L’Afrique a participé jusqu’a présent, souvent à titre de laboratoire, au développement de la science occidentale. Les défis rencontrés par la théorie critique aujourd’hui sont l’instrumentalisation de la théorie par les gouvernements, la prolifération de pratiques critiques diverses, notamment écologique, et surtout l’émergence d’un capitalisme de l’image et de l’affect. C’est en relation avec la Chine que l’Afrique peut apporter de nouvelles réponses et relever ces défis.

The purpose of this study was to examine the effectiveness of a neuro-meditation program to support nurses during the COVID-19 pandemic. Forty-five nurses were classified into three groups based on their systolic blood pressure: normotensive, hypertensive and control. Using a parallel, randomly controlled design across a 4-week period, 10 × 30-min sessions using the Rebalance© Impulse were completed. Sleep was assessed by wrist actigraphy and subjective sleep questionnaires; perceived sleep quality, Ford Insomnia Response to Stress Test questionnaire and the Spiegel (...) Sleep Quality questionnaire. Blood pressure, resting heart rate, mean heart rate, heart rate variability index, cortisol, and alpha-amylase were also measured. Statistical analysis was completed using factorial ANOVA. Sleep improved in the G-hyp group; SSQ ; perceived sleep quality ; sleep efficiency and fragmentation index. In the G-nor group, sleep was improved to a lesser extent; perceived sleep quality. A significant time–group interaction was reported in resting heart rate, systolic blood pressure, and diastolic blood pressure with these measures being significantly reduced in the G-hyp group. RMSSD increased in the G-nor group. This initial evidence suggests that neuro-meditation reduces excessive sympathetic activity, promoting enhanced sleep quality and autonomic control during periods of increased work-related stress.Clinical Trial RegistrationThe study was conducted at Bioesterel, Sophia-Antipolis, France as a clinical trial: Neuro-meditation improves sleep quality, https://www.drks.de/ui_data_web/DrksUI.html?locale=en, DRKS00025731. (shrink)

Balancing the pros and cons of two options is undoubtedly a very appealing decision procedure, but one that has received scarce scientific attention so far, either formally or empirically. We describe a formal framework for pros and cons decisions, where the arguments under consideration can be of varying importance, but whose importance cannot be precisely quantified. We then define eight heuristics for balancing these pros and cons, and compare the predictions of these to the choices made by 62 human participants (...) on a selection of 33 situations. The Levelwise Tallying heuristic clearly emerges as a winner in this competition. Further refinements of this heuristic are considered in the discussion, as well as its relation to Take the Best and Cumulative Prospect Theory. (shrink)

This article tests human inference rationality when dealing with default rules. To study human rationality, psychologists currently use classical models of logic or probability theory as normative models for evaluating human ability to reason rationally. Our position is that this approach is convincing, but only manages to capture a specific case of inferential ability with little regard to conditions of everyday reasoning. We propose that the most general case to be considered is inference with imperfect knowledge - in the present (...) case restricted to uncertain knowledge - and that a natural framework for testing the rationality of plausible reasoning is System P. This system provides rational postulates for nonmonotonic inference. The semantic of the nonmonotonic inference is given by a possibilistic constraint introduced by Dubois and Prade (1991). This constraint states that a rule p ( q is a plausible rule if "the degree to which p ( q is possible" is greater than "the degree to which p ( (q is possible". Given the choice of this constraint, we study two supplementary postulates of rationality. Eighty-eight subjects participated in an experiment whose results confirm - provided that reflexivity and left logical equivalence would be tested in a further experiment - the rationality of human nonmonotonic inference according to the rational postulates of System P. (shrink)

Le Système de l’idéalisme transcendantal a paru en 1800 et fut traduit en français pour la première fois en 1842 par Paul Grimblot. La traduction de Christian Dubois, parue en 1978 et aujourd’hui rééditée chez Allia, est la deuxième, et dernière en date, transposition en français de ce texte. Cette traduction s’inscrivait, en 1978, dans le cadre d’un regain d’intérêt pour les études schellingiennes dans la sphère francophone, représentée par les travaux de Jean-François Courtine et Xavier Til...

