Epiphanies is a philosophical exploration of epiphanies, peak experiences, 'wow moments', or ecstasies as they are sometimes called. What are epiphanies, and why do so many people so frequently experience them? Are they just transient phenomena in our brains, or are they the revelations of objective value that they very often seem to be? What do they tell us about the world, and about ourselves? How, if at all, do epiphanies fit in with our moral systems (...) and our theories of how to live? And how do epiphanic experiences fit in with the rest of our lives? These are Sophie Grace Chappell's questions in this ground-breaking new study of an area of inquiry that has always been right under our noses, but remains surprisingly under-explored in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

I propose a programme of research in ethical philosophy, into the peak-experiences or wow-moments that I, following James Joyce and others, call epiphanies. As a first pass, I characterize an epiphany as an (1) overwhelming (2) existentially significant manifestation of (3) value, (4) often sudden and surprising, (5) which feels like it “comes from outside” – it is something given, relative to which I am a passive perceiver – which (6) teaches us something new, which (7) “takes us out (...) of ourselves”, and which (8) demands a response. Often the correct response is love, often it is pity, or again creativity. It might also be anger or reverence or awe or a hunger to put things right – a hunger for justice; or many other things. It may be something that leads directly to action, but it may also be something that prompts contemplation; or other responses again. Since epiphanies are what I call a focal-case category, not all of the conditions listed above have to be fulfilled by all instances of epiphanies. In order to allow the reader to get a better grip on which range of phenomena may count as an epiphany, I examine in some detail several examples from literature, in particular from works by Murdoch, Hopkins, Wordsworth, C.S. Lewis, and by James Joyce. (shrink)

This paper articulates a psychodynamically informed phenomenological reading of prepsychotic perceptual alterations, which the author calls anti-epiphanies. Several of Carl Jung's experiences of the anti-epiphany, as described in his autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections , are taken as exemplar cases. These anti-epiphanies are viewed through a critical psychobiographical lens, in an interpretationwhich tacks back and forth between Jung's childhood, psychological theories, and later prepsychotic experience. It is claimed that Jung's anti-epiphanies are linked to his use of schizoid-narcissistic forms (...) of transitional selfobjects, referred to as Jungian manikins. Such Jungian manikins, it is argued, function to defend the subject against annihilation anxieties related to psychological engulfment, penetration, and finalization. When these anxieties become especially pronounced, the subject's entire perceptual world may be defensively used as a Jungian manikin, creating an anti-epiphany. The author conjectures that similar patterns of experience may be operative in the prepsychotic perceptual alterations had by those with schizoid-narcissistic character pathology. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of the second ‘theological’ pattern in Plato’s Republic. Situating Plato within his religious context, it argues that this pattern calls into question the traditional ancient model of divine epiphany. Divine epiphany was a central element in Greek religion. Yet, in the absence of a centralized religious organization, this model threatened the philosophers’ authoritative position. Plato’s second pattern seeks not only to undermine this potential threat but also to pave the way towards a new, philosophicalmodel (...) of divine epiphany, thus further establishing the philosophers’ authority and legitimacy within and outside his ideal city. (shrink)

Sophie-Grace Chappell’s recent book Epiphanies is wide-ranging and illuminating, just like its central subject. One basic motif is the ubiquity of value and value expe- rience in the ethical life: we are immersed in a value-laden reality and morality is rooted in this often epiphanic value experience. This results in an emphasis on a broad receptiveness to the surrounding world. One possible pitfall of such an approach could be the reduction of human beings to ethically passive perceivers, waiting for (...) epiphanies to strike them. However, I think such a reading of Epiphanies would be incorrect. Chappell realizes how the ethical life entails more than just passive reception and contemplation; that both the passive and the active parts of the ethical life are important and related. In this article, I aim to avoid the suggested misreading by focussing on one phenomenon that is a good illustration of this interrelation and that is strongly related to epiphanies: creativity. (shrink)

In this paper I raise three questions regarding the status and function of Absolute Knowing in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. First, can Hegel’s Absolute Knowing be understood as an epiphany? Secondly, how does epiphany make sense of the teleological elements that activate and mobilise the movement towards Absolute Knowing? And thirdly, how does such an interpretation shift the focus from a closed reading of Hegel’s text – that views Absolute Knowing as consummately realised – to an open reading that keeps (...) the Absolute within its purview, but also seeks to foreground its aporias? I pursue these questions through an examination of the key constituents of knowledge: the subject of knowledge, its object, and the process through which knowledge is attained. (shrink)

A common interpretation of Il. 4.73-84, best articulated in de Jong 2004, incorrectly maintains that the warriors believe they witness an omen. In fact, they experience an epiphany. The idiosyncrasies of the epiphany contribute to the development of a prominent theme in the transition from Iliad 3 to Iliad 4.

