Mithilfe der Verfahren des Embryo-Splittings werden unter Laborbedingungen aus einem Embryo mehrere, genetisch identische Embryonen gewonnen. Gegenwärtig wird in Fachbeiträgen debattiert, die in der Nutztierzucht etablierten Verfahren auf die humane Reproduktionsmedizin auszuweiten. Eine solche Anwendung wird derzeit flächendeckend als reproduktives Klonen verstanden und ist in allen Staaten per Gesetz oder Richtlinie untersagt. Bei der Prüfung ausgewählter Einwände gegen die prinzipielle Zulässigkeit einer Anwendung des Embryo-Splittings als assistierter Reproduktionstechnologie zeigt sich, dass sich die Einwände gegen das reproduktive Klonen (...) nicht auf den Fall des Splittings übertragen lassen. Insbesondere liegt dem Splitting nicht die ‚narzisstische‘ Replikation des Genoms einer bereits lebenden Person zugrunde. Die Gleichsetzung mit anderen Formen des reproduktiven Klonens verdeckt darüber hinaus eigene regulative Fragen zum Umgang mit gesplitteten Embryonen, die hinsichtlich einer potenziellen klinischen Anwendung adressiert werden müssen. Schließlich wird deutlich, dass die Maßgabe, Embryonen zu schützen, bisher einseitig als ausreichender Grund für eine restriktive Regulierung des Splittings herangezogen wurde. Diese Argumentation erweist sich in einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft jedoch als unzureichend. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NABER on Embryo SplittingMichael B. BurkeMadam:In its interesting Report on Human Cloning through Embryo Splitting: An Amber Light (KIEJ, September 1994), NABER (the National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction) discusses ten potential clinical uses of embryo splitting. With one member dissenting, NABER finds two of the uses to be acceptable in principle: (1) “to improve the chances of initiating pregnancy in those individuals (...) undergoing IVF who produce only a limited number of embryos for transfer and implantation” (p. 267) and (2) “to minimize the number of egg retrieval procedures for those undergoing IVF by providing embryos for cryopreservation and future transfer” (p. 268).However, some members of NABER limit their support for these uses to cases in which none of the embryos into which the originals are split are intentionally destroyed (see pp. 266–68). I find their position puzzling. They consider it “ethically unacceptable to discard cryopreserved embryos” (p. 268). In general, they object to intentional destruction of embryos resulting from embryo splitting. Yet they accept intentional destruction of the original embryos.Does the splitting of an embryo truly destroy it? Yes, it does, at least if the embryo is split into two equal parts—or into more than two parts, none of which contains a majority of the cells contained by the original. Suppose, for instance, that a two-cell embryo has been split into two one-cell embryos. Then the original embryo, although it may not have “died” and although its cells have both survived, has nonetheless ceased to exist. Even though the resulting one-cell embryos are identical genetically to the original embryo, neither of them is that embryo. (There is nothing to confer this honor on one of them rather than the other.) The original embryo has undergone what I will call “destructive splitting.”Now it is possible, even likely, that some splittings are not destructive splittings. Suppose that a four-cell embryo is spilt into a three-cell embryo and a one-cell embryo. At least from my perspective as an identity theorist, there is nothing to stop us from identifying the three-cell embryo with the four-cell original: we could say that the original embryo, although diminished, still exists. In any case, there is no indication that any members of NABER intended to limit their acceptance of embryo splitting to cases in which the original embryo survives.How are we to understand the apparent indifference of conservative members of NABER to the embryo that is split, given their concern for the embryos that result from the split? Perhaps the explanation is found in the following passage:NABER members represent a broad spectrum of views on the moral status of the embryo, and yet virtually all of them find embryo splitting per se ethically permissible if the resulting embryos are not damaged or destroyed in the process. These members maintain that there is nothing inherently wrong with creating several embryos [End Page 210] from a single embryo, providing all the embryos involved [except the original!] remain intact at the conclusion of the procedure. Embryo splitting parallels the spontaneous production of identical twins or triplets at this stage of embryo development, an occurrence that is accepted in our society with equanimity. The fact that embryo splitting is deliberately used to produce multiple embryos does not make it inherently wrong to employ the procedure.(Report, pp. 266–67)This argument appears to rely on the following principle: if something is properly viewed with equanimity when it happens spontaneously, then it is not inherently wrong to bring it about deliberately. At least in its full generality, this is a principle generally and rightly viewed with suspicion (by moral conservatives above all). Although it is proper to view with equanimity, even with relief, the natural deaths of terminally ill patients in great pain, many hold that active euthanasia is inherently wrong.When NABER has occasion to revisit the issue of embryo splitting, those members who object to destruction of embryos resulting from embryo splitting should make clear whether they accept the destructive splitting of embryos. If they do, they should clarify their reasons for accepting it.Michael B. BurkeDepartment of Philosophy Indiana... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Future Directions for Human Cloning by Embryo Splitting:After the HullabalooCynthia B. Cohen (bio)In October 1993, a paper entitled, "Experimental Cloning of Human Polyploid Embryos Using an Artificial Zona Pellucida," was presented at a joint meeting of the American Fertility Society and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society. Although it was awarded a prize, its authors, who are affiliated with George Washington University, decided against calling a press (...) conference to announce their findings. Word of their experiment soon leaked out, however, and the New York Times blazoned on its front page that human embryo cloning had been achieved. The story was accompanied by a diagram of cloning by nuclear transplantation.Newspapers and television networks around the world picked up the story and embellished it. The idea of unlimited, xeroxed copies of human beings gripped the public imagination. Wild scenarios of hundreds of Hitlers plotting to take over the world and of clones giving birth to their own twins enlivened media reports. Only gradually did it become clear that the term "polyploid" in the title of the paper referred to abnormal embryos that could never develop into living human beings and that "cloning" referred to embryo splitting or twinning, not to nuclear transplantation or the transfer of a donor nucleus into an enucleated egg. Once this sank into public consciousness, the "hullabaloo," as Dr. Howard W Jones, Jr., called it, died down.It left in its wake unanswered questions about the ethics of splitting embryos. During the height of the publicity given to the George Washington experiment, newspaper and TV stories had not delved in any depth into the ethical issues it raised. Ethicists, given limited time to discuss the ethical questions at stake, had been quoted in quick, simplistic responses. Some had offered little analysis of the rights and wrongs of embryo splitting, but, revealing tremendous creative talent, had spun out [End Page 187] imaginary and frightening applications of the procedure. This was a story essentially about ethics in which ethics was never really discussed.The National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction* (NABER), an independent, multidisciplinary group that addresses ethical issues in modern reproductive science, technology, and care, became concerned about the sparsity of reflective ethical debate about embryo splitting. NABER's chair, Albert Jonsen, observed that "reporters phoning ethicists for comment and ethicists appearing on talk shows do not a debate make. Debate requires face to face (or at least essay to essay) argument among persons sharing the same information. This has yet to take place." Consequently, NABER decided to convene a workshop on human cloning by embryo splitting at the National Academy of Sciences in February 1994. The board invited participants who would provide a broad range of opinion about the ethical and public policy issues entailed by human embryo splitting. Embryologists, ethicists, reproductive biologists, public policy experts, staff from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), legal scholars, journalists, and infertility specialists were among those who participated. The feature articles in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal derive from that workshop. Their authors were given free rein to take whatever stance they deemed ethically supportable.The first article is designed to provide some understanding of the science of human cloning as a basis for exploring the ethical issues raised by this set of techniques. Jacques Cohen, a leading reproductive embryologist, and Giles Tomkin, a science writer, both of Cornell University Medical School, explain, in a way that is clear to laypersons and biologists alike, the meaning, nature, and function of cloning. They discuss recent: advances in this area and offer an assessment of feasible uses of human cloning procedures, hoping to dispel what they view as mistaken fears about its future applications. Dr. Howard W Jones, Jr., a pioneer infertility specialist, briefly comments on Cohen and Tomkin's paper, pointing out that embryo splitting may not improve pregnancy results if genetic heterogeneity is required for successful embryo transfer and implantation.In the next article, three major ethical arguments against human cloning by embryo splitting are analyzed and rejected by Ruth Macklin, an expert in reproductive ethics from Albert Einstein College of Medicine. She finds the first argument, that the worth of individuals... (shrink)

