The author gives a critical and comprehensive study of the fundamental problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. The centre of the study is the controversy between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist nominalists on the other. The author discusses not only the epistemological and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy. In this context the view of the (...) Grammarions with special reference to Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail. A brief but critical analysis of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western Philosophy--beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers--has also been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the foundation of our thought and speech. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian PhilosophyHarold CowardSemantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy. By Jonardon Ganeri. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. x + 266.In Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy, Jonardon Ganeri adds to our understanding of the Nyāya philosophy of language in the modern English-speaking world. (...) Building on Bimal Matilal's introduction to Nyāya thought in Matilal's foundational Epistemology Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (1971) and on Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from Gangeśa to Raghunatha Siromani (1993), Ganeri's clearly written book valuably extends our knowledge of the Nyāya philosophy of language by its exposition of the seventeenth-century Nyāya philosopher Gadādhara's Saktivāda or "Essay on Semantic Power." Ganeri's exposition is based on having read the first half of the Saktivāda text with Matilal, before the latter's untimely death, and the second half with Bhattacharyya in Calcutta.In the Saktivāda, Gadādhara defends key Nyāya claims as to how language conveys meaning. In the first half of the text, the author deals with such questions as whether languages are convention-based, whether the central function of language is as an instrument of knowing, whether word meaning or sentence meaning is conceptually prior, and whether the notion of meaning is reducible to physical and/or psychological concepts. In the second half, Gadādhara looks at the semantic problems connected with particular constructions: notably proper and theoretical names, anaphors, indexicals, and the quantifiers. The English exposition of Gadādhara's text offered by Ganeri in this book covers the same topics.According to Gadādhara and the Nyāya philosophy, "the language faculty is a sui generis epistemic faculty, reducible to neither perception nor inference nor some combination of these two. The question for the Naiyāyika is: what properties must the language faculty have if it is in this way to be a source of knowledge?" (p. 15). The Nyāya approach also places an emphasis on testimony as a valid source of knowledge (pramāna), which it understands simply as the transmission by language of knowledge from the speaker to the hearer. The "Communication-intention" variable, discussed by recent thinkers such as McDowell, is not dealt with by Nyāya thinkers, who would deny that the acquisition of knowledge by testimony involves anything like the recognition of the speaker's intentions. Rather, the Nyāya thesis is "that understanding typically consists in direct, non-inferential assent, is in sharp contrast to the assumption implicit in McDowell's position: that assenting to another's utterance is never direct, but always depends on the speaker's intentions, or of the speech-act performed by the speaker" (p. 17). In supporting the Nyāya position, Ganeri appeals to Frege's theory of understanding.The basic idea in the Nyāya philosophy of language is that each of us is endowed with a language faculty, analogous to our perceptual faculty, which generates beliefs from perceived utterances. It has a meaning function. As Ganeri puts it: [End Page 419]My testimonial faculty fixes, as it were, a mapping from utterances of a given language to belief contents. The 'meaning' of a statement for me is, by definition, the belief content to which it is mapped by my testimony faculty. If I am able to understand every statement I hear, the language processing mechanism which underpins this faculty must have a certain compositional structure, and that leads to an assignment of belief-content components to subsequential elements in the language, (p. 29)This thought of Gadādhara, dating from about 1700 C.E., resonates with Chomsky's contemporary ideas of "deep structure" and, in classical Indian philosophy, with Bhartṛhari's fifth-century notion of innate-structuring ideas within consciousness (see Coward and Raja, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 5). Like Bhartṛhari, Gadādhara takes the sentence to be the irreducible meaning-bearing unit of language.While Karl Potter and Sibajiban Bhattacharyya's volume 6 of The Encyclopedia... (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive description of the 'doctrine of salvation' and Vaiśeṣika, one of the oldest philosophical systems of Indian philosophy and provides an overview of theories in other related Indian philosophical systems and classical doctrines of salvation. The book examines liberation, the fourth goal of life and arguably one of the most important topics in Indian philosophy, from a comparative philosophical perspective. Contextualising classical Greek Philosophy which contains the three goals of life, and explains salvation (...) as first understood in the theology of the Hellenistic and Patristics periods, the author analyses six classical philosophical schools of Indian philosophy in which there is a marked emphasis on the ultimate ontological elements of the world and 'self'. Analysing Vaiśeṣika and the manner in which this lesser known system has put forward its own theory of salvation, the author demonstrates its significance and originality as an old and influential philosophical system. He argues that it is essential for the study of other Indian sciences and for the study of all comparative philosophy. An extensive introduction to Indian soteriology, this book will be an important reference work for academics interested in comparative religion and philosophy, Indian philosophy, Asian religion and South Asian Studies. (shrink)

