Is What Is Right for Me Right for All Persons Similarly Situated?

Journal of Religious Ethics 8 (1):125 - 134 (1980)
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Abstract

It is almost commonplace to suggest that what is morally right for one person to do must also be right for anyone else similarly situated. The author suggests that this "universalization requirement" applies to only a limited sphere of the moral life, chiefly to duties of perfect obligation. Extending the requirement beyond this sphere fails to leave room for human freedom in vocation or for a clear recognition of human finitude.

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