Despite much research now being published on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) investments and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) withdrawal risk, there appears to be a lack of evidence on the prospective IPO withdrawal risk associated with voluntary disclosure of ESG policies. This paper investigates the influence of ESG disclosure on IPO withdrawal by comparing voluntary ESG disclosure to conventional IPOs in the international market. A large data set is employed here, containing 33,535 failed and successful IPOs from 1995 to 2019 (...) from several nations with their own legal systems, cultural norms, and economic systems. The findings reveal that voluntary disclosure of ESG practices does significantly reduce the likelihood of an IPO withdrawal, by as much as 48%. These findings strongly suggest that organizations engaged in ESG activities perceive voluntary disclosure as an incentive, to adhere to social expectations. Consequently, reducing the asymmetry of information between IPO participants minimizes the withdrawal risk these companies face, hence diminishing doubts about their legitimacy. The results have consequences for IPO businesses, investors, researchers, and regulators. (shrink)

This study attempts to investigate the role of movie and TV series clips in enhancing EFL learners’ pragmatic competence by utilizing an experimental design. The sample of the study was 42 students from the English language department at Cihan University-Duhok, Iraq. The experiment lasted one academic semester. The participants’ English language proficiency, as determined by an IELTS test sample, was intermediate, and then they were randomly split into two groups, namely experimental and control. Before and after the treatment, a Written (...) Discourse Completion Test served as a pre-and post-test given to the two groups to assess statistically significant differences between them. The experimental group received direct instruction on request and suggestion speech acts via the presentation of the carefully chosen movie and TV series clips. In contrast, the control group was exposed to a minimal amount of pragmatics through printed texts. The findings demonstrated that the experimental group outperformed the control group. More precisely, the findings revealed that movie and TV series clips had a significant influence on learners’ production of requests and suggestions. Considering the above findings, the researchers propose EFL teachers apply movie and TV series clips to improve their Students’ pragmatic competence in class. (shrink)

Au-delà du cliché du savant fou, il semble qu'il y ait un vrai problème d'équilibre mental chez les plus grands mathématiciens. Le Russe Perelman, le Français Grothendieck, l'Allemand Cantor et l'Autrichien Gôdel en sont des exemples frappants. À l'issue d'une étude minutieuse, Fouad Laroui distingue trois formes de folie chez les mathématiciens, qui toutes trois lient Dieu à leur discipline il s'agit de se mesurer à lui dans une quête de l'infini, de voir sa Face dans la vérité absolue, (...) ou de le dépasser dans un formalisme débridé et sans limites. Mais le chemin de Dieu passe-t-il par l'intelligence et le calcul? La vérité du monde est-elle atteignable? Une telle quête, si exaltante soit-elle, n'est-elle pas une forme de démesure qui appelle la punition? Phobies, névroses et psychoses, troubles divers s'ensuivent, que la haute voltige intellectuelle crée ou renforce... Dans cette courte mais brillante incursion dans l'histoire et la philosophie des mathématiques. Fouad Laroui met en scène des personnalités étonnantes aux destins fulgurants, parfois tragiques, toujours passionnants."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Supervenient libertarianism maintains that indeterminism may exist at a supervening agency level, consistent with determinism at a subvening physical level. It seems as if this approach has the potential to break the longstanding deadlock in the free will debate, since it concedes to the traditional incompatibilist that agents can only do otherwise if they can do so in their actual circumstances, holding the past and the laws constant, while nonetheless arguing that this ability is compatible with physical determinism. However, we (...) argue that supervenient libertarianism faces some serious problems, and that it fails to break us free from this deadlock within the free will debate. (shrink)

Since our moral and legal judgments are focused on our decisions and actions, one would expect information about the neural underpinnings of human decision-making and action-production to have a significant bearing on those judgments. However, despite the wealth of empirical data, and the public attention it has attracted in the past few decades, the results of neuroscientific research have had relatively little influence on legal practice. It is here argued that this is due, at least partly, to the discussion on (...) the relationship of the neurosciences and law mixing up a number of separate issues that have different relevance on our moral and legal judgments. The approach here is hierarchical; more and less feasible ways in which neuroscientific data could inform such judgments are separated from each other. The neurosciences and other physical views on human behavior and decision-making do have the potential to have an impact on our legal reasoning. However, this happens in various different ways, and too often appeal to any neural data is assumed to be automatically relevant to shaping our moral and legal judgments. Our physicalist intuitions easily favor neural-level explanations to mental-level ones. But even if you were to subscribe to some reductionist variant of physicalism, it would not follow that all neural data should be automatically relevant to our moral and legal reasoning. However, the neurosciences can give us indirect evidence for reductive physicalism, which can then lead us to challenge the very idea of free will. Such a development can, ultimately, also have repercussions on law and legal practice. (shrink)

Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, (...) it does not appear at all obvious that the agent can be held responsible. Present popular FSCs include alternatives that are ambiguous in their significance, and when the examples are sharpened to remove this ambiguity, they lose their force. Moreover, the proponent of such examples faces a problem: We can easily construct scenarios in which any alternatives are obviously insignificant, and in such scenarios, we are not intuitively inclined to suppose the agent is responsible. The proponent of new FSCs must therefore distinguish any alternatives she includes from the sorts included in these scenarios. The difference must now be such that this helps to make it seem intuitively likely that the agent is responsible where the agent otherwise would not appear responsible, and these alternatives are irrelevant to any judgment about whether the agent is responsible. I maintain that it is impossible to achieve both of these goals at once. (shrink)

Pereboom has formulated a Frankfurt-style counterexample in which an agent is alleged to be responsible despite the fact that there are only non-robust alternatives present (Pereboom, Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities, 2003; Phil Explor 12(2):109–118, 2009). I support Widerker’s objection to Pereboom’s Tax Evasion 2 example (Widerker, J Phil 103(4):163–187, 2006) (which rests on the worry that the agent in this example is derivatively culpable as opposed to directly responsible) against Pereboom’s recent counterarguments (...) to this objection (Pereboom 2009). Building on work by Moya (J Phil 104:475–486, 2007; Critica 43(128):3–26, 2011) and Widerker (Widerker 2006), I argue that there is good reason to measure the robustness of alternatives in terms of comparative, rather than non-comparative likelihood of exemption, where the important factor for blame is whether the agent is “doing her reasonable best” to avoid blameworthy behaviour. I maintain that an agent only ever appears responsible when alternatives are robust in this sense. In Pereboom’s examples, both Tax Evasion 2, and his more recent version, Tax Evasion 3 (Pereboom 2009), I maintain the robustness of the alternatives, so understood, is unclear. We can clear up any ambiguity by sharpening the examples, and the result is that the agent appears responsible when the alternatives are made clearly robust, and does not appear responsible when alternatives appear clearly non-robust. The comparative nature of our judgements about blame, I maintain helps to explain the continuing appeal of the “leeway-incompatibilist” viewpoint. (shrink)

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not (...) justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them. (shrink)

Through a close reading of the works of the Ancient Greek Cynics , the Marquis de Sade , and Friedrich Nietzsche , this dissertation explores "ethics of destruction" that undermine set goals and determinate approaches to the world and that confront dominant social-historical institutions while privileging an approach to philosophy as a way of living and of relating to the world. Ethics of destruction affirm difference and irreducible singularities and undermine inherited beliefs and traditions; they reject prescribed social values set (...) on universality, transcendence, and fixity, and embrace singularity, indeterminacy, and transformation. ;The ethics of destruction described in this dissertation involve practices that oppose any domination and that attempt to do justice to what is "hidden and forbidden" and "ex-communicated" in the name of what has been constructed as life. The Cynics, Sade, and Nietzsche engaged in different ethics of destruction that led them towards transforming themselves and towards "becoming tyche," "becoming chaos," or "becoming fatum" respectively. These ethics privilege the multiple, unlimited, and indeterminate at the basis of something that can no longer be called "ontology" but that can be designated as "ways of living." They also accentuate the permeation and stratification of an unlimited, or rather an ungraspable, multiplicity of sensations, feelings, emotions, events, interpretations, etc., at the basis of what can no longer be called "epistemology" but that can be designated as "ways of relating to the world." The particular ways of living and of relating to the world associated with ethics of destruction are shown to privilege practices that open pathways towards "multiplicity.". (shrink)

The paper will draw on Foucault’s the last College de France lectures of to present his exploration of Cynic self-transformative practices and self-subjectivizing “ways of living” associated with social and political transfor-mation of ontology - of “life” and not just the “world” - as politics of difference, otherness, and alterity. For Foucault subjectivity is a historical production shaped through discursive practices immersed with social practices, where the transcription of power relations reflects various forms of governmentality as well as different “regimes” (...) and “dispositifs”, combining various techniques, mechanisms, relations, effects etc.. Subjectivity is not a socially fixed determinate product but “techniques of living” that provide the foundation for the social and discursive practices and subjectivization and self-subjectivization processes, but as a foundational horizon that is open, contingent, and always shifting. Foucault’s late focus on the “care of the self” and “parrhesia” not only complements his analyses of regimes of truth or of mechanisms, techniques, processes, and powers associated with various forms of governmentality, but provides the final chapter of his social and political ontology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, I explore whether the alternatives could be physically undifferentiated, despite their moral difference. The reason there is an ineliminable moral (...) difference is because there is an ineliminable causal one: The agent’s choice must be caused by his own inclinations in one sequence, but by Black’s manipulation in the other. Whether this causal difference entails a physical one depends on whether we suppose causal relations conform to Humean supervenience. The denial of the latter requires us to either reject any broadly Humean view of causation, or else to suppose that we can individuate events or their qualities independently of the physical facts. If these are coherent possibilities, such examples may show that physically differentiated alternatives are not required for moral responsibility. This could support compatibilism, but only if such examples adequately parallel determinism, and I remain sceptical on this point. (shrink)

