Part 12: The fall of the house of ethics‘Sometimes a cliché is the best way to make ones point’From: Whatever works.For some seconds Gordon is blinded by the lights the television crews direct at him. More than 20 cameras focus on him, and one journalist yells “there he is!” Even Gordon is not used to that much attention, but vanity is a speedy advisor. Within seconds he has clad himself in the aura of important person, and knowledgeable ethicist, even if (...) he has no idea what that many journalists expect from him at precisely this moment. Particularly when he has little time, preparing for the world conference on bioethics in Singapore. Then a wave of disappointment hits the gathered gossip-mongering press. The floodlights are turned off, microphones are lowered, the buzzing quiets down.“Guys, this is not Testosterone Tony.”This Tony, the athlete who participated in the Olympic Games in Beijing, at that moment leaves the hospital by a back door, far away from the paparazzi. The armoured car of his sponsor Nanosock disappears from sight softly humming and brings him to a private clinic where he will be pampered and detoxified. His career in sports is over, but his reputation can certainly sell sports socks with nanofibres against sweaty feet. The only price he has to pay is to admit he has sweaty feet, not true, but a small price to pay considering the alternatives. In front of the hospital the disappointed and somewhat offended Gordon tries to save his ego and asks the journalists:“Maybe I can be of help? Do you want an ethical analysis of Testosterone Tony and enhancing evolution? My name is Gordon Mc….” Nobody listens, nobody reacts.A day later. Nurses Jake and Gwen return from the medication round. Jake looks at the unlit room in the Nuttree …. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Richard Rorty begins by telling us why pragmatists such as himself are inclined to identify truth with justification: ‘Pragmatists think that if something makes no difference to practice, it should make no difference to philosophy. This conviction makes them suspicious of the distinction between justification and truth, for that distinction makes no difference to my decisions about what to do.’ (1995, p. 19) Rorty goes on to discuss the claim, defended by Crispin Wright, that truth is (...) a normative constraint on assertion. He argues that this claim runs foul of this principle of no difference without a practical difference: ‘The need to justify our beliefs to ourselves and our fellow agents subjects us to norms, and obedience to these norms produces a behavioural pattern that we must detect in others before confidently attributing beliefs to them. But there seems to be no occasion to look for obedience to an additional norm – the commandment to seek the truth. For – to return to the pragmatist doubt with which I began – obedience to that commandment will produce no behaviour not produced by the need to offer justification.’ (1995, p. 26) Again, then, Rorty appeals to the claim that a commitment to a norm of truth rather than a norm of justification makes no behavioural difference. This is an empirical claim, testable in principle by comparing the behaviour of a community of realists (in Rorty’s sense) to that of a community of pragmatists. In my view, the experiment would show that the claim is unjustified, indeed false. I think that there is an important and widespread behavioural pattern that depends on the fact that speakers do take themselves to be subject to such an additional norm. Moreover, it is a.. (shrink)

Speech act theory is one of the more lasting products of the linguistic movement in philosophy of the mid−Twentieth century. Within philosophy itself the movement's products did not in general prove so durable. Particularly striking in this respect is the perceived fate of what was one of the most characteristic applications of the linguistic turn in philosophy, namely the view that many traditional philosophical problems are such as to yield to an understanding of the distinctive function of a particular part (...) of language. Most typically, the crucial insight was held to be that despite appearances, the function of the part of language in question is not assertoric, or descriptive, and that the traditional problems arose at least in part from a failure to appreciate this point. Thus problems in moral philosophy were thought to yield to an appreciation that moral discourse is expressive rather than descriptive, problems in the philosophy of mind to an understanding of distinctive r×le of psychological ascriptions, and so on. The philosophical journals of the 1950s are rich with views like these. (No general term for this approach seems to have become widely accepted at the time. I shall call it "non−factualism", for what it denies, most characteristically, is the fact−stating r×le of language of a certain kind.). (shrink)

Dreamwork, Anthropology and the Curing Professions:. Cultural Approach to Dreamwork. Ian R. Edgar. Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1995. ix. 145 pp. £29.95.

We tend to assume that progress in answering the ‘hard question’ of consciousness will be accompanied by a subjective feeling of greater understanding. However, in order to feel we understand how one state of affairs arises from another, we have to deceive ourselves into thinking we have found a type of causal link which in reality may not exist . I draw from and expand upon Rosch's model, which specifies the conditions under which this self-deceptive kind of causal attribution arises. (...) I argue that the mind-body relationship may not meet these conditions, especially because of its potential novelty and uniqueness. We should not therefore expect to subjectively feel we understand consciousness. (shrink)

One major success of studying neural cell development in tissue culture has been the discovery of the O‐2A cell. This bipotential cell generates oligodendrocytes or, under certain conditions, a type of astrocyte. This essay considers the evidence that the characteristic properties demonstrated by the O‐2A cells in vitro are an accurate reflection of oligodendrocyte development in vivo.

New protocols have been developed for donors after circulatory death involving early assessment of donor status and premortem supporting treatment in appropriate cases where there is evidence that the patient wished to be an organ donor. These donors are now making an increasingly marked impact on overall deceased donor numbers in the UK. Donors after brainstem death, on the other hand, are much less buoyant yet require the same flexibility in approach in order to improve rates of donation and to (...) realize the wishes of potential deceased organ donors to the proper requisite extent. (shrink)

Ecstasy, Ritual, and Alternate Reality: Religion in. Pluralistic World by Felicitas D. Goodman. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana.University Press, 1988. Pp. 193. ISBN 0‐253‐31899‐8.

This is a review of John Leslie's 'Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology' (OUP, 2001). It was commissioned by the London Review of Books in 2002, but rejected by the commissioning editor, apparently because he disliked its anti-theological stance. (See the Postscript to the present version for more details.).

(1992). The agonic and hedonic modes: Definition, usage, and the promotion of mental health. World Futures: Vol. 35, Socio-Mental Bimodality, pp. 87-113.