Libertarians assume that the sense of agency supports their belief in the agent’s ability to have done otherwise; however, they do not present arguments in favor of their assumption beyond introspection. Although agents may hold this belief, the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency—the comparator model and the perception of the relation between action and events in the environment—do not provide reasons to support it. Nonetheless, these mechanisms can help explain why agents hold the belief in the (...) first place, and the investigation makes clear that the workings of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency are compatible with determinism. Here, I will defend that a compatibilist explanation can be given as to why the sense of agency may seem to support libertarian beliefs. Hence, the sense of agency does not support the libertarian position in the free will debate; it is merely the pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, and it is associated with control mechanisms.Keywords: Sense of agency, Regulative control, Incompatibilism, Comparator model, Guidance control. (shrink)

Words change meaning, usually in unpredictable ways. But some words’ meanings are revised intentionally. Revisionary projects are normally put forward in the service of some purpose – some serve specific goals of inquiry, and others serve ethical, political or social aims. Revisionist projects can ameliorate meanings, but they can also pervert. In this paper, I want to draw attention to the dangers of meaning perversions, and argue that the self-declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning perversions. (...) The road to Hell, or to horrors on Earth, is paved with good intentions. Finally and more importantly, I want to demarcate what meaning perversions are. This, I hope, can help us assess the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects. (shrink)

Philosophers of language and metaethicists are concerned with persistent normative and evaluative disagreements – how can we explain persistent intelligible disagreements in spite of agreement over the described facts? Tim Sundell recently argued that evaluative aesthetic and personal taste disputes could be explained as metalinguistic negotiations – conversations where interlocutors negotiate how best to use a word relative to a context. I argue here that metalinguistic negotiations are neither necessary nor sufficient for genuine evaluative and normative disputes to occur. A (...) comprehensive account of value talk requires stronger metanormative commitments than metalinguistic negotiations afford. (shrink)

A Crítica de Hume ao Argumento do Desígnio José Oscar de Almeida Marques Dep. de Filosofia – UNICAMP -/- RESUMO: É comum considerar que o chamado “argumento do desígnio” (o argumento a posteriori para provar a existência de Deus a partir da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo) teria sido refutado ou seriamente abalado por Hume. Mas a natureza e o alcance dessa alegada refutação são problemáticos, pois Hume muitas vezes expressou suas críticas através de seus personagens e evitou assumi-las (...) diretamente enquanto autor. Em vez de supor que Hume procedeu dessa forma apenas para disfarçar suas verdadeiras convicções e evitar um conflito com as autoridades eclesiásticas, proponho que sua posição nesse assunto não é tão categórica como às vezes se supõe, e que os famosos argumentos de Filo nos Diálogos mostram apenas que é possível que a ordem e funcionalidade do mundo tenham surgido sem a intervenção de um desígnio consciente, mas não podem por si sós dar a essa hipótese o mínimo grau de plausibilidade necessário para torná-la digna de uma séria consideração. De fato, antes da revolução explicativa operada por Darwin um século depois, ninguém estava realmente em condições de vislumbrar uma alternativa plausível à atuação de algum tipo de inteligência na geração da ordem e funcionalidade do mundo. ------------ Some Remarks on Hume’s Critique of the Argument from Design José Oscar of Almeida Marques Dep. of Philosophy - UNICAMP -/- ABSTRACT: The so-called “argument from design” (the a posteriori argument to prove the existence of God from the order and functionality of the world) is commonly considered to have been refuted or seriously impaired by Hume. But the nature and scope of this alleged refutation is problematic because Hume often expressed his critics through other characters’ mouth and avoided to assume them directly as author. Contrarily to the supposition that Hume proceeded in this way only to disguise his true convictions and to avoid a confrontation with the ecclesiastical authorities, I propose that his stance on the matter is not, in fact, as clear-cut as it is sometimes supposed, and that Philo’s famous arguments in the Dialogues show only that it is possible for the order and functionality of the world to have arisen without the intervention of an intelligent design, but cannot by themselves lend to this hypothesis the least degree of plausibility needed to make it worthy of serious consideration. In fact, before the explanatory revolution inaugurated by Darwin a century later, nobody was in position to envisage a plausible alternative to the operation of some sort or other of intelligence in the generation of the order and functionality of the world. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that hate speech expresses hate, and answer some objections to expressivist views. First, I briefly comment on some limitations of pragmatic accounts of harmful speech. I then present an expressive-normative view of derogatory discourse according to which it is expressive of an affective state by presupposing it. A linguistic act expressive of an affective state inherits the normativity that is constitutive of that state, as directed to its intentional object. If the act is successful, it (...) updates the conversational context with the normative appraisal conditions of the affective state presupposed. I argue that this model can be applied to hate speech. I rely on current research on the psychology of hate to identify the appraisal conditions, action tendencies, and motivational goals characteristic of hate. The account supplements other pragmatic accounts of hate speech. (shrink)

