This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen (...) on whether having evidence is sufficient for having a normative reason for belief and another one from S. Street. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen (...) on whether having evidence is sufficient for having a normative reason for belief and another one from S. Street. (shrink)

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law-like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question whether this is possible and what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” (...) that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life. (shrink)

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura’s experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to (...) the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments. (shrink)

This paper suggests that the truths of religion and democracy are, respectively, theocracy and moral relativism. Religion tends toward theocracy, the thesis that religiously influenced political norms should trump secular norms. Democracy tends toward moral relativism, the thesis that society lacks agreed upon standards by which the varying and conflicting moral views therein may be adjudicated. The conflict between religion and democracy is thus unavoidable: theocracy insists that any conflict with democracy be decided in favor of the religious principles in (...) question; and the moral relativism engendered by democracy cannot be tolerated by religion. The recommendation is to act in accordance with principles that will ease the conflict by strengthening tendencies counter to the two, namely the principle of chaos (which mitigates the effects of religion) and the principle of order (which serves to mitigate the effects of democracy). (shrink)

Of late there has been a resurgence of interest in the proofs of God’s existence. Both the ontological argument and Thomistic forms of the cosmological argument have been analyzed repeatedly and well. Very little attention, however, has been given to the rather unique cosmological argument presented by Descartes in his Third Meditation. An additional reason for airing this argument is that a recent presentation of D’s cosmological argument has misconstrued its basic structure.

“Daily Mail”, “Centros”, “Überseering” and “Inspire Art”: The ECJ has triggered by applying the principle of freedom of establishment step by step the competition between EU corporate legal systems. Entrepreneurs and investors within the EU now can choose between the various corporate legal forms of the various member states when deciding where and how to carry out their business. “Corporate Business Forms in Europe” is the first compendium including a review and description of the most important types of corporate business (...) forms in the newly enlarged Europe. In particular with respect to the proposed directive concerning the transfer of the registered office of a company from one member state to another under perpetuation of its legal capacity this compendium becomes an indispensable reference book for investors/businessmen, lawyers and students providing practical information starting with the formation and ending with the winding up of the various types of corporate entities presented. The team of authors comprises lawyers and professionals from the various countries concerned with a profound background in corporate law. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate the concept of analogy in the late works of St. Thomas Aquinas, i.e., in his two Summas, and to go on to compare this with Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of “family resemblance”, in order to reveal some interesting similarities between the named linguistic-philosophical concepts of these two very different thinkers.

When the accrediting association for collegiate schools of business, AACSB International, reformulated its accreditation standards to include a systematic assessment of undergraduates’ progress in analytic and reflective thinking, our interdisciplinary team looked at available instruments. Logistical problems, concerns about validity, and an interest in assessing quantitative skills not covered in the available instruments led us to devise the Texas Assessment of Critical Thinking Skills™ (TACTS™). As part of the process we followed a suggestion from Scriven and Fisher and incorporated novel (...) multiple-rating items. We went through a lengthy process of test validation, employing both expert consultants and a large-scale comparison between performances on a standard critical thinking skills test and the TACTS™. Consequently, our university is in a position to regularly assess the progress made by undergraduates from our College of Business in acquiring the relevant analytic and reflective thinking skills. (shrink)

This essay applies a plausible model for moral growth to examples of secular and religious children’s literature. The point is that moral maturation, given this model, requires imaginary worlds on both secular and religious presuppositions. Trying to guide a child’s reading toward either religious or secular books rather than toward good literature is shown therefore to miss the mark of good parenting.