Im antiken Athen und Rom war moralkonformes Verhalten eine Ressource von Ansehen. Aber welche konkrete Relevanz hatte Moral in diesem Sinne als soziales Kapital? Welchen Stellenwert hatte sie in den sozialen Zusammenhängen des gegenseitigen Kennens und Anerkennens? Und in welchen Foren, durch welche Medien und in welchen Textgattungen wurden Verhaltensnormen definiert oder ausgehandelt und kommuniziert? 0Die Autorinnen und Autoren zeigen in ihren Beiträgen die nachweisbaren sozialen Konsequenzen eines guten oder schlechten Rufes auf und stellen verschiedene Moraldiskurse vor: von Majestätsprozessen und (...) aristokratischer Moral in der frühen Kaiserzeit über Freizeitbeschäftigungen als Spiegel moralischen Wandels im spätklassischen Athen bis hin zu Klatsch, Gerüchten und fama als moralischem Kapital im spätrepublikanischen und frühkaiserzeitlichen Rom. (shrink)

À des « antiquisants » séduits par les publications de K. J. Dover, de P. Veyne et de E. Cantarella, à un lectorat pétri des travaux de M. Foucault, l’ouvrage de J. D. Davidson propose une autre « histoire des plaisirs » dans la démocratique Athènes, une approche plus complexe et plus souple parce qu’elle entend se dégager de l’opposition prégnante entre sexualité active et sexualité passive. Sa lecture est d’autant plus passionnante que l’ouvrage plus récent de F. Dupont et (...) T. Eloy - L’Érotisme masculin dans la Rome antique - invite, lui aussi, à réfléchir sur ce que l’auteur appelle « la théorie du phallus ». (shrink)

Suppose that we acquire various items of information from various sources and that our degree of confidence in the content of the information set is sufficiently high to believe the information. Now a new item of information is being presented by a new information source. Are we justified to add this new item of information to what we already believe? Consider the following parable: “I go to a lecture about wildlife in Greenland which was supposed to be delivered by an (...) expert in the field. When I arrive I notice that the expert has excused himself and that the biology department has sent a newcomer to fill in for him. I have no beliefs about wildlife in Greenland, but I do have some beliefs about Greenland’s climate and about the kinds of climate conditions that various types of wildlife favor. Suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of elk roam in a particular valley on the southern tip of Greenland. Then I would certainly be willing to accept this item of information. But suppose that he proclaims that large colonies of armadillos roam in the same valley. Then I would not be willing to accept this item of information. Why do I accept the former but not the latter item of information? Let us suppose that neither item of information is logically inconsistent with what I already believe. Clearly, the former item of information is not inconsistent. But also the latter item is not: after all, there may be small pockets of Greenland with special climatological conditions and some Texan sailors may have set loose a pair of armadillos as a practical joke. But whereas the former item of information is quite plausible given my previous beliefs, the latter item of information is not. And this is what makes for the difference. Now suppose that our newcomer proclaims that large colonies of wild boars roam this valley in Greenland. I am not that sure anymore. Given everything I believe, I find wild boars in Greenland more plausible than armadillos in Greenland, but certainly less plausible than elk in Greenland. Had our expert presented the lecture and provided precisely the 2 same information, then I would have been willing to adopt the belief that there are wild boars in Greenland, but, with our newcomer delivering the lecture, I am not willing to do so. It is not that I would believe anything out of the expert’s mouth: also he could not have convinced me that there are armadillos in Greenland. But when it comes to wild boars, the difference between the expert’s and the newcomer’s credentials simply makes for the difference.” What we learn from this story is that the question of belief expansion has something to do with the reliability of the information source as well as with the plausibility of the new information, given what I already believe. The more reliable the information source is, the less plausible the new information needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to our belief set. The more plausible the new information is given what I already believe, the less reliable the information source needs to be given what I already believe, for me to be justified to add the belief to my belief set. The challenge is: can a precise account of this relationship be provided? (shrink)

Nietzsche calls himself a “psychologist [Psychologe]” in a few passages of his published works. Furthermore—and mainly due to his intense interest in the scientific debates of his time, which involved figures such as Hartmann, Schopenhauer, Gerber, Helmholtz, and Zöllner—Nietzsche’s early philosophical thought can be regarded as clearly “permeated” by his concern with the unconscious. The combination of psychology and this concern with the unconscious..