Neither the George Washington University embryo splitting experiment nor the technique of embryo splitting itself has ethical flaws. The experiment harmed or wronged no one, and the investigators followed intramural review procedures for the experiment, although some might fault them for failing to seek extramural consultation or for not waiting until national guidelines for research on preembryos were developed. Ethical objections to such cloning on the basis of possible loss of individuality, possible lessening of individual worth, (...) and concern about potential harm to the resulting children are discussed and challenged, as are objections to the creation of embryos for the purpose of genetic diagnosis. Many of the ethical questions raised by the George Washington experiment are similar to those posed by existing reproductive technologies that allow the simultaneous production of several embryos. A multidisciplinary group should consider whether regulation of cloning is needed, and laws should be enacted to prohibit a commercial market for all frozen embryos. (shrink)

In 1993, investigators from George Washington University Medical Center separated the cells of 17 human embryos and produced 48 embryos, an average of three embryos for each original. The method, variously called twinning, cloning, embryo splitting, and blastomere separation, demonstrated that human embryos could be split to create genetically identical entities during conception. When publicized, however, the experiment brought to mind a different view of cloning repeated since the beginning of the new reproductive technologies. In the early 1970s, (...) when research on in vitro fertilization was in its infancy, commentators worried that cloning–defined as the duplication of persons–would be next, leading to a scenario of “boys genetically exactly like the father, girls like the mother, or individuals like some true or false hero of art, science, or sports, or like some demagogue or some saint.”. (shrink)

Although many scientists view cloning as a useful procedure for scientific research into early embryo development—one that cannot currently be used to produce multiple copies of humans—the popular literature has led some individuals to view it as sinister. To address the concerns of the public, various conceptions of cloning are distinguished and their basis in fact analyzed. The possible uses, benefits, and detriments of both embryo splitting and nuclear transplantation are explained. Once the nature and purposes of (...) cloning are understood, and the distinctive ethical dilemmas created by embryo splitting and nuclear transplantation are sorted out, these procedures should be clinically implemented to assist in vitro fertilization treatment for those who are infertile and to further other therapeutic and investigational efforts in medicine. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Recently, ”Dolly” has been confirmed by cloning several other mammals. In January 1999 it was even reported that Korean researchers first of all had cloned the first human embryo. In the following article some basic biological and technical aspects of modern cloning strategies, such as embryo splitting and nuclear transplantation, will be described. Subsequently, a short critical analysis will discuss the ethical problem of cloning human beings. Since the German Embryo Protection Act (...) from January 1991 substantial progress in cloning technology has been made, so that the principal question now is whether the Act is still sufficient to forbid human cloning or whether it should be revised. Arguments and conclusion: With advanced technical progress human cloning now seems to be possible. From the ethical point of view, the cloning of human beings should be rejected, as it offends the fundamental value of human dignity. On the other hand, the German Embryo Protection Act is antiquated and does not provide the required protection. This article may stimulate further discussion in the fields of ethics and jurisdiction, especially regarding to the Embryo Protection Act. (shrink)

I consider the argument, thought to clinch the moral case for use of a human embryo solely as a means, that only a human individual can be a person, because it can happen at any time before formation of the primitive streak that an embryo splits into monozygotic twins, no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a human individual, and therefore no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a (...) person. I explore the following proffered arguments for : indivisibility is a necessary condition of individuality, nonidentity of an embryo with successor twins impugns the embryo’s individuality, and totipotency of an embryo’s constituents is inconsistent with the embryo’s being a human individual. These arguments are tested and found wanting; so too is an alternative to , the argument that indivisibility is intrinsic to personhood. Whereupon is unsustained. In search of ways to rehabilitate the nonindividuation argument, I canvass alternative metaphysical views and inquire further into biological individuality, but find that the argument cannot be saved. I conclude by analyzing where this leaves matters concerning the morality of embryo use. (shrink)

I consider the argument, thought to clinch the moral case for use of a human embryo solely as a means, that only a human individual can be a person, because it can happen at any time before formation of the primitive streak that an embryo splits into monozygotic twins, no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a human individual, and therefore no embryo in which the primitive streak has not formed is a (...) person. I explore the following proffered arguments for : indivisibility is a necessary condition of individuality, nonidentity of an embryo with successor twins impugns the embryo’s individuality, and totipotency of an embryo’s constituents is inconsistent with the embryo’s being a human individual. These arguments are tested and found wanting; so too is an alternative to, the argument that indivisibility is intrinsic to personhood. Whereupon is unsustained. In search of ways to rehabilitate the nonindividuation argument, I canvass alternative metaphysical views and inquire further into biological individuality, but find that the argument cannot be saved. I conclude by analyzing where this leaves matters concerning the morality of embryo use. (shrink)

