Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 389-391.

There is consistent and strong empirical evidence for social inequalities in health, as a vast and fast growing literature shows. In recent years, these findings have helped to move health equity high on international research and policy agendas. This paper examines how the empirical identification of social inequalities in health relates to a normative judgment about health inequities and puts forward an approach which embeds the pursuit of health equity within the general pursuit of social justice. It defends an indirect (...) approach to health equity, which views social inequalities in health as unjust in so far as they are the result of an unjust basic structure of society in Rawls’ sense. (shrink)

This book offers a systematic treatment of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. It argues that democratic procedures are essential for political legitimacy because of the need to respect value pluralism and because of the learning process that democratic decision-making enables. It proposes a framework for distinguishing among the different ways in which the requirements of democratic legitimacy have been interpreted. Peter then uses this framework to identify and defend what appears as the most plausible conception of democratic legitimacy. According to (...) this conception, democratic legitimacy requires that the decision-making process satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. (shrink)

Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of mutual accountability that characterize appropriately conducted (...) deliberation. I will argue that it only comes into view from the second-person standpoint. I shall explain what the second-person standpoint in the epistemic context entails and how it compares to Stephen Darwall’s interpretation of the second-person standpoint in ethics. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and of the decisions—about laws, policies, and candidates for political office—made within them. This entry will survey the main answers that have been given to the following questions. First, how should legitimacy be defined? Is it primarily a descriptive or a normative concept? If legitimacy is understood normatively, what does it entail? Some associate legitimacy with the justification of coercive power and with the creation of political authority. Others associate it with the (...) justification, or at least the sanctioning, of existing political authority. Authority stands for a right to rule—a right to issue commands and, possibly, to enforce these commands using coercive power. An additional question is whether legitimate political authority is understood to entail political obligations or not. Most people probably think it does. But some think that the moral obligation to obey political authority can be separated from an account of legitimate authority, or at least that such obligations arise only if further conditions hold. (shrink)

Does political decision-making require experts or can a democracy be trusted to make correct decisions? This question has a long-standing tradition in political philosophy, going back at least to Plato’s Republic. Critics of democracy tend to argue that democracy cannot be trusted in this way while advocates tend to argue that it can. Both camps agree that it is the epistemic quality of the outcomes of political decision-making processes that underpins the legitimacy of political institutions. In recent political philosophy, epistemic (...) democrats have embraced this instrumentalist way of thinking about democracy. In this chapter, I argue that the attempt to defend democracy on epistemic instrumentalist grounds is self-undermining. I also develop an alternative – procedural – epistemic defence of democracy. I show that there is a prima facie epistemic case for democracy when there is no procedure-independent epistemic authority on the issue to be decided. (shrink)

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, (...) however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy. Key Words: legitimacy • deliberative democracy • epistemic democracy • social epistemology. (shrink)

According to an often repeated definition, economics is the science of individual choices and their consequences. The emphasis on choice is often used – implicitly or explicitly – to mark a contrast between markets and the state: While the price mechanism in well-functioning markets preserves freedom of choice and still efficiently coordinates individual actions, the state has to rely to some degree on coercion to coordinate individual actions. Since coercion should not be used arbitrarily, coordination by the state needs to (...) be legitimized by the consent of its citizens. The emphasis in economic theory on freedom of choice in the market sphere suggests that legitimization in the market sphere is “automatic” and that markets can thus avoid the typical legitimization problem of the state. In this paper, I shall question the alleged dichotomy between legitimization in the market and in the state. I shall argue that it is the result of a conflation of choice and consent in economics and show how an independent concept of consent makes the need for legitimization of market transactions visible. Footnotes1 For helpful comments and suggestions I am most grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Alain Marciano, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Thomas Pogge, Hans Bernhard Schmid, to seminar or conference participants in Aix-Marseille, Tutzing, Paris, and Amsterdam, and to two anonymous referees. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on the difficulty in judging what is called covert hate speech. We emphasize the need for a multidimensional framework when analysing covert hate speech in situ, and the need to consider the multifaceted dimension of such speech act to assess its performativity. To explain such need, we apply the test of the Rabat Plan of Action and adopt a pragmatic perspective to analyse a specific covert hate speech act, considering such speech act as both an (...) expressive and potentially performative act. We focus on the prosecution of hate speech against a woman holding a poster during an anti-safe pass demonstration. Her poster inferred a link between conspiracy theory, the government strategy addressing the Covid pandemic and many other collectives, primarily the Jewish community. Our analysis of the sign adopts a radically context-dependent methodology combining a pragmatic approach and the Rabat Plan of Action test. We then contrast our analysis with the legal and media perspective on the issue. We conclude by suggesting the benefit of integrating pragmatic analysis with application of normative set of rules such as the Rabat Plan of Action test, even though the fluidity of meaning always poses a challenge to any authority tasked with judging such communicative events. (shrink)