ABSTRACTResearch has established that human thinking is often biased by intuitive judgement. The base-rate neglect effect provides such an example, so named because people often support their decisions in stereotypical individuating information, neglecting base-rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that reasoners acknowledge information provided by base-rates and may use individuating information in support of a “rational” decision process. Results from four experiments show that “base-rate neglecting” occurs when participants acknowledge sample distributions; participants who prefer individuating over base-rate information perceive base-rates (...) as less diagnostic and are more confident in their individuating-based responses; and that posterior probabilities predict more individuating-based responses for individuating-preference participants. However, data also show a deeper form of base-rate neglect: even when some partic... (shrink)

How can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Can we actively disagree if it is common ground that the speaker has no intent to deceive? And why do we disapprove of bald-faced liars so strongly? Bald-faced lies pose problems for accounts of lying and of assertion. Recent proposals try to defuse those problems by arguing that bald-faced lies are not really assertions, but rather performances of fiction-like scripts, or different types of language games. In this paper, I raise two objections (...) to the fictionalist view, and then offer an analysis of how we disagree with bald-faced liars. I conclude that bald-faced lies are assertions, and that in pronouncing a bald-faced lie, the speaker tries to make it common ground that the assertion was in good standing qua assertion. (shrink)

In this article I provide an overview of the many different terms that Brentano sometimes uses as synonyms or as explanations for “intentional inexistence”. The many terms associated with intentional inexistence appear in many different contexts, and we can conclude that Brentano uses these terms primarily to describe a property that is accidental and dependent on the subject from which it arises and with which it passes away. Ontologically, both properties and substances exist, but the former requires a substance (the (...) subject) for its existence. A mental act is to be considered as a first-order property, whereas the content (or part of the mental act) can be understood as an accident of that accident. (shrink)

Social constructionist claims are surprising and interesting when they entail that presumably natural kinds are in fact socially constructed. The claims are interesting because of their theoretical and political importance. Authors like Díaz-León argue that constitutive social construction is more relevant for achieving social justice than causal social construction. This paper challenges this claim. Assuming there are socially salient groups that are discriminated against, the paper presents a dilemma: if there were no constitutively constructed social kinds, the causes of the (...) discrimination of existing social groups would have to be addressed, and understanding causal social construction would be relevant to achieve social justice. On the other hand, not all possible constitutively socially constructed kinds are actual social kinds. If an existing social group is constitutively constructed as a social kind K, the fact that it actually exists as a K has social causes. Again, causal social construction is relevant. The paper argues that (i) for any actual social kind X, if X is constitutively socially constructed as K, then it is also causally socially constructed; and (ii) causal social construction is at least as relevant as constitutive social construction for concerns of social justice. For illustration, I draw upon two phenomena that are presumed to contribute towards the discrimination of women: (i) the poor performance effects of stereotype threat, and (ii) the silencing effects of gendered language use. (shrink)

When we read Rousseau's Social Contract, we tend to focus on its explicit goal, which is to investigate and establish a safe and legitimate rule of administration for a single political community. In accordance with the abstract character of the work, we tend to see this community as something pre-existing and isolated, without asking what those individuals who decide to submit to the rule of his general will had initially in common, and how the political body thus formed is related (...) to those who are not they themselves, but "the others", i.e., with other societies among which they will inevitably have to live. Such issues were of great importance to Rousseau, and only the fragmentary and inconclusive nature of the Social Contract explains why they did not receive the detailed treatment that would be due to them. In this paper I intend to explore some aspects of the solutions Rousseau left sketched elsewhere, especially in Emile and in the Extract and Judgment of the the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's project of perpetual peace, which point to Rousseau's very lucid understanding of the problem of relations between nations, and to a solution that has, surprisingly, much in common with the one that he proposed, in the Social Contract, to the problem of relations between individuals. I Intend to show that there is, in Rousseau, the germ of a conception of international relations that do not reduce them to the mere play of forces proposed by Hobbesian "realism" and, at the same time, allows a regulated and civilized coexistence without imposing the uniformity of values and perspectives characteristic of Kantian cosmopolitanism.Ao ler o Contrato social de Rousseau, tendemos a nos concentrar em seu objetivo explícito, que é o de investigar e estabelecer uma regra de administração legítima e segura para uma comunidade política individual. Em conformidade com o próprio caráter abstrato da obra, somos levados a ver essa comunidade como alguma coisa pré-existente e isolada, sem perguntar o que já havia inicialmente de comum a esses indivíduos que decidem submeter-se à regra de sua vontade geral, e como esse corpo político assim constituído se relaciona com os que não são eles mesmos, mas "os outros", isto é, com as demais sociedades com as quais terá inevitavelmente de conviver. Tais questões tinham grande importância para Rousseau, e só o caráter fragmentário e inconcluso do Contrato social explica por que não receberam o tratamento aprofundado que lhes seria devido. Pretendo, em minha exposição, explorar alguns aspectos das soluções que Rousseau deixou esboçadas em outras obras, especialmente no Emílio e em seu Extrato e Julgamento, do projeto de paz perpétua do Abbé de Saint-Pierre, e que apontam para uma compreensão muito lúcida do problema das relações entre as nações, e para uma solução que tem, surpreendentemente, muito em comum com a que propôs, no Contrato social, para a questão das relações entre indivíduos. Pretendo mostrar que há, em Rousseau, o gérmen de uma concepção das relações internacionais que não as reduz ao mero jogo de forças proposto pelo "realismo" hobbesiano e, ao mesmo tempo, viabiliza a convivência civilizada e regulada, sem impor a uniformidade de valores e perspectivas característica do cosmopolitismo kantiano. (shrink)

Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.

Neste trabalho, pretendemos investigar o poder que os argumentos do apêndice da Parte I da _ Ética _ possuem para enfraquecer a superstição que reside na mente do leitor. Dada a necessidade dos preconceitos que levam à consolidação da superstição finalista, é esperado que o leitor, ao se deparar com a _ Ética _, esteja completamente tomado pelas crenças finalistas. Tendo isso em vista, como poderia a compreensão desses argumentos ser capaz de eliminar a superstição? Como intentamos demonstrar, o conhecimento (...) adquirido é incapaz, ao menos num primeiro momento, de levar a cabo essa tarefa: é necessária uma meditação amiúde reiterada. Isso é possível porque a meditação, ao utilizar o conhecimento sobre a necessidade da superstição como ponto de partida, é capaz de reorganizar os afetos, de modo a tornar os afetos racionais gradativamente mais fortes que os afetos ligados à superstição. (shrink)

This paper presents reasons against semantic relativism. Semantic relativism is motivated by intuitions that are presumed to raise problems for traditional or contextualist semantics in contested domains of discourse. Intuition-based arguments are those based on competent speakers’ putative intuitions about seeming faultless disagreement, eavesdropper, and retraction cases. I will organize the discussion in three parts. First, I shall provide a brief introduction to the intuition-based arguments offered in favor of semantic relativism. Second, I shall indicate that there are ways for (...) contextualism to explain the (appearance of) intuitions that support semantic relativism. Third, I shall review some experimental results and independent arguments that put into question the appeal of semantic relativism. (shrink)

In this chapter, I try to answer the above question, and another question that it presupposes: can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle? A reader can be sceptical of a positive answer to the latter question; after all, citizens, political theorists, and journalists seem to be capable of following current politics and its coverage in the news, and there is no reason to think that philosophy of language in particular should be capable of helping people make (...) sense and respond to the news. I will illustrate the application of philosophy of language to three contrasting strategies of political propaganda: dogwhistles, meaning perversions, and bald-faced lies. I hope that these help us see that philosophy of language can be a good tool in diagnosing demagoguery, and in resisting it. (shrink)

Haslanger (2000) has argued that we should ameliorate concepts of race or gender to better capture existing structural inequalities. Her analysis was criticized by Simion (2018a), who argued that a concept should be ameliorated only if doing so preserves epistemic accuracy. But, as I argue, this criticism misses Haslanger's target. In response, Podosky (2018) and McKenna (2018b) have argued that conceptual revisions need not preserve "epistemic accuracy" since concepts can "shape reality", not just represent it. Here I argue that social (...) kind concepts need not "shape" the corresponding social kinds: neither causally nor constitutively. This raises doubts about the function of ameliorative projects for social kind concepts as means to change social reality. (shrink)

This paper presents a new method - which does not rely on the cut-elimination theorem - for characterizing the provably total functions of certain intuitionistic subsystems of arithmetic. The new method hinges on a realizability argument within an infinitary language. We illustrate the method for the intuitionistic counterpart of Buss's theory Smath image, and we briefly sketch it for the other levels of bounded arithmetic and for the theory IΣ1.

This paper addresses recent calls to study the role of the state in private regulation. Integrating current scholarship on the state as a catalyst of private regulatory regimes with prior literature on regulatory failure and self-regulation, it identifies and problematizes unsettled assumptions used as a starting point by this growing body of research. The case study traces the evolution of public debates and the interaction of different regulatory initiatives dealing with corporate social responsibility issues in Canada’s mining industry. Findings reveal (...) the conditions under which the state is more likely to encourage firm-level, fragmented initiatives than facilitate and promote industry-wide regulatory strengthening and consolidation. I discuss the need for greater analytical precision regarding the variation in regulatory policy preferences across time and branches of government and the interaction between public and private regulatory initiatives. The conclusion outlines suggested areas for future research as well as the likely outcome of Canada’s current CSR policy framework. (shrink)

