Ideas of the good are ideas of what is worthy of pursuit, and a thinker's conception of the worthy objects of pursuit may differ from that of the ordinary person. Suppose we call ordinary self‐interest the objects of pursuit that relate to the ordinary person's own interests, including such things as health, possessions, power and honour. And suppose we call an ethical ideal a thinker's conception of how one should live – a conception of what, according to the thinker, (...) should constitute the proper object of devotion for everyone. An attempt to understand ideas of the good in Chinese thought involves discussing the ways in which different philosophical movements view the ethical ideal and its relation to ordinary self‐interest. (shrink)

One of this century's most important philosophers here focuses on Plato's Protagoras, Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus and on Aristotle's three moral treatises to show the essential continuity of Platonic and Aristotelian reflection on the nature of the good. "Well translated and usefully annotated by P. Christopher Smith.... Gadamer's book exhibits a broad and grand vision as well as a great love for the Greek thinkers."--Alexander Nehemas, New York Times Book Review "The translation is highly readable. The translator's introduction and (...) frequent annotation provide special elucidation on points of doctrinal complexity, giving ample references to other works and rival interpretations."--Choice "This book is an important addition to the steadily growing number of Gadamer's works available in English. In it, we see Gadamer at his best, that is, engaged in the practice of interpreting important texts from the philosophical tradition, and also at his most controversial.... I enthusiastically recommend this...challenging book as one that rewards all efforts to understand the important claims it makes on its readers."--Francis J. Ambrosio, International Philosophy Quarterly Hans-Georg Gadamer is professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Heidelberg. He is the author of numerous books, including two others translated by Smith: Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato and Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. (shrink)

One of the problems usually encountered in comparative studies on systems of thought belonging to cultures far removed in space and time is the difference in the manner in which they conceptualize their experience. This difference in conceptualization is reflected in the difference in the words and other linguistic forms adopted in articulating their experience. Studying the thought of a specific social group involves studying the concepts special and peculiar to that group through the language that mirrors their mode of (...) thinking, their peculiar conceptual categories and forms of life. These facts have to be borne in mind in any attempt to search for the ideas of the good in Buddhism from the perspective of comparative philosophy. (shrink)

John Dewey looks to the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle for the general outlines of his ethical thought. In his 1932 Ethics, he describes the ethical framework that he shares with Aristotle in terms of knowledge, choice and character: "The formula was well stated by Aristotle. The doer of the moral deed must have a certain 'state of mind' in doing it. First, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose it, and choose it for itself, and thirdly, (...) the act must be the expression of a formed and stable character."1 This paper examines the interaction of these elements within Aristotle's and Dewey's ethical thought. In particular, it discusses the idea of the good as a link between the character virtues and practical deliberation. It will show how this idea of the good that guides practical deliberation is also an expression of one's character virtues. (shrink)

Plato gradually reaches the concept of the “Good itself” in the most extensive dialogue (apart from The Laws). The dramaturgy of Republic was included in the pedagogical idea. Plato’s own brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, representatives of the aristoia, want to hear from Socrates logically based instruction on what is really good and why, regardless of the prevailing public opinion in Athenian society. They both know that the most valued asset is the wealth and political influence that the (...) use of force provides. Thanks to this, you can effectively appear to be the fairest among citizens, despite the fact that you are extremely unjust. Appearances are highly valued in social life. Only minds exceptionally open to dialectics seek the truth, not content with appearances. Socrates introduces listeners to the knowledge of “the Good itself”, the “form of the Good”, as the most perfect object of knowledge and at the same time the highest principle. The Good, identical with the “One”, “is” above substance (509b). (shrink)

