Deficits in the ability to read the emotions of others have been demonstrated in mental disorders, such as dissociation and schizophrenia, which involve a distorted sense of self. This study examined whether weakened self-referential source memory, being unable to remember whether a piece of information has been processed with reference to oneself, is linked to ineffective emotion recognition. In two samples from a college and community, we quantified the participants’ ability to remember the self-generated versus non-self-generated origins of sentences they (...) had previously read or partially generated. We also measured their ability to read others’ emotions accurately when viewing photos of people in affect-charged situations. Multinomial processing tree modelling was applied to obtain a measure of self-referential source memory that was not biased by non-mnemonic factors. Our first experiment with college participants revealed a positive correlation between correctly remembering the origins of sentences and accurately recognising the emotions of others. This correlation was successfully replicated in the second experiment with community participants. The current study offers evidence of a link between self-referential source memory and emotion recognition. (shrink)

There has been a movement aiming to teach agents about their privilege by making the information about their privilege as costless as possible. However, some argue that in risk-sensitive frameworks, such as Lara Buchak’s (2013), it can be rational for privileged agents to shield themselves from learning about their privilege, even if the information is costless and relevant. This threatens the efficacy of these information-access efforts in alleviating the problem of elite-group ignorance. In response, I show that even within the (...) same framework, in this case David Kinney and Liam Kofi Bright’s (2021), the rationality of this information avoidance rests on shaky ground in practice. In this framework, whether an agent should avoid information depends on the precise details of (1) how relevant they expect the information to be, (2) their priors about the value of various options, and (3) their risk attitudes. The model suggests that the rationality of elite-group ignorance is a function of structural factors that are pervasive but nonetheless not insurmountable, thus offering a way out of pessimism about elite group education. (shrink)

Recent research has uncovered the dark side of creativity by finding that creative individuals are more likely to engage in unethical behavior. However, we argue that not all creative individuals make trouble. Using moral self-regulation theory as our overarching theoretical framework, we examine individuals’ moral identity as a boundary condition and moral disengagement as a mediating mechanism to explain when and how individual creativity is associated with workplace deviant behavior. We conducted two field studies using multi-source data to test our (...) hypotheses. In Study 1, the results indicated that creativity positively predicted moral disengagement for those low in moral identity. In Study 2 with multi-wave data, we replicated the finding that moral identity moderated the effect of creativity on moral disengagement in Study 1 and further revealed that moral disengagement mediated the interactive effects of creativity and moral identity on workplace deviant behavior. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

In his writings around 1930, Wittgenstein relates his philosophy to the idea of phenomenology. He indicates that his main philosophical project had earlier been the construction of a purely phenomenological language, and even after having given up this project he believed that "the world we live in is the world of sense-data," that is, of phenomenological objects. However, a problem is posed by the fact that he does not appear to have given a full, explicit account of what he means (...) by his 'phenomenology', 'phenomenological language', or 'phenomenological problems'. The aim of this dissertation is to unravel the nature of Wittgenstein's phenomenology and to examine its importance for his entire work in philosophy. ;Phenomenology can be characterized as philosophy whose primary concern is what is immediately given in one's experience. This 'immediately given' is not merely impressions inside one's mind, but includes also the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. Thus, an aim of phenomenological enterprise is to grasp this objective reality by attending to immediate experience. Husserl's phenomenology is in fact a case in point. ;Similarly, Wittgenstein's main attention is directed to one's immediate experience. However, the early Wittgenstein's phenomenology is unusual because of the way he views immediate experience. For him, the nature of the immediately given is unique in the sense that the possibility of logic is also based on it. Indeed, the fact that Wittgenstein sees the foundation of logic in immediate experience is what makes his philosophy a kind of phenomenology. In the Tractatus, all logical forms are combinations of the logical forms of immediately given objects of experience. Also, immediate experience can only be grasped and understood by means of language, because Wittgenstein views language as the ultimate medium through which we understand the world. Therefore, the important problem for him is the way we use language to describe immediate experience. In my study, I examine Wittgenstein's concern with immediate experience and the way we describe it, a concern which guides his philosophical journey through the phenomenological problems that pervade his work. (shrink)