O presente artigo é uma discussão sobre a noção heideggeriana de Überwindung. Seu objetivo é duplo: por um lado, [1] mostrar a perspectiva que tal termo deve ser compreendido; por outro, [2] aprofundar esta perspectiva à luz de comentários ao aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik. Para tanto, duas questões são postas: em que perspectiva e que questões estão implícitas quando Heidegger propõe o projeto da Überwindung der Metaphysik?; e por que uma Überwindung contém em si tantos problemas? De (...) modo a discutir e comentar tais questões, o artigo percorre dois caminhos: [1] faz-se uma análise da própria indicação heideggeriana da perspectiva de compreensão da Überwindung der Metaphysik, qual seja, revisitar, a partir de um olhar determinado, a construção da noção de história do ser. Esta, por sua vez, tem sua gênese antes mesmo da própria Kehre. Mais especificadamente, na reinterpretação que o próprio Heidegger faz de seu texto Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. A partir desta reconsideração feita por Heidegger e inserida em seu próprio texto, é possível detectar quatro teses fulcrais que traçam essencialmente a metafísica e que justificam a sua superação. São elas: [a] o fato de o ser, originariamente, se velar e provocar, historialmente, o seu esquecimento; [b] a relação entre a verdade do ser e a história, que se desenvolve como história do ser; [c] a ideia de que pertence ao ser um caráter originário de retração de si mesmo e que essa retração é um destino que pertence à história do pensamento metafísico e se configura na própria essência da metafísica; [d] afirmar que a certeza da manifestação da essência coincide com o seu fim. [2] Adentra-se, mediante uma aproximação pari passu, no aforismo I do texto Überwindung der Metaphysik, com intuito de comentar a problematicidade do termo Überwindung quando usado para repensar a metafísica à luz da perspectiva da história do ser. (shrink)

To what extent is the form of our life fixed, i.e. is there a form of life or forms of life? How does this bear on the nature of experience? These are two Wittgensteinian questions in need of clarification. Wittgenstein on Forms of Life and the Nature of Experience sheds light on a much exploited but rarely analysed topic in Wittgenstein scholarship while addressing central themes of contemporary philosophy. Bringing together essays from some of the leading scholars in the field, (...) the book concentrates on Wittgenstein’s concept of Lebensform(en), and more specifically its evolution in the author’s thought until his death in 1951. (shrink)

I suggest that the main aim Recanati proposes to achieve in Perspectival Though—that a moderate relativist should adopt a Kaplanian framework with three levels of content, rather than a Lewisian framework with only two— seems insufficiently motivated, and the arguments offered do not settle the issue. I suggest furthermore that the claim that subjects’ mental states and cognitive situations can determine parameters or indices in circumstances of evaluation is an original and very interesting contribution. It is also an important one, (...) since it sets further apart the radical from the moderate relativist, and it is relevant in the current relativism debate, where truth is deemed to be relative to parameters other than worlds, times, places and individuals. I also offer a few objections to some of the reasons Recanati puts forward in support of this latter claim; I object in particular to those that depend on some considerations about psychological modes. (shrink)

This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...) view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess recent Stalnakerian views of communication in moral and normative domains. These views model context updates with normative claims. They also aim to explain how people disagree when they follow different norms or values. I present four problems for these Stalnakerian views. I conclude that the problems require a new conception of how common ground relates to illocutionary force and attitude mode, which is still lacking.

Chris Hom argued that slurs and pejoratives semantically express complex negative prescriptive properties, which are determined in virtue of standing in external causal relations to social ideologies and practices. He called this view Combinatorial Externalism. Additionally, he argued that Combinatorial Externalism entailed that slurs and pejoratives have null extensions. In this paper, I raise an objection that has not been raised in the literature so far. I argue that semantic theories like Hom’s are forced to choose between two alternatives: either (...) they endorse an externalist semantics that determines prescriptive properties, or they endorse the null extensionality thesis, but they can’t have both. (shrink)