One of this century’s most important philosophers here focuses on Plato’s _Protagoras, Phaedo, Republic, _and _Philebus_ and on Aristotle’s three moral treatises to show the essential continuity of Platonic and Aristotelian reflection on the nature of the good. “Well translated and usefully annotated by P. Christopher Smith…. Gadamer’s book exhibits a broad and grand vision as well as a great love for the Greek thinkers.”—Alexander Nehemas, _New York__ Times Book Review_ “The translation is highly readable. The translator’s introduction and (...) frequent annotation provide special elucidation on points of doctrinal complexity, giving ample references to other works and rival interpretations.”—_Choice_ “This book is an important addition to the steadily growing number of Gadamer’s works available in English. In it, we see Gadamer at his best, that is, engaged in the practice of interpreting important texts from the philosophical tradition, and also at his most controversial…. I enthusiastically recommend this…challenging book as one that rewards all efforts to understand the important claims it makes on its readers.”—Francis J. Ambrosio, _International Philosophy Quarterly_ Hans-Georg Gadamer is professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Heidelberg. He is the author of numerous books, including two others translated by Smith: _Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato _and _Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies._. (shrink)

If the good is what people desire or strive after, the Indian thinkers very early on developed a theory of hierarchy of goods: these are artha (material wealth), kāma (pleasure), dharma (righteousness), and mokṣa (spiritual freedom). Leaving aside the question about precisely how the first two in this list have to be ranked, one might suggest that the first two are what human beings do strive after, while the last two are what they ought to strive after. Such a (...) distinction between what human beings in fact strive after and what they ought to strive after is indicated in a distinction between the śreya (morally good) and the preya (pleasant) found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, although it may have to be conceded that the is – ought distinction did not come to the forefront of Hindu moral thinking. One may as a matter of fact construct an argument to prove that even mokṣa, the supreme value, is not a mere ought – to‐be. The argument would run as follows: we do want to get rid of pain and enjoy a state of happiness. This natural desire, by implication, may be extended to a complete freedom from pain and enjoyment of an uninterrupted state of bliss (even if no one ordinarily posits this as his or her goal). It is only on reflection, and after reaching the first two goals and finding oneself dissatisfied with them, that one self‐consciously posits the last two goals – the third to begin with and, as a result of experiencing a similar dissatisfaction once it has been reached, subsequently the fourth and highest good, which is not a mere ought‐to‐be but an ideal state of being. If the English phrase “the highest good” translates into niḥśreyasaḥ in Sanskrit, then mokṣa is that state of excellence than which there is nothing greater and which leaves, upon attainment, nothing else to be desired. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

One of this century’s most important philosophers here focuses on Plato’s Protagoras, Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus and on Aristotle’s three moral treatises to show the essential continuity of Platonic and Aristotelian reflection on the nature of the good.“Well translated and usefully annotated by P. Christopher Smith.... Gadamer’s book exhibits a broad and grand vision as well as a great love for the Greek thinkers.”-Alexander Nehemas, New York Times Book Review“The translation is highly readable. The translator’s introduction and frequent annotation (...) provide special elucidation on points of doctrinal complexity, giving ample references to other works and rival interpretations.”-Choice“This book is an important addition to the steadily growing number of Gadamer’s works available in English. In it, we see Gadamer at his best, that is, engaged in the practice of interpreting important texts from the philosophical tradition, and also at his most controversial.... I enthusiastically recommend this...challenging book as one that rewards all efforts to understand the important claims it makes on its readers.”-Francis J. Ambrosio, International Philosophy QuarterlyHans-Georg Gadamer is professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of Heidelberg. He is the author of numerous books, including two others translated by Smith: Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato and Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

The concept of prayer didn’t exist until the first step outside the garden. And Adam and Eve’s prayers had to be maddened ones, predicated upon a new and shockingly acquired paranoidic consciousness, completely unlike their prelapserian paranoic1 state wherein the primal couple didn’t know hope or prayer inside the amoral edenic, in the egregious garden where anything was possible anytime.And that is why you don’t notice the word “good” in the original account of creation in Genesis; that is, the (...) “J” account, written around 1000 B.C.E. during the reign of Solomon—the account wherein Adam and Eve are formed of the dust of the earth and given life through the intimacy of divine breath, with God planting the garden... (shrink)

Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles, of which the present work is an English translation, was first published in Heidelberg in 1978.