The debate about cloning that took place 25 years ago, although directed toward a different sort of cloning, elucidates fundamental issues currently at stake in reproductive technologies and research. Paul Ramsey and Joseph Fletcher were participants in this early debate. The differences between Ramsey and Fletcher about the meaning and sufficiency of freedom, the understanding and weighing of good and evil, the connection between embodiment and personhood, the relationship of humans with nature, and the meaning of parenthood suggest both a (...) broader agenda for the debate about cloning and a cautious move forward in the development of embryo splitting. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.3 (2002) 305-323 [Access article in PDF] Scope Note 41 Bioethics and Cloning, Part I Susan Cartier Poland and Laura Jane Bishop This is Part One of a two part Scope Note on Bioethics and Cloning. Part Two will be published in the December 2002 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal and as a separate reprint. Contents For Parts 1 And 2 (...) Part 1Part 2I.History of the ScienceI.Ethical PerspectivesII.Historical CommentaryII.Religious PerspectivesIII.Animal WelfareIII.Fiction and FilmIV.Laws and Legal Literature"Clone" is a collective noun (I, Stewart 1997, p. 771). A collective noun names a group and is composed of individual members, such as "herd" or "flock." Derived from the Greek kl¯on for twig or slip, "clone" was first used in biology to describe the aggregate of asexually produced progeny of an individual, either naturally occurring or man-made; the definition later expanded to mean a group of genetically identical members who originate from a single ancestor. Thus, a clone is a group that results from the process of asexual reproduction.In nature, cloning occurs either by parthenogenesis (reproduction without fertilization) or by fission (embryo splitting). In a pioneering experiment in 1952, Robert Briggs and Thomas J. King (I, 1952), cancer researchers at the Institute for Cancer Research (today part of the Fox Chase Cancer Center) in Philadelphia, demonstrated on frogs another method of cloning by transplanting nuclei into enucleated cells, a technique called "nuclear transplantation," which John B. Gurdon and colleagues (I, 1958, 1975) used to create clones of frogs.Then, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, two back-to-back frauds in cloning occurred. First, the cloning of a human described by American science journalist David Rorvik in the 1978 book In His Image was called a hoax by a court in [End Page 305] 1982. Second, the cloning of three mice, announced by German wunderkind Karl Illmensee to scientific circles in 1979 (and to the public in 1981), could not be proven to be true, according to convincing evidence by McGrath and Solter (I) published in 1984.With their pronouncement that mammalian cloning was impossible, McGrath and Solter essentially stopped cloning research and funding for such biological research. So by the mid-1980s, instead of further investigating cloning, developmental biologists studied embryology related to in vitro fertilization, while molecular biologists studied recombinant DNA under the newly relaxed NIH guidelines. These two strands of scientific investigation came together in the work of Ian Wilmut, who created in vitro embryos using nuclear transplantation to reproduce genetically engineered cattle. Wilmut was seeking a way to increase the successful birth rate when, in the 1990s, he produced identical twin sheep, Megan and Morag, cloned from an embryonic cell, followed by another sheep, Dolly, cloned from an adult cell. The birth of a mammal from an embryo whose genetic material came from an adult cell firmly re-established the possibility of cloning from adults. Prior to Dolly's birth, scientists believed that adult cells lost the ability to dedifferentiate—i.e., to become unspecialized—and so could not direct the development of an embryo through to birth.The 1997 announcement of Dolly's birth initiated the present widespread discussion of cloning. Because of its potentially vast applications across human health, medicine, agriculture, and business/economics, cloning raises a host of issues including those concerning: genetics and genetic engineering, patenting, animal rights and/or animal welfare (especially for transgenic, research, or cloned animals), organ transplantation, reproduction, eugenics, pharmacology (drug production using transgenic animals), research practices, informed consent, stem cell research, women's rights, children's rights, parental rights and responsibilities, and theology and philosophy. It fosters questions about the meaning and purpose of life, the limits of human powers to intervene in research and therapy, and what it means to be human or animal. In addition, environmentalists and organic farmers raise concerns about the effect of novel animals and plants on the environment, while nutritionists and the lay public wonder... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cloning without Prior Approval:A Response to Recent Disclosures of NoncomplianceRuth Macklin (bio)Editor's note: In September 1994, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal published a special issue on the ethics of embryo splitting or "cloning," which included papers originally prepared for a workshop on embryo splitting sponsored by the National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction (NABER) and NABER's report, Human Cloning through Embryo (...) class='Hi'>Splitting. The impetus for the project was embryo-splitting research conducted by Drs. Jerry L. Hall, Robert J. Stillman, and others, at George Washington University and presented in October 1993 at a joint meeting of the American Fertility Society and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society. Media coverage at the time reported that the research had been approved by the university's formal review committees. However, it came to light in December 1994 that the researchers had not obtained approval from the university's institutional review board prior to conducting the research. Following a university investigation, the researchers were disciplined and instructed to destroy their data. The university also voluntarily forwarded the records of the incident to the Office for Protection from Research Risks at the National Institutes of Health. Dr. Hall resigned from George Washington University in September 1994.In the following postscript to her article on the ethics of embryo splitting (KIEJ, September 1994), Ruth Macklin discusses these events. The letters and memoranda that she cites were obtained from NIH through the Freedom of Information Act.My article, "Splitting Embryos on the Slippery Slope: Ethics and Public Policy" (KIEJ, September 1994), included a brief assessment of the ethics of the Hall-Stillman embryo-splitting experiment conducted at George Washington University (GWU). The article reviewed the researchers' stated purpose ("to help infertile couples by reproducing nature's ability to reproduce twins"), the features of the research itself (splitting embryos that never could become viable and with no plan to implant either the original or the split embryos), and the review procedures surrounding the experiment. I said that the researchers might be [End Page 57] faulted for not waiting until embryo research guidelines had been established at the national level; on the other hand, they surely could not fail to conform to such national guidelines when none existed.My conclusions were based on information that had been reported in the print media. Dr. Robert J. Stillman's statement that the experiment "had been approved by the university's formal review committees and peer reviewed by colleagues" was reported in the Washington Post on October 25, 1993, (Sawyer 1993). However, in light of the recent disclosure that the researchers had not obtained approval from George Washington University's IRB before proceeding with the research (Schwartz 1994), I now draw a sharply different conclusion about the ethics of the researchers' behavior.The most glaring flaw was the researchers' failure to submit a protocol to their institution's IRB in advance of embarking on the research. Following an investigation of the matter, the Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) made the further determination that "the failure on the part of GWU research investigators and administrators to notify the IRB promptly about noncompliance in this research constitutes additional serious noncompliance" with research regulations (J. Thomas Puglisi, Chief of the Compliance Oversight Branch, Division of Human Subject Protections, OPRR, letter to Stephen J. Trachtenberg, President of George Washington University, 23 August 1994). Is it reasonable to suppose that these researchers were unaware of their obligations (a) to obtain prior review and approval from the IRB and (b) to notify the IRB promptly about their noncompliance? Regarding the latter item, Dr. Puglisi's letter to the President of GWU states that "the notification requirement has been a longstanding element of the GWU MPA [multiple project assurance], which should have been familiar to all members of the GWU research community." I shall concentrate on the researchers' more glaring ethical omission, failure to obtain prior review and approval from the IRB.Did either or both of these researchers contend that they were unaware of any review requirements for their research? Hall blames Stillman, Director of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology, Fertility, and IVF Programs, for not making the requirement... (shrink)

