relations et rencontres, implique-t-elle l'articulation des corporéités vives comme dans le tact sensitif ou dans la jalousie amoureuse et dans l'amour pensé en terme de tonalité érotique? Comment comprendre la mobilité et parvenir ainsi jusqu'à l'éminente dignité ontologique du mouvement? De quoi la pensée est-elle redevable au corps? Telles sont les questions qui jalonnent cet ouvrage. Par son orientation résolument phénoménologique, l'Intelligence du corps entend renouveler l'entente du phénomène le plus proprement humain et, cependant, le plus malmené par la métaphysique. Prenant librement appui sur les vues inouïes de Martin Heidegger, consciente de l'actuelle soumission du corps de l'homme à l'arraisonnement technique, Ingrid Auriol ouvre une voie d'accès à l'intelligence du corps libérée de cette violence. (shrink)

Social enterprises are seen as innovative towards solving societal problems, but little research exists on possible negative aspects, the so‐called dark sides. In this study, the emphasis is on dark sides of social entrepreneurship, how they are managed, and how systems thinking can contribute towards managing these effects. Dark sides of social entrepreneurship can take many forms, like unethical or insincere motives and unintended outcomes like the negative impact on the well‐being of founders and employees, but they are also a (...) call for a critical reflection on the role of the government in society and the economic system social enterprises have to operate in. This paper aims to contribute to the dark side theory of social entrepreneurship by linking system archetypes to themes of dark side thereby stressing how management strategies act as balancing feedback loops to mitigate or prevent dark sides. A qualitative research was conducted by interviewing 21 respondents who play an important role in the world of social entrepreneurship in Belgium. The results show that dark sides of social enterprises manifest itself mostly in the form of trade‐offs and financial, business, and management related issues. Taking over the habits of profit‐oriented companies emerged as a new dark side element. Management strategies include anchoring goals, transparency, obtaining external views, changing the system, and above all reflection. The latter is an important first step to become aware of these issues to be able to change the negative dynamism of these dark sides. (shrink)

Many older gay men experience diminished psychological well‐being (PWB) due to unique circumstances including discrimination, living with HIV, and aging through the HIV/AIDS crisis. However, there remains ambiguity as to how older gay men define and understand PWB. Our team interviewed and analyzed the accounts of 26 older (50+) self‐identifying English‐speaking men living in southwestern British Columbia, Canada. We drew on tenets of constructivist grounded theory and intersectionality to account for unique contextual considerations and power relations. Semi‐structured Zoom interviews were (...) conducted from August‐October 2022. Interview transcripts were compared to generate high‐order conceptual findings underpinned by processes understood as central to PWB. Three PWB temporal processes highlighted interlocking social and contextual circumstances intersecting with power and maturation: (1) being emotionally balanced, (2) living gratitude (3) and fully embracing self‐acceptance. Being emotionally balanced supported the affective and sustainable state of contentment, living gratitude drew from the wisdom of accrued experiences to cultivate a positive affective state inclusive to recognising social location privileges, whilst fully embracing self‐acceptance redressed the harms of anti‐gay discourses that men endured throughout their lives. The knowledge is relevant to service and resource development to deliver tailored PWB supports to older gay men. (shrink)

Drawing on Laurie A. Paul’s notion of “transformative experience”, this paper explores transformative philosophical experiences and analyses the structure of the attitude underlying them. It is argued that these experiences have to be explained not in cognitive terms but as a change in our affective attitude. More precisely, these experiences lead us to feel values in a novel manner. However, in order to make the philosophical experience epistemically transformative and provide a new perspective from which we can acquire new philosophical (...) insights, this feeling of value must meet certain moral conditions such as being open, humble and aware of possible self-deceptive tendencies. Since affectivity is central to the person we are, epistemically transformative experiences in philosophy go hand in hand with personal transformation. (shrink)

Is the leibnizian'doctrine of science laying on a doctrine of knowledge? This book demonstrates that there is not such a dependence in Leibniz'searlier writings in which the theory of science is established, independently of any doctrine of understanting.