The study of Hegel’s ethical thought has focused traditionally on the Phenomenology, the early writing or his Philosophy of Right but has mostly ignored the treatment of the idea of the good in the Science of Logic. This paper is an attempt at a close reading of Hegel’s exposition in light of the methodological and foundational claims of speculative logic. It identifies several points of equivocation, in particular the notion of a reversal of the logical movement of the (...) Concept back to the subjective standpoint, and the focus on goal and action which replace the proper logical explication of the notion of the good. The paper tries to assess the meaning and consequences of what we see as points of weakness in Hegel’s exposition and formulate questions for further discussion on a hitherto neglected subject. (shrink)

The ethical neutrality of technology has been widely questioned, for example, in the case of the creation and continued existence of weapons. At stake is whether technology changes the ethical character of our experience: compare the experience of seeing a beating to videotaping it. Interpreting and elaborating on the work of George Grant and Marshall McLuhan, this paper consists of three arguments: 1) the existence of technologies determines the structures of civilization that are imposed on the world, 2) technologies shape (...) what we do and determine how we do it, and 3) technology, unlike any other kind of thing, seems not to make moral demands of us: it is morally neutral. This means that they offer us the freedom of imposing on something that does not impose back. The introduction of this experience of freedom changes the way we experience the world in general by introducing a new way of relating to the good, namely by introducing the act of subjective valuation. Each of these points implies that technology structurally changes or interferes with our ethical relationship with things, with the result that through subjective valuation the experience of the obligation to act can be suspended. (shrink)

What makes religion not only possible but necessary for a meaningful human life is the fact that human nature is meant for good but ends up being mired in evil. Religion's task is to solve this problem. We might portray reason as “bumping its head” on the inexorable limits of necessary ignorance when it attempts to answer the two questions: where does moral evil come from? and how can we overcome its powerful influence on us? Immanuel Kant regards (...) class='Hi'>good and evil as equal and opposite rational principles. Kant focuses on two key questions: (1) must an example of the archetype be fully human? and (2) could we also rightly regard such an archetype as divine? This chapter also examines the answers Kant proposes along with side comments he makes on various other issues in Christology. (shrink)

Rodney G. Peffer argues that Karl Marx cannot be considered a utilitarian, a consequentialist, or a nonutilitarian consequentialist. Based on ethics of social consequences as one of the versions of nonutilitarian consequentialism, the author examines Marx’s early journalistic articles concerning the common good published mainly in the Rheinische Zeitung. The author verifies the hypothesis that Marx was a nonutilitarian consequentialist in the given period with regard to the common good. By examining Marx’s views on freedom of the press (...) and censorship, as well as his criticism of the feudal experiences of Prussia, the author came to the conclusion that Marx’s views expressed in early journalism are close to ethics of social consequences and thus to nonutilitarian consequentialism. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconstruct Kant’s notion of the practically conditioned, introduced in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, by drawing on Kant’s general account of the faculty of reason presented in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. We argue that practical reason’s activity of seeking the practically unconditioned for a given condition generates two different conceptions of the practically unconditioned and identify these as virtue and (the ideal of) happiness. We then account for how and why (...) reason proceeds to combine these two distinct ideas into the composite idea of the highest good. Last, we draw on our discussion to determine more precisely what Kant intends by the ‘supremacy’ of virtue within reason’s idea of the highest good. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, Aristotle directs his criticism not only against the Platonic Idea of the Good but also against the notion of a universal Good. In this paper, I also examine some of the most interesting aspects of his criticism of the Platonic Good and the universal Good in Eudemian Ethics 1.8. In the EN, after using a series of disputable ontological arguments, Aristotle’s criticism culminates in a strong ethical or rather practical and, simultaneously, (...) epistemological argument, from which a dialectical postulatum emerges. This argument aims to show that we have to discover the dialectical stages or grades which constitute the relation between the ultimate End, i.e., the Good simpliciter or the absolute Good, and the relational goods till the last prakton good in which each specific praxis ends. According to the present reading, Aristotle sets out to establish a kind of Dialectic of the ends or Dialectic of the goods, which puts emphasis on the descent to the specific good, which is appropriate to and cognate with each individual, be that a person, praxis, science or craft. It is also suggested that this might be relevant to Aristotle’s tendency to establish a separation of phronēsis, i.e., practical wisdom, from sophia, i.e., wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