Can an appeal to the difference between contrary and contradictory statements, generated by a non-uniform behaviour of negation, deal adequately with paradoxical cases like the sorites or the liar? This paper offers a negative answer to the question. This is done by considering alternative ways of trying to construe and justify in a useful way (in this context) the distinction between contraries and contradictories by appealing to the behaviour of negation only. There are mainly two ways to try to do (...) so: i) by considering differences in the scope of negation, ii) by considering the possibility that negation is semantically ambiguous. Both alternatives are shown to be inapt to handle the problematic cases. In each case, it is shown that the available alternatives for motivating or grounding the distinction, in a way useful to deal with the paradoxes, are either inapplicable, or produce new versions of the paradoxes, or both. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue that the argument for fatalism based on the relativity of simultaneity fails. The original proponents of the argument called the thesis in terms of ‘determinism’, but Levin refers to it as ‘relativistic fatalism’. Relativistic fatalism is a view supported by the alleged dependence of the property of being future on an arbitrary choice of some coordinate system. First I will try to explain the classic argument, attributed to it a dialectic that justified to call (...) it in the same terms as Levin did. Subsequently, I will refuse the relativistic fatalism using many strategies to deal with it. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a reconciliation between science and nature is possible by way of the role played by ecological sciences on the aesthetical and ethical appraisal of natural diversity. First, I show that the aim of science – namely natural sciences – is to dominate nature and contend that environmental ethics was founded to support nature’s protection from the perils of science. I then show that when environmental ethics is supported by environmental aesthetics, a different role may (...) be assigned to science. I start by building on Allen Carlson’s philosophical aesthetics to show that the aesthetical appraisal of nature requires a scientific understanding of the ecological processes. Finally, I refer to Holmes Rolston’s environmental ethics to show how nature’s ethical value may arise from Carlson’s peculiar aesthetic evaluation. (shrink)

The role of consciousness in the production of actions has received much attention from philosophy and neuroscience. Wegner claims that what he calls the conscious will plays no role in the causal production of human actions, and that it is just an illusion. I will argue that Wegner’s claim is mistaken, because his defense of the alleged illusion rests on how he conceives of what the Readiness Potential represents in a key experiment—Libet’s experiment—and this conception is mistaken. Therefore, Wegner has (...) not offered a convincing reason to believe that humans are deluded about the way they produce their actions. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I (...) start by identifying truth-bearers: an utterance, for instance, is a truth-bearer if it says that something is the case. Truth-bearers are evaluable items, with truth- and falsity-conditions statable in corresponding instances of schemas for truth and falsehood. A genuine case of a truth-value gap should be an utterance that is neither true nor false but says something to be the case. But it is inconsistent to accept the schemas for truth and falsehood and the existence of genuine cases of truth-value gaps. Secondly, I expound Williamson’s argument, which explores this inconsistency, and I identify two kinds of strategy to disarm his argument: those that preserve the schemas for truth and falsehood, and those that do not. Neither strategy is found to be persuasive. Thirdly, I argue that cases of reference failure causing truth-value gaps illustrate the upshot of Williamson’s argument. Fourthly, I examine Scott Soames’s account of liar sentences as counterexamples to bivalence. Soames adopts a strategy of the first kind to avoid contradictions. I argue that his solution allows some contradictions to be true, and that he fails to show that liar sentences are truth-bearers. Finally, I examine Charles Travis’s case for isostheneia: an equal balancing of reasons to evaluate a statement as true or as false, in which case a statement is neither. Travis avoids contradictions by adopting a strategy of the second kind. I argue that the schemas for truth and falsehood are immune to Travis’s objections, and that isostheneia fails to identify evaluable items. The cases examined confirm that utterances that are neither true nor false say nothing. My claim is thus that truth-value gaps are not counterexamples to bivalence. (shrink)

The consolidation of the interdisciplinary field of bioethics in Europe and in the United States was accompanied by harsh criticisms by the social sciences; criticisms that have endured and been reshaped from the late twentieth century until the present. This article begins with a critical discussion of the myopia detected in a bioethical thought that has systematically disregarded its origins, both cultural and social. I claim that this deficit could be rectified if social scientists, in general, and sociologists, in particular, (...) were to move away from the periphery, which they still occupy today, and take up a central position in the area of bioethics. In order to analyze the distant and controversial relationship between the social sciences and bioethics, I proceed to an analysis of their various approaches, respectively guided by descriptive and normative ethics. The specific intersection of sociologists with bioethical thought will be scrutinized, in accordance with an analytical continuum that illustrates an evolution from a collaborative position to a free and independent position adopted by the social scientists. The article concludes by presenting a suggestion regarding the integration of the sociological imagination in the processes of ethical deliberation on the moral problems that emerge in biomedical research and clinical practice. In this context, further epistemological reflection is invited regarding the influence of socio-cultural sources of morality relating to the manner in which such problems have been challenged by the bioethical imagination. (shrink)

In this article, we propose to question the accuracy of Jean Wahl’s definition of Vladimir Jankélévitch’s Philosophie Première (1953) as one of the “ultimate efflorescences of negative theology.” In fact, we maintain that—although conceiving the apophatic discourse as a necessary (but insufficient) stepping-stone to the absolute—the aforementioned work constitutes, if anything, an effort to overcome it by means of what we shall call a tesiphatic philosophy, i.e., one that identifies the first principle, not as the absolute negation of being, but (...) as the absolute position of being. To defend our thesis, we shall start by discussing the meaning of the five divine names that Jankélévitch bestows upon his absolute, namely, (1) the “totally-other-order,” (2) the “super-truth,” (3) “the itself,” (4) the “I-know-not-what,” and (5) the “almost-nothing.” In this section of our paper, we will try to show how Jankélévitch’s discourse is, in fact, shaped by the whole negative theology tradition (from Plotinus to Nicholas of Cusa). Finally, in the last part of our paper, we will strive to reflect upon Jankélévitch’s interpretation of the limits of a apophatic metaphysical discourse, questioning whether his Philosophie Première effectively overcomes negative theology’s conception of the absolute. (shrink)