Wittgenstein frequently uses the word 'aspect' (Aspekt) in his writings from 1947 to 1949. There he uses the word along with aspect-seeing and aspect-change, so that readers are misled into thinking his primary concern in using the word is something like Gestalt psychology or philosophy of psychology per se. However, Wittgenstein's late treatment of aspect is only a special case of a more general problem, namely phenomenology. In the middle-period writings, the word 'aspect' refers to a phenomenological object. Basically, Wittgenstein's (...) aspect means the way an object appears to us. For him, an 'aspect' is a phenomenological object. (shrink)

2. Saebyŏngnyŏk chʻodang esŏ on pʻyŏnji.

Phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area or substantia nigra compacta has been suggested to encode reward-prediction error signal for reinforcement learning. Recent studies have shown that the lateral habenula neurons exhibit a similar response, but for nonrewarding or punishment signals. Hence, the transient signaling role of LHb neurons is opposite that of DA neurons and also that of several other brain nuclei such as the border region of the globus pallidus internal segment and the rostral medial (...) tegmentum. Previous theoretical models have investigated the neural circuit mechanism underlying reward-based phasic activity of DA neurons, but the feasibility of a larger neural circuit model to account for the observed reward-based phasic activity in other brain nuclei such as the LHb has yet to be shown. Here, we propose a large-scale neural circuit model and show that parallel excitatory and inhibitory pathways underlie the learned neural responses across multiple brain regions. Specifically, the model can account for the phasic neural activity observed in the GPb, LHb, RMTg, and VTA/SNc. Based on sensitivity analysis, the model is found to be robust against changes in the overall neural connectivity strength. The model also predicts that striosomes play a key role in the phasic activity of VTA/SNc and LHb neurons by encoding previous and expected rewards. Taken together, our model identifies the important role of parallel neural circuit pathways in accounting for phasic activity across multiple brain areas during reward and punishment processing. (shrink)

It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years. And, along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic. Given the historical context (...) of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias. (shrink)

Robots and other smart machines are increasingly interwoven into the social fabric of our society, with the area and scope of their application continuing to expand. As we become accustomed to interacting through and with robots, we also begin to supplement or replace existing human–human interactions with human–machine interactions. This article aims to discuss the impacts of the shift from human–human interactions to human–machine interactions in one facet of our self-constitution, i.e., morality. More specifically, it sets out to explore whether (...) and how the shift to human–machine interactions can affect our moral cultivation. I shall structure the article around what Shannon Vallor calls technology-driven moral deskilling, i.e., the phenomenon of technology negatively affecting individual moral cultivation, and shall also attempt to offer a Confucian response to the problem. I first elaborate in detail Vallor’s idea of technology-driven moral deskilling. Next, I discuss three paradigms of virtue acquisition identified by Nancy E. Snow, i.e., the “folk” paradigm, the skill-and-expertise paradigm, and the Confucian paradigm, and show how the Confucian paradigm can help us to respond to technology-driven moral deskilling. Finally, I introduce the idea of Confucian rituals (li) and argue for the ritualizing of machines as an answer to technology-driven moral deskilling. (shrink)

Global engineering ethics is the engineering ethics’ response to globalization. It plays a major role in the received narrative about the need for a global engineering ethics, which is often illustrated by stories of some engineers A (of culture X) who interact with people or organizations of culture Y, and as a result encounter conflicts between their (i.e. culture X’s) ethical values and culture Y’s ethical values that generate ethical conundrums to the engineers. Global engineering ethics is thus needed to (...) help engineers to navigate through these ethical conundrums. However, the received narrative is insufficient in attending to the different nature and scope of ethical challenges for engineers and engineering practices in a globalized context, or so I shall argue. To understand these differences, I elaborate three basic presuppositions that create the need for global engineering ethics and explain their various interpretations. These presuppositions will then form the basis of my discussion of current approaches to global engineering ethics. I also argue that global engineering ethics is not merely reactive but also proactive, but the existing approaches have paid insufficient attention to the proactive dimension of global engineering ethics. So, I will end this chapter by arguing for the importance of the proactive dimension and exploring what it demands from engineers and engineering practices. (shrink)