Zusammenfassung. Inzwischen ist „Dolly” mehrfach durch die Klonierungen anderer Säugetiere hinreichend bestätigt worden. Im Januar 1999 sollen Koreanische Forscher sogar den ersten menschlichen Embryo kloniert haben. Im folgenden werden zunächst biologisch-technische Grundlagen aktueller Klonierungstechnologien des Embryo-Splittings und der Zellkerntransplantation vorgestellt. Anschließend folgt eine kurze ethische Bewertung der Klonierung beim Menschen, wobei das Klonen als ein Verstoß gegen die Menschenwürde klassifiziert wird. Seit der Verabschiedung des Embryonenschutzgesetzes (ESchG) im Januar 1991 sind jetzt über neun Jahre vergangen. In Anbetracht der (...) wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse und des technischen Fortschrittes auf dem Gebiet der Reproduktionsmedizin in den letzten Jahre meldet das ESchG nicht nur zunehmenden Interpretationsbedarf an, sondern weist auch z.T. gravierende Strafbarkeitslücken auf. Mit dem vorliegenden Beitrag soll ein Stück weit eine auf der Basis des naturwissenschaftlichen Fortschritts fundierte ethisch-rechtliche Diskussion insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund des in die Jahre gekommenen deutschen ESchG angeregt werden. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When OPRR Comes Calling:Enforcing Federal Research RegulationsCharles R. Mccarthy (bio)In an update following this article, Ruth Macklin responds to the revelation that the controversial Hall-Stillman embryo-splitting experiment at George Washington University was conducted—contrary to federal regulations—without prior institutional review board (IRB) review. This revelation altered Dr. Macklin's view of the ethical status of the research. Undoubtedly such revelations also raise general questions for administrators and researchers in (...) many institutions, including, for example: How do allegations of noncompliance with federal regulations arise? When should allegations of infractions of the regulations be reported? Who has an obligation to report? To whom should reports be made? What sort of inquiry should take place? Who should conduct the inquiry? If a determination is made that infractions have occurred, what sanctions are appropriate? And, what publicity is given to the allegations, before, during, and after an evaluation?Some of these questions can be answered in a straightforward manner, while the answers to others depend on the circumstances of the case. This article provides some general answers to these questions.1BackgroundThe Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the largest supporter of biomedical and behavioral research in the world. Somewhere between 25 and 33 percent of its medical research budget is devoted to the support of research involving human subjects. In accordance with the Public Health Service Act, DHHS has issued Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46). The DHHS Secretary has delegated responsibility for promulgating and administering the regulations to the Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), which is located within the National Institutes of Health.When an institution receives an award from a DHHS agency to carry out research involving human subjects, it is required to negotiate, or to have on file, an "assurance of compliance" document that provides detailed information [End Page 51] specifying how the institution plans to comply with the regulations for the protection of human subjects. Most major research institutions in the country have on file a "multiple project assurance" (MPA) document, which extends DHHS regulations to all human subjects research conducted or sponsored by that institution, irrespective of the source of funding. The regulations and the assurance of compliance require any research project involving human subjects to be reviewed and approved by an institutional review board (IRB) prior to initiation of the research. In addition, the project must be re-reviewed by the IRB at appropriate intervals—in no case, less than once a year. Institutional compliance with these and other requirements of the regulations has improved during the last 30 years and appears to be at a high level. However, from time to time, allegations of noncompliance arise, as they did in the George Washington University embryo-splitting experiment, and set in motion the review process described below.How do Allegations of Noncompliance Arise?Allegations or indications of noncompliance with federal regulations for the protection of human subjects may come from a variety of sources. Most commonly, the institution's IRB discovers that research involving humans is going forward without the required prior IRB review and approval, or that approved research is being conducted in a way that is contrary to the stipulations of the IRB. The Hall-Stillman case came to the attention of George Washington University's IRB because the research protocol was submitted to the IRB after the research had been carried out. In this case, there could be no doubt that an infraction had occurred.Information about possible noncompliance also frequently derives from a funding agency's Initial Review Group (IRG) (commonly called a Study Section) when it has reason to suspect noncompliance in a project it is reviewing for possible funding. An actual case that occurred some years ago involved a research application that proposed to perform brain biopsies on normal volunteers. The IRG that reviewed the application lost little time in questioning whether an IRB had approved the protocol. In this case, it was not enough for the IRG to recommend disapproval of the proposal for funding; it also was obliged to report the possible infraction to OPRR.Whistleblowers, including research subjects, nurses, students, members of the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Private Bioethics Forums:Counterpoint to Government BodiesCynthia B. Cohen (bio) and Elizabeth Leibold McCloskey (bio)Ethical issues associated with reproductive technologies quickly gain public attention. The front pages of newspapers have featured stories about grandmothers giving birth to their own grandchildren, couples "renting" wombs from surrogates, and researchers prepared to transplant fetal ovaries into women unable to produce viable eggs. With each new and bolder foray into reproductive realms, the question (...) of whether to set limits on the use of such technologies surfaces. An ancillary debate inevitably ensues about the proper forum for discussing and deciding such limits. The recent announcement of human embryo splitting or cloning research is no exception to this pattern. Articles in both the popular press and academic circles in the wake of the reported research contain lamentations about the absence of a national ethics body that could address the ethical issues raised by the cloning experiment. This research also breathed new life into congressional calls to create a government bioethics commission.1At times, it appears that the substantive questions raised by a procedure like cloning are subsumed under the debate about whether this ethics group or that should be convened to study the matter. But the forum in which options are discussed is as crucial to the development of sound ethical thought and public policy as are the conclusions themselves. Thus, we address the question of whether a private, as opposed to a public, bioethics body provides a distinctively useful forum for reaching an understanding of issues such as cloning that have significant ethical and public policy implications.A 1993 Office of Technology Assessment report, in which the authors suggest that a new federal bioethics commission might be useful, has helped to frame recent discussions about the value of government-sponsored bioethics bodies (Office of Technology Assessment 1993). To most people, the question of whether a national forum for bioethics is needed is synonymous with the question of whether a new federal body should be convened. Yet the existence of the National Advisory Board on Ethics in Reproduction (NABER) suggests that the scope of the question should be broadened. [End Page 283]NABER was born in 1992, in part as a response to an Institute of Medicine report on infertility. That document endorsed the formation of a nongovernment body to develop guidelines for assisted reproductive measures and fetal research in the event that a government body was not forthcoming (Institute of Medicine 1989). NABER, which was founded by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Fertility Society, now functions wholly independently of those groups and is supported by private foundations including the Ford, Greenwall, and Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundations and the Walter and Elise Haas Fund. NABER has issued a report on ethical issues related to the use of fetal tissue (Cohen and Jonsen 1993), is about to publish a report and background papers on oocyte donation, and presents a report on human cloning in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. In addition, it has developed a protocol for NABER review of research proposals from federal agencies subject to federal guidelines on the use of human subjects in research.Thus, in function and form, NABER was envisioned as a substitute for a government body, and it now functions in a manner similar to several types of government bioethics groups. Like the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National Commission) and the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (President's Commission), NABER functions primarily through the publication of reports intended for a broad audience of practitioners, patients, policymakers, and the general public. Just as the Ethics Advisory Board of the late 1970s examined ethical issues related to specific protocols or types of research as they arose, NABER's purposes include scrutinizing the ethics of various research efforts in the reproductive area.NABER also parallels past government bodies in form. Like these groups, NABER is a multidisciplinary board that meets regularly and is supplemented by consultants and staff who provide research and writing for the board. Its members are nationally recognized in... (shrink)

Definition of the Problem: The ethical debate on the cloning of human beings is by no means new. Its history goes back to the middle of the 1960s. However, the theoretical level of the contents of this debate still doesn't seem to have got past its initial stages.Arguments and conclusion: First, a short overview will be given of these 30 years of history of ethical debate, and some central concepts will be explained. Subsequently a critical analysis will be made of (...) the arguments for and against the cloning of people which are used in this debate. The intention of this exposition is to stimulate further ethical discussion on the cloning of human beings. (shrink)

The idea of splitting off cells from embryos to clone human beings sounds so bizarre and dangerous that one would think the practice should not be permitted. A closer look reveals its ethical acceptability.

This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of personDS a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity andx dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes (...) with a look at different views of the person found in Homer, Aristotle, the post-Cartesians, and contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing (...) with cases of fission and fusion and both seem to be available to the conceptionist. One is the Replacement View according to which objects cease to exist when they fission or fuse. The other is the Multiple Occupancy View – both twins may be present already in the zygote and both persist in a chimera. So, is the conceptionist position tenable after all? I argue that it is not. A zygote gives rise not only to a human being but also to a placenta – it cannot already be both a human being and a placenta. Neither approach to fission and fusion can help the conceptionist with this problem. But worse is in store. Both fission and fusion can occur before and after the development of the inner cell mass of the blastocyst – the entity which becomes the embryo proper. The idea that we become human beings with the arrival of the inner cell mass leads to bizarre results however we choose to accommodate fission and fusion. (shrink)

If we distance ourselves from the content of the debate for and against the destruction of human embryos for scientific research purposes, we may be struck by its rhetorical form. Each side thinks not only that it has the superior argument, but that its conclusion is wholly obvious, while the other side’s position is obviously mistaken. Those who defend splitting embryos to obtain stem cells say that it is ridiculous to claim that a tiny zygote or blastocyst without a (...) brain is the same sort of being as we, while those who oppose this research claim it to be clear as day that each of us is the same being we were when newly conceived, though now .. (shrink)

