Humility has not always been regarded as a virtue. Aristotle, if he recognized it at all, seems to have regarded it as a vice, a deficiency in regard to magnanimity. In the popular culture of the twenty-first century, while courage is held in high moral esteem, the regard given to humility is more questionable. Humility, however, is not universally dismissed as a virtue. Many see it as having moral value. In fact, a number of contemporary philosophers are relatively clear that (...) humility is a morally valuable trait and so is a moral virtue, although they disagree about its character. For traditional Christianity and Judaism, of course, and for other religious traditions, humility is a religious virtue. However, if humility is a religious virtue, is it different from humility as a moral virtue? Below, we shall start in section II with the question, What is the best way to understand the general notion of humility? In section III it shall be followed by the question, What are the core contrasting states that humility opposes? Third , in section IV we shall ask, Does humility as a religious virtue have a distinctive and abiding character? (shrink)

This book is an inquiry into the extent to which human relationships are foundational in morality. J. Kellenberger seeks to discover, first, how relationships between persons, and ultimately the relationship that each person has to each person by virtue of being a person, underlie the various traditional components of morality—obligation, virtue, justice, rights, and moral goods—and, second, how relationship morality is more fully consonant with our moral experience than other forms of human morality. Kellenberger traces the implications of relationship morality (...) for an understanding of religious duty to God and for the status of our obligations to animals. He also examines issues relating to a feminist "ethics of caring." While this book is a work in ethics, its approach is not limited to an examination of theories of obligation, such as utilitarianism, nor is it limited to the traditional areas covered by wider philosophical treatments of ethics. It embraces these but examines such moral categories as love, respect for persons, shame, and their place in morality. (shrink)

Starting with Job's reaction to evil, I identify three elements of Job-like belief. They are: (1) the recognition of evil in the world; (2) the conviction that God and God's creation are good; and (3) the sense of beholding God's goodness in the world. The interconnection of these three elements is examined along with a possible way of understanding Job-like believers beholding and becoming experientially aware of God's goodness. It is brought out why, given that they are as they understand (...) themselves to be, Job-like believers properly do not see evil as evidence against God's goodness. Finally, Job-like belief is related to the different reactions to evil by Ivan and Aloysha in The Brothers Karamazov. (shrink)

One in the series New Dialogues in Philosophy, edited by Dale Jacquette, J. Kellenberger brings together a group of hypothetical individuals from different backgrounds with real philosophical views to discuss their ideas on morality and moral relativism. The dialogues examine arguments for and against adopting a relativistic stance on morality.

This book is the last book that Norman Malcolm wrote. Though he was working on it until shortly before his death in 1990, making improvements here and there, he left the manuscript essentially ready for publication. His friend Peter Winch has edited Malcolm’s text and added a forty-page discussion that brings the entire work to book length. Malcolm’s starting point is Wittgenstein’s comment, "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of (...) view." Malcolm sets out to explore how Wittgenstein in his later work took, if not a strictly religious point of view, still something analogous to a religious point of view. His thesis is that there is "an analogy" between Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought and a significant form of religious thought. There are, he goes on to argue, four points of analogy. (shrink)

This book is about the relationship between God and the world’s evil. It proposes a religious, Job-like approach to evil that does not approach evil through the problem of evil and accepts that both good and evil are given by God.

This book examines the thinking of two nineteenth-century existentialist thinkers, Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Its focus is on the radically different ways they envisioned a joyful acceptance of life - a concern they shared. For Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, joyful acceptance flows from the certitude of faith. For Nietzsche, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, joyful acceptance is an acceptance of the eternal recurrence of life, and is ultimately a matter of will. This book explores the relationship between these opposed (...) visions. (shrink)

This book aims to clarify the debate between moral relativists and moral absolutists by showing what is right and what is wrong about each of these positions, by revealing how the phenomenon of moral diversity is connected with moral relativism, and by arguing for the importance of relationships between persons as key to reaching a satisfactory understanding of the issues involved in the debate.

