v. 1. A critical edition of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra) -- v. 2. An annotated translation of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra).

ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to determine whether genetic engineering is ever acceptable. The prominent arguments which have been put forward by the opponents of genetic engineering are examined and evaluated. The arguments ‘we should not interfere with nature’, ‘we should not alter the genetic constitution of organisms’, and ‘we should not alter the genetic constitution of organisms to this extent’are found to be inadequate as valid arguments against all genetic engineering. However, it remains a possibility that there (...) is nothing intrinsically unethical about genetic engineering, but that the risks of misuse render the techniques ethically unacceptable. Since universal legislation is not possible, and the risks of genetic engineering are so real, this alone may be sufficient to dismiss all genetic engineering as wrong. (shrink)

Human brain organoids are three-dimensional masses of tissues derived from human stem cells that partially recapitulate the characteristics of the human brain. They have promising applications in many fields, from basic research to applied medicine. However, ethical concerns have been raised regarding the use of human brain organoids. These concerns primarily relate to the possibility that brain organoids may become conscious in the future. This possibility is associated with uncertainties about whether and in what sense brain organoids could have consciousness (...) and what the moral significance of that would be. These uncertainties raise further concerns regarding consent from stem cell donors who may not be sufficiently informed to provide valid consent to the use of their donated cells in human brain organoid research. Furthermore, the possibility of harm to the brain organoids raises question about the scope of the donor’s autonomy in consenting to research involving these entities. Donor consent does not establish the reasonableness of the risk and harms to the organoids, which ethical oversight must ensure by establishing some measures to mitigate them. To address these concerns, we provide three proposals for the consent procedure for human brain organoid research. First, it is vital to obtain project-specific consent rather than broad consent. Second, donors should be assured that appropriate measures will be taken to protect human brain organoids during research. Lastly, these assurances should be fulfilled through the implementation of precautionary measures. These proposals aim to enhance the ethical framework surrounding human brain organoid research. (shrink)

In his paper “Non-human moral status: problems with phenomenal consciousness,” Joshua Shepherd emphasized an objectivist understanding of welfare to establish the moral status of non-human entities...

仁斎にとっての「学問」とは、世界の見え方を刷新させるものである。そして、そのような「学問」の道を開いたのが孔子であった。.

「士農工商は天下を治めるたすけとなる」―江戸期、都市化・経済化の流動的な波の中で、人々の生のつながりの公共的意義を説いた梅岩。広範な影響を及ぼしたその心学は、人々に希望を与え、世界のすべての存在が共に 幸福になることをめざす創造的・運動的な営みであった。.

Japanese conversational data reveal that Japanese speakers produce, and recipients orient to, smaller units of talk than what the conventional notion of a `turn constructional unit' represents. Unlike TCUs, such units may be grammatically, prosodically and pragmatically incomplete and may happen on the sub-phrasal level of discourse, as Japanese conversationalists prosodically break up even a single semantic constituent with the insertion of an interactional particle. In this article, I give numerous examples of how such practices of separating a segment of (...) talk are not random but are precisely embedded in the sequential organization of talk that participants co-create. I argue that such segmentation contributes to the interactional co-construction of a turn so as to highlight specifically a `move' Within the larger action that is implemented by the TCU. Doing so thereby provides opportunities for the participants to deal with local contingency problems without changing the global level of the pragmatic work of the turn. (shrink)

Sara Ahmed’s enquiry on what it means for sexuality to be lived as oriented from the work Queer Phenomenology inspired the art series ‘A Sexual Series’, based on post-humanist theory and asexual experience. Shapes of performative alter egos materialized from a queer cyborg position of technologically enhanced crip experiences (the strong symbolical constructing process of straightening scoliosis surgery). From being a glitch of the past towards a post-individualist future, the artificial intelligence sexbot is a metaphoric, elevated cyborg drag version of (...) the artist to embody asexuality and queer Otherness. Based on multitudes of CUNTraDICKtions to encourage self-reflection, the series explores the complexities of ob/scene and on/scene performances; the position of a sex positive asexual as well as questions of belonging as a naturally artificial rebel. (shrink)

We study price formulas suited for empirical research in financial markets in which put–call parity is satisfied. We find a connection between risk and the bid–ask spread. We further study the compatibility of the model with market frictions, and determine market subsets where the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing applies. Finally, we characterize the price formula.

Working with elders around the world has taught me that those living in grass huts in Africa with children at their feet are often happier than people in assisted‐living homes with a chandelier over their heads. My work in design consultancy and in fifteen years of running a nonprofit, Ibasho, that aims to co‐create socially integrated and sustainable communities that value their elders has allowed me to learn much about how architects and designers can contribute to helping people live a (...) good life in late life. People often need supportive services or other adaptations as they age, but do they really need—or want—the luxury environment few are accustomed to? The challenge for architects and designers is not to create a built environment whose carefully curated facades hide lives of quiet desperation. It is to help elders access the support they need without upending their lives or severing virtually all ties to their communities. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus that the offer of a reasonable compensation for oocyte donation for reproductive treatment is acceptable if it does not compromise voluntary and altruistically motivated donation. However, how to translate this ‘reasonable compensation’ in practice remains unclear as compensation rates offered to oocyte donors between different European Union countries vary significantly. Clinics involved in oocyte donation, as well as those in other medical contexts, might be encouraged in calculating a more consistent and transparent compensation for donors (...) if the elements that constitute a reasonable compensation are explicated. In doing so, lessons can be learnt from living organ donation and medical research participation. Practices in which the elements of a reasonable compensation for the individuals involved have already been more defined in the literature. By means of analogical reasoning, we will outline the different components of a reasonable compensation and subsequently apply these to the context of oocyte donation. We will argue that oocyte donors should first of all be reasonably reimbursed direct expenses related to the donation, without standard remuneration of lost wages. Second, donating oocytes requests a serious time investment, therefore donors are entitled to suitable compensation for their time spent and efforts made. Finally, we will explain that a reasonable compensation consisting of these two components allows for altruism to remain the key value of oocyte donation for reproductive treatment. However, if we acknowledge that donors’ motives are more complex and often include reasons from self-interest, the reasonable compensation may be complemented with modest (non)monetary benefits. (shrink)

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)

From ancient times, western civilization has been driven by a trust in scientific progress. Is Science Biology and biogenetics promise spectacular advances, mathematics unfolds new areas of understanding. This work explores some of the possible consequences for society and for the future of science itself.".

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness is the result of a means of valid cognition. It has also been understood that Dignāga accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object as the result; in PS ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the (...) result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object is the result. In I 9ab he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramāṇa and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna is the phala, Kumārila points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramāṇa and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature, i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasaṃvitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthaniścaya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. (shrink)

In recounting some of the key sociological insights offered by over 30 years of research on emotion management, or emotion regulation, we orient our discussion around sociological answers to the following questions: What is emotion management? How does emotion management occur? Why does it occur? And what are its consequences or benefits? In this review, we argue that emotion and its management are profoundly social. Through daily interactions with others, individuals learn to differentiate which emotions are appropriate when, as well (...) as the most effective ways to bring their feelings in line with culturally agreed-upon emotion norms. Emotion management is also functional, not only for the individuals who perform it, but also for the dyads, groups, institutions, and societies in which they are embedded. The social processes through which individuals learn to display culturally appropriate emotions have important implications on many levels, from interpersonal interactions to the development of social movements. (shrink)