In Modern Isonomy distinguished political theorist Gerald Stourzh develops the idea of "isonomy" or a system of equal rights for all, as an alternative to the concept of "democracy." The ideal for Stourzh is a state, and indeed a world, in which individual rights, including the right to participate in politics equally, are clearly defined, and possessed by all, as the core of a real democratic system. Stourzh begins with ancient Greek thought contrasting isonomy--which is associated (...) with the rule of the many--with oligarchies and monarchies, pursuing the implications of these different forms for the rights accorded to individuals. He moves on through history to discuss the American experiment with the development of representative democracy as well as the French revolution, after which the idea that rights should not be influenced by the status of the individual became the bedrock of a democratic system. But progress on the creation and protection of individual rights for all has been uneven. Democratic systems themselves often limit the scope of rights, particularly rights to participate in the political system. Stourzh brings this learned exploration forward to the discussions of human rights and democracy in the postwar period, with the end of the colonial empires and the fall of fascist dictatorships. He demonstrates how deeply intertwined equal rights for all, under law, as a concept and practice are with the development of democracy. He then explores the challenges to the idea of equal rights posed by economic inequality and the demands of the "security state" and concludes with a discussion of universal human rights which, under his idea of isonomy, will require bodies superior to nation-states to enforce. (shrink)

This book contains the material for a first course in pure model theory with applications to differentially closed fields.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Mandeville writes that it was said of Montaigne “that he was pretty well vers’d in the Defects of Man-kind, but unacquainted with the Excellencies of human Nature,” adding, “If I fare no worse, I shall think my self well used.” Mandeville transformed Montaigne’s suggestion into a methodology for his systematic attempt to “anatomize the invisible Parts of Man”. His tale of “the grumbling hive,” and his extensive commentary on it, were designed to demonstrate that “if Mankind could be cured of (...) the Failings they are Naturally guilty of, they would cease to be capable of being rais’d into such vast, potent and polite Societies, as they have been”. (shrink)

Nowhere has H.L.A. Hart's influence on philosophical jurisprudence in the English-speaking world been greater than in the way its fundamental project and method are conceived by its practitioners. Disagreements abound, of course. Philosophers debate the extent to which jurisprudence can or should proceed without appeal to moral or other values. They disagree about which participant perspective—that of the judge, lawyer, citizen, or “bad man”—is primary and about what taking up the participant perspective commits the theorist to. However, virtually unchallenged is (...) the view that jurisprudence is fundamentally interpretive or “hermeneutic”; that it takes for its subject a certain kind of social practice, constituted by the behavior and understandings of its participants; that its task is to explain this practice and its relations to other important social practices; and that it can properly be explained only by taking full account of participant understandings. It is, perhaps, some measure of the hegemony of Hart's influence that Ronald Dworkin mounts his fundamental challenge to Hart's positivism squarely from within this jurisprudential orthodoxy. Dworkin may have exceeded the limits of the method as Hart conceived it, but, as Stephen Perry has argued, “the seeds of Dworkin's strong version of inter-pretivism were sown by Hart himself.”. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Rhetorik wird in der Forschungsliteratur meist als eines der Entgegensetzung und des wechselseitigen Ausschlusses beschrieben. Dabei wird dem überzeitlichen Wahrheitsanspruch der Philosophie die kontextabhängige Wirkungsabsicht der Rhetorik gegenübergestellt. Während Philosophie auf sicheres Wissen und Erkenntnis ziele, gehe es der Rhetorik nicht um Wahrheit, sondern um die bloße Wahrscheinlichkeit und Meinung. Das kann allerdings nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass Philosophie und Rhetorik auf grundsätzliche Weise aufeinander verwiesen bleiben. Denn allein in der Notwendigkeit, ihren Wahrheitsanspruch öffentlich durchsetzen zu (...) müssen und in der Frage nach der adäquaten Wahl der Ausdrucksmittel, muss sich Philosophie notwendig rhetorischer Verfahren bedienen. Entsprechend hinterfragt eine rhetorische informierte Philosophie das intellektualistische Ideal einer transparenten und selbstexplikativen philosophischen Sprache. Sie unterstreicht demgegenüber die Materialität, Literarizität, Performativität und Historizität philosophischen Sprechens. In diesem Sinne zielt das Handbuch Rhetorik und Philosophie auf ein Denken, das sich des paradoxen Verhältnisses von Philosophie und Rhetorik bewusst bleibt. (shrink)