In recent developments in political and legal philosophy, there is a tendency to endorse minimalist lists of human rights which do not include a right to political participation. Against such tendencies, I shall argue that the right to political participation, understood as distinct from a right to democracy, should have a place even on minimalist lists. In addition, I shall defend the need to extend the right to political participation to include participation not just in national, but also in international (...) and global governance processes. The argument will be based on a cosmopolitan conception of political legitimacy and on a political conception of human rights that is normatively anchored in legitimacy. The central claim of my paper is that a right to political participation is necessary – but not sufficient – for political legitimacy in the global realm. (shrink)

Ce texte est l'introduction d'un recueil d'articles édité par Fabienne Pomel, Cloches et horloges dans les textes médiévaux . Mesurer et maîtriser le temps, Rennes, PUR, 2012. On en trouvera une présentation ici et une recension là. Nous remercions Fabienne Pomel et les Presses universitaires de Rennes de nous avoir donné l'autorisation de le reproduire ici. Introduction L'horloge, particulièrement, en tant qu'objet nouveau et rare, représente une merveille technique, tandis que la cloche peut (...) - Histoire – Nouvel (...) article. (shrink)

Classical ethology encourages a causal approach to animal behaviour, using Tinbergen's four questions concerning evolution, function, mechanism and development of behaviour. It sets aside the study of mental processes, which could otherwise help to unify our picture of the relationships between animal and environment. Here the steps in research focused on the psychological meaning of a peculiar behaviour in the mouse — carrying its tail — and what this implies regarding the mouse's cognitive world are given. Initial empirical observations suggested (...) epistemic choices concerning space and object notions in the mouse; this led us to go beyond the first stage in exploring the significance of this behaviour. Later experiments showed the limitations of an explanation based on a cause-effect relationship. An interpretative model integrating a phenomenological conceptual framework is proposed. (shrink)

In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism–the view that political equality is only instrumentally valuable. I reject (...) instrumentalism on two grounds: (i) because it fails to respect reasonable value pluralism and to recognize the constitutive role of democratic procedures for legitimacy in pluralist societies, and (ii) because it neglects the constructive function of democratic decision-making. I then consider two alternatives to pure epistemic proceduralism: David Estlund's version of epistemic proceduralism and a Deweyan account of epistemic democracy. I argue that only pure epistemic proceduralism can make good on both shortcomings of instrumentalism, whereas each of the other two approaches only makes good on one and neglects the other. (shrink)

The volume concludes with a specially-written reply by Sen, in which he responds to his critics and provides a rich commentary on the preceding essays.

At the core of political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or justifiable to be legitimate. What explains the significance of public justification? The main argument that defenders of political liberalism present is an argument from disagreement: the irreducible pluralism that is characteristic of democratic societies requires a mode of justification that lies in between a narrowly political solution based on actual acceptance and a traditional moral solution based on justification from the third-person perspective. But (...) why should we take disagreements seriously? This – epistemic question – has not received the attention it deserves so far. I argue that the significance of public justification can be explained through the possibility of reasonable disagreement. In a reasonable disagreement, the parties hold mutually incompatible beliefs, but each is justified to hold the belief they do. I shall use the notion of a reasonable disagreement to explain the possibility of an irreducible pluralism of moral and religious doctrines and, on that basis, why the justification of political institutions has to be public. (shrink)

Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine. He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice−a theory of justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging to one family (...) of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice. (shrink)

Publié en janvier 2020, cet ouvrage de Claude Langlois puise son origine dans un « sentiment d’urgence, urgence civique et toute séculière, d’apporter [sa] part de vérité » (p. 7) après la publication, le 20 août 2018, de la Lettre au peuple de Dieu du pape François. Directeur d’étude à l’École pratique des hautes études, Claude Langlois est historien et sociologue, spécialiste du catholicisme contemporain. Il s’empare du sujet de la pédophilie après avoir déjà fait une incursion croisée dans...