Modern science is, to a large extent, a model-building activity. But how are models contructed? How are they related to theories and data? How do they explain complex scientific phenomena, and which role do computer simulations play here? These questions have kept philosophers of science busy for many years, and much work has been done to identify modeling as the central activity of theoretical science. At the same time, these questions have been addressed by methodologically-minded scientists, albeit from a different (...) point of view. While philosophers typically have an eye on general aspects of scientific modeling, scientists typically take their own science as the starting point and are often more concerned with specific methodological problems. There is, however, also much common ground in middle, where philosophers and scientists can engage in a productive dialogue, as the present volume demonstrates. (shrink)

Modern science is, to a large extent, a model-building activity. But how are models contructed? How are they related to theories and data? How do they explain complex scientific phenomena, and which role do computer simulations play here? These questions have kept philosophers of science busy for many years, and much work has been done to identify modeling as the central activity of theoretical science. At the same time, these questions have been addressed by methodologically-minded scientists, albeit from a different (...) point of view. While philosophers typically have an eye on general aspects of scientific modeling, scientists typically take their own science as the starting point and are often more concerned with specific methodological problems. There is, however, also much common ground in middle, where philosophers and scientists can engage in a productive dialogue, as the present volume demonstrates. To do so, the editors of this volume have invited eight leading scientists from cosmology, climate science, social science, chemical engeneering and neuroscience to reflect upon their modeling work, and eight philosophers of science to provide a commentary. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Abhandlungen zur systematischen Philosophie.--Bd. 2. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte.--Bd. 3. Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie.

Excerpt from Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie Sichtbarfeit fehr balb an einer beftimmten 03ren3e, ohne baß wir fagen tonnten, baß wir bie legten Strulturelemente burch fie erbracht hätten. Das Sormproblem erftrecft fich offenbar weiter, als wir es 3urucfverfolgen tönnen. Die Kleinheit ber (elemente fchiebt unferer Beobachtung ben Riegel vor. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology (...) to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the \textit{discursive dilemma}. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good (...) the various approaches are at selecting the right conclusion. We focus on two approaches: distance-based procedures and a Bayesian analysis. They correspond to group-internal and group-external decision-making, respectively. We compare those methods in a probabilistic model, demonstrate the robustness of our results over various generalizations and discuss their applicability in different situations. The findings vindicate (i) that in judgment aggregation problems, reasons should carry higher weight than conclusions and (ii) that considering members of an advisory board to be highly competent is a better strategy than to underestimate their advice.". (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Sartres Sozialphilosophie" verfügbar.

Dieses Buch hat sich die Aufgabe gestellt, den Beitrag der allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie der Naturwissenschaften zur Forschungsmethodik des naturwissenschaftlich arbeitenden Zweiges der Psychologie zu erbringen. Im Anschluss an die Ausarbeitung der Programmatik einer Protopsychologie – der Wissenschaftstheorie der Psychologie – werden traditionelle wissenschaftstheoretische Probleme erörtert, welche für die naturwissenschaftliche Psychologie – aber auch für andere Naturwissenschaften – von Relevanz sind. Die Themenpalette reicht hierbei von der Frage nach den wesentlichen Merkmalen von Naturgesetzen bis hin zur Planung, Durchführung und Evaluation von Experimenten. (...) Spezifische Probleme der Psychologie – etwa die Frage nach der methodischen Rolle der Instruktion im psychologischen Experiment – werden dabei jeweils besonders berücksichtigt. (shrink)

