Aesthetic chills occur in artistic, scientific and religious context. We introduce a theoretical framework relating them to humans’ vital need for cognition. We discuss the implications of such a framework and the plausibility of our hypothesis. Numerous references to chills are introduced.

A new, expanded, and reorganized edition of a collection of texts that present a fuller scope to Guattari's thinking from 1977 to 1985. This new edition of Soft Subversions expands, reorganizes, and develops the original 1996 publication, offering a carefully organized arrangement of essays, interviews, and short texts that present a fuller scope to Guattari's thinking from 1977 to 1985. This period encompasses what Guattari himself called the “Winter Years” of the early 1980s—the ascent of the Right, the spread of (...) environmental catastrophe, the rise of a disillusioned youth with diminished prospects for career and future, and the establishment of a postmodernist ideology that offered solutions toward adaptation rather than change—a period with discernible echoes twenty years later. Following Semiotext's release last season of the new, expanded edition of Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972–1977, this book makes Guattari's central ideas and concepts fully available in the format that had been best suited to Guattari's temperament: the guerrilla-styled intervention of the short essay and interactive dialogue. This edition includes such previously unpublished, substantive texts as “Institutional Intervention” and “About Schools,” along with new translations of “War, Crisis, or Life” and “The Nuclear State,” interviews and essays on a range of topics including adolescence and Italy, dream analysis and schizo-analysis, Marcel Proust and Jimmy Carter, as well as invaluable autobiographical documents such as “I Am an Idea-Thief” and “So What.”. (shrink)

It is being increasingly recognized that the Saussurean dictum of “the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign” is in conflict with the pervasiveness of the phenomenon commonly known as “sound symbolism”. After first presenting a historical overview of the debate, however, we conclude that both positions have been exaggerated, and that an adequate explanation of sound symbolism is still lacking. How can there, for example, be (perceived) similarity between expressionsand contents across different sensory modalities? We offer an answer, based on the (...) Peircian notion of iconic ground, and G. Sonesson’s distinction betweenprimary and secondary iconicity. Furthermore, we describe an experimental study, in a paradigm first pioneered by W. Kohler, and recently popularized by V.Ramachandran, in which we varied vowels and consonants in fictive word-forms, and conclude that both types of sounds play a role in perceiving an iconic ground between the word-forms and visual figures. The combination of historical conceptual analysis, semiotic explication and psychological experimentationpresented in this article is characteristic of the emerging paradigm of cognitive semiotics. (shrink)

This volume includes Felix Noeggerath's dissertation from 1916, published here for the first time in a reliable critical edition. The dissertation represents a daring and far-reaching re-conceptualization of Kantian and neo-Kantian thought that consists in "critique of anti-rationalism," especially in the form of vitalism. Both Kant's and Hermann Cohen's philosophies can be experienced anew through the far-reaching optic that Noeggerath developed - an optic that he reiterates and develops into a comprehensive theory of art in a 1951 essay - republished (...) here, as well. The introduction by Hartwig Wiebebach provides an overview and incisive analysis of Noeggerath's philosophical program, while the afterword by Peter Fenves describes in detail the effect of Noeggerath's thought on Walter Benjamin's own attempts at a critique of anti-rationalism. Altogether, the volume provides a new point of access to the important legacy of neo-Kantian thought in the early twentieth century not only in terms of the systematic philosophy, but also in relation to the theory of art and the philosophy of modern science. (shrink)

Philosophers have offered many arguments to explain why historical injustices require reparations. This paper raises an unnoticed challenge for almost all of them. Most theories of reparations attempt to meet two intuitions: (1) Reparations are owed for a past wrong and (2) the content of reparations must reflect the historical injustice. I argue that necessarily no monistic theory can meet both intuitions. I do this by showing that any theory that can meet intuition (1) necessarily cannot also meet intuition (2). (...) This result suggests that a theory of reparations must either sacrifice one of the two intuitions or be pluralist. I argue that we ought to prefer the pluralist over the monistic theory. I sketch the pluralist theory and I defend it by considering an objection about the way it can resolve conflicts. (shrink)

This paper discusses the pluralist theory of reparations for historical injustice offered by Daniel Butt (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24(5):1161–75, 2021). Butt attempts to vindicate purely past-regarding corrective duties in response to Alasia Nuti’s historical-structural model of reparations. I agree with Butt that reparative justice requires both past-regarding and future-looking structural duties. And I agree with him that Nuti’s model leaves out purely past-regarding duties. I argue, however, that Butt does not offer a genuinely pluralist account. I present minimal (...) necessary conditions for past-regarding (corrective) justice and demonstrate that the past-regarding duties Butt advocates do not meet these conditions. The past-regarding duties Butt offers collapse into the kinds of distributive (structural) duties from which he attempts to separate them. Yet, I suggest these shortcomings are instructive and sketch a path forward for a genuinely pluralist account of reparations. A genuinely pluralist account must follow this path in order to vindicate the intuitions that motivate both past-regarding duties and the structural injustice model. (shrink)

