Through a close reading of the works of the Ancient Greek Cynics , the Marquis de Sade , and Friedrich Nietzsche , this dissertation explores "ethics of destruction" that undermine set goals and determinate approaches to the world and that confront dominant social-historical institutions while privileging an approach to philosophy as a way of living and of relating to the world. Ethics of destruction affirm difference and irreducible singularities and undermine inherited beliefs and traditions; they reject prescribed social values set (...) on universality, transcendence, and fixity, and embrace singularity, indeterminacy, and transformation. ;The ethics of destruction described in this dissertation involve practices that oppose any domination and that attempt to do justice to what is "hidden and forbidden" and "ex-communicated" in the name of what has been constructed as life. The Cynics, Sade, and Nietzsche engaged in different ethics of destruction that led them towards transforming themselves and towards "becoming tyche," "becoming chaos," or "becoming fatum" respectively. These ethics privilege the multiple, unlimited, and indeterminate at the basis of something that can no longer be called "ontology" but that can be designated as "ways of living." They also accentuate the permeation and stratification of an unlimited, or rather an ungraspable, multiplicity of sensations, feelings, emotions, events, interpretations, etc., at the basis of what can no longer be called "epistemology" but that can be designated as "ways of relating to the world." The particular ways of living and of relating to the world associated with ethics of destruction are shown to privilege practices that open pathways towards "multiplicity.". (shrink)

The paper will draw on Foucault’s the last College de France lectures of to present his exploration of Cynic self-transformative practices and self-subjectivizing “ways of living” associated with social and political transfor-mation of ontology - of “life” and not just the “world” - as politics of difference, otherness, and alterity. For Foucault subjectivity is a historical production shaped through discursive practices immersed with social practices, where the transcription of power relations reflects various forms of governmentality as well as different “regimes” (...) and “dispositifs”, combining various techniques, mechanisms, relations, effects etc.. Subjectivity is not a socially fixed determinate product but “techniques of living” that provide the foundation for the social and discursive practices and subjectivization and self-subjectivization processes, but as a foundational horizon that is open, contingent, and always shifting. Foucault’s late focus on the “care of the self” and “parrhesia” not only complements his analyses of regimes of truth or of mechanisms, techniques, processes, and powers associated with various forms of governmentality, but provides the final chapter of his social and political ontology. (shrink)