Il est assez rare qu’un concept philosophique s’échappe de l’arène académique. C’est pourtant le cas du concept de spécisme, qui a fait une entrée remarquée dans la sphère publique au cours de la dernière décennie. Il est désormais au cœur du débat de société sur nos devoirs envers les animaux non humains. Hélas, ce concept et les enjeux qu’il soulève sont souvent mal compris. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui contestent sa légitimité alors qu’ils le maitrisent mal. D’autres l’utilisent plus volontiers (...) sans toutefois mieux le comprendre. Les confusions qui entourent cette notion l’empêche de contribuer à la discussion autant qu’elle le pourrait. Le présent ouvrage entend remédier à cet état de faits en donnant de la notion de spécisme une présentation à la fois assez précise pour rendre justice aux discussions philosophiques dont elle fait l’objet et suffisamment claire pour être accessible à quiconque s’intéresse au statut moral des animaux. Il se divise en deux parties. La première aborde des questions ontologiques : Qu’est-ce exactement que le spécisme ? À quelles conditions existe-t-il ? Ces conditions sont-elles remplies dans les faits ? Quant à la seconde, elle porte sur des questions éthiques : Le spécisme peut-il être justifié ? Faut-il au contraire le condamner au même titre que le racisme et le sexisme ? (shrink)

Common sense has it that animals matter considerably less than humans; the welfare and suffering of a cow, a chicken or a fish are important but not as much as the welfare and suffering of a human being. Most animal ethicists reject this “speciesist” view as mere prejudice. In their opinion, there is no difference between humans and other animals that could justify such unequal consideration. In the opposite camp, advocates of speciesism have long tried to identify a difference that (...) would fit the bill, but they have consistently seemed to fail. In light of this, some naturally began to appeal to Moorean arguments: the case against speciesism must be flawed somehow, these philosophers maintain, because speciesism is supported by a strong and widespread intuition. This chapter draws on recent findings in social psychology to criticize this defence of speciesism. It argues that the strong and widespread intuition that humans count more than animals is epistemically defective because it is causally shaped by a pair of irrelevant influences: cognitive dissonance and tribalism. Accordingly, it is no suitable basis for a Moorean argument. (shrink)

Many people believe that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals, and this “speciesist belief” plays a crucial role in the philosophical debate over the moral status of animals. In this paper, I develop a debunking argument against it. My contention is that this belief is unjustified because it is largely due to an off-track process: our attempt to reduce the cognitive dissonance generated by the “meat paradox”. Most meat-eaters believe that it is wrong to (...) harm animals unnecessarily, yet they routinely and deliberately behave in ways that cause great unnecessary suffering to animals. As recent research suggests, this practical inconsistency puts them in an unpleasant state of dissonance, which they try to escape by resolving the paradox. And they do so in part by adopting the speciesist belief—if animal suffering matters much less than human suffering, then harming animals cannot be so wrong after all. Since this belief-forming process does not track moral truth, I conclude that we are not justified in believing that human interests matter more than the similar interests of non-humans. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethic without sentience.

Oscar Horta has argued that speciesism is wrong by definition. In his view, there can be no more substantive debate about the justification of speciesism than there can be about the legality of murder, for it stems from the definition of “speciesism” that speciesism is unjustified just as it stems from the definition of “murder” that murder is illegal. The present paper is a case against this conception. I distinguish two issues: one is descriptive and the other normative. Relying on (...) philosophers’ use of the term, I first answer the descriptive question negatively: speciesism is a purely descriptive concept. Then, based on both its main functions in the philosophical and public debates and an analogy with racism, I answer the normative question negatively: speciesism should remain a purely descriptive concept. If I am correct, then speciesism neither is nor should be wrong by definition. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people’s judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which (...) deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene’s dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance. (shrink)