THIS PAPER is not a piece of "research"; it simply offers a series of reflections on the transcendental method. It is occasioned by the realization that, while this method is interesting and important in the opinion of some, it can count on little familiarity in the United States. And where philosophers and students of philosophy make the effort, they have great difficulty appreciating transcendental philosophy or understanding its proposals. This difficulty is, as I say, largely circumstantial and due to a (...) lack of familiarity with the relevant works, but, viewed less superficially, it is motivated by a positive affiliation to another philosophical tradition. In fact, the positions of this other tradition are, if largely in a modern guise, the very ones against which transcendental philosophy reacted. This historical relationship has also systematic relevance. In many ways, pre-transcendental positions seem to have priority: we need only think of formal logic, certain basic stances in empiricist epistemology, common sense. Accordingly, the subjective difficulty of philosophers and students of such persuasions can be treated "objectively," as the difficulty of ever establishing arguments for the transcendental turn or for what Kant calls the "Copernican revolution." Transcendental philosophy must provide arguments, so it seems, on the pre-transcendental level to establish the transcendental position. Further, supposing this problem can be overcome, there is the genuine difficulty of understanding what the transcendental theory actually says and in what way it does its job. And lastly, supposing we find that it lives up to its program, there may still be difficulty with certain implications such that philosophers and students take refuge in non-transcendental positions rather than calling for improvements of transcendental philosophy. In this paper we cannot, of course, fully discuss to what extent the transcendental position can take care of its critics. The paper is mainly concerned with the difficulty of access or introductory argument to transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Der Begriff ‘Modell’ leitet sich vom Lateinischen ‘modulus’ (das Maß) ab, im Italienischen existiert seit dem 16. Jh. ‘modello’ und R. Descartes verwendet im 17. Jh. ‘modèlle’. Während der Begriff in Architektur und Kunst schon seit der Renaissance gängig ist, wird er in den Naturwissenschaften erst im 19. Jh. verwendet.1 Dort greifen wissenschaftliche Modelle die für eine gegebene Problemstellung als wesentlich erachteten Charakteristika (Eigenschaften, Beziehungen, etc.) eines Untersuchungsgegenstandes heraus und machen diesen so einem Verständnis bzw. einer weiterführenden Untersuchung zugänglich. Es (...) ist üblich, zwischen Skalenmodellen, Analogmodellen und theoretischen Modellen zu unterscheiden. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Einführung elementarer Aufforderungen über die pragmatische Begründung von Logikkalkülen bis hin zu einer vollständig durchgeführten Logik von Frage und Antwort stellt dieses Buch einen umfassenden Entwurf einer möglichen Grammatik wissenschaftlicher Orthosprachen vor. Besonderes Gewicht erhält in diesem Zusammenhang die Logik von Frage und Antwort. Dem für alle Wissenschaften existentiell relevanten Bereich der exakten Formulierung und Lösung von Problemstellungen wird durch die Bereitstellung von fragelogischen Kalkülen sowie einer logischen Problemlösungsheuristik Rechnung getragen.

FEEL FREE TO CITE - IGNORE IN-PDF REQUEST The eight year gap between the publication of Volume I (1976) of The History of Sexuality and Volumes II and III (1984) has provoked a fair amount of debate within scholarly circles. Does it represent a fundamental rethinking of the analysis of power and knowledge begun in Volume I, or is something else at stake? And what does the shift in emphasis regarding power and resistance after these eight years ultimately entail? James (...) Miller’s influential, if often flawed, biography of Foucault has provided one of the leading interpretations of this gap in Foucault’s publishing career. On Miller’s account, the turn towards governmentality and technologies of the self represents something of a tacit admission of failure on Foucault’s part regarding his Volume I rendering of power and resistance.1 Now, it seems to me that there is something right about this reading – we can map a shift in Foucault’s consideration of power and resistance in this period, culminating in the 1982 essay, “The Subject and Power,” which it seems to me can be read as a perverse re-writing of the themes of Volume I. However, the idea that this eight year period represents a ‘hard break,’ or an introduction of an incommensurability between resistance as tactical reversal (Volume I) and resistance as.. (shrink)

This volume, the second in the Springer series Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, contains selected papers from the workshops organised by the ESF ...