This article updates “The State of the Question in the Study of Plato” (Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1996) based on research covering the years from 1995–2015. Its three major parts examine: (1) how the mid‐twentieth‐century consensus has fared, (2) whether the new trends identified in that article have continued, and (3) identify trends either new or missed in the original article. On the whole, it shows the continuing decline of dogmatic and nondramatic Plato interpretation and the expansion and ramification of (...) the more literary, dramatic, and nondogmatic “new Platonism.” What was a growing insurgency twenty years ago can now be described as a, if not the, dominant approach. (shrink)

The basic concept of Bentham's moral and political philosophy was public utility. He linked it directly with the concept of the universal interest, which comprises a distinctive partnership of the interests of all members of the community. The ultimate end of government and aim of all of morality is ‘the advancement of the universal interest’. This essay articulates the structure of Bentham's notion of universal interest and locates it in his theory of value.

Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory).

What is it to be seen (naked) by one's cat? In “L'animal que donc je suis” (2006), the first of several lectures that he presented at a conference on the “autobiographical animal,” Jacques Derrida tells of his discomfort when, emerging from his shower one day, he found himself being looked at by his cat. Th experience leads him, by way of reflections on the question of the animal, to what is arguably the question of his philosophy: Who am I? It (...) is not so much that Derrida wants to answer this question as to be free of it. His task here is to determine the sense of it— where it leads, for example, when it comes to the nature of the diff erence between himself and his cat. Unlike animal rights activists (and unlike philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond, who have recently addressed this issue), Derrida does not want to erase this difference but wants to multiply it in order (among other things) to affirm the absolute alterity or singularity of his cat, which cannot be subsumed by any category (such as the animal). His cat is an Other in a way that no human being (supposing there to be such a thing, which Derrida is not prepared to grant) could ever be. And here is where “the question who?” leads as well, namely, to a path of escape from absorption into any identity-machine. As Derrida puts it in A Taste for the Secret: Who am I when I am not one of you? In a hospitable world one would be free not to answer. (shrink)

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that (...) matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action. (shrink)

This comprehensive reference guide includes over 140 entries on every aspect of Plato's thought.

Alienation as an aspect of the human condition has a long and storied history. Much of the attention has been focused, however, on alienation among humans themselves. Yet it is increasingly clear that we are in the process of alienating ourselves from the world and all of the creatures and objects in it. This discussion examines the second choral ode from Sophocles’ Antigone and some analyses of the content and formal aspects of Berg’s opera, Wozzeck, in the context of Adorno’s (...) concept of “distinctness without domination,” as means of providing a brief analysis of the problem of alienation considered in this larger sense. Theseconsiderations enable the isolation of several important factors that have inhibited our insight into the seriousness of this form of alienation: First, alienation among humans has effectively distracted us from the increasing urgency of our alienation from the world and the things in it. Second, blinded by our spectacular illusion of “progress,” we continue to pay for it by wreaking destruction upon the planet, the very fount of our existence. Third, morality has only too often been seen as being located in rationalized (hierarchical) relationships among humans rather than as an equally shared, spiritual relationship among the human community,the rest of the biosphere, and the very rocks and water upon which we exist. This final point suggests changes in attitude and behavior that could help us avoid the most devastating effects of this more broadly conceived form of alienation. (shrink)

Rosen argues that Bentham's utilitarian doctrine was sensitive to distributive concerns and would not countenance sacrifice of fundamental individual interests for aggregate gains in happiness in society. This essay seeks to extend and deepen Rosen's argument. It is argued that Bentham's equality-sensitive principle of utility is an expression of an individualist conception of human happiness which contrasts sharply with the orthodox utilitarian abstract conception. Evidence for this interpretation of the basic motivation of Bentham's doctrine is drawn from his view of (...) the relationship between happiness and expectations, from various expressions of his ‘each to count for one’ formula, and from his reformulations of the principle of utility itself late in his career. (shrink)

Bentham belongs to a long tradition of reflection on law according to which the nature of law can best be understood in terms of its distinctive contribution to the solution of certain deep and pervasive problems of collective action or collective rationality. I propose to take a critical look at Bentham's unique and penetrating contribution to this tradition. For this purpose I will rely on the interpretation of the main lines of Bentham's jurisprudence and its philosophical motivations which I have (...) developed inBentham and the Common Law Tradition. will not attempt further to defend it here. I wish, rather, to reflect on themes and arguments which this interpretation of Bentham's jurisprudence has uncovered. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Is and Ought Public Justification and the Principle of Utility Pestilential Nonsense: Rights, Justice, and Utility The Calculus of Pleasure Problems about Pleasure Interests Equality The Universal Interest References and further reading.