This book explores religious epiphanies in which there is the appearance of God, a god or a goddess, or a manifestation of the divine or religious reality as received in human experience. Drawing upon the scriptures of various traditions, ancillary religious writings, psychological and anthropological studies, as well as reports of epiphanic experiences, the book presents and examines epiphanies as they have occurred across global religious traditions and cultures, historically and up to the present day. Primarily providing a (...) study of the great range of epiphanies in their phenomenal presentation, Kellenberger also explores issues that arise for epiphanies, such as the matter of their veridicality (whether they are truly of or from the divine) and the question of whether all epiphanies are of the same religious reality. (shrink)

Being a theist makes a difference, but not so much to what propositions we assent to, nor to an expanded ontology of spiritual entities. Rather, it is concerned with what commitments we enter into, and involves a participatory engagement with a broader reality then we might have supposed was possible. Embodied practices are a crucial part of the contemplative path, which draws on the wisdom of the body. This leads on to a “labor of culture.” Our present culture is not (...) obviously as secular as supposed to be, but what has now become sacred is a strong sense of the individual ego, around which many ethical and political commitments are built, and which sits uneasily with our widely accepted mechanistic view of life. The crucial challenge to artificial intelligence is whether it can find ways of enhancing the mutual recognition that is crucial to the ethical life. (shrink)

In the days before the Third Programme changed its name and nature to those of Radio 3, there were occasional broadcast discussions by a group called the Epiphany Philosophers. Since 1966 they have been publishing a journal whose title and sub-title point to the large questions with which the group has continued to be concerned: Theoria to Theory: An International Journal of Science, Philosophy and Contemplative Religion. The editors are conscious of the risks but also of the need to take (...) them:‘We are not now seen as so “way out” as we used to be, because more people are realizing that one has got to go “way out”, and that what is “in” is culturally more dated than some powerful forces would have us believe’. The latest issue is also to be the last, though there is hope of continuing the good work in other ways. The journal itself may be revived ‘in a new form as a much cheaper production’. There is also a plan under which the publishers, Gordon and Breach, will publish a series of books designed to ‘promote the exploration of new ideas and new applications in philosophy and science through continuing co-operation between philosophers and scientists in different disciplines’. Among the halfpromised volumes is one on The Athletics of Old Age, ‘seen as a spiritual as well as a mental and physical matter’. Others are Revisionary Metaphysics and Revisionary Science, What is Wrong with Contemporary Physics? and How can we move beyond Neo-Darwinism in Biology? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Epiphany in Munich LINCOLN PERRY W hen I used to say the sentence (softly and to myself ) “I hate palms” or “Palms are not beautiful; possibly they are not even trees,” it was a composite palm that I had somehow succeeded in making without even ever having seen, close up, many particular instances. Conversely, when I now say, “Palms are beautiful,” or “I love palms,” it is (...) really individual palms that I have in mind. This quote from Elaine Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just applies perfectly to an experience I recently had regarding a painting by an artist I had assumed I didn’t much care for. Perhaps it would be best to lead into my epiphany gradually, to recreate the preparation that might have been necessary to have my realization. Actually, I speak of a double epiphany, in that it was shared by the friend I was travelling with when we saw the artwork in question. He and I are both painters, and have much in common, both in terms of our own work and our voracious appetite for seeing museums, so when I planned a trip for late October 2018 to see thirty museums in two weeks in Germany and Austria, I knew just whom to call. David Carbone and I have known each other, and appreciated each other’s work, since leaving graduate school in 1975, meeting at the College Art Association held that year in Washington, DC, where people compete for jobs while trying to maintain a veneer of civility. David made less of an effort than most, and I vividly remember him in saddle shoes he had painted bright blue, wearing a tie featuring a burlesque dancer, sipping champagne in the garden courtyard of the National Gallery. All the nearby aspiring art historians were immaculately dressed and scrupulously behaved, but David finished his drink, and in imitation of a arion 27.1 spring/summer 2019 Russian toast, threw his empty glass against the wall, where it noisily shattered. I like this guy, thought I. Over the next few days, visiting DC’s museums together, I recognized the brilliance of his commentaries on the art we saw. And his wit: He told of studying with his painting professor, who became frustrated with David’s pace in painting and said “David, painting is really very simple!” The reply: “But, what if you’re not simple?” I can’t conjure a single artist about whose work we’ve disagreed in the course of the fortythree years we’ve known each other. Meeting often in New York, where he lives with his wife Donna (who, like my wife, is always perfectly willing to let us go museum schlepping without them), we’ve also travelled in central Italy, and even flew to Fort Worth to see a show of the Le Nain brothers. A very sweet guard there asked us, “Who ARE you?” and when we said we were painters, she said, “Oh, because I’ve never seen anybody look at paintings this long, or talk about them so much!” Berlin is a treasure trove, where we visited ten fine museums, then flew to Vienna, which was hosting an extensive exhibit of Bruegel’s paintings, though feast might be a more apt word. A visual feast, but one that didn’t leave one sated, jaded, or bloated, but rather improved, made less ambivalent about membership in a questionable species. Yes, the viewer consumed a meal of war, famine, foolishness, and pride, but the chef made it not just palatable but beautiful, thought-provoking and humorous. Bruegel and his contemporary Rabelais seem kindred spirits, skeptical but amused, bawdy but tender, creating not just works but micro to macro worlds, an alternate world view, in fact. Each painting mesmerized anyone looking long and carefully enough, discovering that a tiny girl on a sled is able to get a purchase on the ice not just with her diminutive sticks, but by the miniscule iron nails in which they end, painted with a one hair-brush. From this minutia we graduate to a wider and wider view, one that comes to imply infinity. Bruegel’s brilliant guidance doesn’t confront us... (shrink)