Si Numénius, en platonicien de son temps, a utilisé le Timée et la République à la fois pour élaborer et étayer sa pensée métaphysique et cosmologique, il est devenu coutume de penser qu’il a également eu recours au Parménide dans sa description du premier principe, qu’il peut paraître tentant d’identifier chez lui à l’Un. L’examen attentif de son œuvre ne fournit cependant que peu d’indices en ce sens et convainc même qu’elle ne permet pas une telle interprétation. Malgré ces conclusions, (...) l’hypothèse persiste pour des raisons qui tiennent principalement à l’histoire de la philosophie et aux recherches qu’elle suscite. Elle est en effet souvent reprise pour trois raisons, présentées comme corollaires : le statut propre à Numénius de platonicien pythagorisant, prédécesseur de Plotin ; les affinités réelles entre sa pensée et celle du Commentaire anonyme au Parménide ; les parallèles également entrevus entre ses formules et celles de la source supposée commune au Zostrien et au Contre Arius de Marius Victorinus, source présentée comme fort proche du Commentaire anonyme. Sont donc invoquées trois raisons nées moins de l’étude de l’œuvre de Numénius elle-même que de la recherche des sources d’autres textes en mal d’auteur et d’origines bien définies, recherche se fondant en partie sur les liens entre cette œuvre et ses prétendus « pairs » en pythagorisme. Cette troisième partie de l’étude présente la dernière péripétie des recherches sur la relation éventuelle de Numénius au Parménide. La première a montré que l’œuvre parvenue de Numénius ne présente aucune trace de l’utilisation de ce dialogue de Platon dans son élaboration de la doctrine des deux premiers principes ; la deuxième a tenté de prouver que Numénius n’est vraisemblablement pas l’auteur du Commentaire anonyme au Parménide. Est ici abordé ce que Michel Tardieu a nommé l’« exposé commun » au Zostrien et au Contre Arius de Marius Victorinus. Les parallèles apparents de cet exposé avec le Commentaire anonyme au Parménide et avec certaines formulations de Numénius ont suggéré qu’il avait Numénius pour source, ce qui a parfois servi à étayer l’hypothèse que Numénius était malgré tout l’auteur du Commentaire anonyme. Là encore, l’examen détaillé et la confrontation des textes révèlent la fragilité de cette double conclusion. Un retour sur la source de l’« exposé » en réalité partiellement « commun » au Zostrien copte et à Marius Victorinus montre néanmoins que Numénius a sans doute servi à son élaboration et qu’il a par suite pu servir aussi de source aux gnostiques, tout comme il a servi aux néoplatoniciens, et ce parfois même, indirectement ou a contrario, dans l’interprétation du Parménide. (shrink)

Si l’homme est un être doté de raison et se distingue des autres animaux par sa capacité à réfléchir sur ses actes tant avant de les poser qu’après, il lui arrive cependant d’être irrationnel. Tandis que certains s’en désolent, considérant les différentes formes d’irrationalité comme autant d’expressions de notre inaptitude à atteindre la sagesse, d’autres semblent plutôt s’en réjouir, estimant que la possibilité de ne pas se conformer à ce que dicte ou suggère la raison est une preuve de notre (...) radicale liberté. Mais quel que soit le jugement moral, explicite ou implicite, porté sur ces phénomènes, la plupart des philosophes ne se contentent pas de les constater. Ils tentent de les cerner, d’en comprendre les mécanismes, parfois de les justifier. Comment et pour-quoi? Telles sont les questions auxquelles voudrait répondre ce numéro portant sur la délibération et l’irrationalité dans l’histoire. (shrink)

The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational response question: how are you rationally required to respond to a doxastic disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be your epistemic peer? A doxastic disagreement with someone also confronts you with a slightly different question. This question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much should you trust our own epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of others? Answering the epistemic trust question is (...) important for the epistemology of disagreement because it sheds light on the rational response question. My main aim in this paper is to argue—against recent attempts to show otherwise—that epistemic self-trust does not provide a reason for remaining steadfast in doxastic disagreements with others. (shrink)

Political decisions have the potential to greatly impact our lives. Think of decisions in relation to abortion or climate change, for example. This makes political legitimacy an important normative concern. But what makes political decisions legitimate? Are they legitimate in virtue of having support from the citizens? Democratic conceptions of political legitimacy answer in the affirmative. Such conceptions righly highlight that legitimate political decision-making must be sensitive to disagreements among the citizens. But what if democratic decisions fail to track what (...) there is most reason to do? What if a democratically elected government fails to take measures necessary to protect its population from threats related to climate change? Peter argues that the legitimacy of political decisions doesn't just depend on respect for the citizens' will; and defends a novel hybrid conception of political legitimacy, called the Epistemic Accountability conception. According to this conception, political legitimacy also depends on how political decision-making responds to evidence for what there is most reason to do. Grounds for Political Legitmacy starts with an overview of the main ways in which philosophers have thought about political legitimacy, and identifies the epistemic accountability conception as an overlooked alternative. It then develops the epistemic accountability conception of political legitimacy and discusses its implications for legitimate political decision-making. Considering the norms that should govern political debate, it examines the role of experts in politics, and probes the responsibilities of democratically elected political leaders and as well as of citizens. (shrink)

Journal of Economic Methodology, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 165-167, June 2012.