Experimental evidence strongly supports the view that the subdivision of organ anlagen into smaller structural units is an autonomous process. Dalcq &Pasteels' hypothesis which says that the boundaries between the different areas into which a morphogenetic field differentiates are determined by “Threshold values” in the “potential” of the field in question, is inconsistent with our present knowledge of biochemical reaction systems. Threshold values may only be used indescribing the spatial differentiation of a morphogenetic field. It is suggested that the latter (...) concept be replaced by the concept of “optimal values” in the intensity of a morphogenetic field-specific for the various chemo-differentiations characterizing the different regions into which a morphogenetic field will split up-and that each optimal value isdeterminative for the appearance of one particular differentiation within the morphogenetic field, each differentiation being formed within a certain range of intensity of the field. On the basis of the hypothesis formulated above a “virginal” morphogenetic field will necessarily differentiate into a number of smaller fields of second order, which in their turn will split up into fields of third order, etc. ” Pattern formation” may be defined as the differentiation of a morphogenetic field into an increasing number of smaller fields of higher order of qualitative different chemical and structural composition. Since differentiation of a morphogenetic field proceeds autonomously, the capacity for pattern formation is an intrinsic property of a morphogenetic field. In the light of these considerations it is suggested that a morphogenetic field action is responsible for the first differentiation of the developing embryo into regions with predominantly ectodermal, mesodermal or endodermal differentiation tendencies. The present knowledge about the characteristic pattern formation taking place in the axial mesoderm as well as in the overlying neural plate seems to be in good agreement with the implications of the present morphogenetic field concept. It is emphasized, however, that if the present morphogenetic field concept cannot be characterized further biochemically and biophysically, it will have to be replaced by another concept which can be defined more sharply and is more easily accessible to experimental analysis. Les preuves expérimentales confirment que la subdivision des ébauches des organes en unités structurelles plus petites est un processus autonome. L'hypothèse deDalcq &Pasteels disant que les bornes entre les différents domaines formées par la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique sont déterminées par des „valeurs seuil” dans le „potentiel” du champ en question, n'est pas en harmonie avec notre connaissance actuelle des systèmes biochimiques. Des “valeurs seuil” ne peuvent être employés qu'en décrivant la différenciation spatiale d'un champ morphogénétique. On prend en considération de remplacer le concept des “valeurs seuil” par le concept des “valeurs optimales” dans l'intensité d'un champ morphogénétique. Ce seraient les valeurs spécifiques aux différenciations chimiques diverses qui caractérisent les différents domaines dans lesquels un champ morphogénétique se différencie. En outre, chaque valeur optimale serait déterminative à la formation d'une différenciation spéciale dans le champ morphogénétique, chaque différentiation se formant dans un certain trajet de l'intensité du champ. Par suite de l'hypothèse formulée ci-dessus un champ morphogénétique “virginal” va nécessairement se différencier en un nombre de champs plus petits de deuxième ordre, qui à leur tour se divisent en champs d'ordre troisième, etc. ... La régionalisation peut être définie comme la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique dans un nombre de plus en plus élevé de champs plus petits d'ordre supérieur de composition chimique et structurelle qualitativement différente. Parce que la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique se produit de façon autonome, le pouvoir de régionalisation est une propriété intrinsique d'un champ morphogénétique. Ces considérations nous mènent à proposer que l'action d'un champ morphogénétique est responsable de la première différenciation de l'embryon en régions qui possèdent des tendences de différenciation principalement ectodermiques, mésodermiques, ou bien endodermiques. La connaissance actuelle concernant la régionalisation caractéristique qui se produit dans le mésoderme axial ainsi que dans la plaque neurale superposée paraît se conformer aux conséquences du concept de champ morphogénétique. Cependant on souligne le fait que dans le cas òu le concept actuel du champ morphogénétique ne pourra pas être plus amplement caractérisé de façon biochimique et biophysique, il faudra le remplacer par un autre concept qui puit être défini plus nettement et qui est mieux accessible à l'analyse expérimentale. Die Auffassung, dass die Aufteilung von Organanlagen in kleineren Struktureinheiten ein selbständiger Prozess ist, findet Bestätigung in den experimentellen Ergebnissen. Die Hypothese vonDalcq &Pasteels , dass die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedenen Gebieten, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenziert, durch “Schwellenwerte” im “Potential” des genannten Feldes bestimmt werden, ist unvereinbar mit unserem heutigen Wissen über biochemischen Reaktionssystemen. Der Gebrauch des Begriffs “Schwellenwert” ist nur gestattet bei der Beschreibung der räumlichen Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Statt dieses Begriffs wird der Begriff “Optimaler Wert” vorgeschlagen; Werte also in der Intensität eines morphogenetischen Feldes, optimal und spezifisch für die verschiedene Chemodifferenzierungen, welche die Gebiete kennzeichnen, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenzieren wird. Jeder optimaler Wert soll dann das Erscheinen einer bestimmten Differenzierung innerhalb des morphogenetischen Feldes veranlassen, welche Differenzierung sich bildet innerhalb eines bestimmten Bereichs der Feldintensität. Auf Grund der obigen Hypothese wird ein “virginelles” morphogenetisches Feld zwangsläufig sich differenzieren in eine Anzahl kleinerer Feldern zweiten Grades; diese in Felder dritten Grades, usw. Musterbildung könnte definiert werden als die Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes in eine zunehmende Anzahl kleinerer Felder höheren Grades von qualitativ verschiedener chemischen und strukturellen Zusammensetzung, Weil diese Differenzierung autonom vor sich geht, ist das Vermögen zur Musterbildung eine innewohnende Eigenschaft eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Im Lichte dieser Betrachtungen ist es naheliegend anzunehmen dass eine morphogenetische Feldwirkung verantwortlich ist für die erste Differenzierung des sich entwickelnden Embryos in Gebiete überwiegend ektodermalen, mesodermalen oder entodermalen Differenzierungstendenzen. Die heutigen Kenntnisse über die charakteristische Musterbildung im axialen Teil des Mesoderms und in der überliegenden Neuralplatte scheinen in guter Übereinstimmung zu sein mit den des morphogenetischen Feldbegriffs. Dennoch wird benachdruckt, dass, falls das gegenwärtige morphogenetische Feldbegriff nicht weiter biochemisch und biophysisch gekennzeichnet werden kann, anstatt dessen ein anderer Begriff entwickelt werden muß, der schärfer definiert werden kann und besser zugänglich ist für experimentelle Analyse. (shrink)