This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the other (...) hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv). The book is beautifully edited and produced; it contains a wealth of illustrative figures, well-chosen short quotations from original sources and contemporary commentators (some longer quotations are relegated in an appendix at the end of a chapter) and does not dispense with insightful mathematical arguments in the main text (some advanced deductions are, however, relegated in the appendices). It contains nine parts, whereas only the first and the last one are exclusively devoted to philosophical issues. The seven remaining parts, each subdivided into three chapters, centre around one major episode (a theory, a world view, etc.) in the history of physics. The author presents this material in a clear and philosophically unbiased way so that also readers who do not share Cushing’s subsequent philosophical conclusions will find this inspiring book extremely useful. Part 1 (”The scientific enterprise”) discusses some traditional (”objectivist”) views concerning the status of scientific knowledge, ”the” scientific method, and the relation.... (shrink)

A longstanding question is the extent to which "reasonable doubt" may be expressed simply in terms of a threshold degree of belief. In this context, we examine the extent to which learning about possible alternatives may alter one's beliefs about a target hypothesis, even when no new "evidence" linking them to the hypothesis is acquired. Imagine the following scenario: a crime has been committed and Alice, the police's main suspect has been brought to trial. There are several pieces of evidence (...) that raise the probability that Alice committed the crime. Her attorney's defense strategy is not to challenge this evidence, but instead to provide personal details about Alice's neighbour, Jane. While Jane is one of many people the police spoke to, they saw no reason to investigate her further. You now learn that Jane, too, had access to the shed where the murder weapon was stored, just like Alice. To what extent should this alter your beliefs about Alice's guilt? In this paper, we provide a formal description of the problem and a solution indicating circumstances under which learning about Jane will more or less impact beliefs about Alice. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz umreißt die Grundzüge eines neuen philosophischen Programms, das sich selbst in Fortentwicklung und Abgrenzung vom Methodischen Konstruktivismus als „Methodischer Kulturalismus“ begreift. Ausgehend von einer Kritik von Naturalismus und Kulturrelativismus erfolgt eine Darlegung der epistemologischen und handlungstheoretischen Grundlinien einer methodischen Begründung von Wissenschaft und Ethik auf der Basis der kultürlichen Lebenswelt.

In everyday life, as well as in science, we have to deal with and act on the basis of partial (i.e. incomplete, uncertain, or even inconsistent) information. This observation is the source of a broad research activity from which a number of competing approaches have arisen. There is some disagreement concerning the way in which partial or full ignorance is and should be handled. The most successful approaches include both quantitative aspects (by means of probability theory) and qualitative aspect (by (...) means of graphical or causal models or logic). Some of these approaches have important impacts on various disciplines including philosophy, computer science, statistics, mathematics, physics, and social science. Most notably, the relation between causal and probabilistic information is a topic of interest in all of these fields. (shrink)

Over the years, mathematics and statistics have become increasingly important in the social sciences1 . A look at history quickly confirms this claim. At the beginning of the 20th century most theories in the social sciences were formulated in qualitative terms while quantitative methods did not play a substantial role in their formulation and establishment. Moreover, many practitioners considered mathematical methods to be inappropriate and simply unsuited to foster our understanding of the social domain. Notably, the famous Methodenstreit also concerned (...) the role of mathematics in the social sciences. Here, mathematics was considered to be the method of the natural sciences from which the social sciences had to be separated during the period of maturation of these disciplines. All this changed by the end of the century. By then, mathematical, and especially statistical, methods were standardly used, and their value in the social sciences became relatively uncontested. The use of mathematical and statistical methods is now ubiquitous: Almost all social sciences rely on statistical methods to analyze data and form hypotheses, and almost all of them use (to a greater or lesser extent) a range of mathematical methods to help us understand the social world. Additional indication for the increasing importance of mathematical and statistical methods in the social sciences is the formation of new subdisciplines, and the establishment of specialized journals and societies. Indeed, subdisciplines such as Mathematical Psychology and Mathematical Sociology emerged, and corresponding journals such as The Journal of Mathematical Psychology (since 1964), The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (since 1976), Mathematical Social Sciences (since 1980) as well as the online journals Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (since 1998) and Mathematical Anthropology and Cultural Theory (since 2000) were established. What is more, societies such as the Society for Mathematical Psychology (since 1976) and the Mathematical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association (since 1996) were founded. Similar developments can be observed in other countries. The mathematization of economics set in somewhat earlier (Vazquez 1995; Weintraub 2002). However, the use of mathematical methods in economics started booming only in the second half of the last century (Debreu 1991). Contemporary economics is dominated by the mathematical approach, although a certain style of doing economics became more and more under attack in the last decade or so. Recent developments in behavioral economics and experimental economics can also be understood as a reaction against the dominance (and limitations) of an overly mathematical approach to economics. There are similar debates in other social sciences. It is, however, important to stress that problems of one method (such as axiomatization or the use of set theory) can hardly be taken as a sign of bankruptcy of mathematical methods in the social sciences tout court. This chapter surveys mathematical and statistical methods used in the social sciences and discusses some of the philosophical questions they raise. It is divided into two parts. Sections 1 and 2 are devoted to mathematical methods, and Sections 3 to 7 to statistical methods. As several other chapters in this handbook provide detailed accounts of various mathematical methods, our remarks about the latter will be rather short and general. Statistical methods, on the other hand, will be discussed in-depth. (shrink)