Research on employees’ responses to corporate social responsibility has recently accelerated and begun appearing in top-tier academic journals. However, existing findings are still largely fragmented, and this stream of research lacks theoretical consolidation. This article integrates the diffuse and multi-disciplinary literature on CSR micro-level influences in a theoretically driven conceptual framework that contributes to explain and predict when, why, and how employees might react to CSR activity in a way that influences organizations’ economic and social performance. Drawing on social identity (...) theory and social exchange theory, we delineate the different but interdependent psychological mechanisms that explain how CSR can strengthen the employee–organization relationship and subsequently foster employee-related, micro-level outcomes. Contributions of our framework to extant literature and potential extensions for future research are then discussed. (shrink)

Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. They think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal experiences. I argue (...) that this argument fails by showing that its defenders cannot maintain that its crucial premise has the kind of support needed for the argument to work, without begging the question against illusionism. (shrink)

Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from (...) discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature. (shrink)

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have recently provided an evolutionary argument for utilitarianism. They argue that most of our deontological beliefs were shaped by evolution, from which they conclude that these beliefs are unjustified. By contrast, they maintain that the utilitarian belief that everyone’s well-being matters equally is immune to such debunking arguments because it wasn’t similarly influenced. However, Guy Kahane remarks that this belief lacks substantial content unless it is paired with an account of well-being, and he adds (...) that utilitarian beliefs about wellbeing—e.g. the belief that pleasure is good and pain is bad—were probably shaped by evolution. Logically, de Lazari-Radek and Singer should therefore reject these beliefs along with the deontological beliefs that evolved. The present paper is a defense of their argument. After considering a number of unsuccessful replies to Kahane’s objection, I put forward a more promising solution: de Lazari-Radek and Singer should combine their objectivist view in metaethics with a subjectivist account of well-being, such as the desire theory. Such a hybrid account would tackle Kahane’s challenge because subjective accounts of value are immune from evolutionary debunking arguments. And it would be compatible with utilitarianism, which doesn’t fit very well with metaethical subjectivism. Before concluding, I deal with two concerns that this solution might raise: I argue that the desire theory is actually subjective enough to escape Kahane’s objection, and I deny that retreating to the combination of ethical objectivism and prudential subjectivism is ad hoc. (shrink)

In this strikingly original contribution to our understanding of Chinese philosophy,Françle;ois Julien, a French sinologist whose work has not yet appeared in English usesthe Chinese concept of shi - meaning disposition or circumstance, power or potential - as atouchstone to explore Chinese culture and to uncover the intricate and coherent structure underlyingChinese modes of thinking.A Hegelian prejudice still haunts studies of ancient Chinese civilization:Chinese thought, never able to evolve beyond a cosmological point of view, with an indifference toany notion of (...) telos, sought to interpret reality solely on the basis of itself. In thisgroundbreaking study, prejudices toward the simplicity and "naiveté" of Chinese thought, Hegelianand otherwise, are dismantled one by one to reveal the intricate and coherent structure underlyingChinese modes of thinking and representing reality.Jullien begins with a single Chinese term, shi,whose very ambivalence and disconcerting polysemy, on the one hand, and simple efficacy, on theother, defy the order of a concept. Yet shi insinuates itself into the ordering and conditioning ofreality in all its manifold and complex representations. Because shi neither gave rise to anycoherent, general analysis nor figured as one of the major concepts among Chinese thinkers, Jullienfollows its appearance from one field to another: from military strategy to politics; from theaesthetics of calligraphy and painting to the theory of literature; and from reflection on historyto "first philosophy."At the point where these various domains intersect, a fundamental intuitionassumed self-evident for centuries emerges, namely, that reality - every kind of reality - may beperceived as a particular deployment or arrangement of things to be relied upon and worked to one'sadvantage. Art or wisdom, as conceived by the Chinese, lies in strategically exploiting thepropensity that emanates from this particular configuration of reality. (shrink)