Experimental evidence strongly supports the view that the subdivision of organ anlagen into smaller structural units is an autonomous process. Dalcq &Pasteels' hypothesis which says that the boundaries between the different areas into which a morphogenetic field differentiates are determined by “Threshold values” in the “potential” of the field in question, is inconsistent with our present knowledge of biochemical reaction systems. Threshold values may only be used indescribing the spatial differentiation of a morphogenetic field. It is suggested that the latter (...) concept be replaced by the concept of “optimal values” in the intensity of a morphogenetic field-specific for the various chemo-differentiations characterizing the different regions into which a morphogenetic field will split up-and that each optimal value isdeterminative for the appearance of one particular differentiation within the morphogenetic field, each differentiation being formed within a certain range of intensity of the field. On the basis of the hypothesis formulated above a “virginal” morphogenetic field will necessarily differentiate into a number of smaller fields of second order, which in their turn will split up into fields of third order, etc. ” Pattern formation” may be defined as the differentiation of a morphogenetic field into an increasing number of smaller fields of higher order of qualitative different chemical and structural composition. Since differentiation of a morphogenetic field proceeds autonomously, the capacity for pattern formation is an intrinsic property of a morphogenetic field. In the light of these considerations it is suggested that a morphogenetic field action is responsible for the first differentiation of the developing embryo into regions with predominantly ectodermal, mesodermal or endodermal differentiation tendencies. The present knowledge about the characteristic pattern formation taking place in the axial mesoderm as well as in the overlying neural plate seems to be in good agreement with the implications of the present morphogenetic field concept. It is emphasized, however, that if the present morphogenetic field concept cannot be characterized further biochemically and biophysically, it will have to be replaced by another concept which can be defined more sharply and is more easily accessible to experimental analysis. Les preuves expérimentales confirment que la subdivision des ébauches des organes en unités structurelles plus petites est un processus autonome. L'hypothèse deDalcq &Pasteels disant que les bornes entre les différents domaines formées par la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique sont déterminées par des „valeurs seuil” dans le „potentiel” du champ en question, n'est pas en harmonie avec notre connaissance actuelle des systèmes biochimiques. Des “valeurs seuil” ne peuvent être employés qu'en décrivant la différenciation spatiale d'un champ morphogénétique. On prend en considération de remplacer le concept des “valeurs seuil” par le concept des “valeurs optimales” dans l'intensité d'un champ morphogénétique. Ce seraient les valeurs spécifiques aux différenciations chimiques diverses qui caractérisent les différents domaines dans lesquels un champ morphogénétique se différencie. En outre, chaque valeur optimale serait déterminative à la formation d'une différenciation spéciale dans le champ morphogénétique, chaque différentiation se formant dans un certain trajet de l'intensité du champ. Par suite de l'hypothèse formulée ci-dessus un champ morphogénétique “virginal” va nécessairement se différencier en un nombre de champs plus petits de deuxième ordre, qui à leur tour se divisent en champs d'ordre troisième, etc. ... La régionalisation peut être définie comme la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique dans un nombre de plus en plus élevé de champs plus petits d'ordre supérieur de composition chimique et structurelle qualitativement différente. Parce que la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique se produit de façon autonome, le pouvoir de régionalisation est une propriété intrinsique d'un champ morphogénétique. Ces considérations nous mènent à proposer que l'action d'un champ morphogénétique est responsable de la première différenciation de l'embryon en régions qui possèdent des tendences de différenciation principalement ectodermiques, mésodermiques, ou bien endodermiques. La connaissance actuelle concernant la régionalisation caractéristique qui se produit dans le mésoderme axial ainsi que dans la plaque neurale superposée paraît se conformer aux conséquences du concept de champ morphogénétique. Cependant on souligne le fait que dans le cas òu le concept actuel du champ morphogénétique ne pourra pas être plus amplement caractérisé de façon biochimique et biophysique, il faudra le remplacer par un autre concept qui puit être défini plus nettement et qui est mieux accessible à l'analyse expérimentale. Die Auffassung, dass die Aufteilung von Organanlagen in kleineren Struktureinheiten ein selbständiger Prozess ist, findet Bestätigung in den experimentellen Ergebnissen. Die Hypothese vonDalcq &Pasteels , dass die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedenen Gebieten, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenziert, durch “Schwellenwerte” im “Potential” des genannten Feldes bestimmt werden, ist unvereinbar mit unserem heutigen Wissen über biochemischen Reaktionssystemen. Der Gebrauch des Begriffs “Schwellenwert” ist nur gestattet bei der Beschreibung der räumlichen Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Statt dieses Begriffs wird der Begriff “Optimaler Wert” vorgeschlagen; Werte also in der Intensität eines morphogenetischen Feldes, optimal und spezifisch für die verschiedene Chemodifferenzierungen, welche die Gebiete kennzeichnen, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenzieren wird. Jeder optimaler Wert soll dann das Erscheinen einer bestimmten Differenzierung innerhalb des morphogenetischen Feldes veranlassen, welche Differenzierung sich bildet innerhalb eines bestimmten Bereichs der Feldintensität. Auf Grund der obigen Hypothese wird ein “virginelles” morphogenetisches Feld zwangsläufig sich differenzieren in eine Anzahl kleinerer Feldern zweiten Grades; diese in Felder dritten Grades, usw. Musterbildung könnte definiert werden als die Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes in eine zunehmende Anzahl kleinerer Felder höheren Grades von qualitativ verschiedener chemischen und strukturellen Zusammensetzung, Weil diese Differenzierung autonom vor sich geht, ist das Vermögen zur Musterbildung eine innewohnende Eigenschaft eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Im Lichte dieser Betrachtungen ist es naheliegend anzunehmen dass eine morphogenetische Feldwirkung verantwortlich ist für die erste Differenzierung des sich entwickelnden Embryos in Gebiete überwiegend ektodermalen, mesodermalen oder entodermalen Differenzierungstendenzen. Die heutigen Kenntnisse über die charakteristische Musterbildung im axialen Teil des Mesoderms und in der überliegenden Neuralplatte scheinen in guter Übereinstimmung zu sein mit den des morphogenetischen Feldbegriffs. Dennoch wird benachdruckt, dass, falls das gegenwärtige morphogenetische Feldbegriff nicht weiter biochemisch und biophysisch gekennzeichnet werden kann, anstatt dessen ein anderer Begriff entwickelt werden muß, der schärfer definiert werden kann und besser zugänglich ist für experimentelle Analyse. (shrink)