The complementary systems of Nyaya and Vaisesika constitute one of the oldest and most important traditions within Indian philosophy. This volume offers a systematic and detailed exposition of the two schools from their beginning to the time of Gangesa. An extensive interpretive essay introduces summaries of most of the known works written within the tradition. The result is both an excellent introduction for students and an indispensable guide to the thought and literature of early Nyaya-Vaisesika. Originally published (...) in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Most writings on Indian philosophy assume that its central concern is with moska, that the Vedas along with the Upanishadic texts are at its root and that it consists of six orthodox systems knowns as Mimamasa, Vedanta, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, and Yoga, on the one hand and three unorthodox systems: Buddhism, Jainism and Carvaka, on the other. Besides these, they accept generally the theory of Karma and the theory of Purusartha as parts of what the Indian tradition (...) thinks about human action. The essays in this volume question these assumptions and show that there is little ground for accepting them. A new counter-perspective is presented for the articulation of the Indian philosophical tradition that breaks from the traditional frame in which it has usually been presented. (shrink)

The Objective Of This Highly Rewarding Book Indian Philosophy Of Knowledge Is To Highlight The Main Purpose Of Gaining Knowledge. The Highest Knowledge In Vedas And Upanisads Is The Knowledge Of Brahman Which Leads To Liberation. The Sankhya System Promises Complete Cessation Of All Sorrows. The Yoga Is Entirely Devoted To The Attainment Of Kaivalya. Gautama, In His Nyayasutra Asserts That Their Knowledge Would Lead To The Attainment Of The Liberation. The Vaisesika And Mimamsa Begins With The Interpretation (...) Of Dharma As The Means For Attainment Of The Worldly As Well As Transcendental Well-Being. The Buddhists Aim Of Knowledge Is To Remove Passions And To Show The Path Of Nirvana. The Removal Of Karmic Matter Is The Main Theme Of Knowledge In Jaina Philosophy. (shrink)

v. 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the epic.--The Buddha and the Jina.--The Sāmkhya and the classical Yoga-system.--v. 2. The Nature-philosophical schools and the Vaiśeṣika system.--The system of the Jaina.--The materialism.

Deepak Sarma completes the first outline in more than fifty years of India's key philosophical traditions, inventively sourcing seminal texts and clarifying language, positions, and issues. Organized by tradition, the volume covers six schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy: Mimamsa (the study of the earlier Vedas, later incorporated into Vedanta), Vedanta (the study of the later Vedas, including the _Bhagavad Gita_ and the _Upanishads_), Sankhya (a form of self-nature dualism), Yoga (a practical outgrowth of Sankhya), and Nyaya and Vaisesika (two (...) forms of realism). It also discusses Jain philosophy and the Mahayana Buddhist schools of Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Sarma maps theories of knowledge, perception, ontology, religion, and salvation, and he details central concepts, such as the _pramanas_ (means of knowledge), _pratyaksa_ (perception), _drayvas_ (types of being), _moksa_ (liberation), and _nirvana_. Selections and accompanying materials inspire a reassessment of long-held presuppositions and modes of thought, and accessible translations prove the modern relevance of these enduring works. (shrink)