The “Averroism” of Ibn Ṭumlūs (d. 620/1223) has already been attested to by both biographers and textual evidence. Conversely, a close reading of a section in his Kitāb al-Qiyās of his Mukhtaṣar fī al-mantiq (Compendium on Logic) reveals that this “Averroism” has a specific resonance. Unlike Ibn Rushd (d. 595/1198), Ibn Ṭumlūs belongs to this group of philosophers who dedicated a special section to the examination of jurisprudential inferences, titled by him “al-Qawl fī al-maqāyīs al-fiqhiyyah”, which is a part of (...) his Kitāb al-Qiyās. In this article, first, I will introduce the text of Ibn Ṭumlūs, and present its teaching by placing it in its intellectual context, namely in the light of al-Fārābī’s, al-Ghazālī’s, and Ibn Rushd’s relevant texts. Then, I provide an English translation followed by a critical edition of the Arabic text. The purpose is to highlight the value (and limitations) of Ibn Ṭumlūs’s effort, based on al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Ibn Rushd, to apply Aristotelian syllogistic model to the jurisprudential inferences. (shrink)

While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, (...) we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will. (shrink)

Science lessons using inquiry only or history of science with inquiry were used for explicit reflective nature of science instruction for second-, third-, and fourth-grade students randomly assigned to receive one of the treatments. Students in both groups improved in their understanding of creative NOS, tentative NOS, empirical NOS, and subjective NOS as measured using VNOS-D as pre- and post-test surveys. Social and cultural context of science was not accessible for the students. Students in second, third, and fourth grades were (...) able to attain adequate views of empirical NOS, the role of observation and inference, creative and imaginative NOS, and subjective NOS. Students were not able to express adequate views of socially and culturally embedded NOS. Most gains in NOS eroded by the next school year, except for tentative NOS for both groups and creative NOS for the inquiry group. (shrink)

I examine Manuel Vargas's revisionist justification for continuing with our responsibility-characteristic practices in the absence of basic desert. I query his claim that this justification need not depend on how we settle questions about the content of morality, arguing that it requires us to reject the Kantian principle that prohibits treating anyone merely as a means. I maintain that any convincing argument against this principle would have to be driven by concerns that arise within the sphere of moral theory itself, (...) whereas Vargas's argument draws solely on concerns about the expensive metaphysics involved in a libertarian conception of freedom. I argue that this amounts not just to changing the concept of free will by stipulation, but also (more problematically) to changing our moral principles by stipulation. (shrink)

This study examines the use of an explicit, reflective method for teaching the difference and relationship between scientific theories and laws to ninth-grade students. Students reflected individually and then as a whole class on theories and laws using a Venn diagram, both before and after reading short articles describing features of theories and laws that provided an explicit challenge to their naïve prior conceptions. In small groups, they chose a theory or law, researched it, constructed a poster, and did a (...) gallery walk. Examination of students’ Venn diagrams and answers to a single question from VNOS-C given as both a pre- and post-test showed that prior to the lesson, all students except for one held more naïve views of both the difference between theories and laws and the nature of scientific theories. After the lesson, more than a third of them had improved their conceptions to more informed, and nearly a quarter understood that there is not a hierarchical relationship between scientific theories and laws. (shrink)

Bringing together international research on nature of science representations in science textbooks, this unique analysis provides a global perspective on NOS from elementary to college level and discusses the practical implications in various regions across the globe. Contributing authors highlight the similarities and differences in NOS representations and provide recommendations for future science textbooks. This comprehensive analysis is a definitive reference work in science education.

