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  1. Against God of the Truth-Value Gaps.T. Parent - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Can God create an unliftable stone? Beall & Cotnoir propose that ‘God can create an unliftable stone’ is a truth-value gap (neither true nor false). However, this yields a revenge paradox on whether God can eschew gaps. Can God avoid gappy ascriptions of power? Either way, God’s power seems to have limits. In response, it may be said that ascribing God the power to avoid gaps is itself gappy—it concerns a power that God neither has nor lacks. Yet this ends (...)
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  2. A theory of truth.Yannis Stephanou - 2024 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    The paradoxes about truth are the subject of extensive research. Developing an original approach, this book argues that we should diverge from classical logic and presents a number of formal theories of truth. Also included is a beginner-friendly introduction to semantic paradoxes, and a discussion of alternative non-classical theories.
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  3. Liminality in Questions of Truth: The Law of the Included Middle.Donald A. Crosby - 2023 - Lanham: Lexington Books.
    This book questions the idea that the boundary between truth and falsity must always be absolute, and thus that there is no possible bridge between the two. The author argues that searching for liminal bridges between opposing claims is an essential part of finding absolute truths.
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  4. How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth.Boris Culina - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):1-31.
    This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. (...)
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  5. The Contradictory Christ, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Jc Beall - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book argues that the standard (orthodox) doctrine of incarnation (of "God enfleshed") is best understood along glut-theoretic lines: the incarnate God is a contradictory being. Example: because God, the Christ figure is all-knowing; but because human, ignorant. And so on. Standard theological theory in the tradition recognizes the apparent contradiction in its core doctrines; Beall argues that the appearance should be accepted as veridical.
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  6. Frege's equivalence thesis and reference failure.Nathan Hawkins - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (1):198-222.
    Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The (...)
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  7. Vagueness as Arbitrariness: Outline of a Theory of Vagueness.Sagid Salles - 2021 - Springer.
    This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. (...)
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  8. Minimalism, supervaluations and fixed points.Sergi Oms - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):139-153.
    In this paper I introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called ‘Minimalism’, and I present his proposal of how to cope with the Liar Paradox. The proposal proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as a consequence of that, it needs a constructive specification of which instances of the T-schema are to be excluded from Minimalism. Horwich has presented, in an informal way, one construction that specifies the Minimalist theory. The main aim of the paper is to present and scrutinize some (...)
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  9. Supervaluationism, Subvaluationism and the Sorites Paradox.Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini - 2019 - In Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 38-62.
    One way in which we might approach the challenge posed by the Sorites Paradox is considering that Sorites-susceptible predicates have several candidate extensions, or several ways in which these expressions can be made precise. For example, a candidate extension for the predicate ‘is a baby’ is the set of humans of less than two years, but also the set of those less than two years and one second, and of those less than two years and two seconds. In this chapter (...)
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  10. In Defence of Radical Restrictionism.David Liggins - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):3-25.
    Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists—as I will call proponents of the strategy—respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema -/- <p> is true iff p. -/- My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.
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  11. A Teoria Trivalente da Vagueza e o Problema da Precisão.Sagid Salles - 2019 - In Marcus José Alves de Souza & Maxwell Morais de Lima Filho (eds.), Escritos de Filosofia III: Linguagem e Cognição. pp. 184-200..
    Há pelo menos duas coisas que tornam o fenômeno da vagueza interessante. Primeiro, a vagueza está espalhada por toda a linguagem natural. Uma parte significativa das expressões de nossa linguagem são vagas e podemos encontrar a vagueza em expressões de diferentes categorias lógicas, como termos singulares, predicados e quantificadores. Por razões de simplicidade, contudo, ao longo deste artigo considero apenas o caso dos predicados vagos. Segundo, o fenômeno da vagueza está por trás de um difícil paradoxo, conhecido como Paradoxo Sorites. (...)
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  12. An Acquittal for Epistemicism.Hesam Mohamadi - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (4):905-928.
    Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (i) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (ii) (...)
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  13. Objective truth in matters of taste.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  14. Magidor on anomaly and truth-value gaps.James R. Shaw - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):513-528.
    In Category Mistakes, Ofra Magidor provides two arguments against the view that category mistakes express propositions that are not truth-evaluable at some world. I argue that her first, Williamsonian argument against this view begs the question, and that her second argument rests on a misleading conception of how semantic defect results in infelicity judgments. I conclude by conceding that she is still correct to stress that the view she opposes face noteworthy foundational and empirical challenges.
