FEEL FREE TO CITE - IGNORE IN-PDF REQUEST The eight year gap between the publication of Volume I (1976) of The History of Sexuality and Volumes II and III (1984) has provoked a fair amount of debate within scholarly circles. Does it represent a fundamental rethinking of the analysis of power and knowledge begun in Volume I, or is something else at stake? And what does the shift in emphasis regarding power and resistance after these eight years ultimately entail? James (...) Miller’s influential, if often flawed, biography of Foucault has provided one of the leading interpretations of this gap in Foucault’s publishing career. On Miller’s account, the turn towards governmentality and technologies of the self represents something of a tacit admission of failure on Foucault’s part regarding his Volume I rendering of power and resistance.1 Now, it seems to me that there is something right about this reading – we can map a shift in Foucault’s consideration of power and resistance in this period, culminating in the 1982 essay, “The Subject and Power,” which it seems to me can be read as a perverse re-writing of the themes of Volume I. However, the idea that this eight year period represents a ‘hard break,’ or an introduction of an incommensurability between resistance as tactical reversal (Volume I) and resistance as.. (shrink)

My job has been made easier tonight, given that Larry Hickman has already done most of the ‘heavy lifting’ for me. I think his paper is an excellent and convincing intervention into this debate, and one of the problems for me in constructing my talk has been that our discussions have forced me to rethink what I wanted to say. Given my Continental biases, I had expected to come out on Rorty’s side; in writing this paper, however, things have become (...) more complicated. So let me here thank Larry for both at once making my job tonight easier, and much to my chagrin, surprisingly difficult. What I want to suggest, in contrast to what you’ve just heard, is that the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty is not wholly inconsistent with Dewey’s pragmatism – or, at least, with a ‘thin’ version of Deweyian pragmatism. As we shall see, while the differences between Dewey and Rorty on the status of metaphysics are in all probability irreconcilable, Rorty’s reclamation of a ‘thin’ Dewey can be read as consistent with at least the spirit of Dewey’s work. I will try to make the stronger case that this reconciliation is possible according to the letter of Dewey’s philosophy as well, and the interrelated issues of method and social hope will serve as the avenues for this investigation. Given my audience, I imagine that what I’m about to say will be fodder for some interesting conversation, and so, in the spirit of Rorty’s thought, let me get on with my paper. (shrink)

FEEL FREE TO CITE - IGNORE IN-PDF REQUEST -/- Husserl defines affection in the Analyses1 as "the allure given to consciousness, the particular pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego."2 That something becomes prominent for the ego implies that the object exerts a kind of 'pull' upon the ego, a demanding of egoic attention. This affective pull is relative in force, such that the same object can be experienced in varying modes of prominence and affective relief (...) depending upon bodily comportment, egoic attentiveness, etc. The phenomenon of affection allows Husserl to describe the genesis of association in terms of the lawful, regular exertions of affection upon the ego, prompting (for example) the reproduction of remembered pasts in retention on a purely passive level. Affection thus provides Husserl a non-Humean mechanism for the lawful phenomenon of association. In this light, we can see that affection plays a crucial role in the passive phenomenon of association and thereby in the constitution of sense. The precise role played by affection, however, remains quite problematic in the Analyses. Husserl is rather unclear on this point, and two of the leading commentators on the Analyses, Anthony Steinbock and Bruce Bégout, offer opposing viewpoints. Is affection the precondition for the constitution of any sense unity, as Steinbock suggests, or is it the.. (shrink)

In his 1939 essay, “Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us,” John Dewey described democracy as “a way of personal life controlled not merely by faith in human nature in general but by faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished.”1 While this may seem an odd definition, it is emblematic of the reconstructive tendency in Dewey’s philosophy. If we are to achieve a truly democratic society, we must reconstruct democracy itself (...) – our personal lives must become more democratic if we are to have hopes for our political institutions. And central to this reconstruction, as Dewey points out in this essay, is a recognition of the roles of communication and education in the interest of democratzing ends. It seems hardly worth mentioning the role played by information technology in our contemporary modes of communication and education, given the centrality of the personal computer and the Internet in our everyday lives. For most of us in this room, and especially for those under the age of 25, it is difficult to remember a time before the home computer, before e-mail and instant messaging. But it is vitally important to bear in mind that the technological advantages of Western life are not universal – large.. (shrink)

Exploring the concepts of Freezing: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Theoretical advancement. Ur Shlonsky and Luigi Rizzi: Criterial Freezing in small clauses and the cartography of copular constructions -- Angel J. Gallego: Freezing Effects in a free-Merge System -- Gereon Maller: Freezing in complex prefields. Empirical domains. Norbert Corver: The Freezing points of the (Dutch) adjectival system -- Jutta M. Hartmann: Freezing in it-clefts: Movement and focus -- Josef Bayer: Criterial Freezing in the syntax of particles -- Michael S. Rochemont: Only (...) syntax -- Maria Polinsky: Freezing and phi-feature agreement: On the role of [PERSON] -- BalÃízs SurÃínyi and Gerg Turi: Freezing, Topic Opacity and Phase-based Cyclicity in Subject Islands. Interface extensions. Peter W. Culicover and Susanne Winkler: Freezing: Between grammar and processing -- Andreas Konietzko: Heavy NP shift in context: On the interaction of information structure and subextraction from shifted constituents -- Rui P. Chaves: Freezing as a probabilistic phenomenon -- Marion Jaeger: An experimental study on freezing and topicalization in English. (shrink)

In this paper we bring together the results of our research into agreement in copular clauses in 4 four different Germanic languages—Dutch, German, Faroese, Icelandic—in order to provide an 5 overview of the results. These cases present a particularly interesting window into how verbal 6 agreement operates, since there are two potential controllers of agreement, which may disagree 7 in person and/or number (The source of the rumour BE the neighbours / you-SG / you-PL). We 8 will show that there (...) is variation at all levels in which nominal controls agreement: cross-linguistic, 9 inter-speaker within a single language, and intra-speaker. We argue that our data support the 10 following claims: (1) “Downward” agreement for person, as well as number, with a nominal that is 11 not in the canonical subject position is possible and in some cases preferred; (2) The agreement 12 patterns observed in Icelandic and Faroese support the hypothesis that in these languages there 13 are distinct Number and Person heads; (3) “Downward” agreement from a high position in the 14 left-periphery is a grammatically distinct phenomenon from agreement when the verb remains 15 in a lower position in the clause; (4) In some languages and some configurations, speakers 16 show a significant degree of indeterminacy in their judgments and production suggesting that 17 speakers use more than one grammar. We relate our findings to current discussions in the 18 generative literature on subject agreement and in particular differences between number and 19 person agreement, and possible connections to restrictions on object clitics, and we also discuss 20 questions that remain open, and invite new, cross-disciplinary research. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Starbucks Aesthetic Starbucks and Ethical Sourcing From Starbucks to Stumptown Fair Trade Revisited The Hermeneutics of Taste Ethics and Aesthetics in Action: The Roast Conclusion.