Erklärungstheoretisch bestimmter Kohärenzbegriff.

Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy of science. However, since their classical discussion by Ernest Nagel, such relations have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the natural sciences. In this paper, we present a model of a new type of intertheoretic relation, called 'Montague Reduction', which is assumed in Montague's framework for the analysis and interpretation of natural language syntax. To motivate the adoption of our new model, we show that this model extends (...) the scope of application of the Nagelian (or related) models, and that it shares the epistemological advantages of the Nagelian model. The latter is achieved in a Bayesian framework. (shrink)

The chromodielectric soliton model is Lorentz and chirally invariant. It has been demonstrated to exhibit dynamical chiral symmetry breaking and spatial confinement in the locally uniform approximation. We here study the full nonlocal quark self-energy in a color-dielectric medium modeled by a two-parameter Fermi function. Here color confinement is manifest. The self-energy thus obtained is used to calculate quark wave functions in the medium which, in turn, are used to calculate the nucleon and pion masses in the one-gluon-exchange approximation. The (...) nucleon mass is fixed to its empirical value using scaling arguments; the pion mass (for massless current quarks) turns out to be small but nonzero, depending on the model parameters. (shrink)

The purpose of teaching logic in philosophy is to enable us to evaluate arguments with respect to (formal) validity. Standard logics refer to a concept of validity which allows for the relation of implication to hold between premises and conclusion even in cases where there is no “relevant” connection between the premises and the conclusion. A prominent example for this is the rule “Ex-Falso-Quodlibet” (EFQ), which allows us to infer an arbitrary proposition from a contradiction. The tolerance of irrelevance endorsed (...) by standard logics unfortunately engenders that they cannot adequately fulfill their intended task of analyzing and evaluating philosophical, scientific and everyday-life arguments – instead, their application even gives rise to a multitude of artificial philosophical pseudoproblems (like the problem of the disposition predicates or the problem of counterfactuals). As alternatives to standard logics, there exist non-standard systems called “relevance logics” or “relevant logics” meant to avoid irrelevance. The problem with these systems, however, is that the mainstream relational semantics (“worlds semantics”) available for them is to be considered unintuitive and complex to a degree which is apt to render relevant logics unattractive to the majority of philosophers who are on the lookout not only for adequate, but also simple and efficient technical means for evaluating arguments. Therefore, the main aim of this treatise is to provide an alternative semantics (“rules semantics”) which is comparatively easy to grasp and simple in application. A second aim of the book is to extend the semantics as least as far as it takes to cover more or less all the logical notions philosophers need in their “everyday analyzing”. This includes first order predicate logic, higher order logic (for analyzing talk about “properties” etc.), identity, definite descriptions, abstraction principles and modal logic. This book can be read without having any more background than a good introductory course in classical logic provides. (shrink)