Consumer society engenders a peculiar set of existential conditions, but it is often neglected in analyses of technology. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate a way to examine technology through the set of existential conditions in consumer society, and, at the same time, argue for its importance in normative analyses of technology. Particularly, this chapter argues against a specific pattern of argument against technology to be inadequate in isolation of an analysis of consumer society. In this respect, philosophers (...) and other researchers interested in normative issues on technology in consumer society can benefit enormously from social theory of consumption. (shrink)

This anthology examines the practical role of well-being in contemporary society. It discusses developments such as globalization, consumerism and the rapid innovation and use of new and emerging technologies and focuses on the significant impact of these developments on the well-being of people living today. The anthology brings together researchers from various disciplines, including psychology, economics, sociology, philosophy and development studies. It provides concrete insight on the role and importance of well-being in contemporary society, using a mix of empirical grounding, (...) philosophical rigour and an emphasis on real-world applications. It is unique in that it seeks to understand the relation between well-being research and its application towards real problems. (shrink)

Nearly a decade ago, Rafael Capurro has gradually shifted his attention towards the ideas of message and of messenger. In lieu of ‘information’, he proposes and develops a new direction of research he calls Angeletics that aims to examine the nature of message and messenger, both of which are inherently social. Coincidently, at about the same time, we witnessed the rise of social epistemology in Angelo-American analytic philosophy. This coincidence is interesting, because both Capurro’s Angeletics and social epistemology indicated a (...) departure from individualistic-orientedness in hermeneutics and traditional epistemology respectively. While social epistemology has earned its place and status in academia, especially in North America and Europe, Capurro’s Angeletics has yet to receive similar attention to which it deserves. Part of the reason for this, I think, is because of its formulation and terminology is relatively unfamiliar to those who do not share the same philosophical tradition. Hence, one remedy to this situation is to attempt to translate Angeletics in terms of social epistemology, and this – is the objective of the current paper. (shrink)

In Information and Computer Ethics (ICE), and, in fact, in normative and evaluative research of Information Technology (IT) in general, researchers have paid few attentions to the prudential values of IT. Hence, analyses of the prudential values of IT are mostly found in popular discourse. Yet, the analyses of the prudential values of IT are important for answering normative questions about people’s well-being. In this chapter, the author urges researchers in ICE to take the analyses of the prudential values of (...) IT seriously. A serious study of the analyses, he argues, will enrich the research of ICE. But, what are the analyses? The author will distinguish the analyses of the prudential values of IT, i.e. the prudential analysis, from other types of normative and evaluative analysis of IT. Then, the author will explain why prudential analyses are not taken seriously by the researchers in ICE, and argue why they deserve more attentions. After that, he will outline a framework to analyse and evaluate prudential analyses, and he will apply the framework to an actual prudential analysis. Finally, he will briefly conclude this chapter by highlighting the limits of the proposed framework and identifying the directions for future research. (shrink)

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the human rights (...) approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...) at the same time, the situation is undesirable. The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to introduce an alternative account of ethics of technology based on the Confucian tradition. In doing so, it is hoped that the current paper can initiate a relatively uncharted field in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology. (shrink)