Con la finalidad de fundamentar y reforzar su teoria de los bienes primários, J. Rawls introduce, en el §65 de Una teoria de la justicia, la idea de "principio aristotélico". Se discuten las dificultades que implica aceptar dicha noción, asi como las limitaciones de la idea de bien que subyace en dicho principio. Se busca mostrar que la concepción de bien que Rawls presenta alli padece de "insuficiencia moral" y se defiende la tesis de que su aproximación a (...) la idea de bien opaca la dimensión práctica de la racionalidad. In order to ground and reinforce his theory of primary goods, J. Rawls introduces the idea of the "Aristotelian principle" in §65 of A Theory of Justice. The article discusses the difficulties entailed by the acceptance of this notion, as well as the limitations of the idea of the good underlying that principle. The objective is to show that the conception of the good presented by Rawls is affected by "moral insufficiency" and to argue in support of the thesis that his approach to the idea of the good overshadows the practical dimension of rationality. A fim de fundamentar e reforçar sua teoria dos bens primários, J. Rawls introduz, no parágrafo 65 de Una teoría de la justicia, a ideia de "principio aristotélico". Discutemse as dificuldades que implica aceitar essa noção, bem como as limitações da ideia de bem que subjaz nesse principio. Pretendese mostrar que a concepção de bem que Rawls apresenta ali padece de "insuficiência moral". Além disso, defendese a tese de que sua aproximação à ideia de bem ofusca a dimensão prática da racionalidade. (shrink)

This chapter considers three closely related principles of political self-restraint that are not cast explicitly in terms of religion: those that exclude nonaccessible grounds, grounds deriving from comprehensive views, and grounds based on controversial ideas of the good life. The basic argument for excluding nonaccessible grounds has two dimensions. The first is that it is fundamentally unfair to coerce people, or to use the corporate authority and power of the state, when the grounds for doing so are not ones (...) that all those affected could be expected to accept if they made reasonable judgments. The second dimension of the argument is that the political life of a society will be healthiest and most stable if political issues are resolved on premises and grounds that are fully available to everyone in the society. On the other hand, the idea of self-restraint is based on principles of neutral input towards decision-making. As the idea is put by Charles Larmore, “The fundamental liberal principle is that the state should remain neutral toward disputed and controversial ideals of the good life.”. (shrink)

The ‘Wu xing’ belongs to Guodian bamboo slips texts, which were buried around 300 BCE and excavated in 1993. Its relation with Mengzi is widely investigated. Yet how it is philosophically related to Xunzi receives little attention. In this article, I illustrate a neglected relation between ‘Wu xing’ and Xunzi, by elucidating how shan 善 (goodness) is first raised in ‘Wu xing’ and developed by Xunzi into a concrete idea. Both ‘Wu xing’ and Xunzi propose that shan exists in (...) action, which boils down to the harmonious unity of the mind and body, and to secure the ideal relation between the mind and body requires constant learning and practicing, particularly, of rituals. Learning and practicing not only lead one to realize shan, but eventually to become a consummate practitioner of rituals, to use Xunzi’s words, to become a sage. (shrink)