In „Philosophische Grundlagen der Psychologie“ wird eine Wissenschaftstheorie der Psychologie entwickelt. Dabei wird die Psychologie nicht, wie in der Philosophie sonst üblich, in erster Linie im Rahmen des Leib-Seele Problems thematisiert, sondern von den Debatten und Theorien innerhalb der Disziplin her. Der Methodische Kulturalismus bildet den Ausgangspunkt für die philosophische Rekonstruktion psychologischer Grundbegriffe wie "Lernen", "Wahrnehmung", "Aufmerksamkeit", "Vorstellung", "Denken", "Gedächtnis", "Emotion" und "Motivation". Im Anschluss an die Klärung dieser Grundbegriffe wird gezeigt, dass die philosophische Behandlung des Leib-Seele Problems in der (...) Analytischen Philosophie auf einem "zweiten" und "dritten naturalistischen Fehlschluss" beruht. Der zweite Fehlschluss besteht dabei in der Hypostasierung theoretischer Konstrukte und der dritte in der Auffassung, dass den hypostatisierten Konstrukten ein ontologisches und methodisches Primat zukomme. (shrink)

"Nicolai Hartman ist zu Unrecht vergessen. Wir benötigen eine breite systematische Neubeschäftigung mit seinem großen Entwurf eines realistischen Weltsystems. Im Zeichen der lebenswissenschaftlichen Wende kann man mit seiner überlegenen Darstellung der Teleologie einen Anfang machen." Prof. Dr. Volker Gerhardt, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.

This volume, the third in this Springer series, contains selected papers from the four workshops organized by the ESF Research Networking Programme "The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective" in 2010: Pluralism in the Foundations of Statistics Points of Contact between the Philosophy of Physics and the Philosophy of Biology The Debate on Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences Historical Debates about Logic, Probability and Statistics The volume is accordingly divided in four sections, each of them containing papers coming (...) from the workshop focussing on one of these themes. While the programme's core topic for the year 2010 was probability and statistics, the organizers of the workshops embraced the opportunity of building bridges to more or less closely connected issues in general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and philosophy of the special sciences. However, papers that analyze the concept of probability for various philosophical purposes are clearly a major theme in this volume, as it was in the previous volumes of the same series. This reflects the impressive productivity of probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of science, which form an important part of what has become known as formal epistemology - although, of course, there are non-probabilistic approaches in formal epistemology as well. It is probably fair to say that Europe has been particularly strong in this area of philosophy in recent years.​. (shrink)

Die primäre Aufgabe des Artikels ist es, die Eckpfeiler einer methodisch-kulturalistischen Handlungstheorie einzuschlagen. Zunächst soll die kategoriale Unterscheidung von Handeln und Verhalten und die Notwendigkeit einer philosophischen Handlungstheorie motiviert werden. Darüber hinaus liefert der Aufsatz die terminologischen Grundlagen einer entsprechenden Handlungstheorie und es wird aufgezeigt, wie diese in eine Theorie des Sprechhandelns und eine Theorie der Handlungsdeutung erweitert werden kann.

In dem Aufsatz wird eine kulturalistische Relevanzlogik im Rahmen des Methodischen Kulturalismus zu entwickeln versucht. Hierfür werden sowohl die Probleme, die in den Logikbegründungsversuchen des Methodischen Konstruktivismus auftraten, besprochen, als auch Probleme der Klassischen und der Intuitionistischen Logik sowie der Minimal- und Relevanzlogik als solcher. Neben der Kulturalistischen Relevanzlogik im engeren Sinne werden durch zusätzliche Anforderungen an die Prämissenmengen weitere Logiken begründet – beschränkt man sich auf konsistente Prämissenmengen, erhält man die kulturalistische Variante der Intuitionistischen Relevanzlogik, beschränkt man sich auf (...) entscheidbare Diskursbereiche, erhält man eine Klassische Relevanzlogik und bei Beschränkung auf konsistente und entscheidbare Diskursbereiche eine Starke Klassische Relevanzlogik. Die in dem Beitrag versuchte Logikbegründung ist vom Autor inzwischen widerrufen und durch den in "On Inferring" dargestellten Ansatz ersetzt worden. (shrink)