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  15. Two methods to find truth-value gaps and their application to the projection problem of homogeneity.Manuel Križ & Emmanuel Chemla - 2015 - Natural Language Semantics 23 (3):205-248.
    Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to identify (...)
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  16. Supervaluationism: Truth, Value and Degree Functionality.Pablo Cobreros & Luca Tranchini - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):136-144.
    This article deals with supervaluationism and the failure of truth-functionality. It draws some distinctions that may contribute to a better understanding of this semantic framework.
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  17. What is a truth-value gap?James R. Shaw - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (6):503-534.
    Truth-value gaps have received little attention from a foundational perspective, a fact which has rightfully opened up gap theories to charges of vacuousness. This paper develops an account of the foundations of gap-like behavior which has some hope of avoiding such charges. I begin by reviewing and sharpening a powerful argument of Dummett’s to constrain the options that gap theorists have to make sense of their views. I then show that within these strictures, we can give an account of gaps (...)
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  18. Category Mistakes.Ofra Magidor - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Category mistakes are sentences such as 'Green ideas sleep furiously' or 'Saturday is in bed'. They strike us as highly infelicitous but it is hard to explain precisely why this is so. Ofra Magidor explores four approaches to category mistakes in philosophy of language and linguistics, and develops and defends an original, presuppositional account.
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  19. Liars, Truthtellers and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2012 - Language and Communication 32 (4):293-311.
    Semantic pathology is most widely recognized in the liar paradox, where an apparent inconsistency arises in ‘‘liar sentences’’ and their ilk. But the phenomenon of semantic pathology also manifests a sibling symptom—an apparent indeterminacy—which, while not largely discussed (save for the occasional nod to ‘‘truthteller sentences’’), is just as pervasive as, and exactly parallels, the symptom of inconsistency. Moreover, certain ‘‘dual symptom’’ cases, which we call naysayers, exhibit both inconsistency and indeterminacy and also manifest a higher-order indeterminacy between them. In (...)
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  20. Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.
    In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...)
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  21. My own truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth.Alexandre Billon - 2011 - In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. springer.
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence use (...)
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  22. Truth.Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and (...)
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  23. MacColl’s Modes of Modalities.Fabien Schang - 2011 - Philosophia Scientiae 15:149-188.
    Hugh MacColl is commonly seen as a pioneer of modal and many-valued logic, given his introduction of modalities that go beyond plain truth and falsehood. But a closer examination shows that such a legacy is debatable and should take into account the way in which these modalities proceeded. We argue that, while MacColl devised a modal logic in the broad sense of the word, he did not give rise to a many-valued logic in the strict sense. Rather, his logic is (...)
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  24. Deflationism and truth value gaps.Patrick Greenough - 2010 - In Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
  25. Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps.Mark Richard - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and clouds: vagueness, its nature, and its logic. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  26. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Edited by Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen.
  27. A plea for epistemic truth: Jaina logic from a many-valued perspective.Fabien Schang - 2009 - In A. Schuman (ed.), Logic in Religious Discourse. Ontos Verlag. pp. 54--83.
    We present the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication as a 7-valued logic, in which every logical value consists in a 3-tuple of opinions. A question-answer semantics is used in order to give an intuitive characterization of these logical values in terms of opinion polls. Two different interpretations are plausible for the latest sort of opinion, depending upon whether "non-assertability" refers to incompleteness or inconsistency. It is shown hat the incomplete version of JL_{G} is equivalent to Kleene's logic K3, whereas the (...)
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  28. Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages.Xinli Wang - 2007 reprint - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:119-124.
    The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories or languages does not lie in (...)
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  29. Congiunzione e contraddizione.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - In Francesco Altea & Francesco Berto (eds.), Scenari dell’impossibile. La contraddizione nel pensiero contemporaneo. Il Poligrafo. pp. 63–86.
    Italian translation of "Conjunction and Contradiction" (2004), by Francesco Berto.
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  30. Vagueness and Inductive Molding.J. R. Welch - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):147-172.
    Vagueness is epistemic, according to some. Vagueness is ontological, according to others. This article deploys what I take to be a compromise position. Predicates are coined in specific contexts for specific purposes, but these limited practices do not automatically fix the extensions of predicates over the domain of all objects. The linguistic community using the predicate has rarely considered, much less decided, all questions that might arise about the predicate’s extension. To this extent, the ontological view is correct. But a (...)