Our societies are marked by anthropocentrism: most people treat animals in ways in which they would by no means treat fellow humans. One might nonetheless expect this prejudice to be much less prevalent in animal shelters since these places are created for the very sake of non-humans and generally managed by people who truly care about animal welfare. This chapter questions this expectation. It discusses three practices that are widespread in animal shelters and yet could be suspected of anthropocentrism: killing (...) animals for lack of resources, partnering with the livestock industry, and feeding animals meat. Drawing on the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, the chapter argues that management euthanasia and cooperation with animal agriculture are acceptable in non-ideal theory even though they would be condemned by ideal theory. Then it argues that meat-based pet food should be rejected even in the non-ideal circumstances faced by animal shelters. (shrink)

The 'Metaphysics of Dasein ' is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and Time. As Heidegger was later to recall, an 'overturning' took place at that moment, more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a 'metaphysical freedom' stood at the root of Dasein (...) 's relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the mid 1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger 's attempt to free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States (...) as a whole fulfills this condition. One way to avoid this counter-intuitive consequence of materialism about consciousness is to adopt what Schwitzgebel calls an “anti-nesting principle”: a principle that states that there can be no nested forms of phenomenal consciousness and that therefore a conscious whole cannot have parts that are themselves conscious. However, Schwitzgebel then proceeds in his paper to draw up various objections, notably based on thought experiments, in order to dismiss these kinds of “anti-nesting” principles. My aim in this paper is to present a version of a sophisticated anti-nesting principle that avoids Schwitzgebel’s objections. This principle is reasonable, intuitive, and as non-arbitrary as possible. Moreover, it can resist the objections mounted by Schwitzgebel against simple anti-nesting principles. This principle helps materialists avoid the implication that the United States has its own stream of consciousness, while granting consciousness to some entities which, in many cases, are intuitive instantiators of phenomenal consciousness. This principle therefore constitutes a way out for a materialist who wants to deny that the United States is conscious. (shrink)

Vous pensez peut-être que la peine de mort est injuste ? Ou que l’avortement est moralement acceptable ? Se pourrait-il alors que vous vous trompiez ? C’est en tout cas l’avis des théoriciens de l’erreur. D’après ces philosophes, tous les jugements moraux sont faux parce qu’ils présupposent à tort l’existence de faits moraux à la fois objectifs et non naturels. Organisé autour de ce défi nihiliste, le présent ouvrage aborde les principales théories métaéthiques comme autant de tentatives, plus ou moins (...) fructueuses, de sauver la morale. Les théories qu’on y rencontre combinent invariablement une thèse psychologique (sur la nature des jugements moraux) et une thèse ontologique (sur l’existence d’une réalité morale conforme auxdits présupposés). Dans le style argumentatif sobre et précis qui caractérise la philosophie analytique, ce manuel de métaéthique – le premier en langue française – entreprend d’évaluer minutieusement un ensemble de théories sur la morale. Bien que destiné en premier lieu aux enseignants de philosophie et à leurs étudiants, il se veut accessible à tous ceux qu’intéresse l’éthique. (shrink)

Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a “rich” illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation—or a “sparse” illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete representation, which leads to drawing incorrect judgments? I (...) present this distinction and I classify the most influential illusionist theories along this line of divide. I then offer an argument against the accounts of the illusion of phenomenality in terms of sparse illusion. (shrink)

Numerous philosophers have recently tried to defend physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness against dualist intuitions, by explaining the existence of dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. David Papineau, for example, suggested that certain peculiar features of some of our concepts of phenomenal experiences (the so-called “phenomenal concepts”) led us to commit what he called the “Antipathetic Fallacy”: they gave us the erroneous impression that phenomenal experiences must be distinct from purely physical states (the “intuition of distinctness”), even though they are (...) not. Papineau’s hypothesis has been accepted, though under other names and in different forms, by many physicalist philosophers. Pär Sundström has tried to argue against Papineau’s account of the intuition of distinctness by showing that it was subjected to counterexamples. However, Papineau managed to show that Sundström’s counterexamples were not compelling, and that they could be answered within his framework. In this paper, I want to draw inspiration from Sundström, and to put forth some refined counterexamples to Papineau’s account, which cannot be answered in the same way as Sundström’s. My conclusion is that we cannot explain the intuition of distinctness as the result of a kind of “Antipathetic Fallacy”. (shrink)

