Empathy has been shown to improve patient care and physician well-being. However, the emotional labor involved in expressing empathy might interfere with experiencing calm, equally important to clinicians’ well-being. This article offers examples of how clinical environments can bolster both empathy and calm and suggests that empathy can be expressed socially, not just individually, to build solidarity and make space for calm.

Recent studies have revealed a drop in the ability of physicians to empathize with their patients. It is argued that empathy training needs to be provided to both medical students and physicians in order to improve patient care. While it may be true that empathy would lead to better patient care, it is important that the right theory of empathy is being encouraged. This paper examines and critiques the prominent explanation of empathy being used in medicine. Focusing on the component (...) of empathy that allows us to understand others, it is argued that this understanding is accomplished through a simulation. However, simulation theory is not the best explanation of empathy for medicine, since it involves a limited perspective in which to understand the patient. In response to the limitations and objections to simulation theory, interaction theory is presented as a promising alternative. This theory explains the physicians understanding of patients from diverse backgrounds as an ability to learn and apply narratives. By explaining how we understand others, without limiting our ability to understand various others, interaction theory is more likely than simulation theory to provide better patient care, and therefore is a better theory of empathy for the medical field. (shrink)

Bioethics has begun to see the revaluation of affects in medical practice, but not all of them, and not necessarily in the sense of affects as we know them. Empathy has been accepted as important for good medical practice, but only in a way that strips it of its affectivity and thus prevents other affects, like sympathy, from being accepted. As part of a larger project that aims at revaluing the importance of affectivity in medical practice, the purpose of this (...) paper is to develop a clinical sympathy that can serve as a trainable skill for medical professionals. While everyday sympathy may be problematic as a professional skill for physicians, this does not imply that sympathy should be entirely rejected. As a natural part of our moral psychology, sympathy is an intersubjective affect that aids in our interactions with others and our decision-making abilities. I present here a theory of clinical sympathy as an affective response to patients, in which physicians are both attuned to their affective response and understand how their affects are influencing their beliefs and judgments. In this way, clinical sympathy serves as a trainable skill that can aid physicians in their interactions with their patients. (shrink)

Medical professionals seem to interpret their uses of humor very differently from those outside the medical profession. Nurses and physicians argue that humor is necessary for them to do their jobs well. Many (potential) patients are horrified that they could one day be the butt of their physician’s jokes. The purpose of this paper is to encourage the respectful use of humor in clinical prac-tice, so as to support its importance in medical practice, while simultaneously protecting against its potential abuse. (...) I begin by examining two extremes of supporting or chastising the use of medical humor. I look at these views through the lenses of popular theories of humor to help explain their theoretical bases. In this second section, I explain the emotional aspect of humor as an embodied and embedded transformation of the world. This clarifies the role that humor plays in our daily lives, as well as why the ethical or unethical nature of its use is dependent on context. Third, I address the potential problems in the relationship between humor and clinical sympathy, and how this further affects the relationship between medical professionals and their patients. I conclude by arguing that humor can conflict with clinical sympathy, but this need not be the case. If medical professionals actively engage with clinical sympathy and focus on using humor in a way that is respectful towards their patients, then humor can continue to be a positive force in their lives while still providing the best care for their patients. (shrink)

In this commentary on Michael Slote’s paper “The Many Faces of Empathy,” I assess the ways in which his theory of empathy aligns with simulation theory, as well as the problems that he needs to address because of this. Overall, I present three problems that need to be addressed: How do we know that we have caught the other’s emotion and not merely reacted on our own; What exactly is it about the other’s emotion or attitude that I am mimicking (...) and catching; and Does empathy provide us with objective or subjective ethical knowledge? (shrink)

Presents a collection of essays by philosophers about the television program "How I Met Your Mother," analyzing the personalities and behavior of its various characters from a moral and philosophical point of view.

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 550-573, July 2022.