A “contrastive explanation” explains not only why some event A occurred, but why A occurred as opposed to some alternative event B. Some philosophers argue that agents could only be morally responsible for their choices if those choices have contrastive explanations, since they would otherwise be “luck infested”. Assuming that contrastive explanations cannot be offered for causally undetermined events, this requirement entails that no one could be held responsible for a causally undetermined choice. Such arguments challenge incompatibilism, since they entail (...) that causal determinism is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. However, I argue that for a significant class of choices, even if we stipulate that they are determined, we will be unable to provide a relevant contrastive explanation. Hence causal determinism is no remedy for luck infestation, and compatibilists do not fare much better than incompatibilists in the face of this requirement. This should serve to weaken its philosophical appeal. (shrink)

Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Haji’s argument requires not only that we embrace an ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle, but also that we adopt the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’. I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (...) principle alone. I argue that despite what look like initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weaker conclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actually have good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moral deliberation at all. (shrink)

The Quran Beheld came out auspiciously in the month of the Qurʾān, Ramadan 1443 (April 2022). This carefully crafted, 2.25kg (5lb) leatherbound muṣḥaf in the ca.

Abstract‘Relativists' and ‘absolutists' about truth often see their own camp as promoting virtues, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, and see the opposing camp as fostering vices, like closed-mindedness and arrogance. Relativism is accused of fostering these vices because it entails that each person’s beliefs are automatically right for the person who holds them. How can we be humble or open-minded if we cannot concede that we might be wrong? Absolutism is accused of fostering these vices because the view is (...) seen as entailing certainty. This also seems to preclude us from conceding that we could be wrong. However, no relativist defends the Protagorean version of relativism that entails infallibilism. And no absolutist posits infallible certainty. Fallibilism really is a precondition of various virtues, but both camps take themselves to be defending fallibilist positions against opponents who they take to be committed to infallibilism. Philosophers may inadvertently end up promoting precisely the sort of infallibilism they oppose by creating a false dichotomy and caricaturing the opposing camp. This underscores the importance of interpretive charity in both academic and public debate. (shrink)

If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn’t preclude responsibility (the Luck Problem) and that it might enhance it (the Enhancement Problem). A ‘strong luck claim’ motivates the Luck Problem: if an agent’s choice is undetermined, then her mental life will be causally irrelevant to her choice, whichever way she decides. A ‘weak luck claim’ motivates the Enhancement Problem: if an agent’s choice is undetermined, then even if her mental life is causally relevant (...) to her choice, whichever way she decides, we cannot explain how she _settles_ her choice. Only the weak luck claim is plausible. However, its plausibility depends on our accepting that we could only settle our choices if they are settled by additional exercises of agency. If we instead understand the process of settling decisions in procedural terms, we can begin to sketch a solution to the Enhancement Problem. (shrink)

Measures aimed at general deterrence are often thought to be problematic on the basis that they violate the Kantian prohibition against sacrificing the interests of some as a means of securing a greater good. But even if this looks like a weak objection because deterrence can be justified as a form of societal self-defence, such measures may be regarded as problematic for another reason: Harming in self-defence is only justified when it’s necessary, i.e., when there are no relatively harmless alternatives. (...) While there are few harmless ways to remove the threat posed by dangerous individuals, there are many relatively harmless methods for preventing crime. We can bracket off our preventative failings when we think of present threats, but we cannot do so when contemplating alternative preventative measures. (shrink)

Incompatibilism is often accused of incoherence because it introduces randomness in support of freedom. I argue that the sort of randomness that's thought to be detrimental to freedom results not from denying causal determinism, so much as denying what we might call ‘rational determinism’: denying that agents' actions are determined by their reasons for acting. Compatibilists argue that introducing the ability to decide differently allows agents to make choices that are irrational, and this undermines rather than furthering freedom. I maintain (...) that this argument neglects scenarios in which reasons are in conflict with one another. In such scenarios, we can preserve rationality without claiming that the agent's choices are rationally determined. (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation into free will, and the role of alternative possibilities. I defend an incompatibilist notion of freedom, but argue that such freedom is not exercised in all cases of decision-making. I begin by considering the debate surrounding Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument that alternative possibilities are irrelevant to freedom. I argue that the main disagreement can be best understood by considering the dispute surrounding the 'Flicker-of-Freedom' objection, which contends that there are still alternatives left open in Frankfurt's (...) example. Compatibilists have argued that any such alternatives are outside the agent’s voluntary control and hence irrelevant. But the arguments for this conclusion commit the compatibilist to the more general claim that volitions are not within agents' voluntary control, and incompatibilism is generally motivated by a rejection this claim - so if we could support this claim, we would refute incompatibilism without appealing to Frankfurt’s argument. This disagreement about whether volitions are within agents' voluntary control has not received much attention in recent years, despite figuring implicitly in the debate. But in previous centuries, this figured explicitly as the main focus. I consider the historical debate, started by the famous dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall, and continuing throughout the eighteenth century. Although the libertarian position better captures our ordinary conception of freedom, compatibilists argue that it introduces freedom-undermining irrationality, and randomness of the sort that is either unhelpful or incoherent. Whilst for many cases of decision-making, these challenges are justified, they are not justified in cases involving a particular kind of reasons conflict. I argue that decisions are free in cases of this sort, but we cannot have incompatibilist freedom more generally. However, I also argue that these are the most important cases, given the nature of our concerns about freedom. By restricting the domain of incompatibilist freedom to just these cases, we can avoid introducing irrationality, or randomness of the sort that has made incompatibilism seem incoherent, whilst preserving the incompatibilist's intuition that an important sense of freedom rests on alternative possibilities. (shrink)

