In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa and anumāna, (...) and reject anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. There have been many scholarly studies dealing with the arguments against the reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge that have been offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, but there is hardly any full-length work that deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge. In the present paper, an attempt has been made at providing a clear and specific account of the same. (shrink)

The Vaiśeṣika school is an important ancient system of Indian philosophy. According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, cognition or jñāna is of two types—vidyā and avidyā (vidyā ca avidyā ca), and avidyā is of four types—saṃśaya (doubt), viparyaya (illusion), anadhyavasāya (non-ascertainment) and svapna (dream). Among these four kinds of avidyā, the third kind of non-veridical cognition (avidyā), named ‘anadhyavasāya’ (non-ascertainment/non-assertory cognition), is acknowledged alone by the Vaiśeṣika school. Apart from the Vaiśeṣika school, no other school of Indian philosophy admits such a (...) type of non-veridical cognition. Such a sort of non-veridical cognition is not mentioned even in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda. However, Praśastapāda discusses it in his Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, after mentioning it as a variety of non-veridical cognition. He has been followed in this respect by the commentators of Padārthadharmasaṃgraha in their respective commentaries. Following them, in this paper I am going to establish anadhyavasāya as a distinct type of non-veridical cognition. (shrink)