It is somewhat of a mystery why one of Foucault's most important concepts—that of ‘dispositif’—is still quite vague in social and political theory; and while a small number of analyses have moved understanding forward, it remains stubbornly opaque. This paper argues that a strengthening of Foucault's concept can be achieved by integrating elements of Althusser’s formulation of a dispositif events), and a detailed examination of the shared conceptual history between dispositifs and discursive formations. Regarding, the paper contends that dispositifs restrict (...) three types of aleatory event: first, a ‘continuous present’ exerted upon objects and subjects; second, overdetermining repetitious occurrences; and third, negating the effects of unexpected aleatory events. The paper also argues that dispositifs are capable of producing certain forms of aleatory change. Regarding, four developmental thresholds of dispositifs are identified: strategic emergence, political elaboration, overdetermined a priori, and aleatory dominance. These two developments are argued to move Foucault's concept from being descriptive and largely passive to becoming a more theoretically active resource—what Deleuze terms changing the analytical to the diagnostic. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...) domain. The central element in Socrates’ account of an expert is what I call the truth-and-caring criterion: an expert has to make seeking the truth and avoiding (avoidable) error her supreme epistemic goal and she has to make caring for common goods the supreme goal of practising her expertise. (shrink)

Decision-making capacityDecision-making capacity for pediatric patients can be difficult to determine and is influenced by a myriad of developmental considerations. This chapter begins with a discussion concerning the nature of decision-makingDecision-making and what constitutes competency. The “rule of sevensRule of sevens” frameworkFramework is then used to explicate pertinent developmental milestonesMilestones for children, dividing pediatric developmentDevelopment into 0–7, 7–14, and 14+ years of age. In particular, the authors highlight the most important cognitiveCognitive, socialSocial, andSocial emotionalemotionalEmotional considerations in each of these periods (...) and how they pertain to a child’s ability to make important medical decisions. (shrink)

In the present article, we review the theory and research on religious deconversion with a focus on adolescence and young adulthood. First, we present the relevant terminology (e.g. religious deconversion, religious disaffiliation, and religious deidentification) and statistical trends (e.g. the prevalence of religious Nones and Dones). We define religious deconversion as any movement away from religion. Religiosity decreases across adolescence and into young adulthood, and these developmental periods also have heightened rates of religious deidentification, at least in many Western cultures. (...) Second, we review the theory and research on processes, predictors, and outcomes of religious deconversion. Deconversion is discussed both in terms of individuals becoming less religious and possibly deidentifying from religion. In terms of processes of deconversion, we discuss various theoretical models and self-expressed reasons for deconversion. Religious deconversion tends to progress in phases, often initiated by religious and spiritual struggles. In terms of predictors, we identify predictors at the level of the individual (e.g. demographics, personality, norm-violating behavior, and dimensions of religiosity), family (e.g. parent and family religiosity, family dynamics such as parenting styles, and religious socialization), peers (e.g. peer religiosity and religious conversations with peers), religious communities (e.g. supportiveness, engagement, and dialogue), formal education, and social media. In line with developmental systems perspectives, religious deconversion is a complex and dynamic process involving numerous individual and contextual factors. In terms of outcomes of deconversion, we identify potential individual and relational outcomes that are considered both negative and positive. Finally, we outlined 10 promising future directions for research on religious deconversion. (shrink)

In this study I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is compatible with a realistic interpretation of scientific theories. That said, I distinguish between the realistic interpretation of scientific theories and scientific realism. The former holds that the theoretical terms of a scientific theory are intended to refer, and that if we have good reason to believe that a scientific theory is true then we also have good reason to believe the entities it refers to exist. Scientific realism holds that the world (...) as described by the physical sciences not only exists, it is the only world that exists—the world of everyday perceptual experience must be demoted to the status of a mere appearance. My case for the compatibility of Husserl’s phenomenology with a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is based on a distinction between scientific laws and scientific theories. I hold that Husserl’s instrumentalism, if one can call it that, is restricted to an interpretation of scientific laws; accordingly, his anti-realism is directed against the reification of ideal objects constructed in the course of the exact mathematical representation of scientific laws, not against the theoretical entities postulated in the explanation of those laws. At the end of the study I seek to allay the fear that if one adopts a realistic interpretation of scientific theories one is thereby committed to some version of scientific realism. (shrink)

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue on Contemporary Issues in Religious and Spiritual Development in Adolescence, Young Adulthood, and Beyond. First, we give an account of the history of research on religious and spiritual development in adolescence and beyond. Although religion and spirituality have a long history in psychology, it is still an emerging area of research. Second, we summarize the current body of work on religious and spiritual development in adolescence and beyond. Most research in (...) this area has focused on outcomes, particularly religion and spirituality as a protective factor against negative youth outcomes. Some work has also looked at individual and contextual predictors of religion and spirituality. Less is known about processes and trajectories of religious development, particularly in terms of changes in religious identification. Third, we recommend directions for future research in this area. We focus on the need for research to look at the role of religion and spirituality in positive youth development, the religious and spiritual experiences of religious minority youth, religious and spiritual challenges faced by sexual minority youth, and processes and predictors of religious deconversion. Fourth, we outline the four review papers on contemporary issues in religious and spiritual development featured in the special issue. These papers provide literature reviews on four important directions for future research. (shrink)