Resumo: Discuto, no presente artigo, a concepção leibniziana da mente, mostrando que as percepções e as sensações podem ser compreendidas como constituindo uma série contínua, mas que as apercepções forçosamente introduzem uma descontinuidade no sistema, o que torna essa concepção incompatível com o princípio da continuidade, igualmente assumido por Leibniz.Abstract: I discuss in this article the Leibnizian conception of the mind, showing that perceptions and sensations can be understood as constituting a continuous series, but that apperceptions forcibly introduce a discontinuity (...) into the system, which renders this conception incompatible with the principle of continuity, also assumed by Leibniz. (shrink)

Resumo: A célebre passagem próxima ao final do Livro I do Contrato social em que Rousseau recomenda a coerção, pelo corpo político, daquele que se recusar a obedecer à vontade geral, e acrescenta que isso equivale a “forçá-lo a ser livre”, tem provocado a perplexidade, se não mesmo a hostilidade, de comentadores que vêem aí uma prova clara de que a doutrina política de Rousseau impõe a submissão tirânica do indivíduo à vontade coletiva. O que mais surpreende, nessa passagem, é (...) que Rousseau não está simplesmente declarando que a vida em sociedade exija restrições à liberdade individual, mas sim que é exatamente o poder coercitivo do corpo político que torna o homem livre. Meu objetivo neste trabalho é examinar seriamente e tentar esclarecer a afirmação de Rousseau sem procurar suavizá-la ou retirar-lhe o aguilhão. Recorro inicialmente às familiares noções de liberdade negativa e positiva de Isaiah Berlin, mas proponho que devemos ir além delas e reconhecer que, longe de estar introduzindo um novo conceito de liberdade, Rousseau compreendeu, mais profundamente que seus antecessores, as condições que devem presidir ao exercício da liberdade política de forma compatível com os requisitos da vida em sociedade. A posição de Rousseau só pode ser corretamente compreendida se levarmos a sério as severas exigências que devem ser atendidas por uma sociedade para que ela possa se organizar politicamente segundo os princípios do Contrato Social; exigências essas que, em nossas modernas sociedades – heterogêneas, fragmentadas e em permanente conflito interior –, não podem mais ser satisfeitas e nem sequer compreendidas, como mostram as reações ora escandalizadas, ora eufemísticas, que o paradoxo de Rousseau costumeiramente desperta nos que tentam decifrá-lo. (shrink)

Resumo: No início do capítulo XIII do Leviatã, Hobbes apresentou o princípio da igualdade original de poder entre homens como um princípio básico de seu sistema político, do qual todas as teses subseqüentes deveriam ser estritamente deduzidas como teoremas. Surpreendentemente, porém, quando Hobbes mais tarde chega à dedução da 9ª Lei de Natureza, ele parece estar tentando demonstrar o próprio princípio da igualdade a partir do qual todas as leis da natureza, inclusive a 9ª, devem ter sido supostamente derivadas. Meu (...) objetivo neste artigo é oferecer uma explicação para esta aparente circularidade, e meu ponto de partida é que devemos distinguir o papel do princípio da igualdade no capítulo XIII, que trata do estado de natureza, do contexto em que opera a 9ª Lei, que é o da sociedade civil. Mas embora esta distinção de contextos nos permita chegar, em cada caso, a diferentes medidas de desigualdade, vou argumentar que essa diferença situa-se inteiramente na métrica, e que a topologia básica da desigualdade na distribuição do poder original permanece a mesma em ambos os casos. Como resultado, vou propor que, ao contrário da opinião costumeira, a posição de Hobbes não difere essencialmente da de Aristóteles, quanto a serem os homens naturalmente desiguais quanto a suas capacidades mentais, embora as conseqüências políticas que cada filósofo extrai desta tese sejam radicalmente diferentes. Nesse sentido, para Hobbes, a 9ª Lei é o meio pelo qual esta desigualdade pode ser minimizada retoricamente para fins de estabilidade política.Palavras-chave: Hobbes - Desigualdade - Estado de natureza.: In the beginning of Chapter XIII of his Leviathan, Hobbes presented the principle of the original equality in power among men as a basic tenet of his political system, from which all the subsequent thesis were to be strictly deduced as theorems. Surprisingly, however, when Hobbes later arrives at deduction of the 9th Law of Nature, he seems to be trying to demonstrate the very principle of equality from which all laws of nature, including the 9th, should be purportedly derived. My aim in this paper is to offer an explanation of this apparent circularity, and my point is that we must distinguish the role of the principle of equality in the Chapter XIII, which deals with the state of nature, from the context in which the 9th Law operates, which is that of the civil society. However, although this distinction of contexts allows us to arrive at very different measures of inequality in each case, I will argue that this difference lays entirely in the metrics, and the basic topology of the inequality in the original distribution of power remains the same in both cases. As a result I will propose that, contrarily to the usual opinion, Hobbes's position doesn't differ essentially from Aristotle's as to men being naturally unequal as regards their mental abilities, though the political consequences that each philosopher extracts from this thesis are radically different. In this sense, for Hobbes, the 9th Law is the means by which this inequality can be rhetorically minimized for the purposes of political stability. (shrink)

