Split brains: no headache for the soul theorist

Religious Studies 50 (4):487-503 (2014)
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Abstract

Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or even unreflective causal interactions. But a soul theorist can allow neurological events to keep some conscious thoughts unavailable to others

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Author Profiles

David B. Hershenov
State University of New York, Buffalo
A. P. Taylor
North Dakota State University

Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Brutal Personal Identity.Peihong Xie - 2023 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 9 (2):75-94.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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