In premodern China, painters used imagery not to mirror the world, but to evoke unfathomable experience. Considering this art alongside the philosophical traditions that inform it, this book explores the 'nonobject', a notion exemplified by paintings that do not seek to represent observable surroundings.

Heidegger’s critique addressed to philosophical anthropology often leads readers to forget the importance of the question of human beings in his writings. The recent publication of the Black Notebooks and some unpublished lectures shed new light on these philosophical problems and help us define more clearly what it would mean to develop the foundation of anthropological knowledge ontologically. This paper argues that while dealing with mythical existence and with the difference between animals and human beings, Heidegger seized the opportunity to (...) speculate on the ontological origins of ethical life. The paper concludes by showing how Sloterdijk’s attempt to “anthropologize” Heidegger fails to follow the demands of fundamental ontology. (shrink)

This comparative study explores 499 corporate social responsibility initiatives implemented by 178 corporations in five distinct, institutionally consistent European clusters. This study provides an empirically grounded response to calls to develop comprehensive, nuanced pictures of CSR in the composite European business environment. In so doing, the article stresses three distinct, non-exclusive approaches that characterize the embedding of CSR considerations in corporations’ strategies across Europe and the CSR challenges for corporations operating in different socio-political contexts. Furthermore, the study reaffirms the CSR (...) notion as a contextualized concept, shaped by socio-political drivers, and contributes by bridging macro-level, socio-political facets of CSR with its meso-level, organizational implications. (shrink)

This is an experimental piece of writing by François Laruelle. Via its origins in both Greek and Judeo-Christian thought, philosophy has risen up from the abysses of the world and made its assault on human identity. Philosophy dominates man, and as long as he lives under the philosophical decision or ?Ontological Statute? he lives also within an impotence of thought and within an infinite culpability. Yet ultimately man is an inalienable reality, and nothing ? not even philosophy ? can (...) substitute itself for man and for his identity. There is no reversibility between man and philosophy. Man itself is the abolition of the Statute. (shrink)

Phenomenology was born as an attack against the false constructions of traditional philosophy. Nevertheless, it soon discovered that it had an important bond to Plato’s, Descartes’ or Kant’s philosophical systems. As I show in this paper, both in Heidegger and in Husserl’s last writings, the philosophical endeavor is interpreted as a retrieval of earlier philosophical intentions. However, this does not lead them to a common interpretation of the meaning of philosophy’s history.

la 4e de couverture indique : "Nietzsche demandait : pourquoi avons-nous voulu le vrai plutôt que le non-vrai (ou l'incertitude ou l'ignorance)? La question se voudrait radicale, et même la plus radicale, mais elle est encore conçue du dedans de la tradition européenne, bien que la prenant à revers : elle ose toucher à la valeur de la vérité, mais sans sortir de sa référence : elle ne remet pas en question le monopole que la vérité à fait à la (...) pensée. Du point de vue de la sagesse, la question deviendrait : comme a-t-on pu - et fallait-il? - faire une " fixation " sur la vérité? Et si, au lieu que ce soit la sagesse qui n'aurait pas accédé a la philosophie qui, en Grèce, en se braquant sur le vrai, avait dérapé hors de la sagesse? Car si le sage est " sans idée ", comme il est dit le Confucius, c'est que toute idée avancée est déjà un parti pris sur la réalité. Aussi, en partant sur les traces estompées de la sagesse, souhaité-je revenir sur ce qui a pu échapper à la philosophie ; comme redonner consistance à son autre enfoui, expliciter sa cohérence. Autrement dit, que faisons-nous aujourd'hui de la sagesse? Et que peut être une logique de la sagesse - une " logique " sans logos?". (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru, sous une forme augmentée et corrigée, dans Le Social et le Sensible. Introduction à une anthropologie modale, Paris, Téraèdre, 2005, p. 101-118. Nous remercions François Laplantine de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici sous sa forme originelle. Nous nous proposons dans cet article d'esquisser une confrontation entre une pensée de la vie et une pensée du social. Une telle confrontation s'avère problématique et délicate. Assez souvent soit elle risque de tourner court parce que (...) - Anthropologie. (shrink)