In a poetic conversation with Thierry Zarcone, the painter and calligrapher Fabienne Verdier exposes her deep and harmonious connection to nature. She tells of her garden, her house and her osmosis with nature. Painting is to her an art of living and being that recalls the Tao masters as well as some Christan mystics.

Dans la culture occidentale, le paysage est le plus souvent reconnu comme une portion d'espace appréhendée à distance, selon un point de vue unique; l'étendue, telle qu'elle est circonscrite par le regard, l'emporte sur la temporalité qui se trouve négligée. Or, le territoire est affecté de changements incessants, que ceux-ci soient d'origine naturelle ou déterminés par l'intervention des hommes; les dispositifs techniques, qu'ils s'agissent des "machines de locomotion" ou des "machines de vision" contribuent à conférer une dimension temporelle à la (...) perception des sites. Le lieu est également le réceptacle des émotions, des souvenirs ou des anticipations de chacun. Paysages en devenir traite de la manière dont un certain nombre d'oeuvres artistiques contemporaines transcrivent et accompagnent les variations et les évolutions du paysage. (shrink)

The debate over rival conceptions of political legitimacy tends to focus on first-order considerations—for example, on the relative importance of procedural and substantive values. In this essay, I argue that there is an important, but often overlooked, distinction among rival conceptions of political legitimacy that originates at the meta-normative level. This distinction, which cuts across the distinctions drawn at the first-order level, concerns the source of the normativity of political legitimacy, or, as I refer to it here, the grounds of (...) political legitimacy. If we focus on the grounds of political legitimacy, there are three main conceptions of political legitimacy: will-based, belief-based, and fact-based conceptions. I present an objection to each of those main conceptions and defend a hybrid account of the grounds of political legitimacy. (shrink)

This paper reports on a manual monitoring of online representations of LGBT persons in the Republic of Cyprus for the period April 2015–February 2016. The article contextualizes the prevalence of “hate speech” in online Greek Cypriot comments against LGBT individuals, and, more generally, against non-heterosexuals. Adopting a Foucauldian position vis-à-vis the social and discursive construction of sexuality, we outline, first, the socio-historical context with a focus on LGBT rights in the Republic of Cyprus and the nationalistic project construing sexualities. We (...) then examine the different levels of discursive discrimination practices, providing a snapshot of the types of “hate speech” referring to this topic typically found in such an environment. The focus is on identification of the frames used to construct LGBT identities, and their perception.We use in our title the word subject as defined by post-modernists and by Butler in particular : subject refers to “a socially produced ‘agent’ and ‘deliberator’ whose agency and thought is made possible by a language that precedes that ‘I’. In this sense the ‘I’ is produced through power ”. This paper focuses on the socially produced definition of the LGBT community in the context under study. We thus address the way in which sexuality is constructed within a compulsory and hegemonic heterosexuality and heteronormativity. We analyze our data i.e. comments focused on the LGBT community, with corpus linguistic tools as well as through a qualitative examination of the identified frames. Our analysis confirms an interface between nationalism and compulsory hegemonic heteronormativity in the Republic as well as the influence of the Orthodox Church and its beliefs. (shrink)

Three years before his death, Michel Foucault delivered a series of lectures at the Catholic University of Louvain that until recently remained almost unknown. These lectures—which focus on the role of avowal, or confession, in the determination of truth and justice—provide the missing link between Foucault’s early work on madness, delinquency, and sexuality and his later explorations of subjectivity in Greek and Roman antiquity. Ranging broadly from Homer to the twentieth century, Foucault traces the early use of truth-telling in ancient (...) Greece and follows it through to practices of self-examination in monastic times. By the nineteenth century, the avowal of wrongdoing was no longer sufficient to satisfy the call for justice; there remained the question of who the “criminal” was and what formative factors contributed to his wrong-doing. The call for psychiatric expertise marked the birth of the discipline of psychiatry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as its widespread recognition as the foundation of criminology and modern criminal justice. Published here for the first time, the 1981 lectures have been superbly translated by Stephen W. Sawyer and expertly edited and extensively annotated by Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt. They are accompanied by two contemporaneous interviews with Foucault in which he elaborates on a number of the key themes. An essential companion to _Discipline and Punish_, _Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling_ will take its place as one of the most significant works of Foucault to appear in decades, and will be necessary reading for all those interested in his thought. (shrink)