Contemporary liberal states must provide an answer to the “question of cultural diversity”, requiring a principled way to determine which minority cultural practices a state must accommodate and support. (Liberal egalitarian) multiculturalism answers this question neatly by creating a dichotomy between national minorities and ethnic minorities (the national/ethnic “dichotomy”). Where national minorities are entitled to extensive and far-reaching cultural rights, ethnic minorities are entitled to significantly fewer cultural rights and accommodations. This dichotomy is enacted through a distributive logic that allocates (...) cultural rights to achieve equal individual autonomy. But the dichotomy is also influenced by the ways these groups were incorporated into the state. Their modes of incorporation are different and, thus, they have different requirements to achieve equally autonomous lives. Critics have challenged multiculturalism by questioning this dichotomy. They have suggested that the dichotomy does not adequately capture differences in kinds of minority groups and their entitlements. This paper defends the dichotomy by offering a supplementary principle to liberal egalitarian multiculturalism: the reparative multicultural principle. This principle allocates cultural rights as part of reparative entitlements for historical and ongoing injustices committed against minority groups. Supplementing multiculturalism in this way more accurately captures the idea of the historical mode of incorporation that inspires the dichotomy and can help resolve some the objections to multiculturalism. (shrink)

Every cultural phenomenon is multifaceted and only with great difficulty can it fit into the framework of one general concept. The term ‘sport’ is such a broad concept, because the great wealth of...

Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

« The vertigo of an alternative Japanese path: Tokyo renounces its role as Eastern capital of occidental capitalism and becomes instead, the Northern capital of the emancipation of the Third World. ».

Während "Logik der Forschung" als Wissenschaftstheorie sich längst etabliert hat, steht eine ebenso notwendige "Ethik der Forschung" als Wissenschaftsmoral noch aus. Dazu liefert die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Francis Bacon wichtige Bausteine: Allgemeines Menschheitswohl als letztes Ziel aller Forschung; Betonung des unabhängigen Selbstdenkens; Forschertugenden wie Wahrhaftigkeit, Hoffnung, Demut, Menschenliebe; Anerkennung von sittlichen Grenzen des Wissens. Hingegen ist zugunsten einer engagierten Eigenverantwortlichkeit der Wissenschaftler vor Bacons Unterwürfigkeit gegenüber der Staatsgewalt zu warnen.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 737-742.

This paper argues that the Husserl—Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl's internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the (...) assumption that immanence equates with internal. This, however, is not the case as can be seen once the reduction is understood not as setting aside the existence of the world, but rather a reflection on its meaning. Turning to Heidegger, I argue that his commitment to a form of the phenomenological reduction precludes him from being either a semantic or a social externalist. The place of authenticity and the first person perspective in his work derive from his phenomenological commitments, which can be seen in his accounts of discourse and language and of falling (Verfallen). I then go on to briefly outline a more plausible basis for understanding the difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies in terms of their respective emphases on logic and on poetics. (shrink)

Formulating a metaphysical definition of human play faces three main difficulties. First, for many years the very possibility, or need, for such a definition has been questioned. Second, very often...

The essays in this collection explore our reliance on experts within a historical context and across a wide range of fields, including agriculture, engineering, health sciences and labour management. Contributors argue that experts were highly aware of their audiences and used performance to gain both scientific and popular support.

This paper explores whether human proactivity can be considered an expression of free will. The discussion involves two paradigms, which are mutually complementary and encompass psychological proactivity and reactivity. Both paradigms raise the question of linear and non-linear determinism, which inevitably leads to the issue of free will. The analysis attempts to find a compromise between linear and non-linear determinism through the approach of human dialectical complexity (Lebed & Bar-Eli, 2013). This refers to the relationships of two types of complex (...) subsystems within a human: the perceptual-motor dynamic system (PMDS), which is mostly determined by linear impacts and expressed through reactive behavior, and the “free-will”11. The authors employ the term “free will” in a metaphorical sense and do not put forth philosophical arguments for this consideration. complex system (FCS), which is mostly determined by non-linear redundant determinism and expressed through proactive dynamics. In summary, it is concluded that there cannot be a categorical assertion of the permanent existence of free will in human functioning. The human dialectical complexity expressed by both proactivity and reactivity causes the “floating” presence of free will depending on the prevalence of proactive control factors and the non-linear determination of a living human system. (shrink)

This study is an inductive approach to investigating and acquiring knowledge of nature in African culture. It begins, without any assumption of foreknowledge, but without any overindulgence, with a brief exposition of the meaning of induction. It analyses, defuses and rejects the attempted arguments made recently by some scholars that induction is not a part of the African reasoning faculty, that it is western exclusive and that most traditional beliefs are irrational, superstitious and non-inferential. It continues with a brief analysis (...) of the African engagement with inductive reasoning, and thereafter, connects induction and the natural environment by concretely analysing some ways the African understands and acquires knowledge of the natural environment through inductive reasoning particularly in traditional African society. It made a demonstrative inquiry into these ways with medicine, agriculture, science, technology, time, and season, among others, and how such thought patterns and the resultant knowledge informs the African beliefs and practices. The study concurrently argues that the African inductive understanding of nature is a demonstration of the inductive creativity, skill and competence of traditional African people. It concludes by arguing that if it is established that the traditional Africans acquire knowledge of nature inductively and shows how this knowledge is acquired, it would concurrently have been established that Africans are capable of inductive logic, whose components includes inferences and rationality. The study adopts the conceptual and critical methods of philosophical analyses. (shrink)