This book addresses the different forms that religious belief can take. Two primary forms are discussed: propositional or doctrinal belief, and belief in God. Religious belief in God, whose affective content is trust in God, it is seen, opens for believers a relationship to God defined by trust in God. The book addresses the issue of the relation between belief and faith, the issue of what Søren Kierkegaard called the subjectivity of faith, and the issue of the relation between religious (...) belief and religious experience. After the introductory chapter the book continues with a chapter in which features and forms of belief allowed by the general concept of belief are presented. Several of these forms and features are related to the features of religious belief examined in succeeding chapters. The book's final chapter examines God-relationships in the Christian tradition that de-emphasize belief and are not defined by belief. (shrink)

This book is about religion, pacifism, and the nonviolence that informs pacifism in its most coherent form. Pacifism is one religious approach to war and violence. Another is embodied in just war theories, and both pacifism and just war thinking are critically examined. Although moral support for pacifism is presented, a main focus of the book is on religious support for pacifism, found in various religious traditions. A crucial distinction for pacifism is that between force and violence. Pacifism informed by (...) nonviolence excludes violence, but, the book argues, allows forms of force. Peacekeeping is an activity that on the face of it seems compatible with pacifism, and several different forms of peacekeeping are examined. The implications of nonviolence for the treatment of nonhuman animals are also examined. Two models for attaining the conditions required for a world without war have been proposed. Both are treated and one, the model of a biological human family, is developed. The book concludes with reflections on the role of pacifism in each of five possible futurescapes. (shrink)

This book treats the presence of God and the presence of persons. The experience of the presence of God is a well-recognized religious experience in theistic traditions. The experience of the presence of persons, this book argues, is an analogous moral experience. As it is possible for individuals to come into the presence of God – to have this phenomenal experience – so it is possible for them to come into the presence of persons. Kellenberger explores how coming into the (...) presence of persons is structurally analogous with coming into the presence of God. Providing a highly focused analysis of the two seemingly distinct concepts, normally thought to fall under different subfields of philosophy, the chapters carefully draw paralells between them. Kellenberger then goes on show how, analogous to “the death of God,” a loss of the consciousness of the reality of God and his presence, is a “death of persons”, felt as a loss of the sense of the inherent worth of persons and their presence. This volume finishes with an examination of the concrete moral and religio-ethical implications of coming into the presence of persons, and in particular the implications of coming into the presence of all persons. (shrink)

This book examines the multifarious nature of wisdom and explores the various types of wisdom and their interrelations. As an investigation of the nature of wisdom and its different expressions it addresses a concern of academic philosophy but also concerns of comparative studies, religious studies, and the humanities generally.

The thesis of this essay is that human relationships are deeper than moral principles or moral rules human relationships generate and fashion moral principles. This thesis has three elements: moral principles have their provenance in human relationships and are intelligible only in their application to the relevant human relationship; relationships determine what counts as a violation of a principle and so determine if a principle is violated or even applies; relationships inform our understanding of the specific demands of principles. The (...) thesis of this essay is supported by advancing each of its three elements. It is acknowledged that it can be argued that moral rules must in some way be accommodated by moral philosophy and that they play a role in our moral lives. Several claims about moral rules that are compatible with the thesis of this article are identified, such as the claim that moral rules are universal and the claim that they are not. Cogent views about the importance of relationships for morality, developed in feminist thought, are acknowledged but distinguished from this essay’s thesis. (shrink)

There is a certain view of religion, deriving from Wittgenstein’s thought, that might be called the language-game view of religion. It has many parts, but in essence it holds–in its own terms–that religion is a language-game in fact engaged in by men; or, what seems to be an alternative way of saying the same thing, or very nearly the same. thing, religion is a form of life participated in by men. As such it is in order. Although one needs to (...) enter into the torm ot lite and engage in the language-game to learn its grammar or logic and to see the order that it has. For its order has internal criteria: what count as, e.g., rational and meaningful within religion are determined not by criteria appropriate to physics or chess playing but by criteria appropriate to religion as it is lived by the religious. (shrink)

This book aims to clarify the debate between moral relativists and moral absolutists by showing what is right and what is wrong about each of these positions, by revealing how the phenomenon of moral diversity is connected with moral relativism, and by arguing for the importance of relationships between persons as key to reaching a satisfactory understanding of the issues involved in the debate.

The purpose of this book is to raise the possibilities of religious knowledge and religious discovery. By religious knowledge and discovery I mean knowledge and discovery of God, and by possibility I mean a viable possibility, the kind that a new look under a new light finds; I do not mean a minimal or a "logical" possibility. -- Introduction.