Recently, contemporary epistemology come systematically discussing the theme of disagreement. In our everyday life, although many cases can be seen as merely apparent disagreements, there are also some cases where disputes are legitimates and the disagreements are real. But, would be possible to occur real disagreements between agents we consider epistemic peers? If that is possible, how can we react to these cases, in others words, what is the correct rational attitude in cases of peer disagreements? These are some of (...) the main questions raised by what we call epistemology of disagreements. The aim of this article is to offer a general vision of this contemporary debate. Firstly, i will to present the problem and demonstrate why the scenario of disagreement - mainly between epistemic peers - would be an important philosophical question. Then, i will to present the main theoretical alternatives that arose on the contemporary epistemology as an answers to this problem. Therefore, the aim of this article is to be explanatory it not search for any original position on this debate. (shrink)

In Book IV of the Metaphysics Aristotle argues that first philosophy investigates not only being qua being but also the axioms or principles of demonstration. In the same place he establishes which principles are first. The first among these is the principle of contradiction. The thesis I defend in my communication is that the principle of contradiction in Aristotle is not merely formal in the style of modern symbolic logic, but is the constituent law of all discourse. As such, the (...) most precise sense in which it is a 'first principle' is that of a condition of the possibility of significance: terms and judgments have significance if they comply with the condition; if they violate it they signify nothing and are vacuous. If my interpretation is correct, various consequences will be derivable from a first principle, of which the most important is its link with essence and substance. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the axiom was replaced by the deontic axiom. In this paper, we propose even weaker systems, by eliminating (...) both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

Research has demonstrated that policing is a stressful occupation and has a negative impact on police officers’ mental and physical health, performance, and interactions with citizens. Mental health at the workplace has become a concern due to the costs of depression, anxiety, burnout, and even suicide, which is high among police officers.To ameliorate occupational health, it is crucial therefore to identify stress and burnout levels on a regular basis. However, the instruments frequently used to measure stress have not valorized the (...) specificity of policing tasks. This study aims: i) conducting a literature review, to identify questionnaires used to assess occupational stress and burnout among police officers; ii) to analyze the psychometric characteristics of a Portuguese version of Operational Police Stress Questionnaire (PSQ-Op); and, using the PSQ-op and other questionnaires, iii) to identify operational stress, burnout, and distress levels among Portuguese police officers. The literature review identified 108 studies, which use a multiplicity of questionnaires to measure burnout or occupational stress among police officers, but few studies use specific police stress questionnaires. Sample sizes were mostly below 500 participants and studies were mainly developed in the last decade in the USA and Brazil, but also in another 24 countries, showing the extent of the interest in this topic. This study applied to 2057 police officers from National Portuguese Police, a force policing urban centers, the PSQ-Op, as well the Spanish Burnout Inventory and the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale.The results show that the psychometric properties of the Portuguese version of PSQ-Op are adequate. Factorial analysis revealed two dimensions defined as social and work issues, which were associated with measures of distress and burnout.Fit indices suggested a second-order solution called operational police stress. Overall, and considering the scale range of each questionnaire, the results showed moderate values of operational stress, distress, and burnout. However, considering their cut-off points, 85% of the sample presented high operational stress levels, 11% critical values for burnout, and 28% high distress levels, with 55% of the sample at risk of psychological disorder. These results reinforce the need to prevent stress and to invest in police officers’ occupational health. (shrink)

Biological conservation has a long story, but what distinguishes Conservation Biology from previous conservation fields is its multidisciplinary scope and its character as a mission-oriented crisis discipline. These characteristics suggested the introduction of the metaphor of biological conservation as a sort of surgery. This paper is about the initial stages of such surgery. Firstly, some data about the so-called “Big Sixth”—the disease—will be presented together with some information about Conservation Biology—the surgeon. Then epistemic and epistemological difficulties in extinction assessment and (...) conservation prioritization, and triage in particular, will be pointed out. It will be argued that, while data deficiency arising from empirical and practical constraints can in principle be overcome, a different order of difficulties stems from the competition among several species concepts. In this case, it will be suggested that the extent of complications is of such significance to require a thorough re-assessment of the very nature of the patients, i.e., outside the metaphor, of the concept of species. (shrink)