This paper examines Dworkin's rejection of external scepticism about ethics and his rejection of incompatibilist accounts of moral responsibility. I argue that his rejection of external scepticism is defensible, but that he errs in treating the challenge posed by incompatibilist accounts of moral responsibility as a parallel form of external scepticism. Incompatibilism only appears to be an external challenge if we make certain assumptions about the motivations for incompatibilism, and about the relation between moral responsibility and other values. I argue (...) that we ought to reject these assumptions, and can do so consistent with embracing Dworkin's broader philosophical project. (shrink)

This chapter aims to provide an outline of the archaeological remains reflecting the Ottoman presence on the Middle Nile, with preliminary interpretation and suggestions for areas in which future research could most profitably concentrate. The Nubian frontier region of the Ottoman Empire is one of its least-known areas. It raises numerous questions relating to both Sudanese and Ottoman history, as well as the nature of relations between the Ottomans and the Funj, in which the Ottoman garrisons on the Middle Nile (...) must have played an intermediary role. While Sai is traditionally thought of as marking the southernmost extremity of Ottoman rule, the evidence of some of the sites above suggests that Ottoman rule extended further south, towards Hannek. (shrink)

Ethical principles are among the topics that are widely emphasised in the Islamic society. Ethics is a set of values, do's and don'ts that can play an important role in the effective management of organisations. If employees of organisations, especially medical staff, are working in the atmosphere of Islamic ethics, they show functional behaviours in line with the goals and missions of organisation. Due to the direct relationship and treatment of nurses with recipients of medical services, nurses' behaviours have significant (...) impact on the quality of services provided by medical centres. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between Islamic ethics and commitment of 1100 Muslim nurses in Indonesia in 2021. This study was performed by descriptive-analytical correlational method. Data were collected using Islamic ethics and organisational commitment questionnaires and measured by Pearson correlation coefficient in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and structural equation modelling analysis (SEM) in linear structural relationships (LISREL). The results indicate that Islamic ethics have significant and positive relationship with nurses' commitment as p = 0.542 and t = 5.63. CONTRIBUTION: According to the research findings, it can be concluded that commitment of nurses can be improved by applying Islamic ethics in medical centres. (shrink)

Dear editorOrgans transplantation is the solution for many end stage insufficiencies, but organ shortage is still matter of debate. As a consequence, organ procurement (OP) remains currently the best way to provide organs in western countries. Besides, the news of the death of a loved one, especially when he is young and dies in violent circumstances, can be a devastating event for families. In those conditions, the process of donation request from the coordinators may be difficult and requires experience and (...) “tact”. Despite these precautions, refusals are not rare.An 18 year-old-patient was transported in shock after a car accident to our hospital. Emergent laparotomy was performed for mesenteric and hepatic trauma requiring liver packing. She also presented a cervical and cerebral trauma with a fast deterioration of the neurological status. A tentorial herniation was quickly suspected. The family had been contacted and the severity of the situation explained without mentioning brain. (shrink)

Researchers have raised concerns about teachers’ ability to embed nature of science in their science instruction, a complicated situation that is certainly impacted by the availability of adequate resources to assist K-12 science teachers. In light of the implementation of the ideas from the Framework for K-12 Science Education and the Next Generation Science Standards in the USA, this study sought to identify and evaluate resources aimed at guiding NOS instruction. A search of the National Science Teachers Association database for (...) Next Generation Science Standards -aligned instructional resources resulted in an analytical sample of eight lessons. All materials accompanying these lessons were analyzed for their representations of 10 NOS aspects. The evaluation of these materials revealed a prevalence of implicit, naïve representations in the sample lessons. Examination of the connections to NOS in these lessons leads to a set of recommendations to improve the quantity and quality of NOS representations in future NGSS-aligned instructional resources. The analytical approach used and the issues raised about the presentation and treatment of NOS in precollege lessons are of interest to the broader science education community. (shrink)