Linguistic convention is one of the central notions of Indian philosophy of language. The well-known view of samaya/saṃketa is its conception as the agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. However, in Indian philosophy of language, we also encounter two other important but little-researched interpretations of samaya/saṃketa, which consider it as the established usage of words. I present a new classification of traditions of Indian thought based on their view of linguistic convention. This (...) classification is to be verified and expanded in further studies. As far as I know, such a classification has never been undertaken before. 1) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and later classical Yoga of the Tattvavaiśāradī accept samaya/saṃketa as an agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. 2) Bhartṛhari the Grammarian and the continuators of his thought acknowledge samaya/saṃketa as the established usage of words that is rooted in the natural relationship between words and their meanings; the convention manifests the relationship. This view was probably also shared by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. 3) Classical Yoga of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya and probably also earlier Grammar thought of the Mahābhāṣya accept linguistic convention as the established usage of words, but this usage, though having neither a beginning nor an end, is not based on any natural and necessary word–meaning relationship. In this view, linguistic convention not only manifests the word–meaning relationship but also keeps it in existence. Another new contribution of this research is my explanation for why the same Sanskrit term samaya/saṃketa was applied to the different ways of understanding linguistic convention. I explain this through the common aspects of all three kinds of samaya/saṃketa. The first aspect is the content of all these kinds of samaya/saṃketa. Irrespective of how linguistic convention is understood, its content is the same: “such and such a word has such and such a meaning”. The second aspect is the crucial role of linguistic convention in language acquisition, communication, and transmission. (shrink)

The Book Discusses The Problems Raised By The Classical Systems Like Carvaka, Jain, Buddhism, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa And Vedanta. It Establishes Epistemological, Metaphysical And Axiological Significance Of Indian Philosophy, Offering A Unique Insight.

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- (...) The Abhidharmakosa bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

This book introduces the vast topic of Indian philosophy. It begins with a study of the major Upanishads, and then surveys the philosophical ideas contained in the Bhagavadgita. After a short excursion into Buddhism, it summarizes the salient ideas of the six systems of Indian philosophy: Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and Vedanta. It concludes with an introduction to contemporary Indian thought.

Philosophy Of Science Draws Upon Different Traditions In Western Philosophy, Starting From The Ancient Greek. However, There Is A Conspicuous Absence Of Non-Western Philosophical Traditions, Including The Indian, In Philosophy Of Science. This Book Argues That Indian Rational Traditions Such As Indian Logic, Drawn From Both Buddhist And Nyaya Philosophies, Are Not Only Relevant For Philosophy Of Science But Are Also Intrinsically Concerned With Scientific Methodology. It Also Suggests That The Indian Logical Traditions Can Be Understood (...) As Requiring That Logic Itself Be Scientific. This Explains Their Engagement With Ideas Such As Valid Inference, Invariable Concomitance, The Use Of The Empirical In Logical Analysis, The Move From Observations To Statements About These Observations And So On. The Essential Relation Between Some Indian Philosophical Traditions And Science Is Further Illustrated By The Semiotic Character Of Indian Logic, Its Explanatory Structures Which Are Similar To Those Of Scientific Explanations, Indian Theories Of Knowledge And Truth, The Pragmatic Nature Of Truth And Its Relation To Action Which Is Essential To Nyaya And To Science, And Finally The Importance Of The Effability Thesis Which Is Central To Nyaya, Bhartrhari And Modern Science. The Book Introduces The Reader To Important Themes In Indian Logic, Epistemology And Philosophy Of Language As Well As Philosophy Of Science. Relationships Between These Various Traditions Are Also Explored Thereby Suggesting How Indian Philosophy Can Engage With Contemporary Philosophy Of Science. This Introductory Book Will Be Valuable For Students, Professional Philosophers As Well As Those Interested In Indian Philosophy And Its Significance To Contemporary Thought. (shrink)