Bruns lucidly depicts the distinctions and convergences between these two lines of thought by examining the works of Mallarme, Flaubert, Joyce, Beckett, and ...

The philosopher Stanley Cavell once asked, "Can a human being be free of human nature?" _On Ceasing to Be Human_ examines philosophical as well as literary texts and contexts, in which various senses of Cavell's question might be explored and developed. During the past thirty or so years, the very concept of "being human" has been called into question within such fields as cybernetics, animal-rights theory, analytic philosophy. This book examines these issues, but its main concern is the link between (...) freedom and nonidentity that Cavell's question implies, and which turns out to be a major concern among the thinkers Bruns takes up in this book: Maurice Blanchot, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida. Each of these is, in different ways, a philosopher of the "singular" for whom the singular cannot be reduced to concepts, categories, distinctions, or the rule of identity. (shrink)

When accidents occur and people suffer injuries, who ought to bear the loss? Tort law offers a complex set of rules to answer this question, but up to now philosophers have offered little by way of analysis of these rules. In eight essays commissioned for this volume, leading legal theorists examine the philosophical foundations of tort law. Amongst the questions they address are the following: how are the notions at the core of tort practice to be understood? Is an explanation (...) based on a conception of justice feasible? How are concerns of distributive and corrective justice related? What amounts to an adequate explanation of tort law? This collection will be of interest to professionals and advanced students working in philosophy of law, social theory, political theory, and law, as well as anyone seeking a better understanding of tort law. (shrink)

Schon seit langem ist bekannt, daß Humes "theory of the passions" sowohl für seine politische als auch für seine Moralphilosophie grundlegend gewesen ist. Vor allem in den Diskussionen über Humes "account of sympathy", also seiner Darstellung der Sympathie, ist dies längst zum Gemeinplatz geworden. Doch wird das gleichermaßen wichtige "principle of comparison" oft übersehen. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Merkmale von Humes Darstellung des Mitgefühls und des "principle of comparison" und geht auf die Bedeutung dieser Prinzipien für (...) die Entstehung spezifisch moralischer Gefühle wie Mißgunst, Mitleid und Neid ein.Das "Selbst" ist unerlässlich sowohl für die Entstehung von Sympathie als auch für das Funktionieren des Prinzips des Vergleichens. Allerdings spielt es in beiden Fällen eine je unterschiedliche Rolle. Um den Unterschied zu erklären, muß man Humes Bindung an das "referencing principle" beachten. Eine Konsequenz dieses Prinzips ist, daß Selbstbewußtsein von den Meinungen, Einstellungen und Emotionen derer abhängt, die einem nahestehen. Schon seit langem ist bekannt, daß Humes "theory of the passions" sowohl für seine politische als auch für seine Moralphilosophie grundlegend gewesen ist. Vor allem in den Diskussionen über Humes "account of sympathy", also seiner Darstellung der Sympathie, ist dies längst zum Gemeinplatz geworden. Doch wird das gleichermaßen wichtige "principle of comparison" oft übersehen. Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die wichtigsten Merkmale von Humes Darstellung des Mitgefühls und des "principle of comparison" und geht auf die Bedeutung dieser Prinzipien für die Entstehung spezifisch moralischer Gefühle wie Mißgunst, Mitleid und Neid ein.Das "Selbst" ist unerlässlich sowohl für die Entstehung von Sympathie als auch für das Funktionieren des Prinzips des Vergleichens. Allerdings spielt es in beiden Fällen eine je unterschiedliche Rolle. Um den Unterschied zu erklären, muß man Humes Bindung an das "referencing principle" beachten. Eine Konsequenz dieses Prinzips ist, daß Selbstbewußtsein von den Meinungen, Einstellungen und Emotionen derer abhängt, die einem nahestehen. (shrink)