Desde o 11 de setembro de 2001, debates sobre o Islã foram intensificados, em busca de explicações plausíveis sobre os ataques terroristas ao World Trade Center. Foram colocadas em pauta, sobretudo nas mídias, nacional e internacional, hoje, uma das mais importantes fontes de informação e de construção dos nossos mundos cognitivos, questões sobre o que são os muçulmanos e o Islã. Motivada por esse cenário e pelo crescimento do número de muçulmanos no mundo, praticamente um quarto da população mundial, no (...) qual os muçulmanos por conversão também são parte, decidi observar e comparar os dois campos, Brasil e em Portugal, tomando nota das ricas relações entre religião e cultura, entre tradição e modernidade. Dois campos com diferentes procedências, vertentes religiosas, escolas de pensamento, movimentos religiosos, que resultaram não somente em diversidade, mas igualmente em semelhança, em conflito e em dilema. De onde se observa que também a diferença une todos os muçulmanos do mundo. Palavras-chave: Islã; Muçulmanos; Convertidos.Since September 11th 2001, debates over Islam have been intensified in search for plausible explanations for the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center . Questions on what Muslims and Islam are have been at stake, above all, in the national and international media nowadays, one of the most important information sources as well as for building our cognitive worlds. Inspired by the scenario as well as by the growing number of Muslims in the world, almost a quarter of the population, included converted Muslims, I decided to observe and compare two fields, Brazil and Portugal, taking note about the richly relations between religion and culture, tradition and modernity. They are two fields with different origins, religious tendencies, schools of thought, religious movements, which have resulted not only in diversity, but also in similarity, conflict and dilemma. In observing that the difference also unites all Muslims in the world. Key words: Islam; Muslims; Converted. (shrink)

This paper explores the interaction between medicine and metaphysics in modern natural philosophy and especially in Descartes ' philosophy. I argue that Descartes ' hypothetical account of birthmarks in connection with his embryology provides an argumentative proof of the metaphysical necessity of a substantial union between mind and body, which however does not threaten his doctrine of the real distinction between these two substances. It would appear that his argument relies on a temporal conception of alethic modalities and provides a (...) new answer to Henricus Regius who in 1641 claimed that, for Descartes, the human being is an ens per accidens. (shrink)

The present paper reports a set of experimental studies concerning the comprehension of French argumentative operators and connectives.The first part is a presentation of the theoretical framework, the methodological problems and some of the most general results. Experiments were carried out in the perspective of the linguistic theory of argumentation developed by Anscombre and Ducrot. According to this theory, a number of devices in language are mainly defined by their argumentation function, i.e. by the types of discursive sequences and conclusions (...) they involve. Three categories of such devices were examined: (1) operators like “presque” (almost), “à peine” (hardly), “au moins” (at least), etc. which give an argumentative orientation to the statement; (2) co-orientation connectives, like “même” (even), which relate two statements oriented towards the same conclusion; (3) counter-orientation connectives, like the concessive ones (“mais” (but), “quand même” (even so), etc.), which relate two statements oriented towards opposite conclusions. The data shed light on issues such as: What is the nature of the relationship between the informative and argumentative functions of different operators? Is there a hierarchical relation between the argumentative processes of “co-orientation” and “counter-orientation”? What is the role of negation in the processing of argumentative sequences?The second part of the paper focuses specifically on the study of how 8 and 10 year-old children process “counter-oriented” statements. Five concessive connectives were studied: “mais”, “pourtant”, “quand même”, “même si”, “bien que”. The test was composed of two successive completion tasks: in one task the children had to choose the relevant context of complex sentences involving concessive connectives; in the other task they had to choose their relevant conclusion. Main results show a clear evolution in the performance of children between 8 and 10, suggesting that concessive strategies are not completely mastered at the age of 8. Differences among the concessive connectives studied were brought out: the item “quand même” obtained much better results than the other items with 8-year-old subjects; statements with “mais” seemed to be better processed in the conclusion task than in the context task, especially by 10-year-old subjects. These results are compared with other data obtained in some of the numerous studies on the production and comprehension of concessive connectives in various languages, and discussed from the point of view of argumentative theory. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the teleological perspective articulated by Émilie du Châtelet in her Institutions de physique (1740). I argue for the decisive influence of Christian Wolff on the metaphysical conception advanced by du Châtelet in the first chapters of this work aimed at providing a consistent metaphysical foundation to the new physics. I further claim that the principle of sufficient reason plays a crucial role in this endeavor. I then show that du Châtelet initiates a significant shift in teleology: she (...) moves away from the ‘idiographic’ standpoint focused on details and singularities, and advances a new, ‘nomothetic’ teleological perspective based on the regularity of the laws of nature. (shrink)