We consider probability theories in general. In the first part of the paper, various constraints are imposed and classical probability and quantum theory are recovered as special cases. Quantum theory follows from a set of five reasonable axioms. The key axiom which gives us quantum theory rather than classical probability theory is the continuity axiom, which demands that there exists a continuous reversible transformation between any pair of pure states. In the second part of this paper, we consider in detail (...) how the measurement process works in both the classical and the quantum case. The key differences and similarities are elucidated. It is shown how measurement in the classical case can be given a simple ontological interpretation which is not open to us in the quantum case. On the other hand, it is shown that the measurement process can be treated mathematically in the same way in both theories even to the extent that the equations governing the state update after measurement are identical. The difference between the two cases is seen to be due not to something intrinsic to the measurement process itself but, rather, to the nature of the set of allowed states and, therefore, ultimately to the continuity axiom. (shrink)

This collection of pen-portraits of the renowned public intellectual Isaiah Berlin, published to mark the centenary of his birth, brings him vividly to life from many vantage-points: essential reading for all who seek to understand the full range of his impact.

Many of those teaching at the intersection of medicine and the humanities are siloed within institutional spaces. This essay recounts the teaching of Sarah Manguso’s The Two Kinds of Decay to students across different academic contexts and considers what we can learn when we put classrooms in conversation with each other. This essay argues for the value of texts like Manguso’s, which explicitly hold the narrating subject and form of illness narrative up for critical examination. The authors call for more (...) collaborative teaching, which has special resonance in the health humanities, where conversations already depend on bridging disciplines and listening to the stories others can tell. (shrink)

I argue that the use of the separateness of persons in the debate between the priority view and the competing claims view is deeply flawed. In making the case, I argue for three points. First, that...

Quantum theory has the property of “local tomography”: the state of any composite system can be reconstructed from the statistics of measurements on the individual components. In this respect the holism of quantum theory is limited. We consider in this paper a class of theories more holistic than quantum theory in that they are constrained only by “bilocal tomography”: the state of any composite system is determined by the statistics of measurements on pairs of components. Under a few auxiliary assumptions, (...) we derive certain general features of such theories. In particular, we show how the number of state parameters can depend on the number of perfectly distinguishable states. We also show that real-vector-space quantum theory, while not locally tomographic, is bilocally tomographic. (shrink)

In the Monumentum Ancyranum Augustus makes some interesting and, if we can unravel them, undoubtedly important statements, from which certain deductions seem possible as to the number of his legionary soldiers, the rate of mortality among them, their length of service and the provisions made for them after their dicharge. Quite early in the Monument we get the following general assertion: ‘About five hundred thousand Roman citizens were bound to me by the military oath. Of these, after the due expiry (...) of their service, I settled in colonies or sent back to their own municipia somewhat more than three hundred thousand. And to all of them I gave land purchased by myself, or in lieu of land sums of money out of my own resources.’ From the place of this statement in that part of the record relating to his earlier career we might be tempted to infer that the five hundred thousand legionaries were those who formed his armies at the time of Antony's collapse, and that the discharge of three hundred thousand of them, whether planted in colonies or sent back to their domiciles, took place at one and the same time. With regard to the second point, we shall see presently that the vague and indiscriminate statement made here is cleared up by a later passage , from which it appears that the assignation of land belongs to two distinct schemes of colonizations, separated by sixteen years, and that the restoration of discharged soldiers to their municipalities, to whom alone the words ‘pecuniam pro agris dedi’ are applicable, belongs to a still later date. (shrink)

Proponents of modal versions of the ontological argument have traditionally defended the prernise that God possibly exists by arguing that such a premise is more plausible than its negation. In this paper I argue that such a defense is insufficient to justify acceptance of the premise within the scope of a modal proof, and that this insufficiency accounts for the lack of probative force of these versions of the ontological argument. Rather, I claim that what is needed is a defense (...) of the claim of God’s possibility against the claim that He possibly does not exist. I give reasons for suspecting that no such defense is possible within the scope of modal ontological arguments. (shrink)