Human embryos produced in labs since the 1970s have generated layers of uncertainty for law and policy: ontological, moral, and administrative. Ontologically, these lab-made entities fall into a gray zone between life and not-yet-life. Should in vitro embryos be treated as inanimate matter, like abandoned postsurgical tissue, or as private property? Morally, should they exist largely outside of state control in the zone of free reproductive choice or should they be regarded as autonomous human lives and thus entitled to constitutional (...) protection like full-fledged citizens? Administratively, if they deserve protection, what institutional and policy mechanisms are best suited to carrying out the necessary oversight? Using a method termed comparative problematization, this article traces divergent answers to these questions produced in three countries—the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany—across the last twenty-five years. Comparison reveals distinct bioconstitutional foundations that give rise to systematically different understandings of each state’s responsibilities toward human life and hence its particular treatment of claims on behalf of embryonic lives. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer (...) an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:You Can't Say "No" to That!(A "Difficult Patient" Story)Ingrid BergAs a sequela of COVID-19, my rural Wisconsin hospital has been jam-packed for months with patients for whom we routinely provide care and many for whom we do not. An exodus of health care workers and other constraints have made the transfer of critically ill patients very difficult. In this disquieting "new-normal" of our work life, we routinely must (...) call bigger cities throughout our state to find beds for complex patients.So, it was not surprising when a young patient, an IV drug user in sepsis from a heart infection, was admitted to me in the middle of the night. In less disheartening times, before the pandemic, this patient would have been transferred promptly to the big-city hospital. Now, though, the possibility of finding an open bed is next to impossible. Resigned, I placed admission orders, continued antibiotics and fluids, and crossed my fingers. Then the unexpected happened: a bed opened up, and we could send her at once!The patient had a harsh heart murmur. It was likely that a "vegetation" was clinging to the valve, between the right upper and lower chambers of her heart. A vegetation is a clump of debris, such as platelets, clotting proteins, and bacteria that is a menace to the body. Her chest imaging looked like her infection had already spread to her lungs.A definitive diagnosis for endocarditis requires a special ultrasound with a probe that goes down through the esophagus, a procedure performed by cardiologists. It's a serious infection, one that requires weeks of IV antibiotics and is best monitored by infectious disease specialists. Sometimes, cardiothoracic surgeons are called upon to strip away the infection at the site, depending on how badly the valve has been slayed or the size of the vegetation. My only recommendation for a young, otherwise healthy patient in this scenario, is transfer.All of these reasons for transfer were lolling around in my tired head when the night-time [End Page 14] nursing supervisor approached me and said, "We have a problem." When the patient was updated about the transfer, she balked: "She says she is tired and refusing to go," the supervisor began. "She doesn't feel like getting into an ambulance in the middle of the night and she doesn't care if her condition is life-threatening. She knows we can't force her to go and she will only talk about it again in the morning."The cartoon version of myself at that moment had bugged-out eyes, a dropped jaw, fists tight and clenched at my sides, and steam coming out of my head. I can look past a patient's self-neglect, poor medication adherence, abysmal communication, alcohol and drug addiction, and other crimes. But saying no to a bed at a tertiary care facility? Unacceptable!I marched down the quiet hallway and into her room. She was lying on her side, facing the door, one IV in a thin arm. I was confident I could reason with her once I explained the scarcity of beds and the medical necessity of transfer. But she was having none of it. I was calm until I could no longer maintain my cool: "You can't give up this bed!""Maybe in the morning," she insisted, yawning. "But not now. I am tired and want to rest!""But there might not be a bed in the morning," I countered. "And your infection can be life-threatening." (This is true, but we both knew she wasn't dying at this very moment.)"I am not going anywhere!" She raised her voice and then closed her eyes.And she was right. I had no choice but to keep her. I could not kick her out of the hospital because she was making a poor choice, and I was frustrated for having to manage the fallout of that decision. Giving her antibiotics and fluid boluses to bolster her blood pressure was certainly within my scope of practice. And fretting. Fretting is always within my scope of practice; not that my scope of practice matters when all the big... (shrink)

This article analyses the general ethical milieu in a nursing home for elderly residents and provides a decision-making model for analysing the ethical situations that arise. It considers what it means for the residents to live together and for the staff to be in ethically problematic situations when caring for residents. An interpretative phenomenological approach and Sandman’s ethical model proved useful for this purpose. Systematic observations were carried out and interpretation of the general ethical milieu was summarized as ‘being in (...) the same world without meeting’. Two themes and four subthemes emerged from the analysis. Three different ethical problems were analysed. The outcome of using the decision-making model highlighted the discrepancy between the solutions used and well-founded solutions to these problems. An important conclusion that emerged from this study was the need for a structured tool for reflection. (shrink)

In this article, a teleological model for analysis of everyday ethical situations in dementia care is used to analyse and clarify perennial ethical problems in nursing home care for persons with dementia. This is done with the aim of describing how such a model could be useful in a concrete care context. The model was developed by Sandman and is based on four aspects: the goal; ethical side-constraints to what can be done to realize such a goal; structural constraints; and (...) nurses’ ethical competency. The model contains the following main steps: identifying and describing the normative situation; identifying and describing the different possible alternatives; assessing and evaluating the different alternatives; and deciding on, implementing and evaluating the chosen alternative. Three ethically difficult situations from dementia care were used for the application of the model. The model proved useful for the analysis of nurses’ everyday ethical dilemmas and will be further explored to evaluate how well it can serve as a tool to identify and handle problems that arise in nursing care. (shrink)

Against the background of high demand for protein-rich feed in the EU and the environmental degradation associated with intensive livestock farming, insect-based feed is discussed as a potential sustainable alternative to conventional feed. However, the establishment of such an innovation depends not only upon technical and economic feasibility, but also on social factors impacting acceptability. The aim of this paper was to determine the acceptability of different social actor groups towards the use of insects as livestock feed, and to gain (...) insights into value-based arguments leading to positive or negative attitudes and perceived benefits and risks. By means of qualitative content analysis, we analysed responses of an EU public consultation process linked to the authorization of insect protein in pig and poultry feed. We found a broad range of value-based arguments that influence the complex judgement process of acceptability that have been neglected in prior quantitative surveys. In particular, our results bring forward more critical voices, such as animal welfare concerns and scepticism that insect-based feed can contribute to a more sustainable livestock system. Based on these findings, we discuss whether insects as feed are a viable contribution to a sustainability-oriented transformation of the agri-food system. We conclude that under certain conditions (when raised on low-value organic side streams such as manure) insect-based livestock feed may contribute to incremental sustainability improvements. Overall, however, the innovation has limitations, not only in terms of regulatory conditions but especially with regard to ethical concerns. (shrink)

La universidad adecuó la formación profesional hacia la virtualidad, adaptando con ello la teoría y la practica de las distintas materias, en ese nuevo contexto el objetivo de este estudio fue desarrollar un juego de simulación de selección de talento humano y describir la experiencia de juego en pandemia. Con un enfoque metodológico cuantitativo, diseño descriptivo no experimental transeccional, aplicado a estudiantes del VIII ciclo del curso de Gestión de Recursos Humanos. Se concluye que el juego simulado es una herramienta (...) que facilita el aprendizaje de forma virtual, asimismo contribuye con el aprendizaje del tema propuesto, de una forma organizada, dinámica y divertida. (shrink)