Dans Aîtres de la langue et demeures de la pensée, Henri Maldiney propose une approche phénoménologique du mythe, en particulier de la figure de Dionysos, pour interroger le statut ontologique de l’homme et de sa présence au monde. La question de la manifestation le conduit à une pensée de l’apparaître qui rompt définitivement avec l’idée d’une pure présence. Le langage peut-il de surcroît dire la rencontre de l’être et du monde? Notre réflexion a pour objet de montrer que cette tentative (...) de réappropriation de l’existence dans la parole philosophique exige un dépassement de l’ontologie. (shrink)

Dans Aîtres de la langue et demeures de la pensée, Henri Maldiney propose une approche phénoménologique du mythe, en particulier de la figure de Dionysos, pour interroger le statut ontologique de l’homme et de sa présence au monde. La question de la manifestation le conduit à une pensée de l’apparaître qui rompt définitivement avec l’idée d’une pure présence. Le langage peut-il de surcroît dire la rencontre de l’être et du monde? Notre réflexion a pour objet de montrer que cette tentative (...) de réappropriation de l’existence dans la parole philosophique exige un dépassement de l’ontologie. (shrink)

The illness immersion condition prevents patients from enjoying everything worth living life for. In any case, according to Frank, this condition could represent one of the most insightful experiences towards understanding the meaning of life. Using the metaphor of phoenix taken from May, Frank identified four kinds of embodiments through which the phoenix can reveal itself in a patient after an illness immersion experience: the phoenix that could ever be and the phoenix that might have been; the recurrent and cumulative (...) phoenix and the reluctant phoenix. Based on these considerations, a qualitative study was conducted in order to give voice to the different phoenix embodiments focusing on several autobiographies of patients afflicted with severe or terminal illness. The analysis highlights several similarities that the different phoenixes shared ; however, a deep difference emerged in their worldview which proves able to lead them towards different epiphanies. These evidences reveal that every sick person should be understood, stimulated and accompanied throughout his lived experience of illness by an expressly designed and dedicated care. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s conception of philosophy evolved dramatically in 1911 — the year he fell in love with Lady Ottoline Morrell. For many years Russell had been an ardent advocate of the view that philosophers ought to look for truths that are certain. The co-author of Principia Mathematica altered his commitment to certainty in philosophy in 1911. An analysis of his published views and correspondence from this time strongly suggests that the radical transformation was induced by an epiphany brought about by (...) his emotional entanglement with his lover. (shrink)

While a great deal has been written on Plato's Lysis in philosophy and philology journals over the last thirty years, nothing has been published on Lysis in the major Anglo-American philosophy of education journals during that time. Nevertheless, this dialogue deserves attention from educators. In this essay, Mark Jonas argues that Lysis can serve as a model for educators who want to move their students beyond mere aporia, but also do not want to dictate answers to students. Although the dialogue (...) ends in Socrates's affirmation of aporia, his affirmation is actually meant to persuade his interlocutors to reflect on an epiphany they had previously experienced. In what follows, Jonas offers a close reading of relevant passages of Lysis, demonstrating the way that Socrates leads his interlocutors to an epiphany without forcing his answers upon them. (shrink)

Educational Theory, Volume 71, Issue 3, Page 371-388, June 2021.