La conception aristotélicienne des principes divins est parcourue de tensions épistémologiques, archéologiques et proprement théologiques, qui constituent à la fois un défi pour Aristote lui-même et un ensemble de problèmes qu'il lègue à la tradition, qu'elle se revendique de lui, ou se fasse critique à son égard. Restituée au mouvement de la tradition, aux vicissitudes de ses relectures, la théologie aristotélicienne voit s'actualiser les potentialités qu'elle portait en son sein, et qu'Aristote lui-même, déjà, commençait d'explorer. Ce volume, sans prétendre à (...) l'exhaustivité, souhaite, par la diversité de ses contributions, donner à lire quelques-unes de ces actualisations, qu'elles soient exégétiques ou polémiques, et tracer quelques linéaments de leurs effets historiques. (shrink)

La linguistique se penche sur les émotions afin de décrire les moyens langagiers de les exprimer ou de les représenter, tant au niveau de la structure de la langue que de l'interaction dans le discours. Par là même, elle met en exergue l'ubiquité des émotions dans le langage. Les contributions du volume Cartographie des émotions s'attachent à mettre à plat les liens entre langues et émotions. Elles cherchent à catégoriser, délimiter, appréhender les affects pour mieux comprendre les enjeux linguistiques et (...) sociolinguistiques de l'expression émotionnelle. On observera ainsi les champs lexicaux et les différents réseaux sémantiques qui s'y mettent en place, les combinatoires lexicales dans de grands corpus, les stratégies intonatives et syntaxiques auxquelles les locuteurs ont recours, les différences et les ressemblances entre les langues au niveau de l'expression des émotions, ainsi que la dimension pragmatique de l'expression émotionnelle et son impact sur les discours et leur interprétation. L'ouvrage ne s'adresse pas seulement aux étudiants et chercheurs en sciences du langage, communication, sociologie, traductologie, mais aussi à tous ceux qui travaillent sur l'interface émotion et communication et que passionne la complexité du langage et des langues. (shrink)

« Les choses ont décidément changé en dix ans, les transformations du présent amènent à relire les textes passés, et la poésie française n’apparaît plus comme un grand désert de femmes. Il faut s’en réjouir » (p. 12). C’est avec ce commentaire enthousiaste que Christine Planté clôt l’avant-propos à la deuxième édition de l’anthologie qu’elle dirige, Femmes poètes du xixe siècle. Si l’édition de 1998 permit de faire découvrir une poésie de femmes que le lecteur ignorait, la nouvelle édition de...

Dans son dialogue Sur le Bien (19 F = fr. 11 dP), Numénius écrit que le dieu qui est « deuxième et troisième est un ». Par là, il désigne un dieu considéré selon deux aspects qui correspondent à la double orientation de son attention. Dans le second, il est tourné vers le monde et joue le rôle de démiurge. Selon la plupart des chercheurs, ce démiurge serait à identifier à l’âme du monde que les fragments parvenus du dialogue ne (...) mentionnent pas. L’article montre que cette interprétation ne rend peut-être pas compte du propos de Numénius. Il indique les raisons théoriques et polémiques expliquant qu’en réalité, même si le démiurge a la fonction de l’âme du monde, Numénius ne l’identifie pas avec celle-ci. Il veut définir les principes qu’il identifie à l’être, conçu comme incorporel. Le mouvement intrinsèque à l’âme et l’immanence qui la caractérise, d’après la tradition platonicienne que suit Numénius et la tradition stoïcienne à laquelle il s’oppose, interdisent de donner à cette âme le statut de pur intelligible – le lui accorder serait précisément céder à l’immanentisme et au corporalisme stoïciens. Enfin, il n’est pas davantage utile de reconnaître dans le second aspect du deuxième dieu, un moment nommé « troisième dieu » dans le dialogue, le troisième dieu que Numénius aurait identifié au monde d’après le témoignage de Proclus (29 T = fr. 21 dP). Ce troisième dieu-là peut réellement correspondre au monde dont Platon fait un dieu, à condition que ce monde soit considéré comme le produit du seul intellect, ordre (κόσμος) qui comporte certes une âme, et même un intellect en elle, mais qui n’est réduit ni à l’une ni à l’autre. (shrink)