Daśapadārthī is a text of Indian philosophy and the Vaiśeṣika school only preserved in the Chinese translation made by Xuánzàng 玄奘 in 648 BC. The translation was included in the catalogs of East Asian Buddhist texts and subsequently in the East Asian Buddhist Canons despite clearly being not a Buddhist text. Daśapadārthī is almost unquestionably assumed to be written by a Vaiśeṣika 勝者 Huiyue 慧月 in Sanskrit reconstructed as Candramati or Maticandra. But is that the case? The author argues (...) that the original Sanskrit text was compiled by the Buddhists based on previously existing Vaiśeṣika texts for an exclusively Buddhist purpose and was not used by the followers of Vaiśeṣika. That would explain Xuanzang’s choice for the translation as well as the non-circulation of the text among Vaiśeṣikas. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate certain inadequacies that are involved in the traditional way of categorizing Indian philosophy and explores alternative approaches, some of which otherwise are not explicitly seen in the treatises of the history of Indian Philosophies. By categorization, I mean, classifying Indian philosophy into two streams, which are traditionally called as astica and nastica or orthodox and heterodox systems. Further, these different schools in the astica Darsanas and nastica Darsanas are usually numbered into six (...) and three respectively. Nyaya - Vaisesika, Sankhya -Yoga and Purva & Uttara Mimamsa are identified as astica darsanas and Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism are identified as nastica darsanas (6+3). It is my endeavor to critically analyze the usual astica-nastica distinction of 6+3 classification of Indian philosophy so as to find out the meaning of such a rationale in this categorization. This general consensus is contested in this paper. What I am intended to support and strengthen such a critical analysis and exploration is to discuss these systems of India’s philosophy within the general intellectual milieu of Indian cultural traditions, its orientations, presuppositions and preferences. In order to carry out such a task, I shall be taking recourse to the theories of different scholars, both traditional and modern, in approaching and appropriating Indian Philosophy from different perspectives and their critical-creative approaches shall be scrutinized. (shrink)

This chapter considers the literature associated with explorations of consciousness in Indian philosophy. It focuses on a range of methodological and conceptual issues, drawing on three main sources: the naturalist theories of mind of Nyaya and Vaisesika, the mainly phenomenological accounts of mental activity and consciousness of Abhidharma and Yogacara Buddhism, and the subjective transcendental theory of consciousness of Advaita Vedanta. The contributions of Indian philosophers to the study of consciousness are examined not simply as a contribution (...) to intellectual history, but rather with a view to evaluating their relevance to contemporary issues, specifically to the mind-body problem. The presence of dualist positions with strong naturalist undercurrents in Indian philosophy, especially in the Nyaya and Samkhya traditions, rules out the possibility of treating the mind-body problem as an idiosyncratic feature of Cartesian metaphysics. (shrink)

The book is the first work of its kind where the scholar has collected the references to Jain doctrines from the vast literature of three systems of Indian Philosophy, namely Nyaya-vaisesika Vedanta and Buddhists for the first time. Organised in five chapters the observations of the scholar in the last chapter of conclusion is interestingly revealing.

"This book is a concordance of theories of Indian tradition. An analytic approach has been made on the theories available in Paninian, Nyaya-vaisesika, Purvamimamsa and Vedanta schools to show the consistency of the discourse made by traditional philosophers who claim themselves to be astika or Vedacentric. Attempts also have been made to establish that the traditional Indian theories of language are undoubtedly relevant for solving some problems raised in modern philosophy of language.".

The meanings in which the word "word" can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the "word-equals-world" thesis, and the extent to which Bhartṛhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartṛhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language (...) plays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The difference of Bhartṛhari's thinking from that of the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and pariṇāma as philosophical terms is offered. (shrink)