_Makes the novel argument that erotic life is the real sphere of human freedom._.

John Stuart Mill was raised to be the Lenin of the revolutionary movement that we remember as utilitarianism, and whose members at the time were called the “Philosophical Radicals”. And as many philosophers know, Mill's youth was brought to a close by a bout of depression – what he called his “Mental Crisis” – that amounted to a crisis of commitment. Sandwiched between his training and his first not‐exactly‐breakdown (of three) we find two epiphanies that get little or no (...) attention, and I want to go some distance towards rectifying that omission. I think they will explain Mill's Crisis, and why he never became the Lenin of utilitarianism – but also why utilitarianism turned out not to be the sort of movement that needed a Lenin. (shrink)

In his _Being Known_ Peacocke sets himself the task of answering how we come to know about metaphysical necessities. He proposes a semantic principle-based conception consisting of, first, his Principles of Possibility which pro­vide necessary and sufficient conditions for a new concept 'admissibility', and second, characterizations of possibility and of necessity in terms of that new con­cept. I focus on one structural feature; viz. the recursive application involved in the specification of 'admissibility'. After sketching Peacocke’s proposal, I intro­duce a fictional (...) protagonist, Cautious Peacocke, whose coherence I claim shows that Peacocke s proposal cannot be made good. I conclude with the conjecture that similar failure will attend any such semantic-based attempts to ground the epistemology of metaphysical necessity. -/- Dans son livre intitulé Being Known, C. Peacocke se propose de repondre à la question de savoir comment nous en venons a connaitre des nécessités métaphysiques. Il développe une conception sémantique reposant sur des principes comprenant, d’une part, ses Principes de Possibilité — qui fournissent les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour un nouveau concept, « l’admissibilité » — et d’autre part des caractérisations de la possibilité et de la nécessité a l’aide de ce nouveau concept. Je me concentre sur une caractéristique structurelle, a savoir l’application récursive a l’œuvre dans la spécification de «l’admissibilité ». Apres avoir esquisse la proposition de Peacocke, j’introduis un personnage fictif, Peacocke-prudent. Je soutiens que la cohérence de ce personnage montre que la proposition de Peacocke ne peut pas être satisfaite. Je conclus en conjecturant qu’un échec similaire se présentera pour toutes les tentatives de fonder l’épistemologie de la nécessité métaphysique sur de telles bases semantiques. (shrink)

In his _Being Known_ Peacocke sets himself the task of answering how we come to know about metaphysical necessities. He proposes a semantic principle-based conception consisting of, first, his Principles of Possibility which provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a new concept ‘admissibility’, and second, characterizations of possibility and of necessity in terms of that new concept. I focus on one structural feature; viz. the recursive application involved in the specification of ‘admissibility’. After sketching Peacocke’s proposal, I introduce a fictional (...) protagonist, Cautious Peacocke, whose coherence I claim shows that Peacocke’s proposal cannot be made good. I conclude with the conjecture that similar failure will attend any such semantic-based attempts to ground the epistemology of metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

An extended discussion of Sophie-Grace Chappell's 'Epiphanies' (OUP, 2022). In this piece I highlight the tension in Ephiphanies between so-called 'moral theory' and the epiphanic stance that Chappell takes. This tension raises questions for us all about methodology within moral philosophy and what we should be aiming to do. As well as detailing this tension, I offer some resolutions to it.

The phenomenon of aspect recognition is at the core of Wittgenstein's later views on logic and language; it is also central to his reflections on religious language and experience. In both contexts, the uptake and use of pictures is the critical element in concept formation and in understanding. Clarity and confusion in religious thought lie in a domain defined by the structure, aesthetics, and functions of the pictures religious people use, and by the relations among them. The argument is conveyed (...) through analyses of experiences of characters in _The Wind in the Willows and Homer's _Odyssey. (shrink)

The hymen is a structure of the female genitalia that is poorly understood even by many medical professionals. Despite the significant anatomical variation in the hymen and no guarantee that rupture or bleeding will occur at first coitus, it has come to hold major cultural significance around the world as a perceived biological indicator of virginity. The persistence of such myths around the hymen causes real harm, including the increase in so-called revirgination surgical procedures.

The experience of fragility is part of the uncertainty surrounding the Covid epidemic. I see Depraz’s experience as involving two types of cognitive processes, one lighter than the other. The ….