Experimental evidence strongly supports the view that the subdivision of organ anlagen into smaller structural units is an autonomous process. Dalcq &Pasteels' hypothesis which says that the boundaries between the different areas into which a morphogenetic field differentiates are determined by “Threshold values” in the “potential” of the field in question, is inconsistent with our present knowledge of biochemical reaction systems. Threshold values may only be used indescribing the spatial differentiation of a morphogenetic field. It is suggested that the latter (...) concept be replaced by the concept of “optimal values” in the intensity of a morphogenetic field-specific for the various chemo-differentiations characterizing the different regions into which a morphogenetic field will split up-and that each optimal value isdeterminative for the appearance of one particular differentiation within the morphogenetic field, each differentiation being formed within a certain range of intensity of the field. On the basis of the hypothesis formulated above a “virginal” morphogenetic field will necessarily differentiate into a number of smaller fields of second order, which in their turn will split up into fields of third order, etc. ” Pattern formation” may be defined as the differentiation of a morphogenetic field into an increasing number of smaller fields of higher order of qualitative different chemical and structural composition. Since differentiation of a morphogenetic field proceeds autonomously, the capacity for pattern formation is an intrinsic property of a morphogenetic field. In the light of these considerations it is suggested that a morphogenetic field action is responsible for the first differentiation of the developing embryo into regions with predominantly ectodermal, mesodermal or endodermal differentiation tendencies. The present knowledge about the characteristic pattern formation taking place in the axial mesoderm as well as in the overlying neural plate seems to be in good agreement with the implications of the present morphogenetic field concept. It is emphasized, however, that if the present morphogenetic field concept cannot be characterized further biochemically and biophysically, it will have to be replaced by another concept which can be defined more sharply and is more easily accessible to experimental analysis. Les preuves expérimentales confirment que la subdivision des ébauches des organes en unités structurelles plus petites est un processus autonome. L'hypothèse deDalcq &Pasteels disant que les bornes entre les différents domaines formées par la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique sont déterminées par des „valeurs seuil” dans le „potentiel” du champ en question, n'est pas en harmonie avec notre connaissance actuelle des systèmes biochimiques. Des “valeurs seuil” ne peuvent être employés qu'en décrivant la différenciation spatiale d'un champ morphogénétique. On prend en considération de remplacer le concept des “valeurs seuil” par le concept des “valeurs optimales” dans l'intensité d'un champ morphogénétique. Ce seraient les valeurs spécifiques aux différenciations chimiques diverses qui caractérisent les différents domaines dans lesquels un champ morphogénétique se différencie. En outre, chaque valeur optimale serait déterminative à la formation d'une différenciation spéciale dans le champ morphogénétique, chaque différentiation se formant dans un certain trajet de l'intensité du champ. Par suite de l'hypothèse formulée ci-dessus un champ morphogénétique “virginal” va nécessairement se différencier en un nombre de champs plus petits de deuxième ordre, qui à leur tour se divisent en champs d'ordre troisième, etc.... La régionalisation peut être définie comme la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique dans un nombre de plus en plus élevé de champs plus petits d'ordre supérieur de composition chimique et structurelle qualitativement différente. Parce que la différenciation d'un champ morphogénétique se produit de façon autonome, le pouvoir de régionalisation est une propriété intrinsique d'un champ morphogénétique. Ces considérations nous mènent à proposer que l'action d'un champ morphogénétique est responsable de la première différenciation de l'embryon en régions qui possèdent des tendences de différenciation principalement ectodermiques, mésodermiques, ou bien endodermiques. La connaissance actuelle concernant la régionalisation caractéristique qui se produit dans le mésoderme axial ainsi que dans la plaque neurale superposée paraît se conformer aux conséquences du concept de champ morphogénétique. Cependant on souligne le fait que dans le cas òu le concept actuel du champ morphogénétique ne pourra pas être plus amplement caractérisé de façon biochimique et biophysique, il faudra le remplacer par un autre concept qui puit être défini plus nettement et qui est mieux accessible à l'analyse expérimentale. Die Auffassung, dass die Aufteilung von Organanlagen in kleineren Struktureinheiten ein selbständiger Prozess ist, findet Bestätigung in den experimentellen Ergebnissen. Die Hypothese vonDalcq &Pasteels, dass die Grenzen zwischen den unterschiedenen Gebieten, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenziert, durch “Schwellenwerte” im “Potential” des genannten Feldes bestimmt werden, ist unvereinbar mit unserem heutigen Wissen über biochemischen Reaktionssystemen. Der Gebrauch des Begriffs “Schwellenwert” ist nur gestattet bei der Beschreibung der räumlichen Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Statt dieses Begriffs wird der Begriff “Optimaler Wert” vorgeschlagen; Werte also in der Intensität eines morphogenetischen Feldes, optimal und spezifisch für die verschiedene Chemodifferenzierungen, welche die Gebiete kennzeichnen, in denen ein morphogenetisches Feld sich differenzieren wird. Jeder optimaler Wert soll dann das Erscheinen einer bestimmten Differenzierung innerhalb des morphogenetischen Feldes veranlassen, welche Differenzierung sich bildet innerhalb eines bestimmten Bereichs der Feldintensität. Auf Grund der obigen Hypothese wird ein “virginelles” morphogenetisches Feld zwangsläufig sich differenzieren in eine Anzahl kleinerer Feldern zweiten Grades; diese in Felder dritten Grades, usw. Musterbildung könnte definiert werden als die Differenzierung eines morphogenetischen Feldes in eine zunehmende Anzahl kleinerer Felder höheren Grades von qualitativ verschiedener chemischen und strukturellen Zusammensetzung, Weil diese Differenzierung autonom vor sich geht, ist das Vermögen zur Musterbildung eine innewohnende Eigenschaft eines morphogenetischen Feldes. Im Lichte dieser Betrachtungen ist es naheliegend anzunehmen dass eine morphogenetische Feldwirkung verantwortlich ist für die erste Differenzierung des sich entwickelnden Embryos in Gebiete überwiegend ektodermalen, mesodermalen oder entodermalen Differenzierungstendenzen. Die heutigen Kenntnisse über die charakteristische Musterbildung im axialen Teil des Mesoderms und in der überliegenden Neuralplatte scheinen in guter Übereinstimmung zu sein mit den des morphogenetischen Feldbegriffs. Dennoch wird benachdruckt, dass, falls das gegenwärtige morphogenetische Feldbegriff nicht weiter biochemisch und biophysisch gekennzeichnet werden kann, anstatt dessen ein anderer Begriff entwickelt werden muß, der schärfer definiert werden kann und besser zugänglich ist für experimentelle Analyse. (shrink)

The extent of neurogenesis in Drosophila is under the control of the so‐called neurogenic genes, named for their mutant phenotype of causing neural hyperplasia. Their wild‐type products appear to be responsible for a signal chain that decides the fate of ectodermal cells in the embryo. Various kinds of data, from cell transplantation experiments as well as from genetic and molecular analyses, suggest that the proteins encoded by the genes Notch and Delta may act at the membrane of the signal‐transmitting (...) cells to provide a ligand to a still unknown receptor molecule; in contrast, the locus of Enhancer of split codes for several functions related to the transduction and further processing of the signal. (shrink)

The phylogenetic position of the hagfish remains enigmatic. In contrast to molecular data that suggest monophyly of the cyclostomes, several morphological features imply a more ancestral state of this animal compared with the lampreys. To resolve this question requires an understanding of the embryology of the hagfish, especially of the neural crest. The early development of the hagfish has long remained a mystery. We collected a shallow‐water‐dwelling hagfish, Eptatretus burgeri, set up an aquarium tank designed to resemble its habitat, and (...) successfully obtained several embryos. By observing the histology and expression of genes known to play fundamental roles in the neural crest, we found that the hagfish crest develops as delaminating migratory cells, as in other vertebrates. We conclude that the delaminating neural crest is a vertebrate synapomorphy that seems to have appeared from the beginning of their evolutionary history, before the splitting away of the hagfish lineage. BioEssays 30:167–172, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are (...) far more effective strategies for preserving the lives of frozen embryos than adoption. Moreover, we point out that those who regard the deaths of frozen embryos as a very bad thing will generally regard the deaths of all embryos as a very bad thing, whether they are discarded embryos, aborted embryos or embryos that spontaneously abort. This entails these other embryos must be taken into account when considering moral obligations, as well as other human lives at risk from preventable causes. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

The recent publications reported in 2022 reveal the possibility of obtaining mouse embryos without the need for egg or sperm. These ‘artificial embryos’ can recapitulate some stages of development ex utero – from neurulation to organogenesis – without implantation. Synthetic mouse embryos might serve as a valuable model to gain further insights into early developmental stages. Indeed, it is expected for these models to be replicated by employing human cells. This promising research raises ethical issues and expands the horizon of (...) ethics in regard to the development of the human embryo. From this point of view, we state some of the new open venues for bioethical research. (shrink)

Recent scientific advances have indicated that it may be technically feasible to sustain human embryos in vitro beyond 14 days. Research beyond this stage is currently restricted by a guideline known as the 14-day rule. Since the advances in embryo culturing there have been calls to extend the current limit. Much of the current debate concerning an extension has regarded the 14-day rule as a political compromise and has, therefore, focused on policy concerns rather than assessing the philosophical foundations (...) of the limit. While there are relevant political considerations, I maintain that the success of extension arguments will ultimately depend on the strength of the justifications supporting the current 14-day limit. I argue that the strongest and most prevalent justifications for the 14-day rule—an appeal to individuation and neural development—do not provide adequate support for the limit of 14 days. I instead suggest that an alternative justification based on sentience would constitute a more defensible basis for embryo protection and that a consideration of such grounds appears to support an amendment to the current limit, rather than the retention of it. While these conclusions do not establish conclusively that the current limit should be extended; they do suggest that an extension may be warranted and permissible. As such, this paper offers grounds on which a reassessment of the 14-day rule may be justified. (shrink)

The emergence of ethical controversy -- First embryo research regimes -- The ethics of embryonic stem cell research -- Stem cell and cloning politics.