When Heidegger takes the decision at the end of the 1920’s to « risk again the step into an authentic metaphysics », a very strong solidarity is already established between his philosophical project and that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This solidarity is testified in the recuperation Heidegger does of the idea – proper to Kant and Baumgarten – of a metaphysica naturalis. The « Metaphysics of Dasein » constitutes the last attempt – after the hermeneutics of facticity and (...) the fundamental ontology – to define philosophy starting from « human nature ». After this « step into metaphysics », Heidegger’s thought will dedicate its efforts to the well-known « Overtaking of metaphysics ». (shrink)

In this article, I argue against a widely accepted model of utterance interpretation, namely the LS model (literality‐based serial model), according to which the literal interpretation of an utterance (the proposition literally expressed by that utterance) must be computed before nonliteral interpretations can be entertained. Alleged arguments in favor of this model are shown to be fallacious, counter‐examples are provided, and alternative models are sketched.

La philosophie morale est traditionnellement divisée en trois sous-disciplines : l’éthique appliquée, qui, comme son nom l’indique, s’intéresse aux positions à adopter sur des sujets pratiques ; l’éthique normative, où s’opposent un ensemble de théories sur ce qui devrait être, sur ce qui est bon/mauvais, etc. ; et la méta-éthique, qui étudie des questions non morales, mais relatives à la morale 1 . Cette dernière définition peut paraître floue, mais c’est un flou que rend nécessaire l’hétérogénéité propre à la discipline. (...) En effet, celle-ci est elle-même divisée en plusieurs domaines : l’épistémologie morale, l’ontologie morale, la psychologie morale, la phénoménologie morale et la logique morale (l’analyse des concepts moraux). Il n’est pas impossible de croiser les domaines, à l’instar de David McNaughton qui oppose une théorie ontologique – le réalisme – à une théorie épistémologique – le non-cognitivisme. Le réalisme moral affirme l’existence de propriétés morales non réductibles à des propriétés non morales : un acte est condamnable si et seulement s’il possède, à côté de ses propriétés non morales (il s’agit d’un acte délibéré, prémédité, etc.), la propriété d’être condamnable. Et, quant à lui, le cognitivisme soutient qu’une opinion morale n’est rien de plus qu’un état cognitif, qu’une croyance. Ce que nie le non-cognitivisme. Ainsi, selon McNaughton, le principal argument contre le réalisme moral est non cognitiviste. (shrink)

The last few years have seen dramatic progress in the development of HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). These developments have been met by ethical concerns. HIV interventions are often thought to be ethically difficult. In a context which includes disagreements over human rights, controversies over testing policies, and questions about sexual morality and individual responsibility, PrEP has been seen as an ethically complex intervention. We argue that this is mistaken, and that in fact, PrEP does not raise new ethical concerns. Some (...) of the questions posed by PrEP are not specific to HIV prophylaxis, but simply standard public health considerations about resource allocation and striking a balance between individual benefit and public good. We consider sexual disinhibition in the context of private prescriptions, and conclude that only unjustified AIDS-exceptionalism or inappropriate moralism about sex supports thinking that PrEP raises new ethical problems. This negative conclusion is significant in a context where supposed ethical concerns about PrEP have been raised, and in the context of HIV exceptionalism. (shrink)