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  31. Vagueness.Varol Akman - 2006 - In A. C. Grayling, Andrew Pyle & Naomi Goulder (eds.), The Continuum encyclopedia of British philosophy. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum. pp. 3260-3261.
    Vagueness, 'the quality or condition of being vague' (OED), has kept philosophers busy since ancient times. This article gives a concise account of vagueness.
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  32. Imperativos, preceptos y normas.Lorenzo Peña - 2006 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 39:111-142.
    The paper goes into the intricate logical relation between imperatives, precepts and norms. It shows that there need not be two senses of "ought", the one descriptive and the other prescriptive, since when the law-giver enacts a fresh statute he is hereby making a tru statement, whose truth is grounded on the statement itself.
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  33. 4. Contradictorial Gradualism Vs. Discontinuism: Two Views On Fuzziness And The Transition Problem.Marcelo VÁsconez - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (195).
    The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...)
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  34. Fuzziness and the sorites paradox.Marcelo Vasconez - 2006 - Dissertation, Catholic University of Louvain
    The dissertation has two parts, each dealing with a problem, namely: 1) What is the most adequate account of fuzziness -the so-called phenomenon of vagueness?, and 2) what is the most plausible solution to the sorites, or heap paradox? I will try to show that fuzzy properties are those which are gradual, amenable to be possessed in a greater or smaller extent. Acknowledgement of degrees in the instantiation of a property allows for a gradual transition from one opposite to the (...)
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  35. Two conceptions of truth? – Comment.V. Mc Gee - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):71 - 104.
    Following Hartry Field in distinguishing disquotational truth from a conception that grounds truth conditions in a community's usage, it is argued that the notions are materially inequivalent (since the latter allows truth-value gaps) and that both are needed. In addition to allowing blanket endorsements ("Everything the Pope says is true"), disquotational truth facilitates mathematical discovery, as when we establish the Gödel sentence by noting that the theorems are all disquotationally true and the disquotational truths are consistent. We require a more (...)
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  36. Modeling the concept of truth using the largest intrinsic fixed point of the strong Kleene three valued semantics (in Croatian language).Boris Culina - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Zagreb
    The thesis deals with the concept of truth and the paradoxes of truth. Philosophical theories usually consider the concept of truth from a wider perspective. They are concerned with questions such as - Is there any connection between the truth and the world? And, if there is - What is the nature of the connection? Contrary to these theories, this analysis is of a logical nature. It deals with the internal semantic structure of language, the mutual semantic connection of sentences, (...)
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  37. Bivalence and the challenge of truth-value gaps.Teresa Marques - 2004 - Dissertation, Stirling
    This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I (...)
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  38. (1 other version)Conjunction and Contradiction.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction : new philosophical essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 93–110.
    There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the second (...)
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  39. (1 other version)语言分类系统、真值间隔和不可通约性 — 对库恩关于不可通约性的分类学解释之重建.Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 2004 - World Philosophy 世界哲学 2004 (5).
    摘要:通常所接受对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释的理解建立在不可译性概念之上,因而是相当不完善的。为了弥补此不足,本文在分类之逻辑语义理论 (a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy)、真值语义理论 (a semantic theory of truth-value),以及跨语言交流的真值条件理论 (a truth-value conditional theory of cross-language communication) 之基础上,对库恩有关不可通约性的分类学解释进行了重建。根据这种重建,如果两个科学语言具有不相匹配的分类结构,则当一科学语言的核心语句在其所属语境中具有真值、而在另一科学语言之语境中考虑缺乏真值时,这两 种科学语言乃不可通约。通过这种重建,库恩对于不可通约性的成熟解释并非基于保真 (truth-preserving) 可译性或不可译性的概念,而是基于保留真值状态 (truth-value-preserving) 的跨语言交流概念之上。这种重建使得库恩有关不可通约性的解释更具坚实的理论基础、也在概念上更加完整。.
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  40. Presuppositional Languages and the Failure of Cross-Language Understanding.Xinli Wang - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):53-77.
    Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communities often problematic and even unattainable? To answer this question, the author first introduces a notion of presuppositional languages. Based on the semantic structure of a presuppositional language, the author identifies a significant condition necessary for effective understanding of a language: the interpreter is able to effectively understand a language only if he/she is able to recognize and comprehend its metaphysical presuppositions. The essential role of the knowledge of metaphysical presuppositions (...)