Halbfass (Indian philosophy, U. of Pennsylvania) combines specialized philological and conceptual investigations with general philosophical and comparative reflections to present a history of the ontology of the Vaisesika system, which is commonly considered the lowest of the Vaisesika school, he focuses on the older period up to Udayana, whose work paves the way for Navyanyaya. Paper edition (unseen), $19.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The article seeks a confrontation between phenomenology - in its husserlian and existential forms - with indian philosophy, Particularly the nyaya--Vaisesika, Samkhya--Vedanta and buddhist schools. Confrontation with husserlian phenomenology is carried through under three headings: (a) methodology, (b) theory of the 'eidos' and (c) the notion of transcendental subjectivity. Despite close affinities, Indian thought is found to lack the dialectics of intention and fulfillment and the supposed temporality and historicity of transcendental subjectivity. The existential concepts of 'sorge' (...) and 'geworfenheit' are set beside the indian concepts of 'duhkha' and 'samsara', The concepts of freedom and nothingness are contrasted, The notion of 'karma' evaluated. Some major trends of modern indian thought, Especially that of k.C. Bhattacharyya, Are then set in this entire context. (shrink)

Bhartṛhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartṛhari and his thought are situated in their intellectual context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to (...) existing problems. Indeed, it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to try to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition. (shrink)

The distinct function of ātmanepada in Sanskrit language remains a sort of linguist mystery in Sanskrit studies. In this article, I analyze the larger implications and subliminal meaning of ātmanepada by moving beyond the realm of linguistics, which has been the dominant approach, and entering the territory of philosophy and, more specifically, the purportful approach of traditional Indian philosophy of language represented by Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛhari’s analytical procedure seeks to unveil the ontological interdependence that binds together the constituent elements (...) of linguistic sentences, understood as modal appearances of the ever present foundational ground of the world/word—Brahman as Vāc. This is our referential guide to the semantic reconstruction of ātmanepada’s teleology. (shrink)

Samavaya, the sixth category in the Kanada-sutra, the corner stone of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system of philosophy, on which the grand edifice of the said school has been assiduously built by the followers, from Prasastapada to Sridhara, Uddyotakara to Udayana and Gangesa, has been dealt with in this work, in its entirety and established that the theory of causality depends on Samavaya.The criticism against the concept of Samavaya by the other schools of philosophy, more particularly the attack mounted on it (...) by Buddhist logicians Dharmakirti, Asoka Pandita, Santaraksita, et al. and the Jain scholars such as Akalanka, Manikyanandin and Prabhacandra have been presented in their full vigour. The arguments in defence of Samavaya marshalled by scholars of the Navya-Nyaya school are also put forward, maintaining their flavour, strength and sharpness. By presenting the strength and weakness of all arguments for and against the concept of Samavaya, the present work establishes the concept of Samavaya in its true perspective. This comprehensive work on Samavaya, published for the first time, helps to understand the basic theory of creation and the emergence of the world order as propounded and upheld by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school of philosophy. This is a significant contribution to the modern review of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

The representation of a rose varies considerably across philosophical, religious, and scientific schools of thought. While many would suggest that a rose exists objectively, as a physical object in geometric space reducible to fundamental particles such as atoms or quarks, others propose that a rose is an emergent whole that exists meaningfully when experienced subjectively for its sweet fragrance and red hue, its soft petals and thorny stem. Some might even maintain that a rose is “consciousness-only,” having no existence apart (...) from conscious perception. Thus, we find a spectrum of realist to idealist perspectives. Even in Dharma studies, with a common basis in Indian thought, the Vaiśeṣikas, Vaibhāṣikas, and the vijñaptimātra doctrine of the Yogācārin-Vijñānavādins entertain diverging perspectives. On one hand, the Vaiśeṣikas, a school of Vedic philosophy, propounded a theory of reality in the form of indivisible, eternal atoms, a metaphysical approach counter to the doctrine of not-self (anātman) in Buddhism. The Vaibhāṣikas, a school of early Buddhist atomism, on the other hand, denied the existence of a true self or eternal soul (ātman) as substratum for reality but maintained their own theory of atomism. For the Vaibhāṣikas, the flow of consciousness may be segmented into discrete moments, yet unlike many of their Buddhist contemporaries from other schools, they asserted that all cognizable phenomena are truly existent insofar as they consist of physically irreducible atoms. Among their objectors were the Yogācārin-Vijñānavādins who proposed the theory of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra), rejecting the independent existence of indivisible atoms and discrete moments of time. This paper introduces the dialectic that formed between these schools through Vasubandhu’s fourth century C.E. text Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Viṃśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi). While the gulf between the realist and idealist positions may seem, at times, irreconcilable, we integrate findings from the field of physics, particularly quantum mechanics (and several philosophical interpretations thereof) within the realm of modern science as a possible bridge between these otherwise seemingly disparate systems of Dharma. (shrink)