Digital media has become an integral part of people’s lives, and its ubiquity and pervasiveness in our everyday lives raise new ethical, social, cultural, political, economic and legal issues. Many of these issues have primarily been dealt with in terms of what is ‘right’ or ‘just’ with digital media and digitally-mediated practices, and questions about the relations between digital media and the good life are often left in the background. In short, what is often missing is an explicit discussion of (...) the relations between digital media and the good life. Under the label of ‘Net recommendation’, the present study aims to offer a balanced and constructive normative analysis of digital media, focusing on the relations between digital media and the good life. The project of Net recommendation aims to (re)assert the importance of actual discourses in our normative analysis of the relations between digital media and the good life. I pursue this project with a Walzerian approach to digital media and the good life that takes seriously (and, ideally, also interacts with) actual discourses. This approach allows us to have a better understanding of our normative judgements on the impacts of digital media has (or will have) on the good life and, at the same time, allows us to answer the question of ‘how should we live with digital media?’ more adequately. Moreover, the Walzerian approach is useful in both an intra-cultural and an inter¬cultural context. Using China’s Internet as a case study, I show that the relations between digital media and the good life in each culture should be examined in its own right. Together, I hope, this study provides an adequate illustration and defence of the project of Net recommendation that does not start with the assumption of digital media being a source of moral problem and strives to recommending specific ways to reform and/or transform digital media and digitally-mediated practices that allow us to have better relations with digital media and enable us to live better lives with them. (shrink)

The burgeoning literature on the ethical issues raised by climate engineering has explored various normative questions associated with the research and deployment of climate engineering, and has examined a number of responses to them. While researchers have noted the ethical issues from climate engineering are global in nature, much of the discussion proceeds predominately with ethical framework in the Anglo-American and European traditions, which presume particular normative standpoints and understandings of human–nature relationship. The current discussion on the ethical issues, therefore, (...) is far from being a genuine global dialogue. The aim of this article is to address the lack of intercultural exchange by exploring the ethics of climate engineering from a perspective of Confucian environmental ethics. Drawing from the existing discussion on Confucian environmental ethics and Confucian ethics of technology, I discuss what Confucian ethics can contribute to the ethical debate on climate engineering. (shrink)

Cells contain a myriad of membraneless ribonucleoprotein (RNP) condensates with distinct compositions of proteins and RNAs. RNP condensates participate in different cellular activities, including RNA storage, mRNA translation or decay, stress response, etc. RNP condensates are assembled via liquid‐liquid phase separation (LLPS) driven by multivalent interactions. Transition of RNP condensates into bodies with abnormal material properties, such as solid‐like amyloid structures, is associated with the pathogenesis of various diseases. In this review, we focus on how RNAs regulate multiple aspects of (...) RNP condensates, such as dynamic assembly and/or disassembly and biophysical properties. RNA properties – including concentration, sequence, length and structure – also determine the phase behaviors of RNP condensates. RNA is also involved in specifying autophagic degradation of RNP condensates. Unraveling the role of RNA in RNPs provides novel insights into pathological accumulation of RNPs in various diseases. This new understanding can potentially be harnessed to develop therapeutic strategies. (shrink)

Researchers have explored questions concerning public participation and consent in geoengineering governance. Yet, the notion of consent has received little attention from researchers, and it is rarely discussed explicitly, despite being prescribed as a normative requirement for geoengineering research and being used in rejecting some geoengineering options. As it is noted in the leading geoengineering governance principles, i.e. the Oxford Principles, there are different conceptions of consent; the idea of consent ought to be unpacked more carefully if, and when, we (...) invoke it in the discussion. This article offers a theoretical reflection on different conceptions of consent and their place in geoengineering governance. More specifically, I discuss three models of consent, i.e. explicit consent, implied consent and hypothetical consent, and assess their applicability to geoengineering governance. Although there are different models of consent, much discussion of geoengineering governance has committed only to explicit consent. I note that such a commitment springs from a specific ideal political order. Accordingly, we should be wary of any naïve commitment to it so long as the political order we hope for remains open to debate. Finally, I illustrate two approaches to introduce consent into a geoengineering governance framework. (shrink)