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  41. 语言预设概念空泛无物吗?(A Defense of the Notion of Semantic Presupposition).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 2002 - In Bo Mou & 博 牟 (eds.), 留美哲学博士文选:当代基础理论研究 (Contemporary Inquiries into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy). 商务印书馆 (the Commercial Press, China). pp. 190-224.
    斯特劳逊 (Strawson)的语义预设概念在语义学和语言哲学研究上颇有建树。尽管如此,语义预设概念一直遭受来自各方面的批判。概要说来,对语义预设概念之批判主要来自两个方面:其一,试图抽去语义预设概念的逻辑基础 ,即非真值概念 (the notion of truthvaluelessness),从而达到间接地拒斥语义预设概念之目的。其二,直接批判语义预设概念本身。他们或者论证此概念在理论上不自恰或微不足道,或者断定即使此概念本身在理论上自恰,但实为一空 洞无物之概念。因为我们根本找任何一个语义预设的具体例证。所以,语义预设概念不具任何真正的哲学意义。它只是一个当代神话,理应拒斥。 -/- 玻尔(S. Ber)和莱肯(W. Lycan)对语义预设概念的批判集中代表了以上两个方面。据我所知,迄今不曾有人对他们的批判予以全面和公正的反驳,以致于许多人人云亦云,使得他们的论点至今颇有影响。给予玻尔和莱恩的批判以全面反驳乃本文初 衷。于此相关,我以为很有必要澄清对语义预设概念的诸多误解,从而确立一个理论上自恰,实际上可行,和确有实质性内容的语义预设概念。基于以上考虑,我对语义预设概念批判之反驳包括正 反两个方面。在第二节,我试图建立一个自恰,完备,非庸俗的语义预设概念。基于这一概念,第三节对玻尔和莱恩反对语义预设的两个核心批判予以全面反驳。第四节着重辩护非真值概念。本文的最后结论是:各种批判并未损 伤斯特劳逊的语义预设概念的精髓。语 义预设概念非但不是一个当代神话,而且具有重大哲学意义。 .
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  42. (1 other version)语义预设概念空泛无物吗?(Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty?).Xinli Wang(王新力) - 2002 - In Contemporary Inquiries Into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy. the Commercial Press, China.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  43. Minimalism, gaps, and the Holton conditional.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):340–351.
  44. On an argument of Williamson's.Mark Richard - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):213-217.
  45. Supervaluationism and Paraconsistency.Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - In Diderik Batens, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest & Jean Paul Van Bendegem (eds.), Frontiers in Paraconsistent Logic. Research Studies Press. pp. 279–297.
    Since its first appearance in 1966, the notion of a supervaluation has been regarded by many as a powerful tool for dealing with semantic gaps. Only recently, however, applications to semantic gluts have also been considered. In previous work I proposed a general framework exploiting the intrinsic gap/glut duality. Here I also examine an alternative account where gaps and gluts are treated on a par: although they reflect opposite situations, the semantic upshot is the same in both cases--the value of (...)
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  46. Is the notion of semantic presupposition empty?Wang Xinli - 1999 - Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 34 (73):61-93.
    This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically (...)
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  47. Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (doctoral dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  48. (1 other version)Are All Tautologies True?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1989 - Logique Et Analyse 125 (125-126):3-14.
    The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.
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  49. Meinong: A Critique from the Left.Ermanno Bencivenga - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25-26 (1):461-483.
    Meinong justifies the need of his Gegenstandstheorie by presenting it as a generalization of (existing) metaphysics, in that the former deals with both existent and non-existent objects, whereas the latter used to deal with existent objects only. But this justification is disingenuous, since the notion of a non-existent object is virtually a contradiction in terms for the traditional paradigm. What Meinong is really proposing is a conceptual revolution of a Kantian variety, and we need to get clearer about the full (...)
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  50. (1 other version)Supervaluations without Truth-Value Gaps.Hans G. Herzberger - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6:15-27.
    For a very long time truth-value gaps were under a cloud of suspicion because they were considered logically unmanageable. So Frege declared that:“as regards concepts we have a requirement of sharp delimitation; if this were not satisfied it would be impossible to set forth logical laws about them”.Three-valued logic promised to dispel the cloud but in the eyes of many it had promised more than it could deliver. So in response to Reichenbach's plea for a three-valued quantum logic Russell replied:“This (...)
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