Presents the fundamental ideas of Indian thinkers that have shaped the mind of Indian from 1770 to the post-modern era in the middle of 20th century in India. Lists the most Indian influential figures in the field of philosophy, political theory, activicism such as Rabindranath Tagore, Ram Mohan Roy, Swami Vivekananda, and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

Indian Perspectives on Consciousness, Language and Self by Marco Ferrante explores theories of consciousness by examining the non-dual philosophy of Recognition mainly represented by the two philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, and also carefully concludes that the trajectory of their ideas have compelling influence from Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja. No philosophy ever evolves and develops in a void. No philosophical tradition or theory functions in oblivion. In the history of philosophy in South Asia, this is also true of the (...) traditions that have staunchly stood up and rigorously argued for the ubiquity of consciousness. The dynamism of... (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa (...) and anumāna, and reject anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. There have been many scholarly studies dealing with the arguments against the reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge that have been offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, but there is hardly any full-length work that deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge. In the present paper, an attempt has been made at providing a clear and specific account of the same. (shrink)

Although somewhat neglected in the scholarly debate, Vṛṣabhadeva’s commentary (known as Sphuṭākṣarā or Paddhati, possibly 8th c. CE) on Vākyapadīya’s first chapter, offers a remarkable analysis of Bhartṛhari’s views on metaphysics and philosophy of language. Vākyapadīya’s first four kārikās deal with ontological issues, defining the key elements of Bhartṛhari’s non-dualistic edifice such as the properties of the unitary principle, its powers, the role of time and the ontological status of worldly objects. Vṛṣabhadeva’s interpretation of the kārikās in question is intriguing (...) and seems to be guided by the urgency to find a solution to the riddle which every non-dualistic theory has to face: how is it possible to postulate a unitary principle of reality when reality is cognized as multiple? In accomplishing the task Vṛṣabhadeva proposes various solutions (some of them based on concepts which are hardly detectable in Vākyapadīya and appear close to the ones propounded in certain trends of Advaita Vedānta), finally suggesting an explanation which, focusing on the pragmatic aspect of language, is altogether consistent with Bhartṛhari’s theoretical picture. (shrink)

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (...) (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana. (shrink)

This article argues that in early Mīmāṃsā the view was current that there are objects in the world corresponding to all words of the Sanskrit language. Evidence to that effect is primarily found in passages from Bhartṛhari’s works, and in some classical Nyāya texts. Interestingly, Śabara’s classical work on Mīmāṃsā has abandoned this position, apparently for an entirely non-philosophical reason: the distaste felt for the newly arising group of Brahmanical temple-priests.

The fifth-century grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari has long attracted scholarly attention, and deservedly so: his magnum opus, the Vākyapadīya, had a profound impact on later Indian schools of thought, Brahmanical as well as Buddhist. The Vākyapadīya is not, however, the only grammatical and/or philosophical work ascribed to Bhartṛhari in addition to a commentary on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya: according to several sources dating back at least to the tenth century, the same author also composed a Śabdadhātusamīkṣā or Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣāi, which, unfortunately, has not come (...) down to us, and which is still shrouded in mystery, as its main topic, and even title and attribution, are considered uncertain to date. The goal of this article is to examine the available fragments and testimonies and to establish on their basis that the work, the original title of which must have been the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā, endeavored to show that the whole phenomenal world is made of six elements while ultimately defending a nondualistic point of view. Verses quoted by later authors as belonging to the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā are gathered and translated in an appendix to the article. (shrink)