There are two approaches to the phenomenon of community in contemporary social ontology. The first is an attempt to account for community in terms of joint action or cooperation. Margaret Gilbert thus believes that by elucidating the nature of joint action we can come to understand more complex forms of collectivity such as communities. The second approach, put forth by John Searle, is to conceive of community as an institutional entity, that is, as a status collectively assigned to a (...) set of people that unites them as a social group. In this paper, I show why both these approaches fail to provide a convincing account of community. A more promising approach can be found in medieval philosophy, namely, in Thomas Aquinas. His account of community builds on the Aristotelian notion of friendship and, so I argue, yields a better understanding of the relation between community, cooperation, and institutions. (shrink)

I discuss three well-known interpretations of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories: the linguistic interpretation put forth by Gilbert Ryle, the logical interpretation to be found in Kant, and the ontological interpretation by Franz Brentano. As it turns out, only Brentano provides us with an accurate understanding of this Aristotelian doctrine, which also allows us to locate and assess it within the context of Aristotle’s metaphysics.

Advances in molecular biological research in the latter half of the twentieth century have made the story of the gene vastly complicated: the more we learn about genes, the less sure we are of what a gene really is. Knowledge about the structure and functioning of genes abounds, but the gene has also become curiously intangible. This collection of essays renews the question: what are genes? Philosophers, historians and working scientists re-evaluate the question in this volume, treating the gene as (...) a focal point of interdisciplinary and international research. It will be of interest to professionals and students in the philosophy and history of science, genetics and molecular biology. (shrink)

Mylan Engels paper (2004) is divided into two parts: a negative part, criticizing the costs of contextualism and a constructive part proposing a noncontextualist resolution of the skeptical problem. I will only address the constructive part here. The constructive part is composed of three elements: (i) a reconstruction or reformulation of the original skeptical argument, which draws on the notion of epistemic possibility (e-possibility), (ii) a distinction between two senses of knowledge (and two corresponding kinds of e-possibility): fallibilistic and infallibilistic, (...) and (iii) an argument which tries to hoist the skeptic by their own petard, namely the closure principle (CP). As I will argue, there are two ways to understand Engels anti-skeptical argument. Only in one interpretation does the argument depend on the proposed reconstruction of the skeptical argument in terms of e-possibility. But this version of the argument is unsound. More importantly, the skeptic has a strong prima facie objection at her disposal, which applies to both interpretations of the argument. If this objection is valid, Engels argument does not hold. But once it is invalidated, his argument is superfluous. (shrink)

In essays written throughout his career, Stanley Hauerwas has unfolded a Christian vision of the marriage bond and the presence of children that seeks insistently to place these seemingly natural bonds within the new family of God that is the church. I examine his understanding, aiming to appreciate the Christian vision displayed while also suggesting that his emphasis on the new thing God does in the church is sometimes allowed to absorb and thereby lose the distinctive significance of the created (...) bonds of marriage and family. (shrink)

It is almost commonplace to suggest that what is morally right for one person to do must also be right for anyone else similarly situated. The author suggests that this "universalization requirement" applies to only a limited sphere of the moral life, chiefly to duties of perfect obligation. Extending the requirement beyond this sphere fails to leave room for human freedom in vocation or for a clear recognition of human finitude.

In a time of intensified interest in an "ethic of virtue," Josef Pieper stands out as one who has pondered and written about the virtues for many years. This paper explores some aspects of Pieper's thought about the virtues and focuses especially on four problems: (1) the question of the unity of the virtues; (2) the relation between natural and theological virtues; (3) the dangers for Christian ethics of picturing virtue as habitual; and (4) the question whether virtue needs any (...) reward beyond virtue itself. (shrink)

This paper explores Paul Ramsey's thought on the question of how properly to care for the sick and dying. Ramsey's views were carefully articulated in "The Patient as Person" and, eight years later, "Ethics at the Edges of Life". Those two treatments are the centerpiece of analysis here, an analysis that argues for essential continuity in Ramsey's view, even though issues are sharpened and explored in new ways in the later work. The theological vision underlying Ramsey's thought on this topic (...) is also examined and explored. (shrink)

The text in which the original JRE editors announced the mission of their newly launched scholarly journal is susceptible to different readings. While Ronald Green has interpreted it as an intention to "effect" a "movement from Christian ethics to religious ethics," the author expresses doubt that any such general framework of "religious ethics" can be discerned in or imposed on distinctive religious traditions. He suggests that the problem of "parochialism and Western bias" is best addressed not through the imperialism of (...) the generic but through sustained attention to the distinctive and particular in all its variations. (shrink)

James Wetzel offers a philosophical reformulation of the doctrine of original sin. In this response I explore the subtleties of his account and question whether his reformulation has not lost something-crucial the connection of original sin and God's grace enacted in Jesus.

In Contested Reproduction, John Evans outlines the results of a major piece of sociological research he has conducted. Evans suspects that reproductive genetic technologies will be a significant issue in coming cultural conflicts in the United States and that religious perspectives will play an important role in determining the shape these conflicts take. If one believes that we are hopelessly and bitterly divided on such issues, then the shape of our future conflicts may simply pit one entrenched side against another. (...) Evans’ findings suggest that ordinary religious believers in the United States have rather complex views about these technologies—more shades of gray than black or white. He concludes that the coming conflicts may be neither as insuperable nor as hopeless as we sometimes suppose. Serious exchange, and not just caricature or dismissal, may characterize even our deep disagreements. Perhaps so. But a reading of Progress in Bioethics, a collection of essays edited by Jonathan D. Moreno and Sam Berger, might give one pause here, and not because of anything it reveals about the views of religious believers. (shrink)

The papal encyclical "Veritatis Splendor", issued in 1993, treats in detail important questions of moral theory and is clearly an important moment in the history of Christian ethics. Supporters and critics of the encyclical have tended to focus attention upon its defense of an objectively true morality and its contention that some acts are intrinsically evil. This discussion overlooks questions that one might address to the encyclical from the perspective of the Reformation. The most fundamental of these is the encyclical's (...) understanding of the place of faith in the Christian life. I will explore this chiefly by contrasting the ways in which John Paul II and Karl Barth understand the story of the rich young ruler and by exploring the possibility that one might cling to God while deliberately choosing evil. (shrink)