Pendant l’ete de 1928 Heidegger a offert un seminaire sur le troisieme livre de la Physique d’Aristote et donc sur l’explication aristotelicienne de la nature du mouvement. La derniere seance de ce cours, qui eut lieu le 25 juillet, est d’une grande importance parce que c’est a cette occasion que Heidegger va au livre neuf de la Metaphysique pour essayer de comprendre la notion ontologique qui est a la base de l’interpretation aristotelicienne du mouvement : l’energeia. Mais dans les protocoles (...) de ce seminaire qui se trouvent parmi les papiers de Heidegger et qui ont ete publies recemment dans le volume 83 de la Gesamtausgabe, la seance du 25 juillet se trouve absente. Ce fait a conduit l’editeur a conclure que le seminaire avait pris fin le 23 juillet, sans s’apercevoir donc que la conclusion du seminaire manquait. Il existe heureusement une transcription preservee parmi les papiers de l’etudiante de Heidegger, Helene Weiss, et accessible aujourd’hui dans les archives de l’universite de Stanford. Cette transcription montre que la derniere session eut bien lieu le 25 juillet et nous offre la lecture heideggerienne de Metaphysique IX qui ne se trouve pas dans la version de la Gesamtausgabe. C’est dans le contexte de cette lecture que Heidegger fait la declaration etonnante qui nous concerne ici : ≪Dans la derniere instance, la Metaphysique Θ revient a Platon ; la priorite de l’energeia est fondamentalement la meme chose que l’epekeina des Idees. ≫La première tâche que je me propose ici sera d’expliquer cette déclaration qui suggère une relation tres etroite, ou meme une identite, entre la notion aristotelicienne de l’energeia comme ayant une priorite vis‑a‑vis de la dunamis et la notion platonicienne de l’Idee du Bien comme etant epekeina de l’ousia. Pour cette explication je ferai appel non seulement au contexte du seminaire de 1928, mais aussi aux textes plus tardifs comme les Beitrage et les cours sur Nietzsche dans lesquels Heidegger semble presupposer et développer sa déclaration de 1928. Ma seconde tâche sera de comparer cette thèse heideggerienne a la tentative de Gadamer de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre les ontologies de Platon et d’Aristote en faisant appel a l’idee du bien chez les deux. Cette tentative se trouve dans le texte Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles. La comparaison que j’entreprends ici va montrer certaines affinites entre les interpretations de l’Idee du Bien chez Heidegger et Gadamer, mais aussi de profondes differences qui vont determiner leurs differents projets philosophiques. (shrink)

In 1930, the British economist John Maynard Keynes predicted that by 2030 people would work only fifteen hours per week and enjoy more free time and leisure, that we would return to “principles of religion and traditional virtue,” declaring “love of money morbid, semi-criminal, and semi-pathological,” and that “we shall once more value ends above means.” But today, we do not see that this prophesy has proven true. Something must have gone wrong. We do not sufficiently know the distinction between (...) needs and wants, absolute values and relative values, what a good life is, and how to live it. In this essay, I will present and discuss ideas from Confucius, Aristotle, Zhuangzi, and the Stoics that I think are deep and meaningful and can help us free ourselves from evolutionary programming and blind belief in economic and technological growth. (shrink)

For all its diversity, contemporary discourse about the Other shares the following suppositions: the Other in its radicality eludes the economy of the logic of the Same; it is beyond Being; its alterity is tied to the infinite in a manner that exceeds the ambit of thematization; and the problem it presents to philosophy is novel, in the precise sense that the dominant logic of the Western tradition, the so-called “logic of the Same” , is incapable of recognizing the full (...) depth of the problem of the Other. In what follows I will engage critically each of these suppositions, to the end of answering the question whether contemporary discourse about the Other is determined by a two-fold one-sidedness, characterized by its thoroughly modern presuppositions about the nature of the Self and logic and by its positing of the kath auto status of the Other as something that is either completely unrelated to the Same or, granting the necessity of recognizing some kind of relation to the Same, something that has absolute priority over the Same. My answer to this question will be “yes.” I will endeavor to demonstrate the two-fold one-sidedness belonging to these suppositions by first returning to the original discussion of the Other in the Western tradition, Plato’s account of the dialogue between the philosophical Stranger from Elea and the mathematician Theaetetus in the Sophist. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, on Kant's view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of the highest good. In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible. In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good (...) is not to strengthen our motivation to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already existent moral dispositions. In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization. Drawing on the results of the second part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison's “formalistic” interpretation. Since, on my view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant's account of fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists. (shrink)

This analysis investigates whether solidarity is an appropriate concept for thinking about justifications for a just distribution of bioethical goods in the international arena. This will be explored by looking at the national origins of the idea of justifying solidarity in the form of the health care that welfare states offer. Following that, ‘life’ and ‘health’ will be placed within a philosophical context by focusing on the main arguments of John Rawls and Amartya Sen and the role of solidarity (...) in these two theories of justice will be analysed. It will be shown that these theories assume that solidarity is not a prerequisite for just international structures. Finally, the possibility will be discussed, that there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding justifications for fair distribution in the international context that can result when the concepts of solidarity and justice are handled imprecisely. (shrink)