This is a contribution to the study of the Muchnik and Medvedev lattices of non-empty Π01 subsets of 2ω. In both these lattices, any non-minimum element can be split, i. e. it is the non-trivial join of two other elements. In fact, in the Medvedev case, ifP > MQ, then P can be split above Q. Both of these facts are then generalised to the embedding of arbitrary finite distributive lattices. A consequence of this is that both lattices have decidible (...) ∃-theories. (shrink)

I defend the argument that if embryo loss in stem cell research is morally problematic, then embryo loss in in vivo conception is similarly morally problematic. According to a recent challenge to this argument, we can distinguish between in vivo embryo loss and the in vitro embryo loss of stem cell research by appealing to the doctrine of double effect. I argue that this challenge fails to show that in vivo embryo loss is a mere (...) unintended side effect while in vitro embryo loss is an intended means and that, even if we refine the challenge by appealing to Michael Bratman's three roles of intention, the distinction is still unwarranted. (shrink)

Is it permissible to use a human embryo in stem cell research, or in general as a means for benefit of others? Acknowledging each embryo as an object of moral concern, Louis M.Guenin argues that it is morally permissible to decline intrauterine transfer of an embryo formed outside the body, and that from this permission and the duty of beneficence, there follows a consensus justification for using donated embryos in service of humanitarian ends. He then proceeds to (...) show how this justification commands assent even within moral and religious views commonly thought to oppose embryo use. Beneath his moral reasoning lies a carefully constructed metaphysical foundation incorporating accounts of the ontology of development, embryos, and species. He also incisively discusses nonreprocloning, reprocloning, ectogenesis, and related scientific frontiers. This compelling philosophical study will interest all concerned to understand virtue and obligation in the relief of suffering. (shrink)

This paper is based on linked qualitative studies of the donation of human embryos to stem cell research carried out in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and China. All three studies used semi-structured interview protocols to allow an in-depth examination of donors’ and non-donors’ rationales for their donation decisions, with the aim of gaining information on contextual and other factors that play a role in donor decisions and identifying how these relate to factors that are more usually included in evaluations made (...) by theoretical ethics. Our findings have implications for one factor that has previously been suggested as being of ethical concern: the role of gratitude. Our empirical work shows no evidence that interpersonal gratitude is an important factor, but it does support the existence of a solidarity-based desire to “give something back” to medical research. Thus, we use empirical data to expand and refine the conceptual basis of bioethically theorizing the IVF–stem cell interface. (shrink)

Iran is the only Muslim country that has legislation on embryo donation, adopted in 2003. With an estimated 10–15% of couples in the country that are infertile, there are not any legal or religious barriers that prohibit an infertile couple from taking advantage of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs). Although all forms of ARTs available in Iran have been legitimized by religious authorities, there is a lack of legislation in all ARTs except embryo donation. By highlighting ethical issues in (...) embryo donation, the paper presents a critical review of the Act of Embryo Donation in Iran. The paper argues that the Act does not provide enough safeguards for the future child and assurance for the safety of the donated embryos. It also does not restrict embryo donation to surplus embryos from infertile couples and is silent about the number of embryos that could be donated by each couple as well as the number of recipients for donated embryos by a couple. The Act is also silent about the issues of genetic linkage (nasab) and heritage which are challenging issues, especially in a conservative Islamic society. As a result, the future child may not inherit from their birth parents, as it is not required by the Act, or from the genetically related parents under the anonymity policy. Finally there is no standard national protocol or guidelines to evaluate the safety of the donated embryos. The paper concludes that despite its benefits, the Act lacks clarity, and it is subject to misunderstanding and confusion. (shrink)

The use of genome embryo editing tools in reproduction is often touted as a way to ensure the birth of healthy and genetically related children. Many would agree that this is a worthy goal. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, if we are concerned with justice, accepting such goal as morally appropriate commits one to rejecting the development of embryo editing for reproductive purposes. This is so because safer and more effective means exist that can (...) allow many more prospective parents to achieve the same valued goal and that offer additional benefits. (shrink)

Research on embryo donation and receipt continues to grow, highlighting how specific national contexts shape views and experiences. The present article reports on a qualitative study on embryo donation and receipt in Australia. Interviews were conducted with 15 participants: embryo donors and those seeking to donate (6), embryo recipients and those seeking donors (3), people with embryos in storage or previously in storage (5), and egg donors where resulting embryos were donated to a third party (1). (...) A deductive thematic analysis identified four key themes: understandings of embryos as cells, potential children, and/or children; a focus on relationships between “siblings”; importance of language and “family words” in discussing relationships; and extended family members having difficulty understanding the concept of embryo donation. The article concludes with a consideration of the implications of the findings in terms of the practice of embryo donation and the policies that surround it. (shrink)

In bioethics as in the sciences, enormous discussions often concern the very small. Central to public debate over emerging reproductive and regenerative biotechnologies is the question of the moral status of the human embryo. Because news media have played a prominent role in framing the vocabulary of the debate, this study surveyed the use of language reporting on human embryo research in news articles spanning a two-year period. Terminology that devalued moral status - for example, the descriptors things, (...) property, tissue, or experimental material - was found to outnumber fivefold those that affirmed any degree of moral status above that of inanimate cellular matter ; for example, living, human life, or human being. A quarter of the articles failed to note that the embryos under discussion were human. These findings confirm that even among scientific and philosophical experts a diversity of opinion exists on society's moral obligations to nascent human life. The skewed linguistic distribution also indicates a distinct bias. Concerned readers should take notice when any category of humanity becomes subject to prejudicial and disparaging language and the value of vulnerable human life is trivialized alongside sensational assertions of anticipated medical cures. The responsibility for holding the media to a higher standard of truth and fairness falls to us all. (shrink)

In the debate regarding the moral status of human embryos, the Embryo Rescue Case has been used to suggest that embryos are not rightholders. This case is premised on the idea that in a situation where one has a choice between saving some number of embryos or a child, it seems wrong to save the embryos and not the child. If so, it seems that embryos cannot be rightholders. In this paper, I argue that the Embryo Rescue Case (...) does not independently show that embryos are not rightholders. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego- (...) class='Hi'>splitting. My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

We investigate the pair-splitting number $\germ{s}_{pair}$ which is a variation of splitting number, pair-reaping number $\germ{r}_{pair}$ which is a variation of reaping number and cardinal invariants of ideals on ω. We also study cardinal invariants of F σ ideals and their upper bounds and lower bounds. As an application, we answer a question of S. Solecki by showing that the ideal of finitely chromatic graphs is not locally Katětov-minimal among ideals not satisfying Fatou's lemma.

There is a significant debate over the moral status of human embryos. This debate has important implications for practices like abortion and IVF. Some argue that embryos have the same moral status as infants, children, and adults. However, critics claim that the frequency of pregnancy loss/miscarriage/spontaneous abortion shows a moral inconsistency in this view. One line of criticism is that those who know the facts about pregnancy loss and nevertheless attempt to conceive children are willing to sacrifice embryos lost for (...) the healthy children they ultimately have. I respond to this criticism and argue that on the most plausible accounts of well-being, these embryos are not made worse off and thus not “sacrifices.” I then make some more general remarks about what people’s typical views about pregnancy loss show about their views toward the moral status of embryos. (shrink)

Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or (...) even unreflective causal interactions. But a soul theorist can allow neurological events to keep some conscious thoughts unavailable to others. (shrink)

We investigate some aspects of bounding, splitting, and almost disjointness. In particular, we investigate the relationship between the bounding number, the closed almost disjointness number, the splitting number, and the existence of certain kinds of splitting families.